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INTRODUCTION
This book aims to introduce readers to some significant areas of ‘modernisation
inspired’ legal changes or challenges that are currently being faced by Pacific island
countries. These challenges are largely arising because of tensions between the legal,
political and social systems introduced by various colonial powers and the legal,
political and social systems of indigenous cultures. It may seem that indigenous
cultures are becoming obsolete, a piece of tradition that, increasingly, belongs in the
past. From such a viewpoint introduced systems must ultimately prevail in order that
Pacific island nations are able to ‘progress’ and to participate in the global economy.
Such a picture, though, rests on a static concept of culture which fails to realise that
cultures adapt to change and that the meeting of different cultures is a catalyst for
change in all of them.  Throughout the Pacific these different systems are currently
struggling to find ways to co-exist, to adjust to and accommodate each other. The
aim of this struggle is to realise systems that are both reflective of culture and allow
for participation in the modern global environment.
Law, as the multifaceted institution that ‘sets the rules’ for society, must be examined
if a resolution to this struggle is to be achieved. This is no easy task. There are
numerous ‘big questions’ to be answered. What is the role of law in Pacific societies,
and what should it be? What needs to be done in order to make people within the
Pacific respect the law? How can we make law become more relevant to people in
Pacific societies? What do we mean by ‘law’ in a Pacific context? It is questions such
as these that need to be addressed in order to develop a Pacific jurisprudence or
philosophy of law.  
There are also problems to be solved. Policy makers and legislatures are being called
upon to address a number of significant issues in a wide range of areas of substantive
(or practical) law. How can we manage our natural resources in a sustainable manner?
How can we cease the seemingly endemic corruption amongst politicians? How can
we translate human rights obligations into domestic law? The number of practical
areas in which the law (either in its content or in its administration) may be deficient
are simply too numerous to begin to list in any comprehensive manner. 
Whilst the development of a body of Pacific jurisprudence or theory about law is
undoubtedly helpful for solving practical law problems, practical law reform exercises
also contribute to the development of theory. Whilst there may be methodological
debate about whether it is preferable to work from concrete problems ‘upwards’ to
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create a generalisation or theory, or to work from theory ‘downwards’ to create
solutions to particular problems, such a debate is not very helpful in practice. The
reality of contemporary Pacific societies is that a number of very difficult practical
legal problems are being faced, and that these problems do, often, require one to
question the very nature and role of law. Given the large number of issues of all kinds
that are being faced within the contemporary Pacific and the urgency with which
some of these issues must be addressed approaching them from a number of
perspectives is to be encouraged.
With these things in mind this book aims to provide readers with both theoretical and
practical discussion of some of the issues facing Pacific societies and legal systems.
There are, as already indicated, a huge number of issues that could be included in a
book that has the aim of discussing current legal issues in the Pacific islands. We have
tried to focus the content of the book on some specific themes or areas of current
legal controversy that allow for the writers to both discuss theoretical issues and to
discuss practical problems within that theme. In the end we also had to be guided by
the areas in which our contributors wished to write. This book covers issues of
governance and corruption, human rights and customary law, resource issues and the
(re)building of social order in Pacific societies. These are, perhaps, some of the most
controverisal issues currently being faced within the Pacific, although we freely
acknowlege that there are many other issues that we are not including in this volume.  
The first section discusses the notion of modernisation and some of the ways that we
can see modernisation affecting Pacific societies. It provides readers with a broad
context in which to consider specific legal issues arising in the contemporary Pacific. 
The second section examines corruption. Chapters consider what corruption is,
whether it is necessarily a bad thing and why it is that corruption is seemingly
endemic within the Pacific. It also considers a specific practical measure to combat
corruption – an ombudsman
The third section of this volume focuses specifically on some issues surrounding the
place of custom and customary law in the legal systems of the South Pacific region.
That is not to say that issues of custom are not relevant to the discussions elsewhere.
Indeed, many of the chapters in other parts of the book will touch on issues related
to those raised here. The content in this section serves to illustrate the complexities
that are rife in any meaningful discussion of the relationship between custom and law.
The authors do not necessarily seek to provide definitive answers. Rather, they assist
the reader in forming appropriate and incisive questions.
The content of the fourth section, discussing human rights, is, in many ways, a
continuation of the discussions that commenced in section 3. The apparent
incompatibility between human rights and custom is perhaps the most visible clash
between the different values found in the introduced and indigenous legal systems.
This section highlights the numerous complexities and subtleties that underpin that
basic question of ‘what is the place of human rights in the South Pacific’?
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The fifth section considers natural resource issues. Whilst Pacific land tenure has long
been widely recognised as an area of considerable general interest for Pacific legal
scholars, particularly because of the predominant role of customary law in this area,
the management of other natural resources has been seen more of a specialist area.
However, given the number of threats that the natural resources of the Pacific are
facing and the centrality of these resources to Pacific lifestyles and economies natural
resources issues are becoming of increasing interest and importance.
The sixth and final section of this book examines issues of disorder. Coups in Fiji
Islands and Solomon Islands and high levels of criminal behaviour in Papua New
Guinea are extreme expressions of the lack of respect for the rule of law that is to be
found throughout the Pacific. Issues of disorder are, perhaps, the manifestation of
tensions discussed elsewhere in this book. Issues of disorder are also, possibly, the
greatest threat to the development of Pacific states. Reasons for the apparent lack of
legitimacy of the state and possibilities for a new conception of statehood suggest
ways for Pacific countries to respond to this threat and find a new way forward. 
Whilst there are, of course, overlaps between the content of each theme, the book has
been arranged into thematic sections in order to assist readers to appreciate the
multiple approaches to a particular issue that can be taken. We have also provided
introductions to each thematic section. This allows us to make some commentary on
the theme and to highlight some of the important ideas within the chapters and links
between them.
It is hoped that students of law, sociology and development studies will find this book
helpful in introducing them to some of the current legal issues facing Pacific island
countries. To assist students each chapter begins with a box defining some key terms
that readers will meet in the chapter. This is done both to assist in ensuring that key
terms are understood and to assist students in focusing upon the key issues contained
within each chapter. Each section concludes with a series of thought provoking
questions and some additional readings that would provide a good place to begin
further investigation into the particular topic.
It is also hoped that this book will find a much wider readership than students. The
authors contributing to this book all have strong academic backgrounds, and present
their material in such a way that should be of interest to policy makers, aid donors
and any others who have an interest in contemporary issues facing Pacific island legal
systems and societies. The book also has relevance to readers who have more general
interests in the nature of law and the state. Within the Pacific, because of the clash of
introduced and traditional cultures, issues surrounding the relationship between law
and the state are, maybe, more apparent than in other countries, as they manifest
themselves as practical problems of disorder. Our experiences within the Pacific can
make a valuable contribution to general political theory and philosophy by
contributing fresh examples and perspectives to the global debate on the nature of
law and the state. As such this book is not only limited to an audience with a specific
interest in the Pacific region.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
In a region and subject area in which there are so many interesting changes taking
place it is inevitable that we can only touch briefly upon a few issues. Hopefully in the
near future futher Pacific island focused publications of a socio-legal nature will fill
some of the many gaps that this volume has to leave.
A N I T A  J O W I T T
D R  T E S S  N E W T O N  C A I N
Editors
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SECTION 1
THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE
1. MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
Vijay Naidu
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The changes that Pacific island countries are currently experiencing can largely be
attributed to the impacts of modernisation. Whether modernisation is
conceptualised as a process of development and progress or as a more chaotic
situation during which traditional and introduced systems meet or are forced
together with the result that both systems have to adjust, modernisation connotes
change. These changes are far reaching. It is not only legal systems that are put into
a state of flux because of modernisation, but all social systems, including political
systems, family systems, education systems and religious systems. 
The chapter by Professor Naidu aims to provide readers with some appreciation of
the broad nature of changes that are currently taking place throughout the Pacific
region. Such an appreciation is necessary in order to put legal change into its
wider context. There are, of course, many potential interpretations of the changes
and many variations in the experiences of different countries. This chapter does
not pretend to be exhaustive in its exploration of the topic. 
Complementing this discussion of change in the Pacific is a discussion of various
theoretical approaches or perspectives on the nature and process of modernisation
and change. The multifaceted nature both of change in the Pacific and of
theoretical perspectives for conceptualising this change is thereby highlighted.
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1.  MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
By: Professor Vijay Naidu
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Modernisation
Modernisation is popularly used to describe a process of societal change from
‘primitive’ to ‘developed’. ‘Developed’ is usually equated with ‘westernised’. As
such the popular concept of the process of modernisation is not neutral, but is
loaded with assumptions about what a modern society should look like and the
desirability of attaining this modern model of society. A number of specific
academic theories have arisen around the concept of modernisation. These
theories may use the term in different or more precise ways than the popular
definition of modernisation.
Indigenisation
Indigenisation can be used to describe a process whereby the values of an
indigenous culture change another (introduced) culture to reflect or
incorporate the values of the indigenous group. It is often used in the context
of discussing how indigenous cultures affect the model of western culture as
reflected in modernisation processes. 
Dichotomy
A dichotomy is a division into two seemingly mutually exclusive or
contradictory groups. Tradition and modernisation are often viewed as
dichotomous concepts.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past century and a half Pacific island societies have undergone very
significant changes. These changes are institutional, and have affected values, beliefs
and attitudes and individual and group behaviour. They have transformed the
political, economic and social dimensions of these societies. The extent and scope of
societal change has varied from society to society but everywhere, from the remotest
of villages to the not so sleepy towns, social change and its consequences are present.
At the same time, however, in all Pacific island societies earlier and apparently more
traditional structures, norms and values persist. The resilience of traditional
institutions and their adaptations to the forces of change is remarkable. In the current
era of globalisation which is driven by strong states, powerful corporate forces and
the communication revolution, Pacific island countries are faced with numerous
challenges as their governments seek to secure higher standards of living for island
peoples. Islanders themselves have also established a transnational network of family
and kin with flows of people, money and goods in an extension of socio-cultural
values and institutions that is centred in the homeland and yet globalising. 
Numerous contradictions and conflicts abound between established norms and new
ways of doing things. Individualism exists in tension with more collective obligations;
communal customary forms of land and the ownership of other natural resources 
co-exist with private ownership and individual accumulation of capital; market forces
collide with the regulatory powers of the state; the nominal equality of citizenship
underwritten by modern day constitutions conflicts with traditional and
contemporary status inequality based on ethnicity, gender, status by birth and region
of origin; traditional forms of authority sit uncomfortably with electoral systems and
other paraphernalia of democracy; introduced systems of meritocracy conflict with
traditionally ascribed statuses; inter-generational conflicts both latent and overt are
ubiquitous; and disparities between urban and rural places, between regions of a
country and between groups of people underlie the tensions and conflicts in the not
so pacific Pacific.
The first part of this chapter briefly considers the concepts of evolution,
modernisation and development and their relevance to the changes wrought in
Pacific societies. The second part of this chapter provides an account of these changes
and their significance for Pacific communities. In attempting to provide an overview
it is likely that the unique and special experiences of some island societies may be
omitted. However, it is hoped that the broad patterns of change that are identified
provide insights into both change and continuity in Pacific societies.
EVOLUTION, MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The changes that have overtaken island societies with increasing intensity over the last
two centuries have their origins in Europe. Feudalism as a mode of production based
on agriculture and the manor with the labour of serfs was displaced by urban-based
manufacture of finished products for private profit. Rural agrarian production largely
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for consumption was superceded by industrial production for exchange. Agricultural
labour coerced by the feudal lord was replaced by town and city based wage labour.
In a short span of time the English landscape was changed by the massive shift of the
mass of rural people to the emergent industrial towns and cities. This “great
transformation” in which the “satanic mill” became central to peoples’ livelihood
caused widespread social dislocation, misery and hardship.1 European societies
underwent radical changes in their social structures and class character. A reading of
the novels by Charles Dickens and accounts of poverty at the turn of the twentieth
century2 provide vivid images of the enormity of societal changes and the impact that
these changes had on the lives of people. Agricultural revolution was followed by the
industrial revolution, which was accompanied by political revolution. Scholars in
Europe became preoccupied by the social, economic and political changes and events
taking place all around them. To paraphrase McKee, scholars could not avoid being
involved in the events of their time and this involvement always left its indelible marks
on their disciplines.3
Scholarly interest in social change has led to the development of a number of theories
about the nature of social change. The initial theoretical trend was to use
evolutionary models to explain change. The evolutionary models were later
complemented by (then superceded by) modernisation theories. Recently these
models have been rejected as being too biased towards western lifestyles and a range
of underdevelopment and other theories have arisen.
Evolutionary Theories
By the mid-nineteenth century European scholars were also aware of peoples
elsewhere. The latter lived in a variety of societies that exhibited different levels of
technology and political organisation — from small scale preliterate hunter-gatherer
bands to tribes practising various forms of agriculture ruled by chiefs or elders to
relatively large civilisations in Egypt, China and India. European social and political
philosophers sought to explain societal change in terms of stages of human progress
from the relatively simple, small and primitive conditions of paleolithic hunters and
gatherers to the complex, large and industrialising societies of their time. Adam Smith
(1723–1790), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), Ferdinand Tonnies (1835–1936),
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Max Weber
(1864–1920), amongst others, contributed to explanations about how human
societies had changed. 
Many of them used evolutionary precepts in their explanations. Sahlins and Service4
provide a comprehensive account of evolutionary theories. At the core of these
explanations was the idea that human societies change from small and simple to
become large and complex and from having the one institution of kinship playing
multiple functions — including economic, social, political, legal and religious
functions — to specialist institutions carrying out each of these functions.
Mechanisms of change varied: population increase and competition over resources,
environmental adaptation, warfare, new technology, literacy, political centralisation,
9
M O D E R N I S A T I O N  A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T
class struggle and religion were some of the various mechanisms, instruments or
catalysts for change identified by different theorists. For the evolutionists all human
societies could be put at different stages of evolution, with contemporary European
society being the most advanced. The adaptability of European societies together
with their technology and social organisation made it possible for Europe to
subordinate the rest of the world. In its extreme form evolution took the garb of
Social Darwinism which not only perceived the manifest destiny of the white man to
dominate the world but also rationalised the demise of indigenous peoples as losers
in the competition for the survival of the fittest. In short, evolutionists chalked out
the stages and mechanisms of change in human societies from ‘primitive savagery’ to
post-enlightenment European ‘civilisation’.
An evolutionary conceptualisation of human development was applied to Pacific
island peoples by different categories of Europeans who arrived in the Pacific during
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While there was a tendency to regard
island societies as being at a more ‘primitive’ stage, early explorers commented
positively on the relative health, tranquility and openness of islanders. Rousseau’s
conceptualisation of the noble savage living in harmony with nature was commonly
used. Missionaries discerned the difference between the centralised chiefdoms of
Polynesia from the relatively egalitarian Melanesia. Many early clergymen assumed
the lighter skinned Polynesians with their aristocratic classes were closer to their own
feudal origins. They sought to save the souls of island people by converting them to
Christianity, an obviously superior religion from the heathen paganism that prevailed.
Early Victorians believed that islanders had been lost to Christendom because of the
influence of the devil and that it was incumbent on the missionaries to save them. 
Islanders also had to be protected from evil Europeans who sought to exploit them
and who brought wicked and corrupting influences. In this regard island peoples
were seen as children who could be led into harm by unscrupulous adults.
Missionaries campaigned against the sale of alcohol, arms and ammunition to
islanders. They also firmly opposed immoral behaviour such as prostitution.
Settlers who came in the late nineteenth century saw island people as occupants of
land that could be better utilised commercially and as potential plantation labour.
They tended to regard islanders as an inferior race impeding progress. Openly racist
organisations such as the British Settlers’ Mutual Protection Society and the Ku Klux
Klan were formed in Fiji.5
Modernisation
During the 1950s and 60s American and European social scientists sought to use
Weber’s ideas to explain the disparities between western and non-western societies
and to chalk out road maps for modernising or developing the latter.6 Their approach
was a model of development that perceived change as the transformation of
traditional social order through a process of modernisation. This meant the changing
of values and attitudes, institutions and societal orientation to those prevailing in the
industrialised liberal democracies of the West. Modernisation essentially meant
1 0
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Westernisation. The theoretical perspectives included Parsons’s pattern variables,
various elite theories, modernising institutions, Easton’s input-output model and
empirical development indicators.
In general modernisation theories from the different social sciences stressed the
significance of changes in values, norms and beliefs and individual motivations. These
changes had fostered industrialisation and development of mass consumption
societies in Europe and North America.7 With suitable changes in values, institutions,
leadership, technology and rates of savings, post-colonial societies could follow.
These changes could be made possible through the diffusion or transplanting of
ideas, institutions, values, capital and technology to the less developed world.
Modernisation through diffusion had already began to take place with education,
urbanisation, nuclear households, increased awareness through mass media,
heightened political awareness and participation in democratic systems, replacement
of traditional authorities with national system of laws coupled with representative
government and the increase in earnings and savings for investment. 
Most writings on change in the Pacific between the 1950s and 1980s can be placed
in the modernisation paradigm. Teo Fairbairn, the prominent Samoan economist,
epitomises this approach: 
...the individual communities in the region have much in common. The force of
tradition has tended to remain strong despite increasing exposure to the outside
world; economic patterns are dominated by agriculture with subsistence
production playing a major role though an ever-increasing demand for the goods
and services of the cash economy is evident... Throughout the region the
dominant physical disadvantages are isolation from large metropolitan centres,
the highly dispersed nature of many individual groups, smallness of population
and with a few notable exceptions, lack of basic mineral and industrial raw
materials. On the economic side one is confronted with generally low levels of
income and rates of savings, indigenous populations lacking in all but the most
rudimentary managerial and technical skills, and methods of land tenure and
social organizations that have their roots in traditional systems. In addition, heavy
dependence on one or two agricultural export products renders them vulnerable
to fluctuations in world markets for primary commodities as well as to the hazards
of adverse weather. The combination of rapidly growing populations and rising
expectations for the goods and services of the modern monetary economy, poses
further challenges.8
More recently he has remarked that: 
In general, the severe shortage of skills experienced by most of the island
countries weakens their capacity to absorb and apply modern technology and
undermines the growth potential of all sectors, particularly the private sector
which is potentially the most dynamic in promoting growth. In addition, cultural
traditions are still a powerful force and tend to weaken the modernisation process
and slow the development effort. The constraining influence of customary land
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tenure systems on agricultural development is a notable example, while traditional
beliefs often dominate attitudes towards savings, business endeavours and
population control.9
Underdevelopment Theories
The modernisation perspective of blaming tradition within a country was turned over
its head by underdevelopment theorists who blamed external forces for constraining
and impeding development in the Third World.
‘Dependency’ and Underdevelopment Theories (UDT), which emerged in the late
1960s, maintained that metropolitan Europe’s progress relied heavily on the
exploitative chain-like relations with post-colonial satellite states. In its extreme form
UDT maintained that the development of Europe led to the underdevelopment of
the Third World. The notion of an expanding metropolis (core) and exploited post-
colonial countries (periphery) was incorporated in Immanuel Wallerstein’s World
System’s Theory. Wallerstein maintained that a world system emerged with the
expansion of European capitalism. Former mini-systems (tribal societies) and empires
(for example, China) were penetrated by and integrated into the capitalist world
system. The world system itself comprises core countries that are industrialised and
powerful, semi peripheral states which are partially industrialised but still dependent
on agriculture and forms of non-wage labour and peripheral countries which
are entirely dependent on agriculture and raw material production based largely on
‘unfree’ labour. The world system was managed by powerful states for their
own benefit.
Several scholars of Pacific island societies have used UDT in explaining change.
Amarshi, Good and Mortimer10 have pointed to how Papua New Guinea’s natural
and human resources have become increasingly harnessed to the exploitative interests
of transnational, often Australian capital. In his analysis of law and the state in Papua
New Guinea, Fitzpatrick has noted that the pre-capitalist modes of production
subsidised emerging capitalist enterprises in the country.11 Rokotuivuna,12 Utrecht13,
Narsey,14 Narayan,15 Durutalo16 and Sutherland17 have pointed to the extraction of
monopoly profits from Fiji, the emergence of a class of collaborator capitalists or
compradors and the emergence of the country as an Australian economic colony.
Shankman18 concluded from his study of Samoan emigration that (Western) Samoa
was being underdeveloped by the loss of its skilled and professional human capital to
metropolitan countries. The Cook Islands was examined by Bellam19 using a similar
perspective and he reached a somewhat similar conclusion that this country’s interests
had been subordinated to the interests of New Zealand capital. For all the smaller
international migration and remittance dependant economies, referred to as MIRAB
countries, the UDT approach can be applied. On a region wide basis, Howard et al20
have used this paradigm as well as the perspective of world system theory and the
articulation of modes of production. Naidu has used a similar approach in his analysis
of Samoan and Fijian political economy.21 On an individual country and region-wide
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basis the story told is similar, there has been a subordination of island economies and
societies to transnational capital and interests.
Alternative Development Perspective
Most recently post modernist writers have attacked attempts at meta or grand
theorising and have instead advocated for accounts that capture the diverse and
complex character of human experiences. Alternative development perspectives vary
in their emphasis on particular aspects of development and in their orientation.
Writers such as Amartya Sen, Dudley Seers, Paul Streeten and Mahbubul Huq have
sought to emphasise poverty eradication, employment generation, social justice,
equality and human development aspects over preoccupation with economic growth.
Still others have seen an attempt by the West to impose its values and norms upon
non-western societies in the push for development. Schumacher’s ‘Small is Beautiful’
type of approaches in turn have emphasised the role of small communities based on
small scale agriculture and appropriate technology providing a more nurturing
environment for all creatures. Eco-development and sustainable development
advocates have pointed to the need for sound environmental management and social
integration for long-term survival. They publicise the potential dangers posed by
unsustainable capitalist industrial development. Intergenerational and international
equity issues have been raised by them. Feminist writers have identified gender
inequalities in policy and decision making, property rights, legal systems, access to
opportunities, division of labour and the double burden of paid employment and
unpaid domestic labour.
A number of Pacific writers have been most critical of the changes brought in the
wake of capitalist development in the South Pacific. A number of them do not see any
material gain in the transition of island people from small holder farmers or peasants
to wage workers.22 Others have pointed to the dangers of moving away from
biodiverse and environmentally friendly horticulture to mono-cropping.23 Sectoral
development in tourism, mining, forestry, fisheries and physical infrastructure has
come under critical scrutiny. Regional organisations such as the South Pacific
Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP), the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) have been pushing for
sustainable development of natural resources as well as for community development.
Scholars who use these approaches tend to be very critical of elements of capitalist
development but do not provide systematic and viable alternatives.
Evolutionary, modernisation and other development theories have sought to explain
societal change. Their wide diversity is indicative of the complex and multifaceted
nature of change. It is also indicative of the lack of theoretical unity or of a dominant
theoretical perspective in the area of development studies.
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SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN
PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES
No society is static. However, social change was gradual until the advent of European
incursion from the seventeenth century onwards, and has been especially apparent
since the early nineteenth century. By this stage some Pacific societies, such as those
in Polynesia, had evolved into centralised chiefdoms and proto-states. In Tonga and
Hawaii certain chiefly lineages were deified while others were bestowed with rights
to secular rule. Specialist craftsmen, canoe makers, warriors, priests and rulers
emerged. The ranks of nobles, priests, subjects and slaves existed.24 Polities in the
Pacific ranged from those with a few dozen people in hunter and gatherer bands, to
a few hundred in smaller chiefdoms to as many as several thousands in the centralised
proto-states of Polynesia.
It is evident that in the post-contact period societal changes intensified over time.
These changes can be divided and periodised into pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial
and contemporary changes. Changes during the pre-colonial period varied but
generally did not cause significant transformation of Pacific island societies, with the
possible exception of communities that were involved in the so-called labour trade.25
In contrast, most significant structural changes were brought about in island societies
during the decades of direct colonialism by metropolitan powers. The post-colonial
period saw a resurgence of supposedly indigenous values but underlying structural
changes persisted. In the contemporary era, economic and technological forces have
engendered greater integration in the global market and significant social changes are
causing political instability. 
In this part of the paper, changes during the pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and
contemporary periods will be outlined sequentially. Obviously, structural changes in
one period will overlap into other periods. This division into periods is to help in the
understanding of the nature and extent of change.
PRE-COLONIAL CHANGES
Pacific historians point to the fur hunters, whalers, sealers, ship wrecked sailors,
castaways, escaped convicts, beachcombers, traders, missionaries and settlers arriving
in the island in the 1800s as being the first outside agents of change. Up to the mid-
1850s their impact on island societies was minimal in the sense that these societies
remained intact. Indeed trading activities tended to reinforce existing social
structures. Even the large scale collection and processing of sea slug or beche-de-mer
did not alter island communities. However, many island societies were seriously
threatened by the large increases in mortality rates and the population depletion that
occurred as they had no immunity to diseases of European and Asian origins.26
Alcohol and warfare also contributed to their demise. Iron and steel tools, knives and
axes, rifles and double barreled guns, ammunition, and other manufactured
commodities including clothes, drapery and items of adornment were in great
demand in the islands. The ubiquity of these goods led Thurston, a settler and future
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Governor of Fiji to declare that “the bow and arrow and stone age [was] disappearing
at an astonishing rate.”27 Beachcombers and missionaries contributed to a change in
local balance of power between chiefdoms, coastal and rural people. The sites for new
exploitation of natural resources such as sandalwood and beche-de-mer made local
rulers and their allies more powerful. Thus Bau and Bua in Fiji emerged as powerful
chiefdoms by the 1830s. Missionaries backed the more powerful chiefs to extend
their authority over neighboring polities. During this period several theocratic
kingdoms backed by Wesleyan, London Missionary Society (LMS) and Catholic
missionaries sprang up. The growing numbers of Europeans and their often
disruptive activities drew the attention of their respective countries. These imperialist
countries soon became embroiled in a scramble for colonies, which led to the carving
of Oceania amongst them. 
COLONIAL PERIOD
Colonies have been divided in terms of colonies of settlement, colonies of partial
settlement and colonies of exploitation. All three forms of colonies were to be found
in the Pacific. Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii became colonies of settlement with
the almost complete displacement of indigenous peoples. Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa
and Tahiti were only partially occupied. Colonies of exploitation included Nauru and
Ocean Islands, which were stripped of their topsoils, and Solomon Islands, which was
depleted of its labour resources.
Many of the seeds of future changes were planted in the previous period of contact
with European missionaries and traders. Missionary enterprise aimed at inculcating
islanders with work ethics consistent with commerce. Coconut oil, copra, bananas,
cocoa, coffee, pumpkin and other vegetables were cultivated and poultry, pigs and
cattle raised for sale so that congregations could shave regularly and meet missionary
dress codes, purchase the Bible and give generously to the mission. It became a
matter of course for the colonial state to introduce a head tax, poll tax or hut tax to
ensure that the islanders extended their revenue generation activities for government
coffers as well. Islanders also engaged in commercial production of copra and
coconut oil, bananas and other produce to meet their own needs of items of clothing,
iron and steel tools, pots and pans, cutlery, matches, et cetera. Money in the form of
colonial currency became increasingly the medium of exchange. In this manner
islanders become peasant producers subjected to market and state pressures.
Economic and Social Changes during the Colonial period
With the establishment of colonial rule, government officials did not regard either
native or small European settler productive activities as sufficient to meet the needs
of the state for revenue. Merchant houses such as Godeffroy and Sons, Burns Philip
and the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Australia were drawn into setting up
plantations and agricultural processing operations in the islands. In New Caledonia,
settler plantations were overshadowed by the mining of nickel. Plantations required
five ingredients to be successful — a plentiful supply of arable land, a plentiful supply
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of cheap labour, efficient management and capital, a secure market for products and
necessary infrastructure. Plantation agriculture, and to a lesser extent mining,
changed the face of some island colonies. Other island colonies were changed as they
formed a vast pool of labour for these plantations and mines.
Land in the colonial and contemporary eras
Land ownership as in freehold private property for the exclusive use of the individual
property rights holder in perpetuity was an alien concept amongst island people. It
was first introduced by Christian missionaries who sought to maintain the exclusivity
of their land acquisition by fencing it. Some small scale land alienation had taken
place before the 1860s but trading in land together with disputes and outright
conflicts over land escalated during the 1860s and 1870s. The American Civil War
was accompanied by the blockade against cotton producers in the South. European
textile mills starved of cotton sought it elsewhere in the world with high prices.
Settlers arrived in Fiji and Samoa in their thousands to make a fortune in cotton. The
South Seas Island variety of cotton proved initially to be a favourite. Acquisition of
land was made possible by the rivalry amongst ambitious chiefs who sought to
subordinate their opponents. They willingly parted with some of the best arable lands
of their subjects as well as their opponents.28 In return they received European goods,
guns and ammunition and boats as well as assistance in warfare. Ironically, as the Civil
War ended in America, arms and ammunition were collected by the Central
Polynesian Land and Commercial Company (CPLCC) from the battle fields for sale
to island chiefs.
One of the first acts of colonial governments in the island colonies was to regularise
land deals as these were causing disputes and outright conflicts. In Samoa, where the
total land area amounted to 950,000 acres, settlers claimed 1,691,893 acres.29 Land
Commissions were established to investigate land claims being made. The
authenticity of property sales and legal documents were investigated and finalised.
The flexible and fluid nature of customary ownership of land, which reflected
demographic changes amongst lineages in a locality and their respective strengths,
was lost with the documentation of ownership. This loss of flexibility together with
the alienation and commercial leasing of some of the best lands contributed to land
shortages among islanders. Land remained a major source of disputes during the
colonial period.
Labour
The second significant act of some colonial governments was to regularise the
recruitment, engagement, terms and conditions and repatriation of migrant labour.
As the colonial enterprise in plantations and mines took root in the islands much of
the western and central Pacific was converted into a large labour reserve. Blackbirding
and labour trading took thousands of labourers from Melanesia and Micronesia to
Queensland and New South Wales in Australia, Hawaii, New Caledonia, Samoa, Fiji
and to central and south America. By the 1870s it was realized that island labour was
inadequate for further plantation growth. The colonial governments of Fiji, Samoa
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and Tahiti readily engaged in recruiting labour from Asian sources. In Hawaii the
plantocracy also opted for labour from neighbouring Asia. Thus immigrant labour for
producing cotton, sugar, coffee, bananas, pineapples, nickel and gold contributed to
the further growth in multi-ethnic societies in the islands. Melanesian labourers were
followed by and worked together with Chinese labourers in Samoa and Indian
labourers in Fiji. Chinese, Japanese, Filipino and Portuguese labourers were imported
to work in Hawaii’s plantations. Chinese were imported into Tahiti. Arabs, Indians,
Chinese, Indo-Chinese, Ni-Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna people were drawn to the
mines and plantations of New Caledonia. 
Urbanisation
Port towns began as trading outposts grew in number and size throughout the island
world from the 1800s. Some of the ‘hell holes’ of yesteryear, such as Apia and
Levuka, settled down to being modest centres of government, trade and commerce,
education and other services. Besides government officials and merchants a
professional class of surveyors, lawyers, doctors and teachers emerged in these urban
centres as did a category of waged workers, domestic servants and garden boys. 
New Social Categories and Classes
Wage labour and urbanisation had a considerable impact on social organisation.
During the colonial period new categories of people emerged in the islands. Apart
from colonial officials, planters, a smattering of merchants and professional people
who were whites occupying the apex of society, there appeared in these societies new
groups of island people. Catechists, pastors and missionaries trained by the various
Christian denominations increased amongst islanders. Employment as interpreters,
court clerks, policemen, low ranking civil servants, stevedores, public works
departments labourers and in merchant houses produced islanders with different
work habits, life styles and orientations to their rural cousins. To these were added,
particularly in the post World War II era, teachers, nurses, medical officers (then
doctors), higher level civil servants, businessmen (usually mixed race, European or
Asian) and just before the end of colonialism, politicians. Professional bodies, trade
unions and social clubs were formed to enhance these new categories of islander
interests and aspirations.
Infrastructure 
Plantation and mining enclaves also impacted on island economies by their demand
for infrastructure. Wharves, jetties, lighthouses, beacons, roads, railway lines and
bridges had to be built and maintained. In order to fund the building and
maintenance of infrastructure and to sustain the nascent government institutions —
the civil service, police force, magistrates and other law enforcement officers, prisons
and the governing executive — revenue had to be collected. Direct and indirect taxes,
excise duties and import-export taxes were imposed. The colonial state also became
the sole determinant of colonial currency and its value.
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Political Changes during the Colonial period
The Pacific has been called a European artifact in so far as its exploration, extent and
identification have been a recent European endeavour.30 In another and even more
direct sense it is a European creation as the countries of Pacific have largely gained
their territorial integrity and their names through direct colonialism. The partition of
the Pacific took place in tandem with the carving up of Africa. Indeed at the Berlin
Conference (1889) Britain and Germany exchanged parts of their Pacific and Africa
possessions! The territorial boundaries of most Pacific island countries reflect the
maps drawn by their colonisers. All Melanesian countries were fragmented into much
smaller tribal polities until direct colonialism. The division of the island of Papua New
Guinea between the Dutch and the British/Australians remains to this day as
Indonesian occupied West Papua and the independent state of Papua New Guinea.
Bougainville, which is culturally related more closely to Solomon Islands, was ceded
by the British to the Germans. Fiji had forty more or less powerful chiefdoms and
polities at the time of European contact. It took the British a war of pacification to
subdue the fiercely independent interior people of Viti Levu. Samoa was divided
between Germany and the United States and remains split between American Samoa
and the independent state of Samoa. Tonga’s expansionism and incorporation of
parts of the Fiji group was stalled by the British. Colonial rule ended the internecine
warfare that erupted throughout the Pacific during early contact.
The Colonial State
With the possible rare exception most Pacific island states’ political boundaries are no
more than a hundred years old and established by the colonial power. In virtually all
cases there has been an expansion in the size of the polity from pre-colonial times.
Local and island-based autonomy gave away to centralised systems of political
control. The declaration of crown colony, protectorate or trusteeship by colonial
powers as well as treaty agreements not only defined the territorial limits of the
colonial possession but also established the new politico-administrative and legal
order. Colonial rule was about law and order as perceived by the representative of the
imperialist state, the colonial governor. The colonial state imposed an administrative
order and a legal framework, including a system of courts and police. Autocratic and
authoritarian rule prevailed until almost a decade before independence. Politics was
discouraged. However, the exigencies of ruling remote colonies and the balance of
forces in the colonised territories required in most cases the co-optation of
indigenous chiefs and aristocracy. 
Although chiefs had some advisory function and influence in the executive of colonial
Government, political representation and participation by the majority of islanders
came fairly late in the period of colonialism. It was not until the 1962 independence
constitution that voting for the Fono of Faipule was introduced in Samoa, but even
then only on the basis of exclusive matai suffrage. Adult ethnic Fijians voted for the
first time in 1965. By this stage Westminster-type institutions were transplanted to
island countries that were ruled by the British, Australians and New Zealanders.
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Similar transfer of political institutions occurred in American and French territories.
Executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state were more clearly identified
and separated and a civil service established.
Indirect Rule 
In Fiji and Samoa, councils of chiefs were established at the colony-wide level. Local
chiefs were used to provide a relatively inexpensive but effective administration
through systems of indirect rule. The incorporation of the chiefly order within the
colonial state meant that although the chiefly structure remained ideologically
traditional, in reality it was being transformed into a foreign-controlled instrument of
domination over ‘commoners’. But this point should not be taken too far as earlier
governors remained sensitive to chiefly interests. Thus Fiji’s Governor Des Voeux
(1880–1885) maintained that, “...the chiefs represent the army and navy, and
practically the police of the country. The maintenance of their interest is therefore
necessary even on these somewhat selfish grounds alone.”31 Pre-existing political
entities such as hamlets, villages, districts and confederacies were modified and
consolidated through the system of indirect rule. Likewise, while labour services,
tributes and other presentations to elders and chiefs were either prohibited or
modified to suit the colonial authorities (for example the taxation in kind imposed by
Governor Sir Arthur Gordon in Fiji), ‘customs of respect’ to those in authority were
reinforced.
Anti-Colonial Struggles
The centralised colonial order was also a racist one. A system of racial hierarchy was
established based on differential incorporation, economic stratification and racial
segregation. A racial division of colour situated managers of merchant houses, traders,
plantation owners, senior public servants and other owners of capital who were
generally white at the highest rank. In the middle were Asians, chiefs and mixed race
business people and at the bottom of the pile were immigrant workers and
indigenous peasants whose involvement in the mainstream economy was subject to
strict controls. Taxation and restrictive controls over day-to-day life proved to be
irksome to many. Anti-colonial struggles took many forms: restorative rebellious of
an atavistic kind attempting to reassert past social order; religious movements that
syncretised Christian teaching with indigenous beliefs and rituals predicting the
arrival of a redeeming (liberating) leader; economic and industrial protests by urban
workers, small holder farmers, plantation workers and peasant producers over what
they earned from their labour or produce; and political struggles (which combined
elements of the other types of struggles) calling for an end to colonial rule. 
POST-COLONIAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERIODS
These economic and political changes, which had their roots in colonial rule, have
continued to affect contemporary Pacific island societies in a number of ways, as
discussed below.
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Social and Economic Change
Multiethnic Societies
During the colonial era, changes had taken place in the population composition,
residential and work patterns, marriage and family structure, social mobility and
gender relations in the islands. To begin with, over the last century demography
patterns have been transformed. Fiji, Hawaii, New Caledonia, Samoa and Tahiti
became more complexly multi-ethnic with the settlement of peoples of Asian and
European origins. Categories of mixed race people have now emerged in virtually all
the islands. Most PICs have become multicultural. 
Land
In the contemporary era changes in land tenure rooted in colonial history have led
to outright conflicts. Relatively small parcels of alienated free hold and state owned
land (in many islands, the British concept of state ownership dubiously exists and
extends to the tidal water mark) sit amidst customary owned land. Where land
boundaries among indigenous landowners have not been surveyed and documented
there are many disagreements over where one group’s land rights end and another
group’s begin. Such disputes often become violent. Land tribunals and courts have
been established to handle such problems in most Pacific Island countries (PICs). In
Fiji Islands the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) was formed in 1940 to oversee the
usage of customary owned land and its leasing to agricultural and other commercial
interests. However, group ownership of such land has led to difficulties over decision
making and the sharing of rent monies. Where customary title holders or chiefs are
the primary recipients of land rents the succession to chiefly title has increasingly
become contentious. These disputes continue to be dealt with by land and titles
tribunals established by the colonial state. Communal or collective ownership has also
made it almost impossible to obtain credit from commercial banks because customary
owned land has little value as collateral. Disagreements also occur over the amount
of rent that ought to be charged. Some members of the land-owning group have
taken it upon themselves to seek additional payments in cash and in kind from
leaseholders. In some instances, as in Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, individuals
have legally sold customary land to Malaitans. This has put the buyer in considerable
hardship as the group itself has refused to accept the legality of the transaction. With
the recent violent political conflict, many migrant islanders have found their property
rights seriously jeopardised. 
In many Pacific countries there is potential for serious tensions and conflicts between
resident land owners in urban and peri-urban areas and localities of enclave
development and migrant islanders. Informal traditional or customary arrangements
between owners and migrants place the latter into a category of tenants at will. With
a growing number of migrants there has been pressure on resident groups. The
competition over land for housing and gardening and over neighbouring marine
resources is likely to spill over into open conflicts.
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Urbanisation
Residential patterns have changed. Over the last forty years and especially in the last
two decades there has been an intensification of population mobility. Islanders have
moved from outlying islands and inland areas to coastal regions and urban places.
Several PICs are predominantly urban. Much of Polynesia and Micronesia has
experienced an urban shift and the rate of urbanisation throughout more rural parts
of Micronesia and Melanesia is double the rate of population growth. Ward points to
how urbanism — town and city life — has become integral to the lives of islanders.32
This has involved shifts away from agrarian livelihoods to employment in
government, business, manufacture, transportation and tourism. Being well
connected to metropolitan centres, urban centres are places for new ideas, life styles
and fashions. Segregated residence has been replaced by socio-economic division as
the major determinant of residential patterns. 
The attraction of opportunities in towns and cities has led to rapid urbanisation and
associated problems. Inadequate housing has resulted in the growth of squatter
settlements and informal housing. Public water supply and the disposal of garbage
and sewerage in towns and cities have become critical environmental and community
health matters. Other infrastructural bottlenecks include roads, electricity supply,
transport connections between islands and to remote localities in larger islands as well
as educational and health services. 
As indicated earlier, the pressure on urban land is causing tensions between
landowners and immigrant groups. Most Pacific states do not appear to have the
capacity to address this very serious problem. 
A consideration of urbanisation and urbanism will be inadequate without reference
to international migration of islanders. Auckland has become the largest Polynesian
city and Vancouver has more Indo-Fijians than the second largest city of Lautoka in
Fiji. Emigration and remittances have become critical in the lives of Micronesians and
Polynesians. Bertram and Watters33 have coined the acronym MIRAB to describe
societies dependent on migration, remittances, aid and relatively large bureaucracies.
Micronesians have been migrating to Guam, Hawaii and the west coast of mainland
USA. Cook Islanders, Niueans, Samoans, Tokelauans and Tongans have sought
opportunities in New Zealand and Australia. Samoans and Tongans have also settled
in the United States. International kinship networks have emerged with flows of
people, goods and services as well as money. Going abroad and making a living as well
as supporting families back home in the islands has become a pivotal strategy for
many island people. In this regard island people not only avail themselves of the
opportunities in metropolitan rim countries for education and training, employment
and improved material standards of living, they are also exposed to stresses of urban
life styles and to the problems of substance abuse, urban gangs, gambling and inter-
generational conflicts. Most islanders find themselves in an underclass of semi skilled
and unskilled workers in Auckland, Sydney, Los Angeles and other cities.34
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Classes 
The dominant classes that inherited state power on the eve of independence
comprised educated chiefs, a coterie of professionals (teachers, lawyers, ministers of
religion and former civil servants) and businessmen politicians. These elements
continue to control the contemporary state. During the first decade of political
independence there was much euphoria and rhetoric about following a unique Pacific
style of development. Leaders and writers spoke about the “Pacific Way” and
“Melanesian socialism”. However, after the initial expansion in the economies of
island countries and their labour markets the limitations of being small, isolated,
vulnerable and poorly governed micro-states have thwarted development prospects. 
In most PICs’ constitutions the position of traditional chiefs is entrenched. This is
another reason why in several instances there has been intense rivalry for prominent
chiefly positions. In Fiji the Bose Levu Vakavanua (BLV) or Great Council of Chiefs
has played a retrograde role in holding back political development. The chiefs with
their allies in the state and in the private sector have supported three military coups
that have toppled left of centre governments or coalitions. On each occasion the
justification for the extra-legal military intervention has been ethnicity when in fact
the real reason was to maintain and even extend the privileged position of chiefs,
senior civil servants and certain business interests. Rampant racism has been the cover
for maintaining class privileges. In virtually all PICs political power has led to and is
perceived as the most potent avenue for acquiring economic wealth. In the short term
it has allowed state power holders to enjoy lifestyles well beyond the imagination of
their fellow country people. In many instances, those who are politically powerful sit
as members of corporate boards of large local and international companies. Private
companies in Fiji Islands have tended to employ persons of chiefly status as personnel
and public relations managers because of their standing and influence.
During the post-colonial and contemporary periods there has been a tendency on the
part of first generation state power holders to extend their privileges to their children.
The latter have been sent to local elite schools and to secondary and post-secondary
institutions abroad. The children of other sections of the middle class have also been
educated. Prominent among the socially mobile are children of church ministers. The
competition for employment in the public service is relieved by international
migration but nepotism affects selection based on merit. There is some indication of
‘elite closure’ in this regard as those in privileged positions seek to reserve similar
privileges for their offspring.
The class of wage earners has increased only slowly in the post-colonial period
because of limited expansion in the labour markets of island countries. This has been
due to depressed economic conditions in virtually all the island states for the last
thirty odd years. Small local markets and limited resources have stifled growth in the
smaller countries. Environmental degradation and conflict arising over the sharing of
proceeds from resource exploitation has damaged prospects in the larger PICs.
However, in many island countries the workers have organised themselves in trade
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unions which have sought to better their wages and terms of employment in spite of
the adverse economic situation.
Slow growth or no-growth has meant that many young people have to turn to
agriculture and other informal sector activities to make their livelihoods. Semi-
subsistence small holder farming has continued to absorb and support growing
populations. In one sense there is a large army of reserve labour in the islands. Other
informal sector activities include roadside vendoring, domestic work, shoe shining,
the selling of garlands (leis), backyard garages, commercial sex and retailing of drugs.
Status changes 
New livelihoods, the acquisition of new knowledge and skills, alternative life styles,
the changing status of women and socially (and physically) mobile young people have
somewhat modified the pre-existing forms of power, prestige and wealth. 
Decision-making is no longer the exclusive preserve of male elders, chiefs and
aristocrats. It is more diffused with educated common people and women having a
role in positions of power and influence. Employment outside villages and agriculture
has given a whole lot of people incomes and purchasing power beyond that of village
headmen and district chiefs. Remittances have reinforced this trend. In some cases
those of chiefly origins have acquired education and are in very powerful positions
but in many instances tradition bound chiefs have had limited education and their
influence limited to the local level. Urbanisation has also changed values and norms
of people. A degree of anonymity and impersonal relations have led to changes in
attire, as well as behaviour patterns not envisaged in village surroundings. Young
people especially value the freedom of towns and cities.
Education
The introduction of formal education, beginning with largely mission and
community run primary schools, then a few secondary schools, followed by teachers’
colleges, nursing schools and other post-secondary institutions had a profound effect
on island peoples’ levels of knowledge and skills, perceptions, aspirations and
orientation. One’s future was no longer entirely dependent on one’s kinship group
and that group’s access to land. Education opened up a new world of opportunities,
initially in the public service but later on in the professions, in business and overseas.
Whilst most islanders spent only a few years in schools, enough to read the vernacular
Bible and return to their family plots, others in ever growing numbers sought the
highest levels of education available. A fortunate few went abroad for further
education. Regional tertiary institutions such as the Fiji School of Medicine,
Universities of Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific, the Pacific Regional
Seminary and the Pacific Theological College have contributed to regional awareness.
In the islands of Polynesia, education was especially valued and literacy rates are
generally above 80 percent. Melanesian countries have much lower literacy rates
because of the later introduction of formal education and the shortage of facilities in
the context of larger fragmented populations.
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In Polynesia and much of Micronesia education is very highly valued. There is a good
spread of primary schools and a few secondary schools. Elite mission and public
schools draw the top students from primary schools. These tend to be the children
of upper and middle class families. Upon finishing high school a large number of
them are sent abroad for tertiary education. Most of them do not go to tertiary
institutions and universities in the region, preferring metropolitan country
institutions. Many of them do not return to their island countries. Indeed, with
public sector reforms and the huge cuts made in the number of positions, overseas
education is seen as a passport to life abroad.
In Fiji Islands a large proportion of non-ethnic Fijian students attending the
University of the South Pacific as well as those going abroad for further post
secondary studies do so to obtain qualifications that will get them abroad. The reason
for this state of affairs is that the Fijian state practises institutionalised racism. There
is systematic discrimination in the allocation of scholarships, in employment in the
public sector and in the prospects for promotion. The periodic and what appears to
be regular extra-legal interference of the Fijian military in national politics, reinforces
uncertainty and the inclination to emigate. 
Unlike the grave shortage of teachers in schools in Fiji Islands because of emigration,
the shortage of teachers in Melanesian countries is a consequence of a poorly
developed educational system. There has been a lack of trained teachers at all levels
because not many people have gone beyond primary school. Indeed, as indicated
above until recently more than 50 percent of school age children did not attend
school. With the relatively high population growth rates and the demand for
education, there is a severe shortage of both schools and teachers in Melanesia. The
prospect for girls being educated in larger numbers continues to be limited in the
Melanesian countries.
Family and Marriage
Education and the new modes of social and physical mobility have changed the life
styles of educated islanders. Clubs, dance halls, nightclubs, cinemas and pubs have
become centres for socialising. Whilst wider kinship ties remain significant, over the
last 30 years nuclear families have gained distinct identity and importance in urban
and peri-urban localities. In Fiji Islands more than half the total households are
comprised of nuclear families. In the context of the financial demands of urban living,
larger families and wider kinship network obligations are perceived as burdensome.
Arranged marriages have been increasingly displaced by love marriages. Marriage
partners in urban areas can be from distant regions and different linguistic and ethnic
groups. The status of women has also undergone change. With proselytisation to
Christianity, polygamy was proscribed and eventually prohibited by law.
Monogamous families were encouraged, although not entirely successfully. Women
who had earlier had been major producers of food and artifacts as well as ‘beasts of
burden’ (in Melanesia) were pressured towards behaving like Victorian housewives.
They were required to learn how to cook, sew, clean their homes and raise children
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along European patterns. This was in contrast to the considerable amount of female
out-door livelihood activities in indigenous lifestyles. Previously with the men being
responsible for cooking the day’s large single meal in the earth oven the kitchen was
not women’s responsibility. Employment, albeit in particular professions relegated to
women such as nursing, teaching and secretarial work, liberated women and also gave
them higher status. A new generation of women professionals, senior civil servants,
businesswomen, women in civil society organisations and women activists have been
active in breaking gender barriers. Contraceptives and growing awareness of
reproductive health have also helped in the liberation of women.
Cultural Change
The term culture is usually defined as the way of life of a people comprising material
and non-material aspects. Material culture denotes technology, buildings, canoes and
other artifacts, including personal possessions. Non-material culture denotes the
symbolic, value, belief and institutional dimensions of the way of life. Whilst one may
think that the changes discussed above would have negatively impacted on Pacific
culture, this does not seem to be the case. Instead, as discussed below, Pacific cultures
have continued to adapt and Pacific societies have retained cultures that, whilst not
purely ‘traditional’ are still uniquely ‘Pacific’.
Resilience of Tradition
Recently Anthony Hooper observed that “culture plays a much more significant role
in national economies and national life of Pacific countries than it does in most other
regions of the world.”35 This is because in most Pacific countries, “around 80 to 90
percent of land resources are under customary tenure, and the traditional sector
accounts for around 50 percent of national GDP.”36 The entrenchment of customary
land tenure and traditional social structures in national constitutions ensure their
perpetuation and insulation from both market forces and state coercion. With
customary control over most economic resources essential for development it is not
“simply a matter of engineering a transition from substance to dynamic monetary
economies.”37 In any case Hooper has argued that it is erroneous to characterise the
traditional sector as subsistence because production is geared to fulfilling a diverse
range of reciprocal and redistributive exchanges in networks of mutual obligations
that integrate island people. Economies in the traditional sector for Hooper are
“embedded in the society”, with a large moral and ideological content.38
A second reason for the significance of culture in the island countries of the Pacific is
because of its role in national politics. Hooper has pointed to the fact that politicians
have to win the support of electors reliant on livelihoods in the traditional sector
where “matters of custom and tradition carry considerable political clout.”39 National
constitutions in Hooper’s view assert legitimacy in terms of “distinctive culture and
traditions” as much as they attend to “notions of democracy and individual rights”.
“In these ways”, Hooper claims, “culture in one form or another is right at the heart
of national and political life.”40
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Indigenisation of Modernity
Marshall Sahlins, in his chapter in the same book, has also argued that indigenous
cultures have been resilient to change and that there has been an indigenisation of
modernity. These cultures have not simply been transformed to being a mere
reflection of the West but have adopted new technologies, money and goods in
diverse ways to invigorate traditional values and norms, customary ceremonies and
exchange relations. Far from being passive victims of colonialism and modernisation,
indigenous people have responded positively “to harness the good things of
Europeans to the development of their own existence.”41 Rural-urban, and even
international migration streams are perceived as circulatory in nature. While the
physical geography of the indigenous village is limited, there are no limits to the
social geography of the village. In this regard even globalisation is seen as making
possible the enlargement of the complex social network of kinship reinforced by flows
of goods, people and cash. Purely rational economic decisions related to the
maximisation of the return to labour are geared to the fulfillment of traditional
obligations to family and kinsfolk in accord with cultural values. 
Sahlins42 maintains that the dichotomy between modernity and tradition is
undermined by the fact that non-western peoples have sought to create their own
cultural versions of modernity. In any case what is regarded as traditional has usually
been neo-tradition, already a hybrid of the old and the new. Cultures have ways of
adapting, changing, disappearing and reappearing in unimagined ways — culture is
not simply a heritage, it is a project and a philosophy of life. As a philosophy of life,
culture “is an exhaustible reservoir of responses to the world’s challenges” in contrast
to development which denotes “a scale of values, norms of conduct or models of
behaviour transmissible from one society to another!”43
Language 
While the dichotomy of tradition and modernity is false and simplistic (English
common law is ‘traditional’) and indigenous socio-cultural systems incorporate and
adapt to modernisation, there nevertheless have been considerable changes in Pacific
societies. Besides indigenous islanders who in the Melanesian countries have
considerable linguistic diversity, there are people of Asian and European origins.
Pidgin and Bislama or a dominant dialect, as in Bauan Fijian, have become the lingua
franca among them. The languages of former colonial rulers, English and French,
have become official languages in post colonial Pacific states. English has become the
medium of communication of the regional elite. It is the language of social mobility.44
Religion
With rare exceptions, islanders converted to Christianity. Catholic and various
Protestant denominations predominate. Just about every village and settlement
boasts a church. Sabbath is closely adhered to amongst islanders, particularly in rural
areas. Prayer sessions, church choirs, grace before meals and other outward
manifestations of religion are widespread. Pastors and priests are highly respected
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and, in most instances, very well rewarded. However, there continues to exist, in
most Pacific communities, beliefs and rituals that predate proselytisation. Such beliefs
range from a regard for ancestral spirits, sacredness of sites and objects, trees, totems,
sorcery and witchcraft, spiritual powers of certain lineages and of chiefs as well as
individuals continue to act as mechanisms for social control. Kava remains a sacred
drink in Fiji Islands and Samoa at ceremonies and ritual functions. The incorporation
of Christianity into the social structures and everyday lives of islanders has led to the
view that there has been an indigenisation of this religion in this view. The Christian
belief system, its moral codes and rituals have a distinct Pacific favour.
In multicultural Fiji Islands, 90 percent of the Indo-Fijian population are Hindus or
Muslims. There has been a syncretisation of these religions with both Christianity and
indigenous religious beliefs and rituals. In recent years there has been an Arabisation
of Islam in Fiji and this is most evident in the attire of Muslim men and women.
Changes in Material Culture
At the level of material culture changes are obvious and marked. In much of
Micronesia and Polynesia buildings, including family homes, have been constructed
with concrete and/or wood in the western style. Corrugated iron has largely replaced
thatch. Pacific style architecture such as the neo-traditional fale and the bure has been
retained. In Samoa family homes, meeting places and public buildings display this
architecture. Parliament buildings in Fiji Islands and Papua New Guinea have a
distinct island character.
Modes of communication and transportation have changed. Traditional drums (such
as the Lali and tamtam) and conch shells continue to be used symbolically and in
ceremonies but telephones (including mobile phones), radio and to an extent
electronic forms of communication have become more widely used. Pacific issues are
discussed on line internationally. Tonga has claimed its share of satellite space and
remote Tuvalu had the foresight to lay claim to its lucrative dot.com name. Land, sea
and air transportation has been revolutionised in most islands. Motor cars, trucks,
buses and vans crowd island roads and highways. Regular aircraft flights exist between
most Pacific capitals to international destinations. In-country airline companies also
operate to service inland and outlying locations. Helicopters are available in some of
the bigger countries. Shipping services are provided by inter-island ferries as well as
fibre-glass outboard powered boats. However, there are still island countries such as
Tokelau and Niue as well as many outer islands of the larger archipelagoes where
transportation continues to be irregular. 
Modern communication and transport systems have facilitated cross boundary flows
of people, ideas, capital, goods and services within and between countries. There is a
demand on political leaders to provide higher materially comparable living standards
found in metropolitan countries. The print media which exists in most countries of
the Pacific, transistor radio, cinema and television together with inter-personal
communication have made most islanders, particularly young people conscious of life
styles and fashions in metropolitan centres. In Pacific towns and cities hair styles,
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attire, personal possessions and even the language used reflect fads and fashions
elsewhere. In Fiji Islands both Hollywood and Bollywood have considerable
influence in these matters. The music and songs in island popular cultures also reflect
external influences but local compositions and styles do impact on the island and
diaspora scenes. Island cuisines have been enriched by European and Asian dishes so
that roasts, barbeques, chopsuey, chowmein, and curries complement lovo food at
most feasts.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that socio-economic, cultural and political changes have transformed
Pacific island societies. Individualism, preoccupation with oneself and one’s
immediate family rather than the wider kinship network together with individual
acquisitiveness has increased. It is also apparent that this transformation is not entirely
in the likeness of the West, as propounded by evolutionary theorists and predicted by
the diffusionist modernisation school. Development has improved standards of living
(nutrition, health, life expectancy, housing, education) but has occurred in tandem
with increased inequality amongst islanders. The co-existence and hybridisation of
traditional and neo-traditional structures with modern institutions of the state and
market have led to many contradictions, tensions and conflicts. As we look to the
future these conflicts and tensions must be addressed so as to ensure the harmonious
continuation of Pacific island states. However, it should be noted that addressing
tensions is not the same as removing tensions through the homogenisation of
cultures. The dualism and admixture that exists in Pacific societies has provided safety
nets, security and equality, as well as new opportunities. There is a place in the Pacific
both for countries and people both to be like Kavaliku’s lokua, “small fish living in
reef ponds cut off from the sea at tidal lows, but periodically replenished by ocean
waters” and to explore oceans and their surrounding shores for new opportunities to
sustain their homelands.45
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Review questions 
1. Identify and evaluate the impact of the most important agents of societal
change during the colonial era in a Pacific island society. (Examples of agents of
change are religious missions, commercial interests, the colonial state, anti-
colonial movements and trade unions.)
2. To what extent do you think it is valid to say that the personal relations found
in small scale pre-European societies have given way to impersonal contractual
relations in PICS? How do you think this change affects the maintenance of
order in PICs?
3. “Social change is more likely to emerge from factories and towns than from
farms and rural settlements.” Discuss this assertion with respect to urbanisation
and urbanism in a Pacific island society.
4. How would you explain or characterise the maintenance of law in order in pre
colonial Pacific societies, colonial Pacific societies and post-colonial,
contemporary Pacific societies?
Further readings 
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Corruption is frequently blamed for the failure of countries in the Pacific and
elsewhere to achieve their development goals. The presence of corruption in
government and the public service is thought to indicate a number of problems,
including lack of accountability, lack of transparency and a general failure to
‘play by the rules’ or follow the law. It is this last factor which is, perhaps, at the
heart of concerns about corruption. If the authorities that are supposed to make
and enforce the rules cannot follow them, how can the citizens and investors into
that country hope to live in a stable and predictable environment in which they
can be sure of having their rights upheld and protected? 
Combatting corruption has been one of the central concerns of the donor
community in recent years, and is at the heart of the good governance agenda that
is currently driving development programmes. Legal and institutional reforms
aimed at increasing accountability and exposing corruption, including leadership
codes, ombusman’s offices and financial accountability legislation have been
proliferating in the Pacific island region. This section discusses the nature and
causes of corruption, and examines the operation of some of the measures that have
been taken to expose and thereby, hopefully, reduce corruption.
The first chapter, by Professor Hughes, provides us with a meaning for the term
corruption. It also raises the question of whether corruption is necessarily a bad
thing, or whether corruption can actually have beneficial results in some
situations. 
Hassall’s chapter elaborates further on the point made by Hughes that whilst
institutions of government are perceived to be largely irrelevant there is not going
to be a commitment to uphold these insitutions or to follow their rules. His
argument is that a lack of constitutional legitimacy caused by constitutions failing
to be grounded in the will of the people has resulted in corruption and instability
within the Pacific Island region. After discussing some notable expressions of this
lack of legitimacy, he turns to consider what is necessary in order to regenerate a
sense of legitimacy in the consitutional orders within the region. 
Hill’s chapter concludes this section by providing a study of the role and
performance of the Ombudsman’s Office in Vanuatu. This chapter complements
the more theoretical chapters preceeding it by providing a discussion of what
corruption means in practice in Vanuatu and the role that the Ombudsman’s
Office plays in such an environment.
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By: Professor Robert Hughes
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES 
Corruption
This term has no precise meaning, but is popularly associated with the abuse of
power for personal gain. Within the popular conception of corruption, not only
legal wrongdoing but behaviours that are seen as immoral can be considered to
be corrupt.
Fiduciary
A fiduciary is a person who is subjected to special legal duties to act always in
the interests on whose behalf he or she acts. Fiduciaries are also denied the
possibility of making personal profits or gains from the carrying out of their
functions. There are many types of fiduciary with different standards of
responsibility. A trustee is the traditional kind of fiduciary and subjected to the
highest duties.
Political legitimacy
Political legitimacy is concerned with the justification of a government or a
system of government to operate within any particular society. The word
‘legitimacy’ has connections with legality, although now it is used in a broader
sense as meaning something like the basis of political authority.
INTRODUCTION
Corruption in political systems is a pervasive international issue. The political systems
of the South Pacific region are certainly not immune to corruption. It is not a
phenomenon which only attends larger developed political systems. Certainly neither
the smallness nor the communal atmosphere of the Pacific island states have
prevented the occurrence of corruption on a relatively wide scale.1 The phenomenon
produces some basic themes which are seemingly incontrovertible. Corruption is one
of the most significant threats to democracy world-wide. It produces instability and
thrives on the social inequality to which it is a substantial contributor. It undermines
the confidence of peoples in the legitimate institutions of government. It is a major
contributor to social, cultural and economic decline of nation states. It is evanescent,
perverse and consequentially difficult both to detect and eliminate. 
To begin it is appropriate to seek some understanding of the concept of (political)
corruption. As with many of our concepts in general use ‘corruption’ is a rather
amorphous notion. It is not quite a term of legal art in the sense that it does not lend
itself easily to a precise definition. It might sometimes be used to denote ‘non-legal’
corruption in the sense that it refers to acts which constitute abuses of power or the
appropriation of advantage which, though not precisely illegal or criminal in nature,
are nonetheless open to condemnation. Some have in mind the contemptible actions
of public officials only whilst others would include corruption in the private sphere
as a significant component of corrupt activity. From a legal point of view the focus
has perhaps been on a special category of crime; namely that type of crime which is
committed by public officers or which is, in some way, connected with the
performance of public duties and functions. 
What is corruption in some places might not be considered so in others. In a world
where cultural relativism pretends considerable explanatory power one is often
confronted with the possibility of misinterpretation of the acts of others. A
condemnation of something as obviously corrupt, particularly by cultural outsiders,
will often be met with a standard response; namely, that the perspective of the
observer does not take account the cultural norms and values. In particular, it fails to
take into account the system of privileges and favours which specific actors, especially
the traditionally powerful, are entitled to within the culture concerned. Hence what
might be treated as clearly a case of corruption in Australia or the United Kingdom
might not readily be perceived as such in, say, Pacific cultures.
It is an unfortunate fact that thinkers from a Western tradition are not always attuned
to these factors. Given a Western tradition of philosophical and political thought
which pretends, be it cultural imperialism or not, the seeking out of universal patterns
of thought and understanding, the cause of the error is obvious enough. No doubt,
if the pretence of a universal moral order were still a realisable objective we would be
on clearer ground. Some simple and universal understanding of corruption might
exist which could direct our thinking on this issue and encourage our forthright
condemnation of unacceptable behaviour. But corruption is not reducible to such a
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simple formula. That aside, most people carry with them certain clear assumptions
about what corruption involves but then find it difficult to provide a reasonable
definition of it or, at least, one which applies to all potential cases of corruption. In
fact, there is no single definition which encompasses everything that people would
want to take as corruption.
The regulation of corruption is rendered problematic by the fact that the
understanding of corruption tends to vary from place to place and from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Certainly cultural factors play a part in this. However, there are many
interesting issues that arise in the context of corruption that are not confined to
problems of definition. Does corruption involve only some positive action on the part
of a particular person or can a failure to act also involve corruption? Are all forms of
corruption intrinsically bad or can corrupt conduct be justified under some
circumstances — for instance where it does no immediate harm or where it actively
promotes some good, or perhaps more good than bad? Let us consider firstly some
definitions of corruption and before turning to some of these questions.
THE MEANING OF CORRUPTION
As indicated above, the legal sense of corruption is somewhat unsettled.2 Certainly the
term has appeared in statutes and in cases from time to time. This has become more
frequent over the last 30 years or so with the rise of efforts to combat corrupt behaviour
of various sorts — usually as some aspect of maladministration. It can mean anything
from the exercise of undue influence to the making of false declarations (e.g. for
electoral purposes). Undue influence, or perhaps breach of fiduciary duties on the part
of trustees or other fiduciaries, seems in fact the closest that private law comes to dealing
with corruption. These breaches involve essentially a failure on the part of a person who
is in a position of power to comply with the duties and obligations of office. Thus they
involve a form of equitable fraud that very often leads to the imposition of a
constructive trust. Whilst corruption is often seen as a public law issue there is some
degree of similarity with principles of equity. I will return to this issue later on.
The term ‘corruption’ in everyday usage is likewise very broad in its meaning. It has
many synonyms including decomposition, neology, foulness, disease, deterioration,
imperfection, perversity, degeneration, improbity, fraud, deceit and vice. But
whatever dictionary meaning the term has, it is now predominantly associated with a
failure in the performance or observance of a public duty by someone who is
considered to be am actor in the public sphere. A Commonwealth paper on
corruption offers this working definition:
Corruption… [is] the wrongful exercise of public duty for direct or consequential
personal gain … Quite apart from the harmful effects which corruption may have
on the actual processes of democracy, government, the law and the judiciary, the
corrupt act is inherently undemocratic.3
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A document issued by the Independent Commission Against Corruption of New
South Wales, Australia states:
What is corruption? Corruption commonly involves the dishonest or preferential
use of power or position which has the result of one person or organisation being
advantaged over another. It includes the conduct of non public officials who
cause public officials to misuse their power or position. The community expects
public officials to perform their duties with honesty and in the best interests of
the public. Corruption involves a breach of public trust and leads to inequality,
wasted resources and wasted public money. A key notion when considering
whether or not corrupt conduct has occurred is the misuse of public office in the
public sector of New South Wales.4
There are some authorities which appear to suggest that the word ‘corruptly’ where
it appears in legislation denotes merely action which is deliberate.5 There are others
that suggest that it imposes a requirement of purposefully doing the act that the
legislation forbids.6 These are authorities that are concerned with the offering of
bribes to public officials which indicate that the innocent receipt of a bribe by the
recipient does not constitute corruption.7 The general tendency, however, is to say
that the element of corruption does not require proof of any special element such as
evil, immorality, dishonesty, wickedness, iniquity, improbity or deceit.8 Something is
corrupt simply if it “does something that the legislature forbids”.9
The definition of corruption in section 8 of the Independent Commission Against
Corruption Act 1988 (N.S.W.) in fact shows how broad the concept has become in
terms of the types of conduct which can be considered corrupt. According to that
section corruption includes: “official misconduct, bribery, blackmail, obtaining or
offering secret commissions, fraud, theft, perverting the course of justice,
embezzlement, election bribery, election funding offences, election fraud, treating
(corruptly influencing a person’s vote), tax evasion, revenue evasion, currency
violations, illegal drug dealings, illegal gambling, obtaining financial benefit from vice
engaged in by others, bankruptcy and company violations, harbouring criminals,
forgery, treason or other offences against the Sovereign, homicide or violence and any
conspiracy or attempt to conspire in relation to any of the above.” Not all of these
are in fact crimes. Where they are civil matters, however, the general tendency has
been for the courts to require proof of corrupt activity according to the criminal
standard of proof or something approximating it.10 But it tends to be the fact that the
relevant activity relates to a public official that brings out the association with
corruption. It is this which also allegedly warrants special treatment of corruption
within the legal system.
Corruption as a Legal Concept
There is no specifically designated crime of corruption in English law, although it
might be an element in certain criminal conduct as we have seen — for example,
something done with an intention to corrupt or done corruptly. In Woolmington v
the Director of Public Prosecutions11 the House of Lords gave recognition to a
3 9
common law offence of corrupting public morals. The corrupting circumstance in
that case was running a brothel, clearly an element of supposed immorality. This case
is therefore sometimes displayed as an attempt to show that there often is a moral
content to the law. This is a claim that stops short of the natural law claim that there
is always a moral criterion that determines the validity of law. It also stops short of
the contention that the legal condemnation of corruption is based essentially on
moral grounds.
One of the primary legal senses of corruption has long been that of bribery. Put
another way, bribery is perhaps the classical legal sense of corruption. Bribery conveys
the basic idea of procuring or attempting to procure favourable actions on the part
of a public official by the payment or offer of a reward. In English law the bribery of
public officials was a common law misdemeanour. Bribery of and by agents was also
recognised as a misdemeanour under the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1906 and
1916 (UK). There are now several statutes which deem corruption or bribery and
corruption an offence — see in the UK for example, the Public Bodies Corrupt
Practices Act 1889, the Sale of Offices Acts 1551 and 1809 and the Representation of
the People Act 1949. There is now also legislation in some jurisdictions which
prohibits the taking by public officers of secret commissions for the performance of
their duties.12
There is no doubt that bribery has been regarded as a serious breach of public trust
and, in criminal cases, has attracted the imposition of serious penalties. For example,
in R v Nath13 Perry J. said (at 119):
A breach by persons holding public office of the duty to act honestly in the
performance of their public duties is a most serious matter which should
ordinarily attract a substantial penalty.
In R v Challoner,14 a case involving fraud by a branch bank manager, Kirby P. said
(at 375):
There is no doubt that a long line of authority in this court lays down the
principle that, in offences of this kind, by persons in a position of trust involving
the manipulation of public monies, a custodial sentence is normally required.
The concept of corruption is now clearly much wider than mere bribery although, no
doubt, this remains one of its primary senses. Although corruption is frequently
linked with the activities of organised crime this is not necessarily the case. One thing
that the link with organised crime does show us is that corruption need not involve
something so simple as an isolated act undertaken by a public official done in return
for the offer of a reward or payment. The techniques, and indeed the conduct,
involved might be much more subtle than mere payment or offers of reward to
procure particular outcomes.
It should be noted that now, particularly in those statutes constituting corruption
investigation agencies, legal definitions appear which widen the concept of
corruption considerably. Evidence of this has been provided above. The focus is now
much more on maintaining the performance of duties and standards by public
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officials. This is not to say that it is only the acts of public officials that can be
regarded as corrupt for the purposes of the law. The breach by a fiduciary (say a
trustee or a corporate director) of his or her duty to act in the best interests of the
entity which he or she controls is a significant form of corruption which the law, and
more especially equity, has long sought to control. There are clearly parallels between
the logic applied with respect to the corrupt activities of public actors and the
principles of public law in the general area of equitable fraud, breach of fiduciary duty
and so on.
In fact the two cases just mentioned (public and private corruption) are not so
distinct as is sometimes thought. Fiduciaries are, by definition, persons who are
obliged to act in the interests of others rather than in their own interest. They are
obliged to avoid conflicts of duty and interest (including the payment of bribes).
Public officials and politicians are really in the position of fiduciaries and, in some
jurisdictions, they have been explicitly treated as such for some purposes. This has
been taken as an implicit part of the conferral of political power for the purposes of
administrative law. The power is conferred on trust. For example, in Manunivavalagi
Dalituicama Korovulasvula v Public Service Commission15 it was said 
The Common Law makes it clear that, generally speaking a statutory power
conferred on any person or authority for public purposes is conferred as it were,
upon trust and not absolutely. Accordingly the holder of such a power does not
have an unfettered discretion in exercising the power.
Some of the bribery cases such as R. v Nath and R. v Challoner (both above) have
treated the action in question as a breach of trust reposed in a public official. But that
is not quite the same as enforcement as a fiduciary duty. Unfortunately, imposing a
fiduciary duty on someone operates merely as an ex post facto attempt to rectify a
breach of the duty on behalf of someone whose interest, usually a proprietary interest,
has been affected. It has not been, and would not be, entirely effective in eliminating
or perhaps lessening corruption. The anti-corruption measures, which we will
examine in a moment, have a much broader purpose.
IS  CORRUPTION ENDEMIC IN
POLITICAL/LEGAL SYSTEMS?
There are divergent views on how far corruption is an inevitable part of all political
systems. The ideologically conservative view is that corruption is part of human nature
and therefore will be an aspect of all forms of human interrelationship. That is so
whether the relationship be realised in national politics, Pacific as well as Western
politics, commerce, village or local administration, corporations and clubs, families or
other such forms of association. Yet such an answer is too simple, in my view. For one
thing, corruption does not appear all the time, nor does it colour all forms of
relationship at all times. The proposition that people are basically or primarily bad is,
to anyone with any reasonable experience of human affairs, quite a naïve and untenable
proposition. It would, of course, be just as naïve and untenable to claim that
corruption and other forms of ‘badness’, do not exist at all. Corruption is, as has been
conceded already, a prevalent aspect of contemporary life and, especially, public life.
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However, corruption in the public sphere has sometimes been treated as if it were
prevalent only in certain forms of society — for example in underdeveloped or third
world societies. The impression has been, indeed that it was or is a characteristic of
those societies; that is, corruption was or is institutionalised in them as an aspect of
the stage of development. The causes are sometimes taken to be poor economic
conditions, ineptitude of administration or the poor education of public officials.
Sometimes it is the existence of the traditional structure of society that is inconsistent
with the regime of public administration imposed by colonisers which is treated as the
primary cause. According to this theory the assumption behind the neutral
administrative role of a public service (bureaucracy) on the Western model does not
work when it falls into the hands of those who have loyalties which lie elsewhere.
Post-colonial societies such as India are often targeted for attention as examples.16
Hargreaves, for example, once wrote of the Indian bureaucracy:
One major element in the effective operation — and in the public image — of
bureaucracy is corruption. Whilst most people continue to see government
service as prestigious, their confidence in it is low. Public servants are described as
ineffectual, self-seeking, and dishonest. In a survey of residents of Delhi State,
almost 60 percent felt that at least half the government officials were corrupt.
Corruption may be greatly exaggerated in India because economically frustrated
individuals seek a scapegoat in official misbehaviour, but A.D. Gorwala argues
that “the psychological atmosphere produced by the persistent and unfavourable
comment is itself the cause of further moral deterioration, for people will begin
to adapt their methods, even for securing a legitimate right, to what they believe
to be the tendency of men in power and office”. Moreover, the public may decry
corruption, but traditional attitudes often condone it, and fatalism may lead many
to accept it as inevitable. Nepotism is officially condemned, but in traditional
terms it may be viewed as loyalty to one’s family friends and community.17
On the other hand, the occurrence of corruption in Western societies is sometimes
supposed to be rare or, at least, very occasional and nothing approximating its
institutional occurrence in third world countries. It might still be the case that the
occurrence of corruption in economically less developed countries is higher. But it is
a significant factor in the developed countries as well. However, more recent
experience has shown that corruption in Western societies has been much more
regular and institutionalised than otherwise thought. Hence the pointing of the
finger at underdeveloped or eastern countries alone was unfair. Confirming this, a
recent report on OECD countries begins:
OECD countries are concerned about declining confidence in government. This
so-called “confidence deficit” has been fueled by well publicised “scandals”,
ranging from inappropriate actions on the part of public officials, to full-scale
corruption. Few, if any, Member countries have escaped the taint, if not the reality
of wrongdoing. As a result, ethics or standards in public life have become an
important public and political issue.18
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Some research has been published by the University of Goettingen and Transparency
International on corruption in various countries throughout the world.19 The report
covers only 85 countries — less than half of the countries in the world. Unfortunately
the South Pacific does not receive a mention at all. A score of 10 indicates the least
level of perceived corruption. The lower the score the worse the perceived corruption
level. The best rankings were: Denmark (10.0) Finland (9.6) Sweden (9.5) New
Zealand (9.4) Iceland (9.3) Canada (9.2) Singapore (9.1) Netherlands (9. 0) Norway
(9.0) Switzerland (8.9) Australia, Luxembourg, United Kingdom (8.7).The ten
worst were : Vietnam (2.5) Russia (2.4) Ecuador (2.3) Venezuela (2.3) Colombia
(2.2) Indonesia (2.0) Nigeria (1.9) Tanzania (1.9) Honduras (1.7) Paraguay (1.5)
Cameroon (1.4).
This is an index compiled on the basis of perceptions of corruption held by members
of the public, business and non-government organisations. It is not a survey of actual
corruption which would, of course, be extremely difficult if not impossible to survey
simply because much of it is undetected. It is a ranking only. Hence a score of 10 for
Denmark does not indicate and absence of corruption in that country. It just means
that it obtained the best score. Significantly, however, it appears that over fifty of the
countries failed to attain a score of at least five which is a remarkably poor
performance. One can merely conjecture how the South Pacific countries might have
ranked given the many reported instances of corruption which have occurred in
recent times. On recent indications they would certainly not rank very highly. If the
exercise is one based on perception of corruption then one would expect the
perception level of corruption throughout the Pacific to be high. For one thing these
are small countries where often corruption is a matter of common knowledge.
Additionally, that common knowledge or awareness simply does not seem to lead to
an impetus to reform.
SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO COMBAT CORRUPTION?
There was once a view that corruption, in certain sorts of environments, including
bureaucratic environments, could be seen in positive terms. It achieved effective
results where this was otherwise impossible or unlikely. One could argue, for
example, that corruption in certain developing countries at least provided a means of
getting the job done. Many large corporations have had the experience of dealing
with bureaucracies in these countries in just this way. If bribery is necessary to get the
corporate project under way then bribery as the means is justified by the end. To take
another view of it, could one argue that if corruption benefits a majority of the
community and harms no-one in particular and, as an aside, also gets things done,
should it be condoned or at least tolerated?
Say, for example, that it is of importance that a particular bureaucratic action should
be undertaken to ensure that a building project of major importance to the economic
well-being of a section of the community in a small island state should be undertaken.
Several jobs will result if the work goes ahead. It will produce considerable revenue
for the people of the island state as a whole because it will dramatically increase the
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revenue of the country. The bureaucracy in the country  is renowned for its
inefficiency and incompetence. It has had the development application for over a year
and nothing has happened. Wouldn’t a small bribe by the developer to an official to
get the job done be tolerable in the interests of the overall well being of the
community concerned? What harm is there in producing effective bureaucratic
action? Many would oppose such a view on the ground that corruption is absolutely
wrong on moral grounds and ought to be opposed and condemned wherever it
occurs on that basis. Corruption ought to be seen as a crime and it should be referred
to criminal investigation divisions for investigation, detection and prosecution. In
short, corruption must not be condoned. It must be rooted out and the corrupt
brought to justice.
Corruption and ineffficiency
But whatever the moral issue involved, such a position of moral condemnation never
seems to have worked very well. If anything it has been a realisation of the failure of
the moral high ground position, just referred to, which seems to have produced
somewhat more effective measures in combating corruption. The move in this
direction came initially from large business organisations in the 1980s. There appears
to have been an increasing awareness of the need to combat corruption. It was a
recognition which went hand in hand with the so-called white collar crime
phenomenon. White collar crime, or crime committed by officers and employees of
corporations, had long been outlawed by corporations legislation and, for the most
part, subjected to harsh criminal sanctions. But such crimes were notoriously difficult
to prosecute successfully. Furthermore, they attracted unwanted attention to the
corporation involved with the publicity potentially able to do damage to the public
image of the company and, more especially, to the image of the corporation in
financial or investment circles. 
Hence an alternative strategy was thought appropriate in this area on the part of both
corporations themselves and on the part of corporate legislators. Firstly, as noted
already, the business corporations came to see corruption within a corporation as
counter productive to the general nature of the enterprise. Corporations which had
sound ethical business practices seemed to perform better on the stock exchange and
to outperform those which didn’t. In other words, big business started to adopt
measures to combat corruption within organisations, not because it was perceived as
morally wrong but because it was bad for business. In the business world moral issues
rarely count. It is turnover and the competitive edge which matters most. Corruption
was and is seen as counterproductive to business performance. This, of course, is not
quite the same view opposing corruption that we might be used to.
On the other hand, corporate regulators, realising the ineffectiveness of hard-line
criminal prosecutions in counteracting white collar crime, proceeded to create
particular categories of quasi-criminal liability — what is in essence a form of civil
liability. Certainly this measure facilitated proof against the delinquent officer but it
also lessened the stigma attaching to the corrupt action against the corporation. The
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business management view of corruption — as something which was
counterproductive to the enterprise and appropriate for alternative strategies of
elimination — then seems to have filtered through to the public sector. One of the
reasons for this was the adoption of the new approaches to public sector management
which sought to adopt business strategies and private sector management techniques
to improve the efficiency of the bureaucracy. 
Corruption and Political Legitimacy
The prevention of corruption is not just a matter which goes to the achievement of
efficiency in the operations of government. I think that this is of as little worth in
explaining the phenomenon of corruption as cavalier condemnations of the
immorality or evil of corruption. An important factor which is of greater signficance
than either of these is that of maintenance of political legitimacy of the institutions
within a given political and/or legal system. These are the institutions which are basic
to the stability of the political system and the maintenance of some sense of order and
regularity in it. The term ‘institutions’ here should be taken broadly enough to
include not only the likes of parliament and the courts but the other institutions
established by and as part of the operation of the law. Thus it would include such
established principles as fundamental constitutional guarantees of human rights, due
process and the like. Enshrined egalitarian principles are, indeed, the most
immediately offended by corrupt activities because the latter provide access for some
to advantages and benefits which are not capable of enjoyment by other citizens. It
is clear enough that order and regularity within any politico-legal system are
sometimes matters which are over-emphasised, most usually by conservatives, as
factors necessary to human life. They have to be balanced against the need for
innovation and change, but they are, nonetheless, important factors.
It is common enough to hear of crises of political legitimacy in the modern and post-
modern worlds. The element of legitimacy means different things to different authors
and indeed the causes of alleged crises in legitimacy is as debatable as the proposals
for their rectification. But in one vital sense legitimacy does involve questions of the
acceptance by the population at large of the place and the functions of established
institutions. Corruption is clearly a major factor which has the potential to devalue
the operation of these institutions and to characterise them in the public mind
sometimes as worthless or unjust and sometimes as having fallen into disuse. To
illustrate this, take the case of the judiciary. If the decisions of judges were the
product of corruption on the part of occupants of judicial office, they would not be
decisions according to law. They would not be impartial. They would be prejudiced.
The consequence of this would clearly be that citizens, other than those initiating the
corruption perhaps, would lose faith in the judicial system and most likely resort to
extra legal means to resolve their disputes. That in turn would cause widespread
instability in the political system itself.
It is not too difficult to draw out further examples of the destabilising effects of
corruption relating to other primary institutions including those for the making and
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administration of law. Nor is it too difficult to see why corruption is perceived as a
danger to the role of institutions of government whether we take them as strictly
democratic in any complete sense or not. Just what constitutes a democracy is an
arguable concept from the point of view of political theory. However if we assume,
as many would do, that it has much to do with the effective role of a parliament,
courts of law and a neutral executive, then the erosion of their legitimacy is also a
challenge to democracy in that sense. There are other less acceptable alternatives and
corruption clearly points us in the direction of some of the least desirable of these
alternatives. 
CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY AND THE SOUTH
PACIFIC COUNTRIES
We have seen how eliminating corruption is regarded by many as essential to
maintaining democracy and the democratic process in various ways. It has significance
for the legitimacy of political institutions. Its elimination encourages better business
practice on the part of bureaucracies and governments. Corruption has the capacity
to erode fundamental human rights to be enjoyed by people within the system and
to undermine the rule of law and basic political institutions. 
In this context it could be said that democracy assumes a predominantly liberal
conception of a desirable system of government. On this view, government is seen as
serving the interests of those individuals who are governed by it. In the so-called
Western sphere it is premised on assumptions relating to the individual composition
of society. 
The democratic institutions of government, in this sense, were brought to the Pacific
countries as part of the colonial inheritance. This is true enough, although it would
be wrong to say that the original colonial institutions of government were themselves
democratic. They were the agencies of colonial rule rather than agencies of popular
government. Parliamentary democracy was slow to emerge in these countries and was
only achieved through various stages leading towards independence. Many Pacific
countries have subsequently adopted some anti-corruption measures and agencies
along the lines of Western countries, although this has not been as extensive as
elsewhere. There remains in fact a certain degree of both ambivalence and ignorance
about these institutions, their basic functions and their objectives. 
One reason for this is the lack of education and training of public officials (and the
general public) in matters pertaining to codes of conduct, political responsibility,
competence and ethics awareness. So far as politicians are concerned there have been
few political systems which have required that political representatives have minimal
educational qualifications to hold office. Yet the jobs they perform are often
intellectually demanding, carrying high levels of financial responsibility and indeed
often requiring considerable business acumen. It is not difficult to point to many
instances where there have been Attorney Generals or their equivalents who hold no
legal qualifications, Ministers of Finance who cannot understand a simple balance
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sheet and Ministers of Education who have no formal educational training at even the
most basic level. There is an element of failure of any democratic system where those
who are elected often do not have the simple competence to engage in informed and
sensible debate concerning the future of a country and its people. No wonder that
when they are forced into dealings which all manner of scheisters and articulate con-
artists, they are often left short. This is a ready road to corruption. Apart from this
there have been numerous areas in which persons who are elected to political office
have no understanding of the responsibilities which attach to their office. Little
wonder again that they perform in a manner which is wholly different from
expectations. Unfortunately the same comments can often be extended to non-elected
public officials who obtain office not on the basis of merit but through political
patronage. Whilst these problems are not unique to South Pacific countries it is a
considerable factor in the region, as with other so-called developing countries.
Sometimes corruption on the part of public officials can be explained not by greed or
criminal dispositions per se. It is often simply a matter of ignorance. People are elected
from backgrounds which are steeped in customary obligations. They frequently have
no idea what the nature of the office to which they are elected requires of them in
terms of simple accountability and responsibility. Although this is not, of course, the
only cause of corruption in South Pacific countries, it is a pervasive one.
A more fundamental reason for the ambivalence towards the existing political
institutions is their perceived relevance. Why should one really set to work upholding
institutions which appear rather remote from cultural experience in any event? It is a
point which might well need addressing before effective moves to combat corruption
can even begin. If we perceive corruption as simply something which is anti-
democratic in the western liberal sense of that term then we will likely be drawn into
numerous side issues about the relevance of democracy in that sense to these
countries. Many Pacific societies are ordered according to traditional lines of
authority which might be better called monarchic or oligarchic, but not democratic.
If, for example, chiefly authority is a predominant factor in such societies, as it mostly
is, the system cannot be understood as democratic in the liberal sense. If they are
communally based societies as we are often told, then one couldn’t say that the
individual members of them are possessed of certain fundamental rights against those
who rule. Their primary position is that they owe obligations to the community. It is
on this basis that we often hear about concepts such as Asian style democracy or
leader-democracy. The contention here is that developing or new countries, or those
countries which are remarkably different from European countries in their social
composition, cannot have the luxury of democracy on the Western model. If they are
not to be called democratic on the Western liberal model does that mean that the
elimination of corruption cannot be justified because it is democratic to do so? 
To agree with the above statement is somewhat unpalatable if one accepts that
corruption necessarily results in political instability. Rather, one might want to say
that South Pacific countries are democratic but in a rather different sense from that
understood elsewhere. Perhaps their makeup is more appropriate to a communitarian
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concept of democracy.20 It is to be borne in mind, of course, that in most of the world
it is better to be seen as democratic than not. The constitution of the former USSR
proclaimed that it was a democratic constitution. So did that of Cuba. This may
simply be because democracy is, as I have said, a ‘good’ word in international politics,
just as perhaps communism is now a ‘bad’ word. However that might be, it is still
arguable that democracy is just one form of government which does not necessarily
require precise implementation of particular models draws from elsewhere. There can
be just forms of government which might not conform closely to the liberal model
of democracy. Would corruption still be condemned in such systems? I would think
so on the basis of the destabilising effect of corruption on any such system. It is
condemned because of its challenge to the legitimacy of basic political institutions
whatever they might be.
In societies such as those of the South Pacific which are based to some considerable
extent on custom one might think that there is some basic brake against corruption
which is provided by the operation of the customary system which provides at least
some restraint against interference with traditional values. But clearly custom is a fluid
set of practices which can enhance the possibility of corruption in many ways. Clever
leaders can, and often do, manipulate the appeal to customary practices and
obligations to achieve purposes which are foreign to them.21 In fact, the simple
existence of introduced law alongside customary systems often creates what could
best be termed a confusion of authority, which frequently lends itself to exploitative
practices, distortion and misrepresentation by leaders and public officials who are
determined to achieve particular ends of their own. It is not the mere existence of
custom as such but the duality of the system in which it operates which creates this
particular confusion.
As a final point we should perhaps acknowledge that the move to adopt anti-
corruption measures of a particular type is not only a matter which is driven by
national politics. Of course it could be questioned how high corruption would be on
the agenda of South Pacific countries if the matter was simply left to these countries
alone. There are, however, numerous external pressures for the adoption of reforms
of a particular type. Much of the agenda of the small island states is written elsewhere.
The pressures brought on a country can be direct or indirect. They might range from
encouragement to diplomatic argument at various levels. Or countries might be
encouraged by economic rewards — for example, tied grants of aid which are often
made on the basis that a country will introduce systematic reforms including legal
anti-corruption measures. The involvement of the European Union in bringing
pressure through the sugar concession for human rights reform in Fiji is one
pertinent example. The role of international development agencies such as the World
Bank22 and the Asian Development Bank as well as foreign government agencies in
bringing about the Comprehensive Reform Programme in Vanuatu is another. True
enough, many people see this as a form of interference in the local political makeup
or political sovereignty of a country. But the fact is that the smaller players in
international politics are often at the whim of the larger countries. This frequently
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leads to a situation where law reform is introduced which does not really reflect what
we could call public opinion or the public mandate. And when it does occur in areas
which are a challenge to established cultural values and practices then there is dissent
about the need for reform in the first place. Put another way, there is apathy about
what might otherwise be entirely justifiable commitment to reform.
Given the existing ambivalence towards political institutions that are perceived to be
irrelevant impositions, it is hard to see how ‘imposed’ anti-corruption law reform
agendas will achieve their desired effects throughout the Pacific. Instead it would
seem that an approach that goes back to basics — first of all considering how political
institutions can be structured to make them relevant for each Pacific island country,
and then considering the meaning of corruption and the role of anti-corruption
measures within these institutions — will be required to meaningfully address
corruption within the Pacific.
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3.  GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY AND THE 
RULE OF LAW IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
By: Graham Hassall
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Autocthonous
Something that is autocthonous is formed, or originates, in the place that it is
found. In this context the term is used when discussing constitutions that have
been home-grown rather than imposed by outsiders or borrowed from western
constitutional models.
Governance
Governance comprises the traditions, institutions, mechanisms and processes that
determine how power is exercised. The concept of governance extends beyond
formal government institutions, and includes a consideration of the role of
citizens and non-governmental organisations (often referred to as civil society)
and the insitutitions and processes by which civil society participates in
governance within a society.
Modern/modernity
Modernism is a complex term used by a number of disciplines, including art
history, literature studies and political studies. Within politics it is often used to
represent a particular order that is based on a number of concepts that are in
themselves complex. These include the concepts of nationhood and the rule of
law. Also characteristic of modernity is the use of rationality or reason and a belief
in certainty. The concept of ‘western’ industrialised nations may be thought to be
an expression of modernity.
Nationalism
Nationalism refers to a commitment to nationhood and represents a complex
web of ideas about the nature of the state and membership of it. Nations are
imagined to be geographical and political communities of limited boundaries that
are in themselves sovereign. They are often imagined to be ‘natural’ phenomena,
arising because of ‘natural’ ethnic unity.
The rule of law
There are a number of definitions of, or jurisprudential statements on, the rule of
law, with the jurist Albert V. Dicey’s conception of the rule of law being possibly
the most familiar. Key elements of the concept are limits to the exercise of power,
equality before the law, predictable and stable laws and procedures and the
separation of powers between various state authorities. 
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter suggests that some of the difficulties now facing the states that came to
independence in the South Pacific at different times in the second half of the
twentieth century derive from the manner in which they were constituted. Although
any state, at any time, may face political crises or economic setbacks, the seemingly
endemic nature of corrupt practices by politicians and of societal unrest in such states
as Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji Islands suggests the
presence of conflict at more fundamental levels. Concerns at the ability of new states
to govern are not new. However, notions of quite recent origin that look at capacities
for governance rather than just ideologies of political and legal legitimacy allow one
to view the actual operation of constitutions in various Pacific island states in a new
way. How well do the state systems that were established at independence provide
governance to their citizens? If it is found that the institutions provided by the
constitution create more disorder than order, deliver less justice than more, and result
in deteriorating social and economic conditions rather than the reverse, then
questions must be asked about regeneration of the constitutional foundations, as
much as about their day-to-day operation. 
In the South Pacific, where the essential aspects of the modern approach to law and
constitution were adopted at independence, a survey of their subsequent operation
suggests that capacities for governance remain limited, and that the legitimacy of
introduced law remains contested. The multiple hindrances to the operation of
introduced law include:
• how parliaments are functioning and how parliamentarians are acting
(for instance legislative inaction, use of no confidence motions, use of electoral
development funds, constituency representation);
• failures within electoral systems (for instance volatility of political parties,
electoral violence); 
• judicial scrutiny and activism (for instance controversy in the areas of finding
the underlying law and protection of human rights, lack of judicial
independence); 
• the functioning of the executive, particularly cabinet ministers (for instance
lack of accountability, difficulties in the provision of services such as health,
education, transport and infrastructure); 
• the functioning of a number of other executive agencies including the police
and the defence forces; and 
• the level of maturity of civil society. 
How is it that new nations, defined so clearly in modern constitutions and laws, have
not gained the moral authority promised at the moment of independence? This
chapter suggests that one possible cause of so much contestation (and hence one
crucial factor in establishing constitutional legitimacy) is the inadequate measures
taken to ‘ground’ independence constitutions in the will of the people. Clearly, this
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is a question about values as much as about the efficacy of law. This chapter also
proposes that the legitimacy of modern law and constitutions must be examined in
the light of both normative considerations as well as more systemic approaches.
Although modern states and law were introduced to the region from outside, with an
expectation that the rule of law would be a sufficient support for development,
modernisation, order and progress, insufficient attention was paid to the validity of
the modern law system as a whole, or to the methods by which this system generated
legitimacy in the eyes of those who are subject to it as citizens.
Constitutions and Governance
A constitutional system might be described as the sum of state and non-state actors
that determine and affect the distribution and use of state power. The constitution
channels the public power of the people. As described by Jan-Erik Lane, “...implicit
in the concept of a constitution is the notion of restraints on State power”.1 Modern
constitutions seek to be effective and to provide the legal framework for the activities
of all citizens (and others) in the state. When I say effective, I mean that they intend
to influence the behaviour of every member of society by making laws about what is
permissible to do and what is ‘illegal’. The extent of effectiveness of a constitution
can, perhaps, be determined by examining governance in a particular country.
Governance refers to the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority
to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their
legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.2 The idea of
governance is being promoted by states, intergovernmental agencies, and civil
society.3 It is also being explored in relation to Pacific island countries’ constitutions,
and the proper operation of government. 4 The concept of governance requires a state
to find new ways of asserting its legitimacy and reinforcing its capacities to govern by
consent. These new mechanisms include improving accountability, allowing for
freedom of association and participation, providing free and fair legal frameworks in
which individuals can act, allowing access to information, improving public sector
efficiency, and boosting levels of cooperation between branches of government, the
business sector and civil society.
Modernity and the Rule of Law
The constitutions that frame the exercise of state power in the new Pacific nations
signify the legal norms of modernity. The term ‘modern’ has a particular meaning. It
doesn’t just mean contemporary, or in our times. Sociologist Anthony Giddens
describes modernity as “…the institutions and modes of behaviour established first of
all in post-feudal Europe, but which in the twentieth century increasingly have
become world-historical in their impact”.5 For present purposes, modernity will be
used to signify a complex network of social norms, economic models, and political
ideals sometimes summarised as ‘the rule of law’.6
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The rule of law is a doctrine concerning the proper construction of law and
application of law developed in the United Kingdom and exported to other legal
jurisdictions by the forces of history.7 Under the ideology of colonialism, the doctrine
sought to impose reason on very different human societies. The ordering processes
were known as pacification and development.8 Modern conceptions of ‘the
constitution’ and ‘the law’ have come to the Pacific as part of this world-historical
process. They seek to establish a paradigm of relations between members of society,
and between the individual, the community, and the state. 
The doctrine states that all people must be treated equally before the law, even though
they may be acting for the monarch. The doctrine states, furthermore, that power will
only be exercised in accordance with law. In other words, power will not be used
arbitrarily. Additionally, the doctrine presumes the presence and desirability of a number
of fundamental rights of citizens, including rights to freedom of the person, of speech, of
movement and association. To speak of the rule of law, in other words, is to conjure a
matrix of legal rules, values, institutions, and procedures, the absence of any one of which
will lead to calls for the restoration of/ adherence to/ upholding of the rule of law. 
The term rule of law is often used when describing approval or disapproval of the
action or inaction of a government or a court. The rule of law is also sometimes
referred to as constitutionalism, which has as its principal motivation the “restraining
of state power”, and “protection of the relatively powerless (individuals and
minorities) from oppression by the powerful.”9 The rule of law is thus a doctrine of
legitimation for those who hold and exercise power in a constitutional state. Why is
their tenure legitimate? Because they ‘uphold the rule of law’ (i.e., they restrain their
use of power in accordance with the laws, which are made by them with the consent
of ‘the people’).
THE LEGITIMACY OF MODERN LAW
The legitimacy of modern law derives from statements about the origin of law and
about how the law is to be applied. The intention of modern law is to locate
sovereignty in the people and treat every member of society equally before the law.
The origin of the law, therefore, is said to be the will of the people, consenting to the
law (through some sort of social contract) as it is a device to uphold their sovereignty
and the rights that this entails. The second source of legitimacy, how the law is to be
applied, is also a monitor of the legitimacy of the origins of the law, as law will only
be effectively applied if it is popularly supported (in the absence of ‘tyrannical’
coercion). 
In the initial decades following the attainment of independence by the small island
groups in the South Pacific problems of colonial rule were supplanted by those of
new nations. By the mid-1990s the stability of states was being challenged from
within as much as from external factors. Ethnic conflict had destabilised Fiji, and
separatist conflicts had greatly affected Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.
Corrupt practices by politicians and public servants greatly occupied the media and
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state-agencies charged with upholding the law in these countries as well as such
nearby states as Tonga, Vanuatu, Nauru, Cook Islands, French Polynesia and Samoa.
The modern Pacific island state, like so many others beyond the Pacific region, gives
the appearance of being populated by citizens who place more emphasis on self-
interest than public service. Within this atmosphere of corruption and instability the
law is patently ineffective. This ineffectiveness is not rooted purely in resource issues
that hinder the timely application of the law. Rather, a more fundamental disrespect
for the law and its origins is indicated. 
The grounding of legitimacy in constitutional assent
Although modern law locates sovereignty in the people and seeks to treat every
member of society equally before the law, the constitutions of Pacific island states
were rarely founded on consent by the people. On the contrary, most states in the
region can truly be regarded as post-colonial in that their constitutional values and
practices were either copied from colonial authorities or established in reaction to
them. Colonial authorities, believing that subject peoples had little understanding of
the issues at hand (and seeking to economise on time and expenses), generally
established expert commissions or at best constituent assemblies comprising people’s
representatives, to complete constitutional exercises on their behalf. On this point
Ghai has written:
In Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, vigorous attempts were made to
consult with the people, through questionnaires and tours of the country by
committees set up to recommend on the constitution for independence.
However, the choices offered to the people, derived largely from the experience
of the colonial powers, were complex, and their intricacies probably beyond the
comprehension of most people. While this consultation lent an aura of legitimacy
to the constitution, it did not significantly influence its contents.10
In the case of the British colonies, consultation within the colony was frequently limited
to elite members of the various ethnic communities co-existing in the colony. The
resulting constitutions were not the result of the free expression of the people but were
rather the evidence of compromise between departing colonial masters and incoming
national elites. In the cases of Solomon Islands, Gilbert Islands and Fiji, for instance,
discussions on independence constitutions were held in London. Such constitutions, as
a consequence, primarily allow access to the state by elites (usually recipients of western
education or otherwise privileged under colonial rule), whether as representatives or as
beneficiaries. The language of the law is not that of ‘the people’. 
There are other rationalisations than simple colonial paternalism for the lack of
traditional concepts of governance being incorporated into Pacific island
constitutions. By way of further rationalisation for such an approach Ghai has
suggested:
Despite consultation with the people and the active involvement of their leaders,
the constitutions cannot be said to be rooted in indigenous concepts of power,
authority, and decision making, for a number of reasons. These lie in the difficulty
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of expanding these concepts, which are peculiar to an island or group, to the
national scale; in the constitutional evolution over several decades of colonial rule
along Western lines; in the emergence to eminence of an educated, Christianised
and Westernised elite with a loyalty to and dependence on modern state
institutions; and in the influence of successive bureaucrats and consultants. With
them, notions of economic development and state management of resources had
primacy, militating against experiments in participatory democracy.11
This modernist approach to nation-building through constitution-making had
intended and unintended consequences. The resulting constitutions mirror those of
the metropolitan powers, and almost all Pacific island states chose at independence a
constitutional form familiar to them from the colonial era. Those associated with
Britain, Australia and New Zealand operate parliamentary systems while those
associated with France and the United States, presidential. They generally ignore the
diversity of traditions within Pacific societies in their search for homogeneity and they
are — consequently — elitist in nature, and valued more among the western educated
than among the majority, whose constitutions (or systems of governance) continue
to operate at village level. Perhaps most significantly, they don’t fully come to terms
with the orders of governance that pre-existed colonial rule and which continue to
hold great significance (under the labels ‘customary law’ and ‘traditional leaders’)
over the majority of the people.
At independence there was a vision of national parliaments replacing the foreign
‘received’ law with more relevant enactments and of national courts contributing law
based more firmly on custom. Papua New Guinea’s Constitution, for instance,
expounds the doctrine of the ‘underlying law’, an indigenous common law that
parliament and the judiciary were to create. This has not been the post-colonial
experience, however, with programs of law reform faltering, and courts explaining
that judgments based on custom were dependent on the quality of arguments placed
before the courts that relied on such custom. John Gawi wrote in 1985 his view that
the problem of Papua New Guinea’s legal order was an institutional one. He
suggested that the common law had become so entrenched in the country’s legal
system prior to independence, that it had become “an integral part of Papua New
Guinean society”:
Because of the nebulous nature of our pre-existing institutions (traditional
institutions), common law with its institutional structure was able to force the
traditional institutions to conform to the framework of the common law. What,
in effect, happened was that our traditional institutions had been subsumed into
the institutional framework of common law. Therefore, before the Constitution
came, the only way we were able to describe our traditional institutions was to
describe them by labels imposed on them by common law…. Our only hope was
the Constitution, but the Constitution has failed. In fact the forces of common
law are such that the Constitution is now being forced to conform to the
institutions of common law. Every constitutional provision purportedly
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interpreted by the courts in Papua New Guinea is as good as a dead provision.
As time goes by, and before we know it, the process of subsumption will
be complete.12
Within the South Pacific region some progress has been made toward recovering an
authentic constitution, or at least one which will not subjugate traditional orders of
governance to western modes of order. When Solomon Islands conducted a
constitutional review in the late 1980s, Prime Minister Alebua described the
intention to his fellow parliamentarians:
Mr Speaker sir… the Constitutional Review Committee was deliberately set up
without any outside legal advisor. Because what we are trying to work towards is
a constitution of and for the Solomon Islands. Once we start putting in foreign
influences sir, certainly it won’t be a Solomon Islands Constitution.13
Another interesting instance of a people attempting to re-establish an authentic
constitutional order occurred recently in Vanuatu. In February 1997 custom chiefs
from four villages on the island of Ambae produced their own constitution
establishing the responsibility of chiefs of certain villages in the area to protect and
safeguard the general welfare of their people, protect and promote traditional values,
resolve disputes and disagreements and assist the police and other authorities,
including churches, schools and other social welfare institutions. Vanuatu’s
Constitution recognises custom chiefs but does not define their role in decision-
making about non-traditional matters.
Such attempts have not, however, resulted in any substantive or formal changes to
Pacific island constitutions. As the modern constitutions remain divorced from
traditional order so too does the origin of the law in the will of the people remain, in
large part, a fiction. This issue is at the heart of the failure of legitimacy of the rule of
law in Pacific island states.
Legitimacy, assent and nationalism
A further challenge to constitutional legitimacy comes from the often
unacknowledged link between social and political philosophies and constitutional
design and practice. While liberal approaches to constitutionalism express concern at
the outcomes of socialist and communist constitutionalism, the impact of
philosophies premised on nation, race and religion must also be considered.
Nationalism, for instance, when translated into nation-building laws governing
language, education and mobility has often sought to suppress or even eradicate the
cultural diversity that constituted the pre-colonial states and societies. These
philosophies complicate the notion of assent. Whilst at one level there may be assent
to an ideal unity, on another level the relationship between this ideal and the reality
of cultural diversity creates a tension, and possibly a negation of any assumed assent.
Legitimacy and performance
The second source of legitimacy, how the law is to be applied, also does not provide
a basis for constitutional legitimacy. As already noted, success in establishing
constitutional legitimacy has been hindered by problematic performance of
constitutional duties in a number of South Pacific jurisdictions by various agencies. 
Instability of political parties
Of particular note is the destabilising practice of strategic changes of political alliance
by members of parliament (MPs). Democracies require (or imagine) communicative
action, but through formalisation, legalisation and, increasingly, the constitutional
recognition of party systems, democracies are increasingly beholden to strategic
action. I say this because I see the following series of events being played out in a
number of countries: peoples’ representatives are elected to legislatures. Political
parties (or interest groups) are established to marshal numbers in a bid to acquire
more than 50% of the seats and therefore capture the executive (in some places, in a
bid to capture the percentage of seats required to capture control over constitutional
change). Loyalty to a party is premised on non-ideological factors and is increasingly
liable to fluid movement of parliamentarians between parties. In an effort to promote
executive stability, laws are being enacted to prevent party-hopping, or defection.
Paradoxically, laws designed to promote political stability strike at the freedom of
association that is at the heart of democratic societies. Paradoxically, too, the more
that political practice is regulated by law, the more constrained the democratic
process becomes. 
The problem of stabilising political party systems is linked to two processes at the
heart of constitutionalism: the performance of the legislative and executive branches
of government. In a system in which the executive government is formed from within
the legislature and in which political party affiliations are fluid, any executive
government faces the challenge of maintaining the allegiance of its members. MPs
may be enticed to cross the floor and, with the opposition groups, to form a new
government with themselves in an improved situation. The necessity to form political
party coalitions among parties — sometimes resulting in coalitions between a great
number of parties — has significant impact on the capacity of parliaments and
governments to carry out their duties. 
An instance of the volatility of political parties occurred in Papua New Guinea in
December 1999. A day after passage of the Budget for 2000, Prime Minister Morauta
sacked the Deputy Prime Minister, John Pundari, and the Advance PNG Party, from
the coalition government.14 In response to the new political environment a number
of existing parties announced the formation of a new political group, the Peoples’
National Alliance (PNA).15 There is other evidence in PNG that raises questions
about the stability of the party system and its existence as anything more than a device
that MPs use to marshal numbers within the Parliament. For more than two decades
since Independence, for example, parties have not adhered to any system of legal
registration other than as associations.16
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Recent events in Cook Islands also demonstrate the problem. Although Cook Islands
received assistance from several overseas agencies to improve electoral administration
prior to general elections in July 1999, no amount of technical assistance could have
prepared the country for the subsequent political turmoil. When incumbent Prime
Minister, Sir Geoffrey Henry, appeared ready to form a coalition government with
the leader of the New Alliance Party (NAP), Norman George, three members of
Henry’s Cook Islands Party defected after the ballot to help Joe Williams gain a
majority in the 25-member Assembly. However, the Williams Government fell three
and a half months later in a no-confidence vote that brought the Democratic Alliance
Party (DAP) and the NAP coalition into government under Dr Terepai Moate.
In 1999 a three-member Commission of Political Review recommended a number of
changes to Cook Islands political system to increase political stability and
constitutional effectiveness.17 The Commission’s report also recommended fostering
of public discussion of future options of Cook Islands system of government and
recommended a “more comprehensive national political review to be undertaken”
after the term of the next Parliament. 
To an increasing extent, in part because of the instability of party politics, electoral
contests and even votes within parliaments are being decided in the courts rather than
through counting of the ballots. In Vanuatu, for instance, Parliament became dead-
locked in November 1997 over a no-confidence motion against the government of
Prime Minister Serge Vohor. President Jean Marie Leye ordered dissolution of the
Parliament, and following the dismissal of a challenge to this dissolution by the
Vanuatu Court of Appeal in January 1998, general elections were held on March 6 at
which no single party won enough seats in the 52-member parliament to govern in its
own right,18 and following which numerous allegations concerning malpractices were
made.19
There are several options for the regulation of political parties, but some create
dilemmas in terms of democratic theory. The view is sometimes put that a smaller
number of stable parties is preferable to a larger number of more fluid parties. But
legislating to limit the number of parties is commonly regarded as being a restriction
on democratic choice. Similarly, preventing the defection of MPs from one party to
another by laws that require defecting members to resign their seats and recontest
with their new party at the next election is similarly a restrictive measure. MPs are,
firstly, representatives of the people rather than of political parties, and so there must
be concerns about laws that place control over the legislature and the executive in the
hands of the parties.
Constitutional reform in Papua New Guinea has sought to limit the impact of
electoral contests by reducing the nomination period for candidates and reducing the
formal campaign period.20 After a long process the Parliament has also created an
organic law concerning the integrity of political parties and candidates as required by
sections 129 and 130 of the Constitution.21 As a major cause of political instability
since Independence has been the volatility of MP loyalty to political parties, the
government is seeking to strengthen the party system and diminish the prevalence of
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‘party-hopping’. To achieve this, the Organic Law provides for the dismissal from
Parliament of an MP who defects to a political party other than the one for which he
or she was elected to Parliament.22
Political parties have expressed concern, however, that the draft provisions are too
harsh and penalise MPs who seek to change parties with valid reasons. The Pangu
Pati, one of the oldest political groups in Papua New Guinea, has suggested that the
Organic Law should also restrict the formation of new political parties “on the floor
of Parliament”, and restrict the influence of independent MPs.23 Melanesian Alliance
leader, John Momis, who is one of the “Founding Fathers” of the Papua New Guinea
Constitution, has also called for constitutional change, but has not defined the
“radical measures” to the Westminster system he envisages.24
The functioning of the executive
The functioning of the executive is another area in which the inadequate performance
of duties weakens the legitimacy of the constitution. In parliamentary systems
executive power is exercised by or on advice from a cabinet, derived from the
legislature. Since executive power is often regarded as the most powerful branch of
government, it is often the most coveted by political interests. It is subject also to the
most scrutiny by other public bodies, particularly the legislature, but also the courts,
on application, and other offices such as that of the ombudsman and auditor-general. 
In Pacific island states MPs tend to desire active roles in executive government. The
traditional argument in favour of this involvement has been that MPs have been
obliged to assist in the delivery of services in response to people’s expectations of a
‘big man’.25 But it may be that the participation of MPs in the planning and delivery
of services has unintended effects, such as drawing resources away from the line
departments ordinarily responsible for such activities, or possibly leading to overlaps
in the delivery of services. Furthermore, the involvement of MPs in service planning
and delivery leaves them little time for other parliamentary duties, such as the
development of legislation, committee service and scrutiny of government. A more
sceptical view would be that MPs have simply sought to exercise control over
budgets, specific programs and statutory bodies. In the long term, the role of the MP
will require clarification, particularly as a more educated public begins to ask incisive
questions concerning the ideal role of elected representatives.
In a number of Pacific island states there have been unprecedented incidents of public
agitation against the corrupt and incompetent actions of executive governments. For
instance, in Samoa in October 1998 five thousand people gathered to protest against
the Alesana government. Principle concerns were the sacking of auditor-general Sua
Rimoni Ah Chong in August, illegal sale of passports and the fact that the public
accounts had not been audited for approximately eight years.26
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INSTABILITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Civil violence is probably the most extreme expression of weaknesses in the
constitution of countries and their law. Such violence is now becoming a familiar part
of Pacific island politics, particularly in Melanesia, where expressions of violence have
resulted in destabilised states. As the experience of Solomon Islands, Papua New
Guinea and Fiji Islands indicate, instability is tied up with a lack of consistutional
legitimacy.
Examining Solomon Islands first, this nation opted for a parliamentary democracy
with the Queen as Head of State and her representative, the Governor General,
elected by Parliament. There was to be a single chamber legislature and, recognising
the hazards of party government in Solomon Islands, the Prime Minister was to be
elected by and from the members of Parliament and could be removed only by a
motion of no-confidence. But neither the Solomon Islands state, nor its constitution,
nor the rule of law ideology has provided sufficient legal, administrative, or
conceptual authority to prevent endemic corruption in public office or resurgent
ethnic and political conflict. 
Although long-standing separatist sentiments in Solomon Islands are well known,
their eruption in the late 1990s has proven difficult to resolve. The escalation
commenced with legal disputes between national and provincial politicians. In 1997
the High Court invalidated the Provincial Government Act 1996, which had sought
to replace Provincial Premiers with elected provincial councils in an effort to decrease
cost and improve the efficiency of government services. The Malaita and Guadalcanal
Provincial Governments had threatened secession on passage of the Bill, and the
successful challenge was made by the government of Guadalcanal. In 1999 the heads
of the Solomon Islands’ nine provinces recommended that the national Constitution
and the Provincial Government Act 1996 be reviewed. Guadalcanal province
commenced seeking compensation for the use of land, especially in and near Honiara,
under use by the national government. Tensions on Guadalcanal between landowners
and settlers from outer islands then became violent, and on June 16 1999 the
government invoked a state of emergency.27 Although Commonwealth special envoy
to Solomon Islands, former Prime Minister of Fiji Sitiveni Rabuka, negotiated a peace
accord, violence continued and the factors underlying the conflict remained
unaddressed. On June 5 2000 members of the Malaita Eagle Force, along with a
faction of police officers, the Seagulls, detained then Prime Minister Ulufa’alu and
demanded his resignnation. On 13 June, Ulufa’alu submitted his resignation and on
30 June, Manasseh Sogavare was elected Prime Minister and a new government was
formed. On 15 October 2000 the Townsville Peace Agreement was signed, the 7th
peace agreement since June of 1999. Although this agreement has not restored
stability it has created a cease-fire situation. Elections were held on 5 December
2001, and it is widely acknowledged that the first responsibility of the new
government will be the rebuilding of order, or reconstitution of the state, in such a
way as to ensure lasting peace.28
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The myth of the modern constitution being written by the people is particularly
prevalent in Papua New Guinea. However, almost thirty years after independence
there is still uncertainty concerning the extent to which the nation of Papua New
Guinea is governed by the rule of law. Here, as in Solomon Islands, corruption and
ethnic conflict have weakened the basis of the state and called into question its
capacity to govern and to apply the rule of law. 
A crisis of legitimacy has been felt most severely in Bougainville. Since Independence
conflict over the status of this province has been in part a conflict over the question
of devolution of power. It is a question at the heart of the Constitution and its
resolution can only be found through constitutional dialogue. The Bougainville
Reconciliation Government (BRG), frustrated at the national Parliament’s inability to
put the Bougainville conflict above political in-fighting, convened a Constitutional
Convention on 24 December 1998, at which a BRG Constitution was adopted by
acclamation, to provide for the establishment of a Bougainville Constituent Assembly
(BCA) as an advisory body ahead of the election of a BRG. The BCA met on 
15–16 January 1999 and adopted the BRG Basic Agreement and the BRG
Constitution. The National Executive Council (NEC) subsequently endorsed the
BRG Basic Agreement but did not consider the BRG Constitution. In May 1999 the
people of Bougainville elected 69 members to the Bougainville Reconciliation
Government. Joseph Kabui was elected President. After a long process of peace talks,
the Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed at Arawa on 30 August 2001 “provides for
arrangements for an autonomous Bougainville Government operating under a home-
grown Bougainville Consistution…”29 This Bougainville-wide exercise, however,
does not constitute a Papua New Guinea-wide constitutional reform exercise.30
Recent events in Fiji, where the Constitution has undergone the most significant
processes of reform of any South Pacific state since independence, further illustrate the
tenuous authority of the modern constitution and state. Negotiations with the British
resulted in independence in 1970. Two military coups occurred in 1987, when Fijian
interests perceived a threat to Fijian hegemony from Fiji–Indian interests.31 Despite the
promulgation of a new constitution in 1990 which met with the satisfaction of those
who instigated the coups, a constitutionally mandated constitutional review
undertaken by the Reeves Commission in 199732 failed to maintain this appeasement,
and in 2000 the state was once again thrown into disarray when George Speight
named the protection of Fijian interests as his paramount reason for storming the
Parliament and attempting to overthrow the Mahendra Chaudhry government. Whilst
the courts intervened in the situation and upheld the validity of the 1997 Constitution
the ongoing disorder that was created by Speight’s actions does little to create the
impression of authoritative constitutional order in Fiji Islands.
THE REGENERATION OF LEGITIMACY
This instability is indicative of a need to reconsider the constitutions, and not just
their day-to-day workings, in order to regenerate legitimacy and create lasting order.
In a recent work, Between Facts and Norms, Habermas has sought the reasons for the
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large distance that sometimes appears between the ideal laws of a society and the
actual practice of that society. He suggests, ultimately, that the ‘most effective law’
results from procedures that all who are affected by that law can participate in:
From the standpoint of legal theory, the modern legal order can draw
its legitimacy only from the idea of self-determination: citizens should always be
able to understand themselves as authors of the law to which they are subject as
addressees.34
Habermas and others have developed a theory of discourse ethics based on a
distinction between strategic and communicative action. In strategic action:
…actors are interested solely in the success, ie, the consequences of the outcomes
of their actions, [and] they will try to reach their objectives by influencing their
opponent’s definition of the situation, and thus his decision or motives, through
means by using weapons or goods, threats or enticements.35
Communicative action, on the other hand, is oriented toward reaching a common
understanding rather than achieving personal success.36 What is required is a
paradigm shift, not simply a tinkering with the system. This involves new
understandings of relations between law and power. When applied to the challenge
of renewing the legitimacy of the constitutions in Pacific island jurisdictions, one
major challenge will be to increase understanding of this distinction between
communicative and strategic action. Some may conclude that communicative action
remains an ideal and that all discourse, including constitutional discourse, is strategic
in purpose. Yet the challenge remains of finding some form of discourse concerning
the structure and operation of the constitution that keeps its interests beyond the
party-political, beyond the interests of any particular group in that society.
It should be noted that there are difficulties in maintaining clear distinctions between
communicative and strategic action. These difficulties can be observed in the recent
history of Papua New Guinea’s Constitutional Review Committee (later the
Constitutional Development Commission (CDC)). MP Philemon Embel, having
been appointed Chair of the Commission in May 1999, was recalled to Cabinet in
July and replaced by MP Bernard Mollok. Charged with overseeing the drafting of
an Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (as required by ss
129 and 130 of the Constitution), Mollok called on the government to undertake a
total review of the PNG Constitution, rather than the “piecemeal approaches” which
had occurred in recent years.37 The Chairman identified existing electoral laws, and
the behaviour that takes place during electoral periods, as indicative of the “foreign
concepts” of governing that had created problems for the country.38 However, when
the Chairman began publicly to berate the government for giving the CDC
inadequate resources and insufficient time to complete its work,39 and eventually
claimed that the government was not supporting the work of the CDC,40 he was
removed from the position.41
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Mechanisms for amending constitutions
The most common ways in which a constitution can be amended are through a vote
in parliament or through other means which allow ‘the people’ to have control over
any changes such as referenda or constitutional conventions. Another mechanism, in
which the role of public involvement can vary widely, is the expert commission, such
as the Reeves Commission that reported on the Fijian Constitution in 1996.42
Constitutional conventions tend to be held when large-scale change to a constitution
is envisaged, rather than change to specific provisions only. The idea is to allow for
full consultation on the issues, or communicative action. Such conventions have been
held in Pacific island nations such as the Federated States of Micronesia and the
Marshall Islands. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, a nation that
has chosen to be in free association with the United States, established a
constitutional convention in 1974 following a vote by the people which gained 75%
approval. A second constitutional convention held in 1984 proposed 44
constitutional amendments, all of which were approved by the people. 
At Kiribati’s first constitutional convention (March 2–6 1998) some 200 delegates
consulted on a report prepared for the convention by a Parliamentary Select
Committee. The convention’s proposals and recommendations included increasing
the members of the Council of State from three to either four or five, although
different views were put as to who the additional members should be. The proposed
amendments will be put to public comment before debate in Parliament, where they
require a two-thirds majority to pass.
A constitutional convention may sound expensive to hold, but where they succeed in
bringing together the people’s representatives to discuss the foundations of the state
system, they help to establish the legitimacy of the constitution. By ensuring that the
constitution truly expresses the wishes of the people as they evolve over time, such a
form of structured public dialogue as a constitutional convention consolidates
legitimacy through communicative action, and in doing so, contributes to the
attainment of such other goals as democracy, justice and prosperity. States that do not
respond effectively to the need to consolidate legitimacy risk serious internal conflicts
and social instability. 
Legitimacy and related goals
The first goal of any exercise aiming to regenerate constitutional order is to establish
legitimacy. As already indicated legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the
foundational principles of a state and to the constitution of a state. A people who see
its state and government as having legitimacy have a sense of constitutional unity.
Without this sense of unity, a state is in danger of serious conflict, and even collapse.
A government can establish this sense of legitimacy over time by meeting the needs
of the people, and by building a sense of purpose and unity amongst them. The
ability to build legitimacy depends partly on the quality of dialogue between the
people and the state. The making of a constitution, and later reforming it, is part of
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this exercise of consolidating the legitimacy of a state. The legitimacy of a state
provides the foundation for the operation of democracy.
Democracy is an ancient concept that continues to evolve over time. In a broad sense
it refers to the election of leaders by the people. People who elect their own leaders
are said to be ‘free’, although this ‘freedom’ refers to their agreement to act as they
wish within the bounds of the rights and responsibilities that are determined by the
society’s legal system and public culture. The idea of democracy is not to achieve
‘total freedom’ — for such a thing is impossible — but to provide a social and
political society in which individuals are able to pursue goals of their own choosing,
to fully develop their personalities, abilities and talents, and to contribute the fruits
of their efforts back to their society. There is not one approach to democratic
structure and procedure, but many. The majority of contemporary democratic states
opt for forms of ‘representative’ democracy, in preference to ‘direct’ democracy. In
political terms, much of this ‘representation’ occurs through party systems. But in the
process of constitution-making we must remain aware that the current approach to
so-called ‘democratic institutions’ is but one among many. It could be argued that
the more party systems are developed, the less represented the people become, as it
is the parties, rather than the people, who come to determine policy. Such
reservations maybe raise the need for a reconsideration of the form of democratic
system selected. However, democracy offers both legitimacy and accountability, since
the people have control over their leaders and over the laws that bind them. Where
these conditions are met a government acquires authority, and, possessing authority,
becomes effective in governing with a sense of justice.
The quest for legitimacy and democracy is, then, linked to the quest for justice.
People have an innate sense of injustice, in the sense that they know when they have
been wronged, or harmed. The ability to govern justly, however, is not innate in the
same way, but only comes with experience, wide knowledge of current conditions and
past circumstances, a sense of compassion and an ability to remain impartial. In many
systems of governance the ‘justice system’ refers to the court system alone, but so-
called ‘access to justice’ is a matter that extends beyond the courts. The laws of a
country must be just, the administration of government must be just and disputes
must be solved in a just manner. A just society exercises both reward and punishment
and a just society ensures the fair distribution of both welfare and wealth. 
A final challenge of contemporary governance is the generation of social and
economic prosperity. This challenge requires more than ‘economic development’,
more than industrialisation and increased consumption and more than the spread of
material benefits. It refers to the attainment of the well-being of the people, through
their acquisition of material development in accordance with their own plans,
activities and priorities. It refers, that is, to the development of the people’s
personalities in accordance with their own volition and choice. Questions of
prosperity become linked to issues like taxation and the provision of welfare services. 
These four challenges, attaining legitimacy, democracy, justice and prosperity,
confront all systems of government, no matter which hemisphere, and no matter
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which culture. They relate to the quest for human rights, transparency, accountability
and non-discrimination. When they are lost sight of, the idea of governance is
reduced to  the struggle for so-called power and struggles over the acquisition and
distribution of limited resources.
Meeting the challenges of contemporary governance requires an evaluation of the
constitution which cannot be rushed, which must be impartial, which must involve
wide participation of the people, and which must meet their needs in the context of
an emerging regional and global order. Such an evaluation may well revisit and
revitalise traditional values of consultation, reciprocity and social solidarity, and more
critically examine introduced structures of governance which produce conflict rather
than progress. This can be done, but not without imagination and universal
participation.
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4.  THE VANUATU OMBUDSMAN
By: Edward R. Hill
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Generic Model 
A generic model is a general or standard model or structure that is applied in a
number of situations. When talking about laws we sometimes find that ‘generic
models’ of particular laws have been transplanted from other legal systems, and
maybe modified to fit the particular situation of the jurisdiction adopting the
generic model. 
Ombudsman
According to the generic model of the ombudsman, an ombudsman is an
independent person appointed by and responsible to either the Head of State
or the parliament of a jurisdiction. The ombudsman acts on the complaints of
members of the public and has powers of investigation. The focus of the
ombudsman’s jurisdiction is the fair and efficient administration of the laws. 
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INTRODUCTION
The 1980 Vanuatu Constitution provides a number of features that are common to
many other constitutional democracies. These include entrenched individual rights
and freedoms, an independent judiciary and a democratically elected government.
The Constitution also includes provision for an ombudsman. In 1994, fourteen years
after the Constitution came into effect, the first Ombudsman was appointed in
Vanuatu. Since then, the Office of the Ombudsman has had a high profile in the
country, exposing misconduct, corruption and mismanagement within the
government and public sector and, in the process, creating widespread controversy.
In this short time the Office of the Ombudsman has undergone a number of changes.
In 1999, the first Ombudsman’s term of appointment expired and a second
Ombudsman succeeded her. There have also been two Ombudsman Acts since 1995
and a term of approximately a year during which the Ombudsman operated without
any supporting legislation apart from the Constitution.1 This chapter describes the
mandate and the role of the Office of the Ombudsman in Vanuatu and the
environment in which it has operated during its first 6 years of operation. It also
examines some types of misconduct that it has revealed. Particular emphasis is placed
on the relationship of the Ombudsman and the politicians and other leaders
of Vanuatu.
What is an Ombudsman?
The International Bar Association defines ‘ombudsman’ as, “an office established by
Constitution or statute, headed by an independent, high-level, public official, who is
responsible to the Legislature or Parliament, who receives complaints from aggrieved
persons against government agencies, officials and employers, or who acts on his own
motion, and has the power to investigate and recommend corrective action and issue
reports.”2 This definition describes what might be referred to as the generic model of
the ombudsman’s office. In this model an ombudsman provides a means for people
to bring to the attention of an official who is independent of the government
complaints about any unfair treatment by the government or any unfair ways in which
laws have been applied to them. An ombudsman then provides assistance in the form
of information, mediation or recommendations to the relevant authority. In most
jurisdictions, the ombudsman also publishes reports exposing problems and
recommending solutions. In most stable democracies the existence of an
ombudsman’s office is largely an uncontroversial feature of governance.
The offices of ombudsmen in numerous jurisdictions are based on this model. The
scope of inquiry of an ombudsman operating in such a model is restricted in certain
ways. For instance, the Head of State and the judiciary are usually beyond the
jurisdiction of most ombudsmen.3 An ombudsman typically has a mandate to make
reports and recommendations arising from complaints but does not have the
jurisdiction to enforce recommendations or engage in criminal prosecutions.4 An
ombudsman is either appointed or elected by the government or Head of State. To
be effective, an ombudsman must be free of political pressures in the conduct of
investigations and reporting. It is also important that an ombudsman be seen to be
neutral, of high integrity and equipped with the expertise and courage to tackle issues
which may not be politically popular. As we shall see, Vanuatu’s Office of the
Ombudsman has, under both Acts, been largely based on the generic model. 
The first country to have an Office of the Ombudsman was Sweden. The Swedish
Parliament elected the first Ombudsman in 1809. His role was to supervise the
observance of laws and regulations by all officials and judges.5 More than a century
later, the appointment of a Danish Ombudsman spurred interest in other countries.6
New Zealand appointed an Ombudsman in 1962. Canada and Australia established
Offices of the Ombudsman in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Since that time ombudsman’s
offices have been established in over 80 countries. 
The ombudsman model is no longer limited to a role of ‘government watchdog’ and
has been applied in a wide range of contexts. For instance, there are ombudsmen
whose mandate is restricted to housing, long term care, funerals, victim-offender
disputes, hospitals, health care, insurance, investments, pensions and police. There
are also private mediators who offer their services in particular areas. ‘Ombudsman’
as a keyword in any search of the World Wide Web produces an abundance of
examples. 
The Vanuatu context
Although Vanuatu has adopted the generic model of the ombudsman, its unique
colonial history, development status, geography and cultural roots create a
challenging environment for the Office of the Ombudsman to operate within.
Vanuatu is a small South Pacific country comprising approximately 65 inhabited
islands and more than 100 indigenous languages. It is one of the most culturally
diverse nations in the world. The cultures of Vanuatu are deeply rooted in traditional
beliefs and ways of living. A majority of the population lives in tribal, non-urban and
largely subsistence communities. Kinship is an important factor in social relationships.
The influence of the modern world, technology and the cash economy is centred in
Port Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, together with several other smaller towns. 
For 73 years, until independence in 1980, the British and the French ruled the islands
jointly as a condominium, in one of the more unique arrangements in colonial
history. Neither colonial power had exclusive sovereignty. The legacy of these two
competing foreign powers is still strongly felt today with political parties and the
education system divided along old colonial lines. In addition, language, culture and
economic disparities continue to be divisive factors in Vanuatu society. As is the case
with other Pacific island countries, foreign donors continue to play a significant role
in the economy.7
The President is Head of State and there is a Parliament consisting of 52 elected
representatives. Elections are held every 4 years. This model of government (and
indeed the notion of a nation state itself) is foreign to the pre-existing social and
political fabric of Vanuatu society. While the model of government incorporates the
major features of the colonisers’ own governments and most ‘western’ democracies,
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it was, and to a large extent continues to be foreign to a large proportion of ni-
Vanuatu people. The process of social and political adjustment to the new order is a
continuing one. 
Since 1995 the Government of Vanuatu has been particularly unstable, with several
cabinet shuffles, the formation of new political parties, the re-alignment of others, an
election, no-confidence motions, frequent changes of government, changing alliances
among political parties and the kidnapping of the President. There appears to be an
increasing inability or unwillingness on the part of government to provide for the social
needs of the population, which is resulting in unemployment, inequity and poverty.8
There have been numerous instances of abuse of political power for personal or political
reasons. It is in this environment that the Ombudsman of Vanuatu operates. 
The Constitutional foundation of the Ombudsman
The Constitution of Vanuatu creates a generic model for the Ombudsman in Vanuatu.
Article 65 provides for the independence of the Ombudsman and his or her freedom
from supervision and control. The Ombudsman is appointed for a 5-year term by the
President, on advice from the Prime Minister and leaders of other political parties. 
Article 62 provides that an inquiry may be conducted by the Ombudsman into the
conduct of any level of the government, public service or public authorities with the
exception of the judiciary and the President. Inquiries may be commenced on the
basis of a complaint by a member of the public, a member of parliament, the National
Council of Chiefs, a local government or on the Ombudsman’s own initiative.9
Article 63 of the Constitution provides that where the Ombudsman finds that
conduct being investigated was defective a report of the findings shall be made to the
Prime Minister and the person in charge of the relevant public service. A decision and
reply is required of the Prime Minister or the person in charge.10
With two notable exceptions, the Office of the Ombudsman, as shaped by the
Constitution, contains few provisions specific to the circumstances of Vanuatu. Article
64 imposes responsibility on the Ombudsman with respect to the three official
languages of the country.11 A person who is aggrieved in connection with the use of
an official language may complain to the Ombudsman who is obliged to launch an
investigation. The Ombudsman also reports to the Parliament on a yearly basis about
the observance of multilingualism.12 Article 62(1)(b) is also specific to the
circumstances of Vanuatu in providing that an Ombudsman’s inquiry may be
launched at the instance of the National Council of Chiefs. 
OMBUDSMAN ACT 1995
Vanuatu’s first Ombudsman was appointed in 1994.13 The first Ombudsman Act came
into force on August 18, 1995, nearly a year after the first Ombudsman had been
appointed. It both strengthened the independence of the Ombudsman and provided
tools for the effective investigation of complaints.14
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Independence
The Act enhanced the independence of the Ombudsman in three ways. Firstly, he or
she could have no political affiliations or trade or profession during his or her term.
Secondly, it provided protection against dismissal except on specific grounds such as
bankruptcy, a criminal conviction or gross misconduct.15 Independence was further
enhanced with the provision that staff be appointed directly by the Ombudsman
rather than through the Public Service Commission.16
Scope of inquiries
Section 14 of the 1995 Ombudsman Act articulated and expanded the method of
inquiry provided by Article 62 of the Constitution. The Ombudsman could inquire
into any government body or body supported mainly out of public moneys, or any
employee of such a body. Such inquiry could be into any defects in any law or
administrative practice or any alleged discriminatory practice or any suspected breach
of the Leadership Code.17
Powers and procedures
The 1995 Act provided the power to compel testimony and the disclosure of
documents in the course of an inquiry. It also created powers of search and seizure
pursuant to a warrant.18 Obstruction of the Ombudsman in the exercise of his or her
duties was made an offence.19
Where an inquiry concluded that conduct was contrary to section 63(2) of the
Constitution, was discriminatory or that a law or practice was defective, section 22
directed that the relevant authority be notified. It also required that reports be
forwarded to the Prime Minister, the President and in some cases to the head of the
department of the public service or to the Leader of the Opposition. 
The 1995 Act ensured that inquiries and reports of the Ombudsman could not be
ignored by the government. In response to a report the Prime Minister was required
to provide not only a decision but also information about the steps that were
proposed in relation to the Ombudsman’s recommendations.20 Where there was no
response to the Ombudsman’s recommendations, she or he was empowered by
section 30 to apply to the Supreme Court for an order that the recommendations be
implemented.21 These provisions provide the Ombudsman with significant powers of
enforcement that are beyond those found in the generic model described above.22
THE FIRST OMBUDSMAN – A NEW PRESENCE
The first Ombudsman, Marie-Noelle Ferrieux Patterson, is a naturalised citizen of
Vanuatu, originally from France. She lost no time in commencing inquiries in
response to complaints. The resulting public reports were unprecedented in the short
history of Vanuatu. Never before had leaders been subjected to such scrutiny and, in
some cases, to such unflinching and sustained criticism. The number of complaints
that fell within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction dramatically increased from 59 in
1994/1995 to 542 in 1998/1999.23
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At the time of her appointment, the first Ombudsman had no office, no staff and few
resources.24 This state of affairs continued during the first year of the first
Ombudsman’s appointment and created a challenge for her. This itself became a
public issue. In describing the efforts to make suitable arrangements for the
accommodation of herself and her office the Ombudsman lashed out at the
government for its ineptitude and resulting waste of energy and time.25 This set the
tone for the ensuing relationship between much of the governing elite and the
Ombudsman. 
The lack of resources was, however, only temporary. It is worth noting by way of
comparison that while the Ombudsman’s staff quickly grew to more than 20 full time
employees and occupied 2 floors of a downtown Port Vila office building, the Office
of the Public Solicitor, which is constitutionally responsible for providing legal
assistance to “needy persons”,26 has continued to work with less than 5 staff. Similarly,
the Office of the Public Prosecutor, responsible for all criminal prosecutions within
the country, has continued to work with a handful of staff. Much of the funding that
has allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to grow so rapidly has come from the
international donor community who obviously saw a significant need for such an
institution.27
The Ombudsman as an outsider
This outside funding has, in part, contributed to a perception that the Office of the
Ombudsman is an imposed institution, serving foreign interests. The first
Ombudsman placed considerable importance upon the need to maintain an
environment that will attract foreign assistance and investment: 
It is vital for the public to face the fact that it is foreign money which constitutes
the only hope in Vanuatu’s present financial crisis. Foreign aid from such
countries as Australia and others makes up almost 50% of Vanuatu’s entire budget
(recurrent plus development). This aid is in danger of being drastically reduced as
a result of the irresponsible antics of some leaders here. It is therefore vital for us
citizens to be aware of who our best friends are, and who are actually our biggest
enemies and drawbacks.28
The obvious interest by the first Ombudsman in attracting foreign investment and
the favour of foreign donors may be justified. However it provided a potential for
characterising her as an outsider with outsider’s interests. This view has indeed been
evident among members of the political elite. For example, one senior bureaucrat,
Father Leymang, after an unsuccessful legal challenge to the right of the Ombudsman
to compel disclosure of information pursuant to section 30 of the 1995 Act, wrote a
letter that was published in the Vanuatu Trading Post on February 18, 1998. In it he
called for the confiscation of the Ombudsman’s passport and her deportation
(notwithstanding that she is a ni-Vanuatu citizen). He stated further that:
Mrs Marie Noelle Ferrieux Patterson stands there like a European-style teacher,
stern and harsh, wielding a big stick fashioned by foreign powers to punish the
young Melanesians (the politicians).29
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The public acceptance of the Ombudsman’s findings and recommendations have
eroded in accordance with the degree that this view of her as an outsider, imposing
outsiders’ views and promoting their interests, is perceived to be correct. One of the
justifications for the repeal of the first Ombudsman Act used this characterisation. The
Prime Minister, interviewed on television in connection with the repeal of the Act
stated that indigenous people should run their own country and not allow “former
colonialists” to decide their future.30 Again, this characterisation is not without its
foundations.31
Being a woman undoubtedly also had an impact on how the first Ombudsman was
perceived in a society where the preponderance of political power is wielded
exclusively by men. This was evident in the Parliamentary debate during the repeal of
the Ombudsman Act 1995. Mr Barak Sope, a Minister who had been subjected to
intense scrutiny and criticism by the Ombudsman, defended his support of the Bill to
repeal the first Ombudsman Act because, in his view, Melanesian culture does not
allow women to criticise men.32 It is questionable that this view of Melanesian culture
is in fact correct in any event.33
The moral imperative 
The reports of the first Ombudsman do more than dispassionately and objectively
reveal wrongful conduct. The tone of the reports themselves is bombastic, combative
and moralistic.34 The reports contain mention of the personal revulsion of the
Ombudsman and severe moralistic reprimands of those found to be corrupt or
criminally responsible for their actions. Reports were routinely prefaced with biblical
quotes.35 The implication of the biblical quotes together with other editorialising,
particularly in the preambles of the reports, is that the Ombudsman has the role of a
moral judge supported in her opinions by biblical authority. The first Ombudsman
has been criticised for taking on this role.36 However, she made no secret of her moral
approach to her duties. In her 1996 Annual Report, she had this to say at page 5: 
I expect to be attacked again for attempting to “lecture” the public, but I make
no apology for sounding out these warnings in an attempt to secure the
enlightenment and education of the public in these important matters. It is of
course one of the specific duties of the Ombudsman to inform the public of what
is done “officially” in their name. It is not a political revolution that is needed in
my opinion, but a moral and ethical one.
The first Ombudsman’s legal battles
The struggle between the first Ombudsman and the political elite was also played out
in court. There have been several attempts by the Ombudsman to compel the
disclosure of information pursuant to section 30 of the first Ombudsman Act.37 There
has also been an application by the Ombudsman to have her recommendation made
enforceable by order of the court pursuant to section 30. This concerned an attempt
to force the repayment of ex gratia payments to certain politicians.38 In response, the
Council of Ministers (which included many of those who were the subject of the
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section 30 application) attempted to dismiss the Ombudsman from office by
resolution. This resolution was challenged in court by the Ombudsman and was
eventually held to be “invalid in law and thus unlawful and of no legal or other
effect.”39 This entire episode attracted media attention throughout the region. 
THE REPLACEMENT OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND A NEW
OMBUDSMAN ACT
The first Ombudsman’s style was tenacious and in her reports, she provided no
quarter to her opponents — those among the political elite of the country whose
conduct formed the basis of her reports. In disclosing the existence of corruption and
incompetence, she left little opportunity by which those involved could save face.40
On June 26, 1998, after three years of operation, the exposure of widespread
corruption and misuse of power, and vigorous opposition from the Council of
Ministers, the Ombudsman Act of 1995 was repealed by Parliament. Given the
opposition among the political elite to the Ombudsman personally and to her role
this drastic action is not surprising. Notwithstanding this, the Ombudsman continued
to operate, solely on the basis of the Constitutional provisions and her continuing
appointment. 
After a period without any specific legislation, a new Act came into force on January
11, 1999. Later that year, the first Ombudsman’s 5 year term of office expired and,
despite her application to have her position renewed, Mr Hannington Alatoa, an
indigenous citizen, was appointed as Vanuatu’s second Ombudsman. The
appointment of the second Ombudsman created a division of opinion between
supporters of the first Ombudsman’s rigorously investigative approach and those who
favoured a more conciliatory approach. 
THE SECOND OMBUDSMAN ACT
In several respects, the new legislation lacks the force of the first Act and therefore
represents less of a potential threat to those whose conduct is likely to be scrutinised. 
No longer are appointments to the staff of the Ombudsman made directly by the
Ombudsman and independently of the Public Service. Under the new Act, employees
are appointed as part of the Public Service and subject to the same control as are
other government employees who are appointed through the Public Service. This
creates the potential for employees of the Ombudsman to be intimidated where their
work is critical of or threatens someone who has control over the employment of
public servants.41
The new Act restricts the use of inflammatory language and prohibits allegations of
criminal wrongdoing without stating the alleged offence and providing evidence to
support the allegation.42 Interestingly the Act does not specify what form the evidence
must take or what standard of proof must be satisfied in order to make an allegation
of criminal wrongdoing. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that this provision
found its way into the new Act in response to the many comments of the first
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Ombudsman which could be construed as inflammatory and the many allegations of
criminal wrongdoing made by her. Whilst reports published by the first Ombudsman
prior to the second Ombudsman Act coming into force do not hesitate to draw
unequivocal conclusions that leaders breached the Leadership Code, those published
after the passing of the second Act qualify allegations with the phrase, “may have” to
condition a conclusion that the Code was breached.43 
Another significant change made by the second Ombudsman Act is the requirement
that notice be given to the person in charge of the relevant government agency or the
relevant leader before an inquiry is launched, except where the Ombudsman has
reasonable grounds for believing that to do so would interfere with his or her
inquiry.44 Such notice could serve to give the agency or leader being investigated an
opportunity to take steps to minimise the effectiveness or impact of an inquiry. 
The 1995 Act provided that the Ombudsman could apply to the Supreme Court for
an order giving effect to a recommendation of the Ombudsman where the Prime
Minister (or other relevant person required to do so) did not respond to the
Ombudsman’s recommendations with a decision and an indication of what steps were
to be taken to deal with the recommendations. This power is lacking in the new Act.
This change (which represents a retreat to the generic model) alters what might be
considered to be the balance of power between the Ombudsman and the government
in favour of the government. 
The Ombudsman’s access to restricted or “prohibited information” is limited by
section 27 of the new Act. This is defined in the Act to include “information that is
prohibited or restricted under or by any recognised duty of professional
confidentiality or privilege.” This definition begs questions concerning the nature of
“professional confidentiality or privilege” which have yet to be clarified by any judicial
consideration. 
Mediation
Another significant way in which the new Ombudsman Act 1998 differs from the
1995 Act is its inclusion of provisions enabling the use of mediation in the resolution
of disputes arising from complaints to the Ombudsman. Although mediation has
been informally used by other ombudsman offices, Vanuatu appears to be the first
jurisdiction to formally include it within the scope of an ombudsman’s powers and
duties.45
The Ombudsman is required to mediate where requested to do so and where
practicable.46 If the Ombudsman believes that it would not be practicable to mediate,
he or she must give reasons in writing to the person who requested mediation. The
use of mediation has not yet become widespread in the work of the Ombudsman.
However, it is expected to increase as a means of resolving complaints in appropriate
cases.47 In order to facilitate the use of mediation, the image of the Ombudsman as
an adversarial presence, which was created in the first 5 years of the existence of the
Ombudsman’s office, will require moderation. The more like an accuser or adversary
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the Ombudsman is, the less effective he or she will be in the role of a neutral agent
who is able to facilitate the resolution of disputes. 
It has been suggested that mediation, as a means of conducting the work of the
Ombudsman, is inappropriate.48 The basis for this criticism is that an invitation to
mediate early in an investigation would give the party to the mediation whose
conduct is being investigated an opportunity to hide or destroy incriminating
evidence. It has also been suggested that common sense favours the view that a
conciliatory approach would not work in cases where there has been an apparent
misuse of official power. While this may be so in some cases, mediation could provide
a useful tool in cases where these factors are not present. 
New image
The second Ombudsman has in fact begun to cultivate an image consistent with the
use of mediation and at variance with that cultivated by the first Ombudsman. The
use of biblical quotes in prefaces of public reports has been discontinued. Personal
reactions of the Ombudsman, particularly expressions of outrage, are less apparent in
the text of public reports than was previously the case. As indicated above, categorical
judgements about the commission of offences by leaders and politicians are no longer
included in the text of public reports. There is less evidence of moral indignation and
a greater emphasis on co-operation and the implementation of mediation as a means
of resolving appropriate disputes. Accompanying these changes is a discernable
lessening of public attacks by politicians and others on the Office of the Ombudsman
and the Ombudsman personally.
PATTERNS OF MISCONDUCT REVEALED
Before the end of 2000, the Ombudsman published more than 70 public reports
arising from individual inquiries. Not all of the reports deal with deliberately
improper conduct. Many reports reveal systemic weaknesses and deficiencies in
administrative practice and procedure. Examples of these types of reports include
inquiries into the condition of prisons and the use of disciplinary procedures in
prisons.49 Others include inquiries and reports concerning the incompetence of the
Vanuatu Fire Service50 discrimination inherent in the Citizenship Act [Cap 112],51 the
language of instruction at a particular school,52 and discriminatory criteria applied by
the National Exam Board for admission into grade 7.53
However, a large proportion of investigations and public reports do reveal
improper conduct, particularly on the part of politicians and senior public servants.
It is difficult to neatly categorise this conduct as the revelations of single reports often
include a wide range of improper conduct. However, using several reports as
examples, it is possible to identify some recurring themes. Some of the major ones are
illustrated below. 
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The rule of law under attack
One aspect of improper conduct that is revealed by the public reports of the
Ombudsman is the degree to which political leaders consider themselves to be free to
make decisions and engage in conduct without regard to the bounds of their
statutory powers. Ministers of the Government have, on numerous occasions, made
decisions that purportedly bind the government (particularly involving the spending
of public money) without a legal foundation for doing so. Proper procedures are
often bypassed in order to achieve results. The Minister of Finance, in response to an
investigation by the Ombudsman, puts a couple of revealing rhetorical questions in
which he justifies his actions with an appeal to what he considers to be democratic
principles:
Why doesn’t the Office of the Ombudsman ask here the real question? Must a
Minister of the Government, an elected member of the People always obey a civil
servant (the Attorney General who is a civil servant). Who is governing Vanuatu:
the elected of the People who govern Vanuatu and take their decision or the civil
servants?54
This response indicates that degree to which the Big Man syndrome appears to play
a role in the politics of the country. Big Man is an expression, usually used
disparagingly, that derives from the customary power of chiefly authority. It is used
in the countries of Melanesia to refer to a person whose power, although not
necessarily derived from chiefly source, is nevertheless exercised as if it is. It has been
asserted that the expression as it has been applied and understood in a political
context is not authentic but is the result of a process that ‘manufactures’ custom.
Politicians are accorded the same status as chiefs to reflect their importance and
contributions. Because of this perceived status they are reluctant to accept criticism
and consider it as contrary to custom. However, it has been pointed out that there is
really nothing in custom which prevents criticism or sanctioning of inappropriate
behaviour by leaders.55
Political appointments of unqualified people
A number of reports have disclosed the appointment of people to senior positions,
either within the public service, onto the board of a public enterprise or as an
employee of a public enterprise. A typical case is that of the hiring of a Deputy
General Manager of the Vanuatu National Provident Fund (VNPF).56 The VNPF
received a number of applications from qualified candidates for this position.
However, no appointment was made by the VNPF Board until consultations took
place with the Finance Minister. The Finance Minister strongly “recommended” an
unqualified politician who had recently lost his seat in Parliament. An application was
submitted by this person after the closing date, his application was considered and he
was “hired” by the Board at a meeting without a quorum. The report on the VNPF
matter publicised the political hiring of an unqualified person and identified the lack
of independence and relevant knowledge on the part of Board members of the VNPF. 
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Other examples of this type of conduct are revealed in the Public Report on the
Appointment of Senior Public Works Staff57 where the Prime Minister, in breach of
procedure, directly appointed persons, based on the political affiliations of the
persons, without consultation with the Public Service Commission or the
Department of Public Works and despite the appointees’ lack of proper qualifications.
The Public Report on Mismanagement of the Vanuatu Livestock Development Ltd,58
reveals that an unqualified political appointee (the brother in law of the Agriculture
Minister) with a criminal record for misappropriation was hired, in preference to a
qualified candidate as Manager of Vanuatu Livestock Development Ltd, a
government owned enterprise. The company suffered disastrous financial
consequences as a result of highly incompetent mismanagement by the appointee. 
Conflict of interest
A number of reports also reveal instances of improper conduct that involves conflict
of interest. In the Nambawan Bottle Shop case59 the Ombudsman found that the
Minister of Finance, as a partner in a private business enterprise, used his influence to
bypass a number of statutory prerequisites to establish a retail liquor outlet. A license
(on unprecedented terms) was granted for the operation of this outlet on a 24-hour
basis, contrary to the terms of legislation governing the sale of alcohol and contrary
to the legal opinion of the Attorney General. The report discloses various other
instances of improper behaviour or inaction by officials in relation to this scheme. 
Conflict of interest is also illustrated in two public reports involving the lease of
government land. In the first case, the Minister of Lands used his power to grant 15
leases in favour of himself, his wife, wantoks, driver and house girl. Proper
procedures, including the valuation of the leases, approvals, application fees and other
requirements were not followed.60 Four of the 5 leases that the Minister granted to
himself were granted free of any premium (purchase price) and the remaining leases
were granted at less than the market value. The Ombudsman’s report concluded that
the Minister, using his position, had misappropriated property. In the second case,
the same Minister again leased a number of properties using an improperly
constituted tenders board, one member of which submitted a bid which he
subsequently considered as a member of the tenders board (his bid was successful).61
The leases were fraught with other irregularities and were granted contrary to the
advice of the Department of Finance and the Solicitor General. 
The Public Report on the Sale of the M. V. Yasur62 revealed a further instance of
conflict of interest. The vessel M.V. Yasur, owned by the government, was leased to
a private company. The Secretary General of the Council of Ministers (the cabinet)
made arrangements relating to the leased vessel, including the release of two public
servants to work on the vessel. At the time he was also an active partner of the
company leasing the vessel. 
Perhaps the most notorious instance of conflict of interest is revealed in the Public
Report on the Vanuatu National Provident Fund Housing Loan Scheme.63 Many
politicians, senior public servants and members of the VNPF Board used their
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positions to gain preferential treatment in a low interest housing loan scheme from
which they benefited at the expense of the 33,000 members of the VNPF whose trust
fund was being used to finance the scheme. 
Bad business deals
Several public reports show how politicians have, ostensibly acting in the best
interests of Vanuatu, become involved in business schemes with foreign interests. The
conduct which has been involved in these schemes has been found to be improper in
a number of respects. These business arrangements were all entered into in breach of
proper procedures which, if followed, would have prevented the risk of unfortunate
results. 
One notable example of such conduct involves the Bank Guarantee case.64 The Prime
Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank arranged for
bank guarantees to be drawn up in the sum of US$100,000,000 and provided to an
expatriate businessman, together with a diplomatic passport and A$50,000. There
was no apparent consideration for these benefits except for the apparently naïve
expectation that the guarantees could be invested and return a profit in the order of
US$250,000,000 in two years. 
Another example of this type of conduct is revealed in the case of the transfer by the
Finance Minister of ownership of all of Vanuatu’s assets to a secret trust established
in Mauritius, contrary to the advice of the Attorney General. The reason for the
ministerial order giving effect to this transfer is not clear. Fortunately it was made
without the necessary authority and was cancelled by the incoming government.65
The Cybank venture provides another example of an improvident business deal with
foreigners.66 The Minister of Finance entered into negotiations with an Australian
businessman for the Republic of Vanuatu to invest in an online internet bank and
casino. The arrangements were hastily finalised without the necessary approval of the
Council of Ministers. The funds for the investment were to come from the VNPF.
Cybank was to receive preferential license fees, tax rates and priority access to
telecommunication facilities in Vanuatu. Neither Telecom Vanuatu Ltd (which was
obliged to provide some of these concessions) nor the VNPF (which was to provide
the financial investment) took part in the negotiations. No independent evaluation
was obtained before the Finance Minister committed to the investment and a number
of necessary procedural prerequisites for such an investment by the government were
not followed. 
These reports and the matters they reveal demonstrate the extent to which naïveté
and corruption are sometimes difficult to distinguish. It should be stressed that the
Ombudsman made no finding that there had been bribery in either case. The need
to stress this fact stems from the ease with which one might make an unwarranted
assumption that it was. 
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FURTHER OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The work of the Ombudsman in Vanuatu is largely concerned with the advancement
of good governance. It is difficult to accurately assess the effectiveness of the
Ombudsman in bringing about good governance within Vanuatu. Many of the
matters inquired into by the Vanuatu Ombudsman are themselves of an order of
significance that are unlikely to be tackled on a regular basis by ombudsmen of most
other jurisdictions. Further, the police and prosecution branches of law enforcement
in Vanuatu are relatively weak and unable or unwilling to follow up with prosecutions
as recommended by the Ombudsman. 
Many of the recommendations arising from the Ombudsman’s reports call for the
non-reappointment or dismissal of appointed board members, employees of the
government or publicly owned companies and the resignation or dismissal of
politicians. Others call for the prosecution of those whose conduct has either been
concluded or suspected to be criminal. However, few, if any, prosecutions have been
initiated on the basis of an Ombudsman’s report. A number of politicians have been
found to have been in breach of the Leadership Code (some on several occasions) and
yet have gone on to further leadership positions contrary to the Ombudsman’s
recommendations. No politician has resigned over revelations of misconduct and
although several charges have been laid, no conviction has, to date resulted from any
of revelations of wrongdoing alleged in any Ombudsman report.67
Other recommendations call for new or amended laws and procedures to correct
deficiencies or fill gaps. Some of these recommendations have been adopted. The
passing of the Leadership Code Act in August 1998 is one example. However, it is
questionable whether the Ombudsman’s recommendations were instrumental in
getting the laws amended. The move to amend or create the laws in relation to the
Leadership Code predated the Ombudsman’s office, and new laws may well have
been created regardless of her recommendations. 
However, although there may have been few formal actions arising from the
recommendations in the Ombudman’s reports, the Office has had an impact on
politicians and society. As has been indicated, the powerful have felt threatened by the
Ombudsman’s power. The former Minister of Finance, Willie Jimmy, in response to
a preliminary report in the Nambawan Bottle Shop case stated that “[the]
Ombudsman does not know that the law does not give her the power to act as a
Policeman, Judge, Jury and Executioner.”68 While there may be an element of
hyperbole in this statement, in a sense it is true that the first Ombudsman assumed
the role of a judge. The many conclusions of criminal conduct, the illegality of
particular actions and the invalidity of others read like judicial pronouncements. This
quality is highlighted in the paucity of judicial pronouncements on the type of
conduct that the Ombudsman has investigated and reported on. In respect of the
allegation of the Ombudsman being an executioner, it can be said that on at least one
occasion, the first Ombudsman did, inadvertently and indirectly, assume this role.
The public reaction to revelations contained in the Public Report on the Vanuatu
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Provident Fund Housing Loan Scheme included rioting and extensive damage to the
office building housing the VNPF and to private property thought to belong to some
individuals whose conduct was judged wrongful in the report. Figuratively therefore,
one might consider the first Ombudsman to have indirectly wielded the authority of
the Old Testament passages which are included in the prefaces of the public reports
and to have been indirectly associated with the retributive moral consequences to
which they refer. 
It may be argued that, compared to many countries with an Ombudsman, the
importance of the Vanuatu Ombudsman is greater, given the relative lack of civic
awareness and no established tradition of independent investigative journalism. It
might also be argued that the lack of these features has increased the difficulty that
the Ombudsman encounters in discharging his or her responsibility and gaining the
confidence and respect of the political class. 
Just as there is very little in the model of the Ombudsman that has been adopted by
Vanuatu which is adapted to the specific circumstances of Vanuatu, so there is
nothing in any of the reports which addresses the cultural differences of the nation
or takes into account how these might provide an understanding of the conduct of
the leaders and public servants whose actions are being investigated. It is also notable
that the National Council of Chiefs, which is specifically entitled to make a complaint
and thereby launch an inquiry has yet to avail itself of this opportunity. 
However this does not lead to the conclusion that the reports of the Ombudsman
have been without effect. Although it is not possible to conclude that the behaviour
of leaders of the country has changed as a result of the presence of the Office of the
Ombudsman, it is clear that the Ombudsman has raised the level of consciousness
among both the general population and the political class. It is also clear that, even
under the new Ombudsman Act, there is sufficient power for the wrongdoings of
politicians and other government and public officials to be investigated and made
public. The challenge now is for the Ombudsman to remain effective in revealing
misconduct but, at the same time, to induce those who have power to do so to make
changes in accordance with the Ombudsman’s recommendations. Ideally, this process
will incorporate more consultation and cooperation between the Ombudsman and
the powerful than has been evident to date. 
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6 International Ombudsman Institute. 1982. Ombudsman Office Profiles Alberta:
International Ombudsman Institute.
7 Luteru, P. 1994. Aid and Development in Relation to Customary Land Tenure: Some Social
and Educational Implications in Land Issues it the Pacific. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies.
8 Huffer, E. and Molisa, G. 1999. Governance in Vanuatu: In Search of the Nakamal Way.
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 99/4. Canberra:
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. 
9 The National Council of Chiefs is a consultative body established under Chapter 5 of the
Constitution of Vanuatu that is concerned with the use and preservation of custom and
may make recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture and
languages.
10 Any limitation period that applies to the complainant’s right to a legal remedy is delayed
until such a reply is made. 
11 These languages are English French and Bislama.
12 This is a feature is not unique to Vanuatu. Canada, a country with more than one official
language, safeguards their status in part by the Official Languages Act RSC 1985 c. 31. It
provides for a Commissioner of Official Languages whose duties include the investigation
of complaints regarding the use of official languages and reporting to Parliament. 
13 The Ombudsman was the last Constitutional position in Vanuatu to be filled; Vanuatu
Ombudsman. 1995. Annual Report. p 14.
14 These aspects can be considered to be the sword and the shield of the Ombudsman. Both
are necessary for the effective discharge of duties by any Ombudsman, see de Jonge, A.
1998. The Pacific Ombudsman’s Complaints Function: Comparative Perspectives on Fiji,
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. Delivered at Corruption and Accountability in the Pacific
Workshop, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Australian National
University 6–9 November 1998.
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15 Dismissal must result from the deliberations of a tribunal comprising 3 persons including
the Chief Justice; section 9, Ombudsman Act 1995 (Vanuatu).
16 Ombudsman Act 1995 (Vanuatu) s.35.
17 The Leadership Code forms Chapter 10 of the Constitution and is set out below:
66. (1) Any person defined as a leader in Article 67 has a duty to conduct himself in such
a way, both in his public and private life, so as not to:
(a) place himself in a position in which he has or could have a conflict of interests or
in which the fair exercise of his public or official duties might be compromised;
(b) demean his office or position;
(c) allow his integrity to be called into question; or
(d) endanger or diminish respect for and confidence in the integrity of the
Government of the Republic of Vanuatu.
(2) In particular, a leader shall not use his office for personal gain or enter into any
transaction or engage in any enterprise or activity that might be expected to give rise
to doubt in the public mind as to whether he is carrying out or has carried out the
duty imposed by sub-article (1) 
67. For the purposes of this Chapter, a leader means the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister and other Ministers, members of Parliament, and such public servants,
officers of Government agencies and other officers as may be prescribed by law. 
68. Parliament shall by law give effect to the principles of this Chapter.
18 Ombudsman Act 1995 (Vanuatu) sections 17 and 21 respectively.
19 Section 22(2)(c).
20 Section 25(2).
21 An application pursuant to this section was made in connection with the investigation and
ensuing report recommending that illegal ex gratia payments made to politicians be repaid
to the government. Vanuatu Ombudsman, 1996. Public Report on Ex Gratia Payments.
June 4, 1996. Although the Ombudsman is given standing to apply to the court for orders
enforcing recommendations, it was not clear who the “responsible person” mentioned in
section 30 is and therefore is unclear who, if anyone, an order should be directed to.
Further difficulties could arise in relation to such applications where the recommendations
are too general to be framed as an enforceable order of the court.
22 Pakistan’s Office of the Ombudsman has similar deviations from the generic model.
Crossland, K. 1998. Interpretation of the Ombudsmsn role by Vanuatu’s first
Ombudsman. Presented at Corruption and Accountability in the Pacific. Workshop: State,
Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Australian National University. 6–9
November 1998. http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/crossland.html (Accessed 6/11/01)
23 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Annual Report of the Office of the Ombudsman. Table 3.4,
page 23.
24 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1995. Annual Report. p 7, 11.
25 “What occurred in this situation was a first-hand example of maladministration of the very
type my Office is repeatedly called upon to investigate by complainants” Vanuatu
Ombudsman. 1995. Annual Report. p 12.
26 Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, Article 56.
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27 Direct contributions in the form of money, manpower or other resources have been made
to the Ombudsman by the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New
Zealand and Papua New Guinea. In addition, the Association des Ombudmans et
Mediateurs de la Francophonie, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the European Union, the
United Nations Development Program and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP) have also made contributions to the Ombudsman. See Vanuatu
Ombudsman. 1996, 1998 and 1999. Annual Reports. 
28 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1996. Annual Report. p 5.
29 As quoted in Crossland, K. 1998. Above, note 22. 
30 As cited by Crossland, K. 1998. Above, note 22.
31 See for instance, Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1997. Public Report on the Improper interference
with a Land Lease by the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amos Bangabiti. July,
17, 1997, at p 2. In this report, the Ombudsman refers to a major recurring problem, that
of expatriates wrongfully becoming the victims of envy and persecution by indigenous ni-
Vanuatu. 
32 Anti Corruption Ombudsman under attack from Parliament. Pacific Islands Monthly Jan
1998 Vol 68 (1) p 14–15.
33 There is really nothing in custom that prevents criticism or sanctioning of inappropriate
behavior by leaders. Rather, it is the manufacturing of a second class of custom that is used
to consolidate the power of the ruling elite. Huffer, E. and Molisa, G. 1999. Above, n 8 at
p 7.
34 Dozens of examples abound. For example: “It has been depressing for the Ombudsman’s
Office to see repeated again and again the selfish and greedy actions of those who put
personal gain before public service with such regularity that it is with heavy hearts that the
growing pile of complaints is surveyed. Cause for sadness, too, in that those charged with
offences have chosen not to follow the path of confession and potential forgiveness but of
denial or silence.” Preamble to Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1998. Final Report on the
Purchase, Repair, Management and Operation of the Prince II. December 2, 1998.
Another example is taken from the preamble from Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1998. Public
Report on the Multiple Breaches of the Leadership Code by Barak Sope. Once more the
Ombudsman Office finds itself reporting yet another clear example of contempt for legal
and honest procedures by a leader so desperate to hold on to power that he was prepared
to intervene and interfere in the vital matter provision of food.
35 Three random selections serve as an illustration: How long will ye judge unjustly and
accept the persons of the wicked? Defend the poor and fatherless do justice to the afflicted
and needy: rid them out of the hand of the wicked”, Psalm 82 v 2; Vanuatu Ombudsman.
1997. Public Report on the Sale of the M.V. Savin Fana. June 26, 1997; “Do ye thank
that the Scripture saith in vain “The spirit that dwelleth in us lusteth to envy” James 4 v 5;
Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1997. Public report on the Improper Interference with a Land
Lease by the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Amos Bangabiti; [t]the getting of
treasures by a lying tongue is a vanity tossed to and from then that seek death.” Proverbs
21 v 6; Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1997. Public Report on Illegal Passport Scheme and Resort
Las Vegas. December 3, 1997.
36 Van den Bergh, N. I. C. 1998. An Analysis of Some Preambles to the Reports From the
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Ombudsman’s Office, Vanuatu. University of the South Pacific School of Law staff
seminar. October 21, 1998. In this paper, it is argued that the quotes are taken out of
context and that they imply to the reader that the leaders of Vanuatu act against Gods will
and laws, that they are sinful, debased and corrupt. Professor Van den Bergh points out
that nowhere in the quotes which form part of the preambles does one find “words of
encouragement, of reconciliation, of forgiveness, concepts which form the heart of
Chrisianity.”
37 Ombudsman v Fr. Gerard Leymang, Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic of
Vanuatu, Civil Case No. 3 of 1997 25 August 1997.
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_O-
Q/Ombudsman_v_Leymang.html (Accessed 7/11/01)
38 Ombudsman V Willie Jimmy, Maxime Carlot Korman et al, Unreported, Supreme Court
of the Republic of Vanuatu, Constitutional Case no. 104 of 1997 4 May 2001.
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_OQ/
Ombudsman_v_Batick.html (accessed 7/11/01)
39 Ombudsman v The Attorney General & anor, Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic
of Vanuatu, Constitutional Case No 114 of 1997, 30 Oct 1997.
40 Although those implicated have an opportunity to respond to a preliminary report before a
public report is released and, although their response is included in the public report, the
first Ombudsman typically responded to the responses, often in a dismissive or incredulous
manner and thereby maintained a position of having the last word. 
41 It was strongly recommended by the advisor from Ombudsman Commission of Papua
New Guinea that the hiring of Ombudsman’s employees be separate from the Public
Service in order to avoid this very possibility. Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1995. Annual Report.
p 12.
42 Section 6 (1).
43 For example, in the Vanuatu Ombudsman. 2002. Public Report on the Failure of Some
Leaders to File Annual Returns to the Clerk of Parliament, the facts revealed that 24
leaders had failed to file an annual return. Sections 19 and 31 of the Leadership Code Act
No. 2 of 1998 make failure to file a return by March 1 each year. Despite these clear and
undisputed facts, the factual finding of the Ombudsman was that the Leadership Code
“may have” been breached. 
44 Section 21.
45 In Fiji, in the early 1980’s at a time when the Fiji Ombudsman had been in operation for
roughly the same length of time as the Vanuatu Ombudsman now has, there was an
informal initiative to engage in a process which was described as mediation. See Scott, I.
1982. The Ombudsman in Fiji, Patterns of Mediation and Institutionalization. The
Ombudsman Journal No.2: p. 1.
46 Section 13.
47 The Ombudman has indicated to the writer on several occasions that the use of mediation
will expand in the work of the Ombudsman. 
48 Crossland, K. 1998. Above note 22, at pp 9 to 11.
8 9
T H E  V A N U A T U  O M B U D S M A N
49 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Report on Prison Conditions and Mismanagment of Prison
Budget. September 16, 1999 and Vanuatu Ombudsman. 2000. Public Report on the
Unlawful Solitary Confinement of Three Prisoners by Prison Authorities. March 13, 2000.
50 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Vanuatu Fire Service Failure to put out
the fire on 6 1998 at Paris Shopping, Snoopy’s, Au Peche Mignon and Frank King Tours.
May 12, 1999.
51 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Illegal and Unconstitutional
Discrimination in the Citizenshop Act. May 18, 1999.
52 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on Conversion Into Anglophone School of
French Speaking Public Primary School at Mangliiu (North West Efate). September 9,
1999.
53 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Discriminatory Crieteria of the
Vanuatu National Examinations Board for Admission to Year 7. August 13, 1999.
54 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1998. Public Report on Illegal Creation of CVDC SA and the
People of Vanuatu Trust and breach of the Leadership Code by Hon. Vincent Boulekone,
Minister of Finance. March 13, 1998.
55 Huffer, C. and Molisa, M. 1998. Above, note 8, at p 7.
56 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1996. Public Report on the Appointment of the Deputy General
Manager of the Vanuatu National Provident Fund. November 15, 1996. 
57 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Improper Appointment of Senior
Public Works Department Staff. March 11, 1999.
58 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Mismanagement of the Vanuatu
Livestock Development Ltd. By the Former Manager Selwyn Leodoro in 1992–1993 and
Illegal Conduct of the Former Chairman of the Board Tom Kalorib. July 23, 1999.
59 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1996. Public Report on the Numbawan Bottle Shop Case. August
20, 1996.
60 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Granting of Leasses by the Former
Minister of Lands Mr. Paul Barthelemy Telukluk to Himself, Family Members and
Wantoks. April 22, 1999.
61 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1999. Public Report on the Mismanagement of the Tender Sale of
Ten Deportees’ Properties by the Former Minister of Lands Mr. Paul Telukluk. May 28,
1999.
62 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1996. Public Report on the Sale of M. V. Yasur. September 23,
1996.
63 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1997. Public Report on the National Provident Fund Housing
Loan Scheme. December 17, 1997.
64 Vanuatu Ombudsman. Public Report on the Provision of Bank Guarantees Given in
the Sum of US$100,000,000, in Breach of the Leadership Code and Section 14 (f) the
Ombudsman Act and Related Matters Thereto. July 3, 1996.
65 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1998. Public Report on Illegal Creation of CVDC SA and the
People of Vanuatu Trust. March 28, 1998.
66 Vanuatu Ombudsman. 1996. Public Report on the Conduct of Barak Sope and the VNPF
Board in a Proposed Investment in the Internet Bank “Cybank” Venture. October 16,
1996.
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67 Information provided by former Ombudsman, Marie Noelle Ferrieux-Patterson,
July 2001.
68 As quoted by Crossland K. 1998. above, n 22.
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Review questions
1. Do you think that corrupt activities can be justified in some situations?
2. Do you think that what is corrupt in one country is not necessarily corrupt in
another due to cultural differences?
3. In what ways do you see constitutional legitimacy compromised or challenged
in your country? What do you think can or should be done to improve
constitutional legitimacy?
4. What do you think is the relationship between constitutional legitimacy and
corruption?
5. Do you think that the generic model of the Ombudsman, as developed in
European and other western countries, is effective in a developing country like
Vanuatu?
6. What powers or duties do you think an Ombudsman would need in order to be
effective in reducing corruption within PICs?
7. Do you think that combating corruption is a good use of limited resources in
PICs?
Further readings 
Botchwey, K. (ed) 2001. Fighting Corruption, Promoting Good Governance:
Commonwealth expert group on good governance and the elimination of corruption.
London: Commonwealth Publications.
Habermas, J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory
of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hassall, G. & Saunders, C. 2002. Asia Pacific Constitutional Systems. Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press.
Larmour, P. & Wolanin, N. (eds) 2001. Corruption and Anti-Corruption.
Canberra: Asia Pacific Press.
Regan, A. Jessep, O. & Kwa, E. (eds) 2001. Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea
Constitution. Sydney, Law Book Company.
Reif, L. Marshall, M.& Ferris C. (eds) 1993. The Ombudsman: Diversity and
Development. Edmonton, Canada: International Ombudsman Institute.
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SECTION 3
CUSTOMARY LAW
5. CUSTOM THEN AND NOW: 
THE CHANGING MELANESIAN FAMILY
Jean G. Zorn
6.  ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY CUSTOMARY LAW:
WOMEN AND THE LAW
Jean G. Zorn
7.  RITES,  WHITES & MIGHT: A CRITIQUE OF 
THE EFFECT OF THE REVIVAL OF CUTOMARY LAW 
ON THE AUTONOMY OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
Susan Bothmann
8.  THE INCORPORATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
AND PRINCIPLE INTO SENTENCING DECISIONS IN
THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION
Tess Newton Cain
9 4
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
It would be possible to produce a whole collection of pieces that were concerned with
each of the themes that are considered in this volume. Such is certainly the case in
respect of this section. The place of custom in modern and modernising Pacific
island societies is a question of ongoing debate in all sectors and at all levels. These
debates have political, economic, legal and social aspects to them. These debates can
be wide-ranging or narrow in focus. They are conducted in a wide variety of
locations and in numerous languages. Some aspects of those debates are identified
and explored here. Our authors are sufficiently well versed in the complexities of
Pacific legal discourse to avoid oversimplifications of the ‘all custom good, all law
bad’ variety. They are not so presumptuous as to offer solutions to problems or
answers to questions that have been vexatious and will continue to be so for many
years to come. Rather, they offer their observations and thoughts as part of an
ongoing and dynamic dialogue whose aim is to identify the most useful questions, to
accurately define the problems before moving on to the next step, the formulation of
responses.
The first two chapters are written by Professor Jean Zorn. Her exposition of
customary law is one that exemplifies the organic and changing nature of custom,
of law and the inter-relationship between the two. The third chapter, by Susan
Bothmann, further broadens the theoretical discussions by considering the
implications of (re)constituting custom for women. Her chapter draws on concepts
established by feminist theorists and those who have written in the field of aboriginal
studies in Australia. Dr Tess Newton Cain provides a narrower focus in her
chapter. She examines the nature of the inter-relationship between law and custom
within a very specific field, that of sentencing decisions in the criminal courts of the
region.
One of the most controversial aspects of customary law is its interrelationship with
human rights. Several of the issues that the authors raise in this section will be
examined further in the following section, which is concerned with human rights.
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5.  CUSTOM THEN AND NOW:
THE CHANGING MELANESIAN FAMILY*
By: Jean G. Zorn
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Agnates
Relatives by marriage (cognates are relatives by birth). So, an agnatic
relationship is a relationship with an in-law or other relative by marriage.
Kula
This is a Papuan word for the circle trade in precious shells that Hula,
Trobriand, Motu and other Papuan people engaged in.
*Professor Zorn would like to thank the people without whose help and support, insight and
understanding this chapter could never have been accomplished. That list includes Tess
Newton Cain, Jennifer Corrin Care, Miranda Dickenson, Kristin Booth Glen, Christine
Stewart, Pamela Goldberg, Ellen Mosen James, Simon Fuo’o, the students in Professor Zorn’s
family law course at the University of the South Pacific, and, especially, Steve, Heather and
Christopher.
INTRODUCTION
All times are changing times, but ours is one of massive, rapid moral and mental
transformation. Archetypes turn into millstones, large simplicities get complicated,
chaos becomes elegant, and what everybody knows is true turns out to be what some
people used to think.1
One of the difficulties faced by state courts when they try to recognise and apply
custom in their decisions is the ever-changing nature of custom.2 Customs change
faster than the law changes, and the rate at which customs are changing probably has
accelerated, even since the colonial period, due to the technological, economic and
political changes that the Pacific island nations are undergoing. 
This chapter looks at a number of questions that are important for courts, clients and
counsel. What is custom?3 What has caused custom to change, and what kinds of
changes have occurred since the pre-colonial era? If custom is constantly changing,
how do courts assure themselves that what they are applying is custom? In looking at
that last question, the chapter will analyse some recent cases that deal with changing
customs.4 The three cases illustrate different reactions to changes in custom. In
Thesia Maip’s case, a Papua New Guinea court refuses to recognise and apply the new
practice, determining that it has not yet become widely used enough to qualify as a
custom. In To’ofilu v Oimae, a Solomon Islands court accepts changed practices, but
treats them as if they were rules of the common law rather than customary rules.
Finally, in Molu v Molu, the Vanuatu court applies new and old customs in a very
customary style. We must ask ourselves what prompted these very distinct responses
and which is best?
CUSTOM THEN
In pre-colonial times, each of the indigenous societies of the Pacific had its own
customs.5 While there were similarities in the customs of all societies of the Pacific
islands, based primarily on broad similarities in their economics and technology,6
there were also differences from one society to another — some the result of
differences in the means of production (fishing versus gardening, for example), some
more likely the result of history (chiefly societies versus ‘big man’ cultures, perhaps).
It was through these distinctive customs that each such society defined itself as
unique. With only a few exceptions, each of the small village societies of the pre-
colonial Pacific was an independent, mono-cultural entity.
Customs are the norms (the rules) of the group. As such, they perform a function
within the group similar to the function that law performs within a nation. Without
complicated state mechanisms — without legislatures or courts or police forces — the
pre-colonial societies of the Pacific nevertheless had functioning legal systems. They
had complex sets of (unwritten) rules governing all aspects of social, political and
economic behaviour.7 They had effective methods for ensuring that the rules would
be followed, and they also had workable procedures for settling disputes. The same
customary legal systems continue to function today in most Pacific villages.8
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CUSTOMS CHANGING
Colonialism and its aftermath produced many changes in the cultures of the Pacific.
Of greatest importance to our study, perhaps, was the introduction into the Pacific of
the colonisers’ laws and legal systems, which were superimposed upon existing
customs and customary dispute settlement methods. 
At independence the new Pacific nations might have done away with the legal systems
that the colonisers had imported and returned to an indigenous legal system made up
entirely of custom. They did not. Instead they kept the structure of the imposed legal
system: its courts and legislature. They also kept much of the content of the imposed
legal system: the constitutions, statutes and common law imported from or based
upon foreign models. But they tried to find a meaningful place for custom within this
formal framework.
The constitutions or statutes of most Pacific nations provided that, in addition to
statutes and common law, the formal courts9 should recognise and apply the customs
of the indigenous peoples of the nation.10 But the courts have been reluctant to use
custom. One reason may be that the colonisers’ disdain for custom has carried over
to inform the beliefs and values of judges in the post-colonial period. Another may
be that judges who are trained in the common law find it difficult to work with norms
that are uncodified and unwritten. Expatriate judges, in particular, unfamiliar with
indigenous cultures, may worry that they could be led to choose norms that do not
really exist or to apply them incorrectly.11
One of the major reasons for the state courts’ hesitation to recognise and apply
custom may be the tendency of custom to change without warning. The customs of
a group are no more than the accumulated beliefs, values and habits of the members
of the group. Over time beliefs, values and habitual ways of acting change and,
because custom is not written down, the changes go unrecorded. As Ursula LeGuin
said, gradually, over time, hardly without our noticing, “what everybody knows is
true turns out to be what some people used to think.”12
During the colonial period courts, for the most part, avoided the problems caused by
changes to custom by recognising and applying only those customs that had “existed
from time immemorial”.13 At independence, however, the definition of custom was
redrawn in a number of jurisdictions to require of courts that they apply such customs
as exist at the time of the court action.14 This has raised problems for courts in
ascertaining just what the applicable custom is and in figuring out what to do, once
a court has adopted a custom, if that custom later changes.
What makes customs change?
Every society is changing all the time. The societies of the Pacific were always
changing, even before the colonial intervention.15 Drought, excess rain, tribal wars or
the lure of the unknown caused whole societies to move to new villages, even to new
islands far across the sea. Pigs and sweet potato changed people’s diets, their
gardening and hunting patterns, and even their feasts and ceremonial exchanges.
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Styles of dress and ornament, tattooing and body painting changed over time.
Different verses and steps to ritual dances went in and out of fashion, or altered over
time as generations forgot old verses or invented new ones. Without written records
many changes went unrecorded and unremembered.
Although the societies of the Pacific have always been changing, colonialism brought
change of a kind probably never before experienced in the Pacific. Some of the
changes were intentional on the part of the colonisers. Others were the unplanned
result of changes to the political system, to technology, and to the economy.
Whichever the cause, the rate of change was more rapid than ever before, and the
political, economic, technological, religious and social leaps probably greater than
anyone in the Pacific had ever experienced.16
The ways in which customs have changed
The economic, social and political changes that began in the colonial era, and that
have continued to occur, changed custom in many important respects. Customary
norms have changed to embrace these economic, social and political changes. For
example, the settlements to many disputes now include the payment of money,
something that did not exist in pre-colonial times. Customary processes have also
changed, adopting some of the formalities that characterise the formal courts of the
introduced legal system.
The most far-reaching change is probably the one most overlooked. The villages of
the Pacific went from being separate, sovereign entities to being lesser parts of larger
political entities. Similarly, in the colonial period, custom ceased to be the sole legal
system operating in Pacific villages. At best, in territories where the colonial power
recognised the legitimacy of custom, it became the lesser of two different legal
systems. At worst, even if villagers still utilised custom, in many Pacific colonies, it had
no official sanction as a legal system.17
The existence of a competing, and more powerful, legal system had a number of
effects on custom. Villagers dissatisfied with the results of a customary meeting now
knew they could go to one of the formal courts where a different outcome might be
obtainable. Once villagers knew that there were courts where one party could win
everything, instead of having to agree to a compromise, some were even tempted to
try the formal courts without first exhausting customary remedies. Moreover,
villagers who disagreed with customary rules of behaviour now knew they could
ignore those norms if the introduced legal system had different rules.
CUSTOM NOW
Recent cases illustrate both the nature of the changes that have occurred in the
cultures of indigenous peoples and the difficulties that these changes pose for the
courts. The cases also show that judges in the Pacific are actively engaging with the
problems raised by changing customs, attempting to sort out current custom from
bygone tradition, to fashion legal rules that will assist the courts in recognising and
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applying custom and to treat custom as a viable part of the state legal system.
Precisely how they are doing it is the topic of this chapter.
The chapter will focus on cases having to do with marriage and divorce. I have chosen
cases from this area of law not because marital customs are any more changed than
other customs or because courts handle changing custom in this area either
particularly well or particularly badly, but only because the examination of three cases
that happen all to be within the same area of the law affords a clearer picture of the
ways in which courts react to changes in custom. For the same reason the three cases
chosen were all from Melanesia. The continuity of culture from one of these cases to
the other makes the nature of cultural change, and the ways in which courts react to
it, stand out all the more clearly.
This part of the chapter will begin with a brief overview of marriage law for those who
wish to be reminded of the key doctrinal principles. At the same time, the chapter will
discuss the kinds of changes that have occurred in customs relating to marriage,
divorce and the custody of children. The chapter will then analyse three cases about
customary marriage, divorce and custody practices.
MARRIAGE THEN AND NOW
One of the reasons that is often given for the continuing recognition of customary
marriages is that people most resist changing those customs — such as marriage and
divorce — that are the most personal.18 Moreover, almost every one gets married so,
if marriages performed according to custom were unlawful, a great many people
would be in violation of the law. Rather than have that happen the drafters of the
marriage and divorce statutes in many Pacific jurisdictions thought it would be better
to recognise the validity of customary marriage.19
Contrary to prediction, practices related to marriage and divorce have changed
considerably over the years, making it more and more difficult for the courts to
decide what custom is or was. The changes have been both large and small. One of
the larger is the intrusion of Christianity into the marriage ceremony. These days,
many couples who believe that they are entering into a customary marriage have a
church ceremony, in addition to all the customary feasts, exchanges and rituals.
However, if the member of the clergy who performed the church ceremony saw to it
that the couple complied with the statutory formalities, and he or she probably did,
then they are now married under the statute, regardless of whether they may also be
married under custom.20
What makes a customary marriage
The first of the cases in this chapter is concerned with whether there can be a
customary marriage between people from different parts of the country, places with
different customs.21 One of the many changes that have occurred in the relations
between men and women in the Pacific is the growth of relationships between people
from different cultures. Some of these relations are between Pacific islanders and
C U S T O M  T H E N  A N D  N O W
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people from other countries, both within and outside the Pacific islands. In more
diverse countries, such as Papua New Guinea, relationships develop between people
from different parts of the country with different matrimonial customs. If the parties
live together without going through the statutory form of marriage ceremony, the
courts may question whether they are married at all, even under custom. Application
of Thesia Maip is such a case.22
Thesia Maip came from a village in the Western Highlands of Papua New Guinea,
Jude Sioni came from Bougainville, another Papua New Guinea province but far from
the Highlands, and different in many ways. This is how the judge of the National
Court describes the relationship between Thesia and Jude:23
... they met at Mendi [which is in the Southern Highlands] and started living
together. He suggested that if she behaved well they would get married in a
church. However there was no formal marriage in a church or under the
Marriage Act nor was there any public ceremony involving brideprice in the
village. They lived together at Mendi and it appears that at no time did Jude Sioni
ever visit Thesia’s village namely Balk village in the Western Highlands. I am sure
that he would have spent some money on her and he states in his evidence he did
give her some money at different times. However, this would be expected when
two people are living together. And also perhaps relatives did visit and cost him
some money. After living together at Mendi for two years, he was apparently
arrested and taken to Bougainville for some problems and was locked up for some
months. He escaped some time in 1990 and came to the Western Highlands to
Balk village to look for Thesia. It would appear that this was his first visit to the
village. At that time she had taken up with another man so he then took her to
the village court.24
Jude’s complaint to the Village Court was that Thesia “was his wife and had left him
and gone off with another man.” Hearing this plea, the Balk Village Court ordered
Thesia to pay K700 compensation “which was later reduced to K300 by the Local
Court Magistrate” who reviewed the case.25 Since Thesia was unable to pay that
amount, she was imprisoned for 30 weeks. Mr Justice Woods of the National Court
on a tour of Highlands prisons discovered Thesia in prison and ordered her release.26
But J. Woods could not have ordered Thesia released from prison unless the law gave
him a reason to do so. He found that reason in the rules about marriage and
adultery.27 According to the common law that Papua New Guinea imported from
England, ‘adultery’ consists of sexual relations between two persons only if one or
both of them is married to someone else.28 Sexual relations between unmarried
persons do not constitute adultery.29
The Village Court found that Thesia and Jude were married under customary law,
which made her an adulteress. The National Court held that they weren’t. The
differences between the two courts illustrate two opposite responses towards
defining, finding and applying custom when social mores and behaviour are
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changing. The Village Court took the position that custom changes with the times,
and that courts should change along with it:
The Chairman of the village court has confirmed that according to the traditional
custom if two people marry and they both are from the Highlands then they pay
brideprice in the village and that is witnessed by the village people. He then stated
that in modern times due to the interaction that takes place between the different
provinces people from coastal [province]s are marrying people from the
Highlands and are not following the traditional procedures. However, even
though they are not following the traditional procedures people today are
recognizing it as a marriage.
The Village Court was willing to adopt and apply new customs provided that they
met two criteria. First, the Village Court required that the new activity be fairly
widespread. Thesia and Jude were not the only couple from different provinces to
have formed a relationship: “people from coastals” generally, the Village Court
chairman said, “are marrying people from the Highlands”. Secondly, the Village
Court required that there be general acceptance of the new activity among other
members of the community: “people” generally, the chairman added, “are
recognising it as a marriage.”
In understanding that customs change as circumstances change the Village Court
chairman was accurate, both as a social scientist30 and in his application of Papua New
Guinea law.31 But was he correct in stating that marriage practices had changed to the
point where the Village Courts ought to recognise liaisons like that of Jude and
Thesia’s as a new kind of customary marriage? In social terms he probably was.
Anthropologists would say that a new way of thinking and behaving becomes a
custom when it is fairly regularly practised by more than just a few people in a
community and when a large segment of the community, including those who might
not themselves engage in the activity, view it as normative.32
The National Court judge, however, held that the chairman was incorrect in stating
that relationships such as the one between Jude and Thesia met the legal definition
of custom:
Whilst one must accept that custom must develop in Papua New Guinea to meet
the many changes within the country one must be very careful in accepting that
such developments in custom are clearly recognised by everyone and that they do
not leave the way open for far reaching consequences.
The judge gave several reasons for deciding that a relationship such as that between
Thesia and Jude could not be a customary marriage. These reasons may become
guidelines for Village and Local Court magistrates, lawyers, and legal scholars in their
attempts to determine which new activities are customs that the state courts will
adopt and which are not. It is therefore important that we explore the judge’s
reasoning.
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First, he said that in order for a belief or activity to become a custom, it must be
“clearly recognised by everyone”. Secondly, he said that the courts must consider
what “far-reaching consequences” their adoption of a new custom might have.33
What did the judge mean when he said that the custom must be “clearly recognised
by everyone”?34 There are, he said, “three clearly recognisable ways of getting
married” in Papua New Guinea:
Firstly by the traditional custom as has always been. Secondly through the church
under the Marriage Act and thirdly by a civil marriage registrar under the
Marriage Act. 
Since there are already three ways to get married, a fourth is hardly needed. If there
is to be a fourth way, it must be as widely recognised as the three that already exist.
That is a very high standard to meet. But the judge had a reason for setting the bar
so high. He did not want the courts adopting customs that “might have far-reaching
consequences” without first thinking through those consequences. Marriage, he
pointed out, creates many rights and obligations. The courts ought not to uphold the
rights — or, in this case, enforce the obligations — unless they are quite sure that the
parties intended to take on those rights and obligations. The only way to be sure of
that is to require that people go through a well-recognised form of marriage:
In view of the fact that imprisonment can result from the breakdown of marriages
at the village court, great care must be taken to ensure that such marriages are
firstly properly recognised and comply with either custom or the formal law...
Because of the legal implications and responsibilities that arise in a marriage and
if imprisonment can be used as a sanction if there is a breakdown, the law cannot
recognise anything but a properly arranged or certified marriage whether properly
done according to the custom of the place or under the formal law, the Marriage
Act.
The judge believed that the law should not easily assume a marriage has occurred
because marriage has important consequences for a couple, for their families, for
society as a whole. He pointed out that the laws about adultery are not the only ones
that operate only if a couple is married. Other important rights that arise only within
the context of marriage include the right to receive maintenance, the right to inherit
a share of a spouse’s property and the right to petition for custody of one’s children.35
Applying these principles and policies to the relationship between Thesia and Jude,
the judge held that they were not married. Their relationship did not meet Judge
Woods’ test of a custom that the courts should apply; it is not “clearly recognisable
by everyone” as a marriage. Indeed, the judge says, relationships like that of Thesia
and Jude are “clearly recognisable” by most people as casual liaisons:
In the modern world two people living away from their homes living together is
quite a common occurrence. Often it is just for the convenience of the time.
However, sometimes it is a serious trial to see if the two people are seriously
interested in getting married.
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Moreover, he noted, Thesia and Jude themselves had not thought they were married.
Jude had said “when they were living together in Mendi that if she behaved herself
he was considering getting married in a church”. Their arrangement seems to have
been, like the others the judge has described, “no more than a casual arrangement...
which suited them both at the time”.36
Even if one agrees with the outcome of the case, one can quarrel with the tests that
Judge Woods devised for ascertaining whether a new practice has become a custom.
The test is very hard to meet. That may be appropriate when marriage is at issue, but
the bar may be set too high for most other purposes. Can we think of any custom
that is recognised by everyone? In every society, there are likely to be a few people at
least who are unaware of recent changes. 
Moreover, the test is vague and will therefore present definitional problems as later
courts try to apply it. Just what, for example, is meant by ‘recognised’? Does this
mean that everyone must now be willing to act in accordance with the custom, that
they must agree with it, or merely that they know of its existence? If the former, then
the courts are even less likely to adopt and apply new customs, because, in most
societies, there are people who dissent to even the most widely shared customs.
Murder, for example, is fairly widely condemned, but there is no society in which
murder never occurs. Are we to conclude that respect for life is not customary? And
what, precisely, is meant by the adverb ‘clearly’? 
However, even if we disagree with Judge Woods about the details of his test for
recognising changes to custom, I think most of us would agree with him about two
things. First, I think we would agree that, whatever our attitude towards Thesia’s
behaviour, we do not condone putting women, or anyone for that matter, into prison
for acts that are not criminal.37 Secondly, I think we would agree that the courts need
a test that lays out rules to recognise new customs and adopt them as customary law.
Without such a test, generally accepted by all the courts, each magistrate or judge will
have to make up his or her own tests. There will be no uniformity. More likely, in the
absence of helpful standards or guidelines, most courts will refuse to adopt and apply
any new customs.
Brideprice
The second case looks at the ways in which the exchange of marital gifts has been
altered by the addition of cash as part of the brideprice.38 The intrusion of money into
the process has altered the custom in many ways, giving rise perhaps to those
“unforeseen consequences” that Judge Woods worried about. The major difference
is summed up in the adoption of that unfortunate English term ‘brideprice’ to
describe a custom that originally involved an exchange of gifts, not a sale and
purchase.39 ‘Price’ suggests that something — or someone — is being bought and
sold, and that is the way it has come to be viewed, both by local people, who now
talk of ‘buying’ a bride,40 and by feminist anthropologists, who argue that the custom
of ‘buying’ wives demeans and dehumanises the women involved.41 When the
husband’s family views the bride as a purchase, not as a person, they expect her to
redeem the brideprice by working for the family and by bearing children, who are also
seen as property that the husband’s clan has purchased. This is probably an
oversimplified view. Nor does it exist universally.42 But it does highlight the kinds of
new social relations and problems that develop when brideprice is transformed by the
infusion of money into the transaction.
Traditionally, brideprice marked the beginning of a relationship not just of the bride
with her new in-laws, but also of the two families. The marriage was a key to the many
relations — social, political and economic — that would now exist between the
bride’s clan or extended family and the groom’s clan or extended family. Aspects of
the complex inter-family relationships that begin with the exchange of brideprice still
exist, but the relationships between agnatic families have undergone many changes.43
Not all of those changes have occurred because money has become a significant part
of bridewealth, but, as the case of John To’ofilu v Oimae44 illustrates, money is a potent
symbol of the ways in which traditional exchange relationships have been transformed
into market economy transactions.
In the To’ofilu case, for example, representatives of two families negotiated a
brideprice that included six tafuliae,45 $1,000 (SI) in cash, three pigs and four bags
of rice. It turned out, however, that, before the marriage, the bride had been made
pregnant by another man. She and her new husband lived together as man and wife
for only a month and a half before he sent her away. His father sued her father in the
Local Court for return of the brideprice.46
The Local Court held for the groom’s father (the plaintiff). The bride’s father (the
defendant) admitted that he had known, even before the brideprice negotiations
began, that his daughter was pregnant.47 The Local Court decided the case according
to the customary law of the region, which expects both parties to divulge all the
important facts during the negotiation for the brideprice.48 Moreover, “according to
Malaita custom only virgins are paid with high price”. Therefore, the Local Court
“found Oimae… not honest in telling John To’ofilu the truth… [so] according to
Malaita custom [Oimae] must refund full brideprice and expenses”.49
The Magistrate’s Court, to which the case was appealed, disagreed with the Local
Court not only about how much brideprice should be returned, but also about what
the customary rules were that determine the quantum to be paid back. The
Magistrate’s Court discussed two rules of customary law that seem not to have been
mentioned in the Local Court. First, the Magistrates’ Court mentioned that the
amount of the brideprice might have been high because of the groom’s intense desire
for this woman, and not because she was presumed to be a virgin. The magistrate,
however, decided that this was not a reason in customary law for determining how
much brideprice should be returned.50 The magistrate was swayed, however, by the
defendant’s argument that less brideprice is to be returned “where the groom rejects
the bride.”51 Taking these customary norms into account, the magistrate decided that
the bride’s family need return only half the brideprice. This decision respected
Malaitan custom in a number of ways. Not only did the magistrate make an effort to
discover exactly what customary rules govern brideprice, but he also handled the
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rules in a customary way. In customary dispute settlement, it is common for two or
three or even more rules to be mentioned, all potentially applicable to the same case.
Here, for example, the parties brought up at least four rules:
• That both sides must tell the whole truth during brideprice negotiations;
• That a virgin deserves a high brideprice;
• That the returned brideprice will be halved if the husband sends his wife away; and
• That the party who shows ‘first sight love’ has to pay a higher brideprice.
The magistrate refused to accept the last of those rules, but he recognised the other
three. He handled the situation very much like an elder or clan leader would handle
a customary dispute settlement mediation.52 He used the rules as markers, as
principles, as reminders to all the parties of what their rights and obligations were,
not as the guidelines by which he would decide the case. He looked for a way, within
the general bounds set by the rules, to get the parties to stop arguing, to give
something to each, perhaps, in the hope that he would thereby restore harmony and
good relations. Thus, he said that the bride’s family acted wrongly, so that some
brideprice should be returned. But he made them return only half of it. A very
customary solution. Unfortunately for the magistrate’s hopes for settlement,
however, times — and customs — have changed. A great deal of money was involved,
and a court system that allowed for appeals was in place. The plaintiffs promptly did.
The High Court judge, Palmer J., overruled the magistrate, reinstating the Local
Court’s decision requiring the bride’s family to return the entire brideprice. Palmer
J. did apply a rule of customary law — he agreed with the Local Court that the
bride’s father ought to have disclosed her pregnancy during the brideprice discussions
— but he applied that rule in a very common law way. First, he made it clear that
there could be only one rule operating in this case. Common law adjudication
requires that the court find just one rule for every issue, because the judge is
supposed to decide the case by applying that rule to the facts, not by exhorting the
parties to remember the rules generally and to re-establish good relations in light of
the rules.
The High Court determined that of the various customary norms that the parties had
suggested the courts should use only the rule that dishonesty about a “material fact”
during brideprice negotiations will require the return of all the brideprice.53 The court
chose this norm over the others for a number of reasons. The other rules had not
been discussed in the Local Court, and it is a principle of common law adjudication
that any issue not raised at trial may not be raised on appeal. Given the adversarial
nature of common law adjudication, this is a useful procedural standard because it
ensures that all the evidence needed to prove each issue will have been presented in
a timely manner. It is not, however, the procedure that customary forums would
naturally adopt. There the goal is not to be sure that the truth of all contentions has
been tested but to permit everyone to say all they feel like saying so the parties (and
their friends, family and supporters) are free to raise whatever seems important,
whenever.54
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A second (and related) reason for the High Court’s refusal of the other customary
rules was that counsel had not presented sufficient evidence proving the existence of
these rules:
The... issue [concerning the groom’s love at first sight] had never been raised in
the Local Court as a matter relevant to the question of calculating the quantum
of compensation. It was only raised for the first time it seems in the Magistrates’
Court but with no evidentiary backing in custom. The learned Magistrate
accordingly had no basis in custom to allow that submission to be taken into
account in calculating the quantum of compensation.… The Magistrates’
Court… was [also] wrong in [taking into account that the groom had sent his
wife away].… It had no evidentiary basis in customary law to find that because
there had been a rejection of the would-be wife by the husband, that the quantum
of the brideprice to be refunded should be halved.55
One might ask why evidence was needed to prove the existence of either of these two
rules when evidence seems not to have been required to support the Local Court’s
adoption of the rule that the parties must disclose all material facts during brideprice
negotiations.56 First, the High Court may have been presuming that evidence about
the existence of that rule was presented in the Local Court. Secondly, the High Court
suggested that it trusted Local Court magistrates not to need evidence, since they are
chosen because of their knowledge of custom. Thirdly, the High Court may have
been holding that magistrates do not need to produce evidence in support of every
custom they intend to apply, but only when they disagree with the Local Court.
The High Court treated the rejected rules differently. In regards to the rule that only
half the brideprice should be returned if the husband has rejected his wife, the Court
implied that, had the defendant raised it in the proper court and supported it with
evidence, then perhaps the case would have been decided on that ground. The High
Court had a very different reaction to the rule that the amount of brideprice would
be higher if the prospective groom had fallen in love with the bride at first sight. The
Court stated that the rule most definitely did not exist. If neither party presented any
evidence about the existence of the rule, how could the High Court know this? And
if the High Court did know which customary rules exist and which do not, then why
did it require evidence of their existence? Why did it criticise the magistrate for
adopting customary rules without evidence when it was willing to reject customary
rules without evidence?
The answer may be that Judge Palmer, who is a Solomon Islander himself, may have
known from his own experience that there was no ‘first sight’ rule in customary law.
Indeed, Judge Palmer may have known from experience about all the rules, but did
not want the case decided on that basis. Looking beyond this case to others that will
arise in future, he may have wanted to instruct magistrates and other judges about
how to deal with custom. To that end he was at pains to announce, and to illustrate,
a general rule of procedure, pointing out, first, that the Local Courts are best able to
decide what the rules of customary law are, and, secondly, that a Local Court’s
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holdings about custom may be challenged in the Magistrates’ Court only if evidence
is presented to confirm that the Local Court erred.57
The To’ofilu case illustrates some of the ways in which the presence of money has
changed custom. The High Court looked upon the pre-marital discussions between
To’ofilu and Oimae as if they were common law contract negotiations. I do not think
the Court was mistaking the nature of their meetings. I am sure that, today, in many
parts of the Pacific, brideprice has become subject to negotiated agreement, similar
to the negotiations that take place over any other monetary transaction. Moreover,
because the brideprice transaction involves money — a scarce, valued and, today,
highly necessary commodity58 — people are probably more prone to go to court
when the transaction falls apart than to look for an unofficial way of settling their
dispute.59 And, once the dispute is in the courts, it is more likely to be decided by
adjudication, leading to a ‘winner-take-all’ outcome, than by a negotiation or
mediation that encourages compromise and consensus. Of course, that might be one
of the reasons people go to court. Because money is involved, a winner-take-all
solution may be precisely what they want. They don’t want a compromise, such as
the one proposed in the Magistrates’ Court, that gives them only half.60
Brideprice has evolved from a mutual exchange of gifts and promises into a one-way
transaction centering on the payment of cash. Brideprice has become a contract
between two parties, with terms negotiated essentially at arms’ length, instead of the
start of a lifelong relationship which begins in mutual feasting and celebration. The
focus on money has transformed the role of women, significantly lowering their
status. Instead of being the key to the relationship between two families, women now
are viewed as servants whose work and childbearing capacities have been purchased.
Finally, the large amount of money involved in the brideprice transaction has led to
disagreements that have sometimes escalated into violence. In his thoughtful
decision, Palmer J. demonstrated his awareness of these changes and responded to
them by making the High Court a forum in which disputes over brideprice could be
safely and surely litigated.
The custody of children
In our third case the custody of children of divorced parents is at issue and we will
see in it the ways in which norms from the imported common law system now mingle
with customary norms.61 If a marriage ends in separation or divorce someone must
decide who will have custody of the children of the marriage. When the parents (or
other family members) cannot agree, the disputants may turn to the courts to resolve
the matter for them. For a long time the courts of the Pacific have been concerned
about what to do when there is a conflict between the rules of customary law in
regard to custody and the rules of the introduced statutory or common law.62
The general principle found in treaties, statutes and the common law is that custody
should be decided according to the ‘best interests of the child’.63 What this has meant
in practice in the common law courts, at least in the last seventy years, is the
assumption that small children belong with their mothers.64 Different cultures make
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different assessments about what is in a child’s interest. Until sometime in the 1920s,
the common law rule in England was that the best interest of the child would be
served by giving custody to their father because he was the breadwinner, the property
owner, and the person whose name they bore.65 Only in more recent years, under the
influence of twentieth century inventions like family therapy, has the common law
decided that young children need a mother’s care and that it is in their best interests,
therefore, to be with her.66
Custom usually provides that children in matrilineal societies live with their mother’s
people and children in patrilineal societies live with their father’s.67 While that may
conflict with the common law notion that small children should always be with their
mothers it does not, necessarily, conflict with the ‘best interest’ standard. The
customary law of most Pacific societies presumed that children did not live in tiny
nuclear households cared for only by their mother or father, but in villages,
surrounded and cared for by grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, older siblings — by
everyone in the extended family. Thus, customary law did not make a choice between
father and mother at all, but between the father’s clan and the mother’s clan.
Customary law held that it was in the best interest of children to remain with their
own clan. They were, in a phrase commonly used in societies in which kinship ties are
important, ‘born for that clan’.68 Their land, all their inheritance rights, their adult
place in the world, sprang from that clan. The members of that clan would love them
best and care for them most responsibly.
The contemporary Pacific has changed in many respects that have a bearing on the
interests of children. For example, though many children still live with the extended
family in relatively traditional village settings, many others have migrated with their
parents to urban areas, where they live in nuclear family units, or, at most, in
households in which, in addition to their mother, father, and siblings, there are, at
most, one or two other adult, or near-adult, relatives. One might ask how the courts
should deal with custody issues in these circumstances. Should customary law be
applied to everyone, even when it might not be in the best interest of an urban child?
Should the common law be applied to everyone, ignoring the interests of village
children in patrilineal societies? Should the choice of law depend upon the type of
family unit — that is, urban or rural, nuclear or extended — or ought courts attempt
to ascertain what the parties, including the children, might want?
Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) Vincent Lunabek of the Vanuatu Supreme
Court was confronted with such a case recently, and resolved it by fashioning an order
that combined the common law and customary law in ways designed to further the
interests of the children involved. In Molu v Molu No.2,69 the Acting Chief Justice
applied the ‘best interest of the child’ standard, but did so in ways derived from the
wisdom of customary law.
Patricia Molu was from Pentecost, her husband Cidie Molu from Santo. They
married in 1992 in Port Vila,70 were separated in 1996, and divorced in Port Vila in
1998.71 They had three children — Yannick, who was born in 1988, ten years old at
the time of the divorce; Annie-Rose, born in 1992, six years old at the time of the
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divorce; and Ian, born in 1994, four at the time of the divorce. Cidie and Patricia did
not have a happy marriage. He had spent most of it getting drunk and beating her,
allegations that he denied during the divorce hearing when he wasn’t blaming it all
on Patricia. The Court found his testimony utterly lacking in credibility.72
Of the three children only Annie-Rose, the middle child and only girl, was living with
her mother at the time of the divorce. Yannick, the eldest child, had been sent to
Pentecost to live with Patricia’s family when he was four years old, partly because his
parents both thought “the general environment… would be better on the island”
than in Port Vila.73 When Patricia and Cidie separated, Cidie’s brothers came to Port
Vila and, against Patricia’s wishes, took Ian, who was then two years old, back to
Santo with them. At the time of the custody hearing he was still living with Cidie’s
family in Santo. Patricia had not seen him in two years.
The divorce was acrimonious and the custody dispute no less so. Each parent sued
for sole custody of all three children. The Acting Chief Justice stated that, in making
his custody decision, he was bound by the statutory standard.74 Therefore, the best
interests of the children had to be his primary consideration.75 That requirement, he
noted, is contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was ratified
by the Vanuatu Parliament, making it a statute binding upon the courts:
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.76
Using that guideline, the Court decided that Annie-Rose should be in her mother’s
custody, because, “It is a matter of common sense and human experience that she will
be better with her mother than her father.… I am of the view that it will be in her
best interest that her custody be awarded to her mother and she will be under the
care and control of the Petitioner/mother”.77 The Court’s determination about the
custody of Annie-Rose was in line with the common law and statutory rules regarding
custody. Like countless common law judges before him, the Acting Chief Justice
decided that a child of tender years belongs with her mother.78
However, the Court did not follow the ‘tender years’ doctrine in determining the
custody of the two Molu boys, even though Yannick, at ten, was probably still a child
of tender years, and Ian, only four, was well within the ‘tender years’ range. The
Court applied the statutory ‘best interest’ standard to them, but did so in a way that
departed from common law practice. His holdings in regards to the two boys were
infused with the sensibility of customary law. The Court decided that, at least for the
time being, both boys should stay where they were—Yannick with his mother’s family
on the island of Pentecost, and Ian with his father’s family in Santo.
The Court’s reasoning in regard to Ian was a mixture of common sense, common law
precedent and, most importantly, customary law. Using common sense, the Court
pointed out that the boy has been with his father’s family for quite a while and there
had been no reports that he was unhappy or that the family was not caring for him
properly.79 Using common law precedent, the Court quoted a 75-year-old English
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case, whose holding seemed to be that, given enough time, the child would forget his
mother.80 The customary aspects of the Court’s reasoning were not stated so
obviously, but were nonetheless present. The father’s “intention appeared to be that
Ian will be raised by his family rather than the child’s mother or father” the Court
said, adding, “such an arrangement is not uncommon in Vanuatu”.81 Santo is a
patrilineal community. The boys, the Court agreed, belong to their father’s clan.
Elsewhere, the Court phrased it as “the children are for them”.82 Moreover, the
Court seemed, like Cidie’s eldest brother, to give ‘brideprice’ its contemporary
connotation. By ‘paying’ brideprice (earned by their hard work) to Patricia and her
family, Cidie’s clan has ‘paid’ for her children. The Court decided that it was in the
best interests of this little boy that he be raised in the clan of his fathers. In so doing,
the Court brought the common law and customary law together. 
The decision partook of the customary legal process in another way as well. To the
extent possible, the Court gave something to every party, compromised, looked for
a resolution that would restore peace and harmony, even if custom and the common
law had both to be bent a little in order to do so. It is a patrilineal world, but,
nevertheless, Yannick will stay with his mother’s family, at least through primary
school. Ian, though of tender years, will stay with his father’s family. Annie-Rose will
stay with her mother. Even Cidie gets something. Though he does not have physical
custody of Ian, the Court gives him legal custody. And everyone, in good customary
consensus-building style, is supposed to put their anger behind them and get
together to work out regular visits for both parents with all three children.
CONCLUSIONS AND AFTER THOUGHTS
The three cases that have been discussed in this chapter illustrate the ways in which
custom is changing (at least in the area of family law) and the different approaches
that courts are developing to deal with the changes. All three cases are very much
about the impact of the market economy on marriage and the family. In Thesia Maip’s
case we see that the development of towns and industries has led to the beginnings
of a working class, of people who move away from home, and who leave the
subsistence economy (perhaps forever, perhaps only for a time) to find work and a
new style of living. When they meet and form attachments to people from other
regions, they are breaking out of the customary framework in which marriages are
arranged by parents and other family members and attested to by a series of
ceremonial events that take place in the village. But they are still people in-between,
they have not broken entirely from village ways. They still expect the marriage to be
customary.
Judge Woods is trying also, it seems, to fashion rules that will suit a world in which
custom and common law are both undergoing changes. He recognises that norms that
were effective within a village setting can have different (and for Thesia Maip,
exceedingly unhappy) consequences when moved from that setting into the very
different life of the towns. He tells the Village Court magistrates that they cannot
impose yesterday’s values on today’s circumstances. He is not calling for an end to
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custom, but for the recognition that custom has changed. Nor is he refusing to
recognise and apply new customs. He is, instead, creating standards that will enable
courts to determine when a new custom exists, so that it can be recognised and applied.
The To’ofilu case illustrates some of the changes that occur when the brideprice ritual,
which used to be performed in a society that got its motive force from kinship ties,
mutual help and reciprocity, begins to be performed in a society characterised by the
existence of a market economy. Brideprice is no longer infused with the notion that
life is a series of mutual exchanges and that the gifts given by the groom’s family are
symbolic of the future relations between the two families. Instead, the focus is now
on the money and other valuable commodities that are being handed over in payment
for a bride and her children.
The court decides to treat brideprice in the same way that the parties do. If the
transaction is, indeed, payment for services to be rendered, then the parties must have
negotiated a contract about that payment, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The court
applies the common law of contracts to the brideprice transaction, assessing whether
the contract negotiations were carried out in good faith and with full disclosure of
material facts so that there could be the requisite meeting of the minds. Finding that
the negotiation did not meet this standard, the court, in effect, holds that the
contract was not duly entered into. The money and other valuables given in payment
must therefore be returned.
In the third case, a couple living in town, but with ties still to their home villages,
cannot agree on which of them should have custody of their children. One child lives
in town; the other two are living with the extended family in what is probably a
relatively traditional lifestyle. She wants the common law principle applied, so that the
children will be with her. He and his brothers prefer custom, at least in regards to
their youngest son.
The Court adopts a mixture of approaches, borrowing freely and flexibly, in a very
customary way, from statute, common law and custom. Utilising the common law
doctrine of ‘tender years’, the judge decides that the girl should stay in town with her
mother. Using custom, he decides that the youngest son should remain in the village
with his paternal kin. Using common sense, which may be what underpins both the
common law and custom, he decides that the eldest son should remain in another
village with his maternal kin.
The customs of Pacific islanders will continue to change and the pace of those
changes will continue to be rapid. Nothing in these three cases suggests any attempt
on the part of the courts to stifle change. On the contrary the courts have shown, so
far, much creativity in keeping up with the changes at the same time that they are
trying to make sure that no one is unduly harmed by the application of old rules in
new settings. Nevertheless, the decisions raise a number of critical questions.
Although the three decisions differ in the balance that they strike between custom
and the common law, nevertheless all three courts do seem to presume that the
common law is here to stay and that the role of judges is to fit customs, whether old
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or new, into a common law scheme. It is not too late, but it is time, for judges and
lawyers in the Pacific islands to think about the relationship that ought to exist
between custom and the common law. And, in contemplating that relationship, we
need to think not only about the substantive rules but also, as the judges did in these
cases, about the differences in the styles and goals of decision-making between the
two legal systems.
The great issue that is raised by all of these cases, though, is the relationship that the
people should have to their law, and that the law should have to the people. In no
society with a formal governmental structure and legal system is law a direct match
for the customs of the people. But, for a society to survive, law and customs must be
close to one another. In order to feel that their law is just people need to feel that it
is familiar, that it relates to their moral sense and to their values. To the extent that
the courts privilege common law principles and processes over customary law, the law
diverges from the felt experience of the people. Moreover, to the extent that courts
cling to outmoded customs or otherwise refuse to recognise and adopt new customs,
the law just as surely diverges from the culture. However, if the law goes too far too
fast, if it adopts and enforces practices that are not accepted as customary by most
people, then it will just as surely be seen as out of step with contemporary norms and
values. The question that these cases raise, that these judges have tried to answer, and
that we must continue to consider, is how the law can maintain that delicate, but
necessary balance.
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and for different reasons. There are at least four main differentiations made: (a) Some use
‘custom’ to mean rules or norms of the indigenous peoples, while ‘customary law’ is saved
for those customary rules that have been recognised and applied by the state courts,
thereby becoming part of the formal law. This distinction is useful because readers can
easily tell which the writer is referring to. Also, it points out that the adoption of custom
by state courts changes the customs into something different. They cease to be the flexible
and ever-changing, mostly unwritten, mostly unconsidered, norms of a culture and
become rules that courts treat as precedent. See, for example, Woodman, G.R. 1969.
Some Realism about Customary Law – the West African Experience. Wisconsin Law
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‘custom’ and ‘customary law’ because it is the distinction that the colonial rulers made,
and they meant by it that the ‘customs’ of indigenous people were not ‘law’ in any sense
and, indeed, were inferior to the ‘laws’ that the colonisers brought with them or imposed
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scholars purposely use the phrase ‘customary law’ to refer to the unwritten norms, usages,
rules and values of the indigenous peoples of the Pacific. Another example of this political
use of the terms ‘custom’ and ‘customary law’ occurs in the laws of Papua New Guinea.
The older PNG Customs Recognition Act 1963 (now Cap 19), which requires courts to
treat the unwritten norms of the peoples of PNG as facts, not as laws, refers to those
norms as ‘custom’. The more recently enacted PNG Underlying Law Act 2000, which
provides that these norms and usages are to be the primary and major source of Papua
New Guinea’s own common law, refers to them as ‘customary law’. (c) Colonial (and even
some post-colonial) legislation and court-made laws used the term ‘custom’ to refer only
to those norms and usages of the indigenous peoples of the Pacific that had existed since
long before colonial times, since ‘time immemorial’. Thus spoke the PNG Customs
Recognition Act, enacted during the colonial period. At Independence, the Constitution,
s 20, redefined ‘custom’ to mean the “customs and usages of the indigenous inhabitants of
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the country … regardless of whether … the custom or usage has existed from time
immemorial”. After Independence, the Customs Recognition Act 1963 was revised to adopt
the new definition of custom. (d) Finally, many lawyers, judges, legislators and scholars use
the two terms — ‘custom’ and ‘customary law’ — interchangeably, without paying much
attention to shades of meaning. 
4 The cases discussed in this chapter are Application of Thesia Maip; In the Matter of the
Constitution, s 42(5) [1991] PNGLR 80; To’ofilu v Oimae, Unreported, High Court of
Solomon Islands, Civil Appeal Case No. 5 of 1996, 19th June, 1997. and Molu v Molu
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6 Pre-colonial Pacific islands societies were, for the most part, small, autonomous
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and marriage. Technology was simple (the primary occupations related to food-getting,
through swithin or ‘slash and burn’ gardening, fishing and hunting), producing a
subsistence economy, in which each household was expected to produce enough for its
own members’ survival, leaving insufficient surplus to support a leisure class or to allow for
much division of labour in to specialised categories. Even in Polynesia, with its chiefly and
royal castes, there was little status differentiation. Members of the community interacted
on the basis of relative equality. Most communities partook of a rich and textured social,
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7 Customary norms were seldom reduced to writing. They were certainly not written down
in pre-colonial times. Nor do most non-governmental groups today write down many of
their most important norms. The faculty of a law school, for example, has many norms —
who gets which office, when to gather for morning coffee, whether to attend one
another’s social events — none of which are written.
8 All non-governmental groups have effective means of teaching and enforcing norms.
Although there are in every group a few dissidents (just as there are those who refuse to
obey some or all of the laws of state societies), most members obey most of the norms
most of the time — either because they believe in the values of the group because they
need to remain in good repute with other members or the group, or because they fear the
adverse consequences of misbehaviour. See, further, Moore, S.F. 1983. Law as Process: An
Anthropological Approach. London: Routledge at pp 54–81; Rheinstein, M. (ed.) 1967.
Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. New York: Simon & Schuster at pp 20–33.
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9 I use the phrase ‘formal court’ or ‘state court’ to distinguish the official courts of the state
legal system from the informal customary dispute-settlement meetings described in the text
accompanying n 8 above.
10 For descriptions of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, see above n 2.
11 See the cases discussed in Zorn, J.G. and Corrin Care, J. 2002. Proving Customary Law in
the Common Law Courts of the South Pacific. Occasional Paper No. 2. London: British
Institute of International and Comparative Law.
12 See above, n 1.
13 This phrase is taken from the colonial version of the Papua New Guinea Customs
Recognition Ordinance 1963, though the phrase was used elsewhere in the Pacific as well.
The refusal of the colonial courts to apply anything other than long-established customs
did avoid the problems associated with change, but that was not the major reason for the
rule. Colonial courts were, for the most part, intended to wean Pacific islanders from
custom, and to head them towards acceptance of the imposed legal system in place of
custom. The courts continued to apply customs only because they believed it unfair to
impose western law on people not yet sufficiently acquainted with it, but the general view
during the colonial period was that custom would gradually wither away, at which point
courts would no longer need to apply it. See, further, the cases cited in Ottley, B.L. and
Zorn, J.G. 1983. Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea: Code, Custom and the Courts in
Conflict. American Journal of Comparative Law Vol 31: 251–300.
14 See, for example, the Constitution (Papua New Guinea), s 20, the Papua New Guinea
Customs Recognition Act [Cap. 19], as it was revised after Independence, and the Papua
New Guinea Underlying Law Act 2000.
15 Bellwood, P. 1979. Man’s Conquest of the Pacific: The Prehistory of Southeast Asia and
Oceania. New York: Oxford University Press.
16 Howe, K. R. 1984. Where the Waves Fall: A New South Seas History from First Settlement to
Colonial Rule. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
17 There are too few articles or books about law in the colonial period. Until the definitive
text is written, see the articles collected in Starr, J. and Collier, J.F. (eds.) 1989. History
and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology. London: Cornell
University Press. 
18 The countries and territories that recognise both statutory and customary marriages are
Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands. Zorn, J. G. 1994. Above, n 2, at pp 88–89. 
19 Zorn, J. G., 1994. Above, n 2, at pp 95–98. For informative discussions of the relationship
between customary and statutory marriage laws, see McCrae, H. 1981. Cases and
Materials on Family Law – Part I: Marriage. University of Papua New Guinea: Port
Moresby at pp 2–7 and McCrae, H. 1982. Reform of Family Law in Papua New Guinea.
In Weisbrot, D., Paliwala, A. and Sawyer, A.  (eds.) Law and Social Change in Papua New
Guinea. Sydney: Butterworths.
20 Islanders’ Marriage Act [Cap. 171] (Solomon Islands) ss 4–9; Control of Marriage Act
[Cap. 45] (Vanuatu).
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21 Application of Thesia Maip; In the Matter of the Constitution s 42(5) [1991] PNGLR 80.
22 Readers who wish to read the decision in conjunction with reading this chapter, will find
the Papua New Guinea Law Reports at the University of the South Pacific law library and
at many other libraries. See, also, Zorn, J.G. 1996. Custom and/or Law in Papua New
Guinea. Political and Legal Anthropology Review 19:15–27. 
23 In this chapter, I will quote frequently from the National Court decision, using a mimeo
version. Since the decision is quite short (3 or 4 pages), I will not use page references to
the PNG Law Reports. Unless otherwise referenced quotes in this section come from the
National Court decision.
24 The rules about village court jurisdiction, personnel and procedures are contained in the
Village Courts Act 1973 (PNG).
25 The Village Courts Act 1973 (PNG) provides that all decisions of village courts may be
reviewed by the Chief Magistrate of the District Court in the district where the village
court operates. K700 is approximately USD200 though, for a village woman without a
regular cash income, it is a staggeringly huge amount.
26 Thesia Maip’s case was one of a number that suggested the village courts in the Highlands
were discriminating against women and treating them unduly harshly. In 1990, the year
that Thesia Maip was imprisoned, more than fifty complaints were made to the national
court in the Eastern Highlands about women being imprisoned by village courts for
marital matters. Thesia Maip was one of three Highlands women whom Judge Woods
freed from prison in a single month. Different village courts had ordered each of them
imprisoned all on the same grounds. All three women were charged with adultery, ordered
to pay fines, and imprisoned when they could not pay. In large part because of Judge
Woods’ efforts, which brought these and similar cases to the attention of the press and the
higher courts, Village Courts were convinced to abandon this practice. For a more detailed
discussion, see Zorn, J.G. 1994–5. Women, Custom and State Law in Papua New Guinea.
Third World Legal Studies 1994–95: 169–205.
27 Judge Woods found different reasons to release the women in the other cases that he
heard that month. One woman was released on the ground that charging her with
adultery when her husband had, to all intents and purposes, deserted her several years
before, violated her right to equality under s 50 of the Constitution (PNG). See
Application of Wagi Non; In the Matter of the Constitution s 42(5), Unreported, National
Court of PNG, 1991. Judge Woods released another woman on the grounds that it was a
violation of natural justice to order her to pay compensation, when the village court knew
she was a village wife with no access to cash. See In the Matter of Kaka Ruk; In the Matter
of the Constitution s 42(5) [1991] PNGLR 105. See, further, Jessep elsewhere in this
volume.
28 There is no definition in the statutes. The standard treatise defines adultery as ‘voluntary
or consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person (whether married
or unmarried) of the opposite sex not being the other’s spouse.’ Cretney, S.M. & Masson,
J.M. 1976. Cretney’s Principles of Family Law (2nd ed.). Sweet & Maxwell: London. 
At p 102. 
29 It seems that the customary law of the Balk villagers, as interpreted by the Balk Village
Court, was the same. Judge Woods does not quote the customary rule, but he does say
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that Jude told the Village Court magistrate that he and Thesia were married and Thesia
told the court they were not, implying that the Village Court’s decision about adultery
under customary law turned on whether Thesia and Jude were married.
30 Customs are not written down in the way that laws are written down, so customs can, and
do, change more easily than laws can. Customs are nothing more than beliefs, values and
habitual activities. Beliefs, values and habitual activities change constantly, to meet new
circumstances or just because everything in human behaviour changes over time.
Rheinstein, M. (ed) 1967. Above, n 8, at pp 11–20.
31 Constitution (PNG), s 20, defines custom as ‘customs and usages’.
32 Nanda, S. and Warms, R.L. 1997. Cultural Anthropology (6th ed.) Columbus: Wadsworth
at p 43.
33 The judge also raises a jurisdictional issue: “My initial confusion is how can a man from
Bougainville come to a village court in the Western Highlands and seek what is in effect an
order for restitution of conjugal rights when there has been no contact at all between him
and that village apart from his living with a woman from that village elsewhere in Papua
New Guinea”.
34 Note the subtle, but important difference between the Village Court’s standard (“people
today are recognising it as a marriage”) and the National Court’s standard (“clearly
recognisable by everyone”). The Village Court, unlike the National Court, does not
require that everyone recognise the custom, nor that the recognition be clearly
recognisable. 
35 See for example John Noel v Obed Toto, Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic of
Vanuatu, Civil Case No. 18 of 1994, 19
th
April, 1995 regarding inheritance
(http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_g_N/Noel_v_Toto.ht
ml Accessed 19/9/02); Pandosy Jean Charles v Pascaline Thuha, Unreported, Supreme
Court of the Republic of Vanuatu, Matrimonial Case No. 16 of 1996, 10
th
December,
1997 regarding custody of children
(http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_O_Q/Pandosy_v_Thu
ha.html).
36 The judge also suggests that there may be some hypocrisy on Jude’s part: “The thwarted
man here had ample opportunity to consider a proper marriage, either by a public
ceremony in the village concerned or in the church or registry office under the Marriage
Act. He elected not to take any of these procedures”. Jude wanted, the judge is
suggesting, none of the responsibilities that a real marriage would entail, but all of the
rights of marriage.
37 “Jails are for criminals,” Judge Woods says, near the conclusion of his decision, “not as a
means of revenge on the breakdown of a living together arrangement which discriminates
against the female partner”.
38 To’ofilu v Oimae. Unreported, High Court of solomon Islands, Civil Appeal Case No. 5 of
1996, 19 June 1997. I am grateful to Jennifer Corrin Care for sharing with me her
detailed case note on this decision. See Corrin Care, J. 1999. To’ofilu v Oimae Case Note
in Journal of South Pacific Law, case note 4 of Volume 3
(http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/journal_splaw/Case_Notes/Corrin_Care3.html Accessed
19/9/02).
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39 In pre-colonial Melanesia, and in other parts of the Pacific as well, marriages were
arranged between the parents of the prospective bride and groom. The marriage was
confirmed when the groom’s extended family gave a feast for the bride’s family and
presented them with gifts. The gifts usually included pigs, polished shells, fine mats, carved
bowls, boars’ teeth, and yam, taro or other foodstuffs. The groom’s father tried to get
members of his family — his uncles, brothers and sisters — to contribute as much as
possible towards the brideprice, as the amount signified the value and status of the family,
as well as their respect for the bride and her family. Pidgin has been heavily influenced by
colonialism, so the Papua New Guinea pidgin term for brideprice now is baim meri (‘buy a
woman’). In most of the indigenous languages of Melanesia, however, the concept of a
price or purchase is absent. According to Simon Fuo’o, a law student from Kwara’ae
region of Solomon Islands, there is no word in Solomon Islands pidgin for brideprice. In
his own (local) language it is daurai’ia, for which there is no accurate English translation.
He said, after some thought, that today most people would think of the word as having
something to do with an exchange to compensate for the fact that the bride’s family were
going to lose her services.
40 Many comments posted on a thread about brideprice in April–May 2001 on the Solomon
Islands Department of Commerce message board substantiated this, though a number
of the e-mail notes also pointed out that the custom did not, at least traditionally, have
anything to do with a sale or purchase. See www.commerce.gov.sb
41 Rubin, G. 1975. The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex. In Reiter,
R.R. (ed.) Toward an Anthropology of Women. New York: Monthly Review Press.
42 However, these attitudes do exist, as a number of the comments on the Solomon Islands
message board demonstrated. See www.commerce.gov.sb
43 The relationships between inter-married clans and families have been changed by a number
of causes. One of the causes can be found in the changed political situation which has
limited tribal warfare thereby lessening the need for members of different clans to depend
on one other to provide help in times of war. Economic change has also reduced the inter-
relationships between in-laws. For example, as traditional inter-island trading, as
exemplified by the kula ring, disappears, so does the need to create agnates in order to
have dependable trading partners. See, further, Malinowski, B. 1984. (original edition
1922) Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Waveland Press: New York. The development of a
market economy, in which buying and selling carries no traces of reciprocity or other
relationship between the purchaser and seller has also lessened the need for people to
extend their family ties.
44 To’ofilu v Oimae, above, n 38.
45 These are shells so special that they are referred to in English as ‘shell money’. They differ
from cash, however, in that they are supposed to be exchanged only at ceremonial
occasions. They cannot be used to buy goods or services the way cash is used. They are
valuables in and of themselves, not, like money a means to enable actors in the marketplace
to buy and sell.
46 In addition to the return of the full value of the shell money, rice, pigs and cash, the
To’ofilu family also asked to be compensated for the money they had spent traveling to the
brideprice ceremony. The Local Court ordered the defendants to pay for these expenses,
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the Magistrates’ Court denied them these expenses, and the High Court reinstated the
Local Court’s order.
47 See above, n 28 at p 2.
48 “...in the circumstances, the Defendant owed a duty in custom to disclose this material fact
to the Plaintiff during the course of discussions and negotiations for the amount of
brideprice to be fixed… [but] the Defendant did not disclose this fact;… the Plaintiff
thereby was deprived of the opportunity to either re-negotiate the amount of the
brideprice fixed or to decline to pay the amount asked for… in the circumstances, the
Plaintiff must be compensated in custom for this breach of customary duty or obligation,
the quantum being the refund of the brideprice in its entirety.” See above, n 44 at p 2.
49 See above, n 38 at p 3.
50 “...brideprice should not be taken as a yardstick to measure the man’s love for his wife. In
this case clearly it was the man Ronny who showed first sight love for Fiona. Whether the
woman Fiona was pregnant before the marriage or not is a matter for negotiation so as to
determine the amount of the brideprice to be paid to the girl’s family.” 
See above, n 44 at p 5.
51 See above, n 38 at p 4.
52 One of the purposes of a legal system is to resolve disputes between members of the group
so that the dispute does not result in violence and so that the interdependent activities of
group members can continue. In state societies the courts assume this function also,
applying the rules of tort, contract or property law to disputes between citizens, and
resolving the disputes according to these rules. The aim of these court proceedings is to
reach a definitive conclusion, based upon the applicable rules, both so that the parties to
the dispute will feel that a resolution in accord with their beliefs and values has been
attained and so that participants in the market economy generally can act in the confidence
that, so long as they are acting in accordance with the rules, their expectations will be
rewarded. In the non-state societies of the pre-colonial Pacific, there were customary
means of resolving disputes. One method consisted of meetings, attended by everyone
with a concern for the parties to the dispute, often by everyone in the village, in which the
grounds of the disagreement would be discussed, commented upon, and discussed again,
until all those at the meeting had reached a consensus about how to resolve the dispute.
Often a chief or elder presided at these meetings but the outcome was not his to dictate.
He acted as a mediator not as a judge because without the threat or reality of police at his
command, he had no means to enforce his orders. He had to depend upon the willingness
of both parties to the dispute to enforce the outcome upon themselves. The aim of these
customary meetings, therefore, was to restore peace and harmony between the disputants
and within the group as a whole, so that the members of the small community could go
back to living and working together.
53 See above, n 38 at p 2. The use of the phrase “material fact” is itself an indication that the
High Court is treating custom as if it were common law. That phrase is part of common
law jurisprudence, not part of customary dispute settlement. Another common law motif
occurs in the way in which the High Court judge views the brideprice negotiation. He
describes it as a judge would describe any negotiation over a contract, not necessarily as
one would the more free-flowing, open-ended negotiations that occur in customary
environments.
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54 The High Court also noted that the Local Court, being closer to the parties and their
village, and made up of magistrates who are chosen for their knowledge of custom, is
better equipped to decide what the customary rule governing each case is than are
magistrates, who live farther away and whose training has been, for the most part, in the
common law.
55 See above, n 38 at p 6.
56 The Customs Recognition Act 2000 (No. 7 of 2000) (Solomon Islands) provides, at s 3,
that the courts must have evidence of the existence of any customary law that a court
intends to use, and that, for this purpose, customary law is to be treated as a fact. The Act
did not exist at the time To’ofilu v Oimae was decided, and the Solomon Islands courts did
not seem to believe that evidence of custom was always required. 
57 This is a carefully, and purposefully, limited decision. The High Court has said here only
that evidence must be presented to overturn a Local Court’s decision about custom. The
High Court has not said that evidence must be presented every time a party wishes custom
to be adopted by a state court.
58 This is particularly the case in today’s world where people need (or want) many things that
they cannot grow or make for themselves. Cash is needed today for every thing from
store-bought clothes and canned goods, airplane flights, television sets, trucks and other
tools to a primary school education. In the early 1970s, when I observed brideprice
ceremonies in the Papua New Guinea Highlands, cash was included amongst the gifts, but
cash was not as necessary a part of people’s lives at that time as it has become since. It
tended more to show the prestige of the donor — ‘I’m one of those few with access to the
western world and its paper money’ — than to be of real use to those who received it.
59 Of course, people having arguments over brideprice did not have the ability to go to a
formal court in pre-colonial times, because no state courts existed. Even during the
colonial period, few disagreements of this sort would have been heard in state courts,
because those courts tended to be forums primarily for criminal cases and for disputes
between expatriates. Ottley, B. L. 1995. Above, n 3, at pp 97–107.
60 Another reason people probably prefer the courts to customary mediation, especially
where a large amount of money is involved, is because of the perceived finality of a court
solution. Even in a civil suit brought in a local court, courts have the power of the state
behind them, enforcing every judgment. And the magistrates and judges speak so
definitively. However, despite their desire for an absolutist verdict (or, perhaps, because
of it), people are led by the hierarchal nature of the court system into continuing appeals,
making resolution of the dispute ever more elusive. The High Court decision in To’ofilu
v Oimae was handed down more than four years after the matter first came before the
Local Court.
61 Molu v Molu No. 2. Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic of Vanuatu, Civil Case
No. 30 of 1996, Matrimonial Case No. 130 of 1996, 15 May 1998.
62 The leading case, holding that custom may be applied in determining custody so long as
custom does not conflict with the common law ‘best interests of the child’ standard, is
from Solomon Islands. See Sukutaona v Houanihou [1982] SILR 12. 
63 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), art. 3(1), adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations, 20th November, 1989, provides that “in all
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actions concerning children... the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.” The Convention is self-executing. It is binding on every country that has
ratified it and all the Pacific island nations, including Solomon Islands, have ratified it.
(The only nations not to ratify it are the United States and Somalia.) An example of a
Pacific Islands statute mandating that custody decisions be based solely upon the best
interests of the child is the Custody of Children Act [Cap 20] (Tuvalu), s 3(3): “...the court
shall regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration and shall not
take into consideration whether from any other point of view the claim of the father is
superior to that of the mother or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father”.
In other Pacific jurisdictions — for example, in Solomon Islands — the ‘best interests of
the child’ standard has been established by the courts, rather than directly by statute. See,
for example, Sukutaona v Houanihou [1982] SILR 12. In some jurisdictions, the statutory
standard also takes the interests of other family members into account. In Marshall Islands,
for example, the statute requires the courts to take into account the interests of everyone
involved. See Domestic Relations Law [26 Revised Statutes, Cap 1] (Marshall Islands).
Section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap 282] (PNG) stipulates that the courts
should take into account equally the welfare of the child, the conduct of the parents, and
the wishes of each parent. Section 3 of the Custody of Children Act [Cap. 20] (Tuvalu) also
permits the court to take the conduct and wishes of the parents into account, but specifies
(as quoted above) that they be secondary to the child’s welfare.
64 See, for example, the discussion of this point in Sukutaona v Houanihou [1982] SILR 12.
65 Yes, the major common law countries (England, Australia, the United States) were
patrilineal and patriarchal, and this was reflected in the common law. See Cott, N.F. 2001.
Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation. Harvard University Press: Cambridge;
Hartog, H. 2000. Man and Wife in America: A History Harvard University Press:
Cambridge and Yalom, M. 2001. History of the Wife. Harper Collins: New York.
66 I do have to point out that, despite the certainty of judges, there is no certainty in the
psychological, sociological or medical literature as to whether children of ‘tender years’ are
invariably best served by being in their mother’s custody, even when their mother is in all
respects fit to care for them. The consensus amongst professionals seems to be: ‘It depends
on the mother, the father, and the children’. See Baris, M.A. and Garrity, C.B. 1988.
Children of Divorce. Psytec: New York.
67 An excellent discussion of customary and statutory custody rules can be found in McCrae, H.
1981. Cases and Materials on Family Law – Part III: Custody, Maintenance, DeFacto
Relationships and Ex-Nuptial Children. University of Papua New Guinea: Port Moresby
at pp 2–7.
68 A phrase used in many kin-based societies to signify the inter-dependence of clan
members. For descriptions of the important role played in a child’s life by the extended
family in kin-based societies, see Glasse, R.M. and Meggitt, M.J. 1969. Pigs, Pearlshells
and Women. Marriage in the New Guinea Highlands. New York: Prentice Hall; Hutter, M.
1959. The Family Experience: A Reader in Cultural Diversity. London: Allyn & Bacon;
Mead, M. 1959. Coming of Age in Samoa. New York: Mentor; and Pulea, M. 1986. The
Family, Law and Population in the Pacific Islands. Suva: University of the South Pacific.
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69 Molu v Molu No. 2, Above, n 61.
70 It was a statutory marriage, performed in a church, although Cidie and his family also gave
brideprice to Patricia’s family. To his mind, therefore, they also had a customary marriage.
The Court points out, however, that, under the Marriage Act [Cap 60] (Vanuatu), if one
is married with all the proper formalities in a church, the law recognises it as a statutory
marriage, and only a statutory marriage, regardless of what additional customary
ceremonies may have been performed. Therefore, the Court must apply the statutory
standards, not the customary rules, to all aspects of the marriage, including divorce, child
custody and property division. See above, n 61 at p 12. But what if, in addition to
observing the statutory formalities, the couple had gone through all the aspects of a
customary marriage, rather than just giving brideprice? The Court does not say whether it
would, then, be willing to apply customary law, rather than the statute, in determining
custody or the division of property. It does say, “There is no evidence that the marriage
between the Petitioner and the Respondent was a custom marriage performed in a place
and according to the form laid down by local custom of the parties”. See above, n 61 at p
12. This suggests that the Court might apply customary law, at least within the bounds
permitted by the statute in such a circumstance.
71 See Molu v Molu No. 1, Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic of Vanuatu, Civil
Case No. 130 of 1996, Matrimonial Case No. 2 of 1996, 21st April, 1998.
(http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_G–N/
Molu_v_Molu1.html Accessed 19/9/02).
72 See above, n 71 at pp 4–8.
73 See above, n 61 at p 5: “I accept the general environment which both the Petitioner and
Respondent thought would be better on the island. But I reject the evidence that Yannick
wanted to go to Pentecost to escape the behaviour of his father since he was just a little
boy (4 years) when he was sent there, even if the Respondent admitted he slapped him on
one occasion”.
74 The Vanuatu Constitution provides, at Art 72, that ‘the rules of custom’ are part of
Vanuatu law, and, again, at Art 93(3), that ‘customary law shall have effect as part of the
law of the Republic”. The Constitution does not, however, stipulate amongst statutes,
custom and the common law, as to which takes precedence. The Acting Chief Justice
ruled, in this case, that he had to follow the dictates of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap
192] (Vanuatu) in relation to matters arising out of marriages performed under the
Marriage Act [Cap 60] (Vanuatu).
75 Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap 192] (Vanuatu), s 15. The Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap
192] (Vanuatu) itself does not expressly mention the ‘best interests’ standard. It provides
only that “the Court may… make such provision as appears just with respect to custody...”
76 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 3(1), adopted by the General Assembly of the
U.N., 20th November, 1989; ratified by Vanuatu Parliament, Ratification Act 1992
(Vanuatu). The emphasis in the quotation was added by the Acting Chief Justice. See
above, n 61 at p 6.
77 See above, n 61 at p 7.
78 See text at n 66 above.
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79 It should be noted that, though the Court gave formal custody to Cidie, the father, the
Court intended that the boy live not with the father in Port Vila, but with the paternal
family in Santo — an important distinction, since Cidie Molu had spent most of Ian’s life
drunk and beating up Ian’s mother.
80 The Court quotes from the decision of Re Thain [1926] All E.R.384: “one knows from
experience how mercifully transient are the effect of parting and other sorrows [for young
children]; and how soon the novelty of fresh surroundings and new associations effaces the
recollection of former days and kind friends”. The quotation, it seems to me, could just as
well mean that, if Ian were returned to his mother, he would soon stop missing the people
in Santo. Today, as opposed to 1925, most childcare and child psychology professionals
would agree that children have very long memories, that they do not soon get over
parting and other sorrows, and that the novelty of fresh surroundings do not diminish
their longing for former days, especially if those former days included their parents. Baris,
M. A. & Garrity, C. B. 1988. Above, n 66. However, those studies were done, for the
most part, in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. It is altogether
possible that children in other cultures, especially those cultures in which most children
live in extended families, rather than in nuclear families react differently.
81 See above, n 61 at p 5. However, the Court notes, it is unusual for such an arrangement
to occur over the objections of one of the parents.
82 This is a phrase found, in one version or another, in all clan-based societies, to mean that the
children belong to the clan. The clan is for them, and they are for the clan. See above, n 68.
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6.  ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY CUSTOMARY LAW:
WOMEN AND THE LAW*
By: Jean G. Zorn
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Discourse
A conversation or dialogue, usually of a formal kind or in a formal setting.
Dualism
A condition in which a single entity is made up of two, sometimes
conflicting, parts.
Ultra vires
A Latin phrase meaning an action that ought not to be taken because it is
beyond one’s power or authority, most often used in reference to government
officials or company directors. 
* The list of people who deserve thanks for their contributions to this chapter includes
Bruce Ottley, Pamela Goldberg, Jennifer Corrin Care, Christine Stewart, Tess Newton
Cain, Heather McCrae and Imrana Jalal. Some of you have actually read drafts of the
chapter; every one of you has written or said things that made me think — and think
again. Thanks to you all. And to the women of CUNY School of Law, who have taught
me the value of a woman’s approach to legal issues. And, especially, to Steve, Heather and
Christopher.
Many people argue that the law does not discriminate against women. Certainly,
many laws have been changed in their written form so that they seem gender-
neutral, seeming to treat men and women equally. However, the legislation may
have bad effects on women because women are not socially and economically
equal to men. The law is produced by social, economic and political forces. It does
not of itself make women unequal, but it does influence their situation.
Patriarchal interpretations of written and unwritten laws combine with local
social, cultural and political forces to keep the status of women inferior to that of
men.1
INTRODUCTION
One of the criticisms of custom frequently heard these days is that it discriminates
against women.2 Many of the critics believe that customary gender discrimination will
end whenever women can get their cases into the formal courts, where judges will use
the constitutions, statutes and the common law to defeat custom.3 Imrana Jalal has
provided us with an excellent definition of gender discrimination:
Discrimination means treating people in different ways, depending on their sex,
race, religion, political opinions, creed, sexual preference and so on. We may
discriminate against a particular group of people, just as we may discriminate in
favour of that particular group of people. Here we are concerned with sex
discrimination. This is often called “gender discrimination” because it focuses on
whether a person is male or female.4
Jalal differentiates between two kinds of gender discrimination — direct and indirect.
She defines direct discrimination first:
Discrimination takes many forms, both direct and indirect. In law, direct
discrimination against a woman means that something happens to a woman
because she is a woman and not because she is an individual. The discrimination
may be based on a particular characteristic applying generally to women (for
example, being able to have babies) or it may be based on a particular
characteristic that people may think women have (for example, being
“emotional”). Direct legal discrimination may be obvious in the legislation or
legal practices specifically permitting certain rights to men but not to women.5
When people say that custom discriminates against women, it is usually direct
discrimination that they have in mind. Polygamy is often cited as an example of direct
discrimination because in most societies that practice polygamy men are allowed to
have several wives but women are not permitted more than one husband.6 Brideprice
has also been criticised as an example of gender discrimination,7 as has the customary
political process in that it tends to place women in an inferior position and to shut
them out of public discourse.8
It is the thesis of this chapter that whether or not indigenous cultures are discriminatory
their critics are wrong — or, at least, have been wrong up to now — in presuming that
the state courts will redress the balance. To the extent that gender discrimination does
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exist under customary law, the rules and agencies of state law do little, or nothing, to
correct it. State law fails to address customary examples of direct sex discrimination
because, in Jalal’s phrase, the instrumentalities of state law are ‘indirect discrimination’.
She notes that indirect discrimination can occur in three ways:
[1] Most legislation is written in gender-neutral form. It may seem not to favour
men over women, but it indirectly discriminates against women, because the
courts and law agencies that apply, interpret or enforce the written laws do
not consider the disadvantages of women.
[2] Indirect discrimination occurs also when social and cultural attitudes cause
officers of the courts, law enforcement agencies and associated agencies to
interpret laws and procedures in ways that discriminate against women. 
[3] The law may also be indirectly discriminatory where it fails to correct
discrimination. Here, discrimination occurs not because the law does
something, or does it badly, but because it omits to correct something.9
We will see examples of all three kinds of indirect discrimination in the cases to be
discussed in this chapter.
In recent years, a number of instances have arisen in which customary law has
discriminated against women. For example, many people in Vanuatu, especially in the
Port Vila expatriate community, were shocked when four custom chiefs forced a
woman to return from Port Vila to her home in Tanna because she refused to be
reunited with the husband who had beaten her.10 Another example of customary
discrimination against women had arisen a few years earlier in Solomon Islands, when
village men refused to enter a voting booth on the grounds that its prior use by
women contaminated it.11 In yet a third incident, which occurred in Papua New
Guinea, a man who had killed a young girl promised to give his own daughter to the
girl’s parents in compensation for her death.12
All three of these incidents prompted much discussion in their respective countries and
most people probably assumed that the state courts would deal with all three by
voiding the relevant customary norms since they conflicted with state laws prohibiting
sex discrimination. As the following discussion demonstrates, however, those
expectations were proven wrong. In each instance, the case was decided on entirely
other grounds. The Courts barely noted the existence of discrimination and certainly
did not base their decisions on it. As such, the decisions are examples of Jalal’s third
definition of indirect discrimination: failures by officers of the law to correct
discrimination. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the cases provide us with
examples of Jalal’s other forms of indirect gender discrimination as well.
WOMEN AND THE POWERS OF CHIEFS
In Vanuatu, in 1993, four “very important chiefs”13 from the southern part of Tanna
held a meeting in Port Vila in an attempt to resolve the problems that had caused
their kinswoman Marie Kota to leave her husband Walter.14 Marie and Walter were
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from Tanna, both subjects of the Tanna chiefs but, like many other rural villagers,
they had been drawn to the capital city and had been living there for a while. A
number of other Tannese, mostly friends and kin of the couple, attended the meeting.
Walter was happy to attend. Marie did not want to but the chiefs sent two officers
from the Vanuatu Police to her house to compel her attendance.
At the meeting the Chiefs and a number of other people suggested that Marie and
her husband should get back together. Marie said that she did not wish to go back
to her husband, as he had beaten her, and that she wanted a divorce. The meeting
was then adjourned for 15 minutes, so that she could decide whether she really
wanted the divorce or not. After that period, she said that she did want the
divorce, and then it was the Chief Andrew who announced the decision of the
Chiefs, that she must go back to Tanna. This decision appears to have been a
consensual decision made by all the chiefs present.15
Marie told the chiefs she did not want to go back to Tanna so men were sent with
her to her home, while she packed, and then to the wharf where she was put aboard
a boat bound for Tanna.16 She cried all the way. She thought about jumping off the
boat before it left Port Vila harbour, but was sure that, if she did, the men would find
her, beat her and put her on the boat again. With help from the Vanuatu Association
of Women against Violence against Women she returned to Port Vila the following
week and, a few weeks later, filed a criminal complaint.17
Walter Kota, the chiefs and the other participants in the meeting were charged, some
with kidnapping, some with inciting to kidnap.18 The Supreme Court had little
trouble, on these facts, finding several of them guilty. Their major defence seems to
have been that they did not use force but the Court noted that a conviction for
kidnapping does not require the use of force. It requires merely that force be
threatened19 and the Court had no trouble deducing from Marie Kota’s testimony
that threats had occurred:
I believe the Complainant when she said that she was crying, and that she was
fearful [as] to what would happen to her, she believes that the situation she was
in was such that if she had jumped off the vessel, she would have been beaten up
and put back on it, and that if the ship had left the wharf and she had swam to
shore, she would have been beaten.20
The defendants also raised the defence of mistake of fact.21 The Supreme Court was
not sure what the defendants meant by this, as there did not seem to be any facts that
they had misunderstood. The Court concluded that the defendants must be arguing
that they had mistakenly believed that custom controlled the matter and that they
would not be held liable under state law for actions governed by Tanna custom. The
Court held there was no mistake of fact, stating: “If anything there was a mistake of
law and the effective custom, but not facts”.22
The judgment could have stopped there. No more was needed to dismiss the
defendants’ arguments, but the Court went on to discuss the role that custom had
played in the matter — and the role that custom should play. One must ask why the
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Court did this, knowing, when it did so, that its pronouncements on custom were,
at best, dicta. The judge, Downing J., an expatriate, was very upset at what the chiefs
had done, and particularly upset that they had invoked custom to support their
actions.23 And there are suggestions in the decision that this was not the only example
of chiefs overstepping the legal bounds of their role.24 It may be that the Court took
advantage of this case to lay down general rules for chiefly behaviour. That would
explain the Court’s insistence that the case did not raise a conflict between custom
and the laws introduced by the colonisers, but between custom and the laws enacted
by the defendants’ own Parliament and people.25
Although custom is part of the law of Vanuatu it is secondary to the Constitution and
statutory law and therefore cannot be invoked to excuse actions that are in conflict
with the Constitution or with statutes.26 In this case, the Court found that the chiefs’
actions violated several different constitutional and statutory provisions. In forcing
Marie Kota to go back to Tanna, the chiefs had violated her constitutional rights to
liberty and to freedom of movement, as well as her statutory right to be free from
coercion.27 Their behaviour also violated Marie Kota’s right to equal treatment:
Article 5 of the Constitution makes it quite clear that men are to be treated the
same as women, and women are to be treated the same as men. All people in
Vanuatu are equal and whilst the Custom may have been that women were to be
treated or could be treated as property, and could be directed to do things by
men, whether those men be their husbands or chiefs, they cannot be
discriminated against under the Constitution.28
Gender equality is one of the Court’s major concerns, one of the primary reasons for
the lengthy discussion of custom that concludes the judgment. But it is not the
Court’s only concern about custom and the behaviour of the chiefs. It may not even
be the Court’s primary concern.
The Court is also very much concerned about the chiefs’ attempt to give themselves
greater powers than they actually have in a parliamentary system of government:
...the Chiefs must realise that any powers they wish to exercise in Custom is
subject to the Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, and also subject to the
Statutory Law of Vanuatu.29
The Court is speaking here in particular about the chiefs’ use of the police to compel
Marie Kota to attend the meeting. The Court is so upset about this abuse of police
authority that it mentions the police twice. The subject comes up first when the
Court is describing the facts of the case. At that point, the Court criticises only the
police themselves:
The police were consulted at the Police Station, and 2 police in a police truck…
went to the house where Marie Kota was living and forced Marie to go to the
meeting. I find it most astonishing and abhorrent that Vanuatu Police had
anything to do with this matter.… The Vanuatu Police had no authority in the
legislation of this country to act as they did in this case, to bully and force a person
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to attend a meeting, and I propose to take this matter up to the Chief
Commissioner of the Police.30
The Court brings up the topic a second time and this time focuses on the role of the
chiefs in telling the police what to do:
...it is most unfortunate that the meeting was called in the circumstances in which
it was called. It is also extraordinary as I have said, that the police were used to
bully the Complainant, and this has risen again from the fundamental
misunderstanding of the constitutional rights by the Chiefs, together with those
around the Chiefs, whether they be assistants or members of committees of the
community.31
Like everyone else in Vanuatu, the Court said, chiefs must learn to abide by the
Constitution. It did bother the Court that the chiefs discriminated against Marie
Kota. But the method they used to discriminate bothered the Court more. The chiefs
assumed they had the power to command the nation’s police — and the police
agreed. It was the chiefs’ assumption of the powers of modern government that most
upset the Court.32
For centuries, chiefs were the supreme leaders of many of the traditional societies of
the Pacific. The colonial authorities usurped much of their power, subsumed their
chiefdoms into larger political entities, and changed many of the norms under which
the chiefs had governed.33 At independence a number of Pacific island nations
attempted to create a new balance, making a place for chiefs in the constitutional
scheme of government. But the role created for the chiefs tends to be small and very
different from the authority they enjoyed prior to the colonial period. 
In Vanuatu, for example, Chapter 5 of the Constitution establishes a National Council
of Chiefs composed of custom chiefs elected by their peers, but the Council is not a
true legislative body. Its powers are limited to discussion, recommendation and
consultation about matters relating to custom.34 Moreover, the constitutional
provisions are merely permissive. Nothing in the Constitution requires the Council to
hold discussions or make recommendations, nor, except in relation to land laws, does
it require Parliament to consult with the Council. When the Council does choose to
make recommendations, the Constitution does not require Parliament to follow
them. Indeed, except in relation to land, the Constitution does not mention
Parliament in relation to the Council. The Constitution does not specify which
governmental body the Council is supposed to make recommendations to.
Despite the limitations on their powers at the national level, chiefs continue to play
an important role in the political life of Pacific villages. No village is likely to do
anything as a corporate body or community group without the chiefs’ leadership or
approval. Chiefs still maintain a measure of control over the allocation of the clan’s
customary land. And, as in Marie Kota’s case, villagers still expect their chiefs to chair
village meetings, to resolve disputes between villagers, and to punish villagers who
offend against the social order.35
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It can be said that  in Vanuatu — as in many other Pacific nations — two separate but
occasionally interlinking spheres of government have developed. There is the post-
colonial sector, characterised by the practices, and to some extent the ideologies, of
democracy, to which people belong according to the rules of citizenship and
nationality. And there is also the traditional sector, characterised by chiefly (or ‘big
man’) rule, by reciprocity and exchange, to which people belong according to
kinship. Some people in Vanuatu live in only one of these worlds, either the post-
colonial or the village sphere. Most people, however, have to find a way to function
in both worlds.
To an expatriate judge — perhaps to anyone trained in the parliamentary system of
government or the common law system of law; certainly to anyone who lives
primarily, if not wholly, in the post-colonial sphere — the distinctions between the
post-colonial and traditional systems probably seem too obvious even to need
explaining. To their way of thinking, except as granted by the Constitution, chiefly
power is confined to the traditional sphere; to the extent that chiefs have any
authority at all in the post-colonial sphere, it is limited to that given by the
Constitution; and, since the Constitution gives to chiefs no authority over the police,
it is ultra vires for chiefs to try to exercise power over the police. Similarly, to the
minds of those living in the post-colonial sector, the police are purely a product of
that sector, ought to take orders only from officials within that sector, and have no
business doing what someone in the traditional sector has told them to do.
However, to chiefs and other villagers, and to persons (members of the police force,
for example) who are attempting to negotiate a life that spans both spheres, the
distinctions may appear very different. Chiefs are used to commanding their men to
do their bidding, especially when the chiefs think they are doing right. Chiefs see
themselves as political leaders, equal, if not superior to, the members of parliament
from their districts. Villagers have the same dualistic perspective and most police
officers come from, still live in, villages. So it is not surprising for chiefs to assume
that, on a visit to the capital city, they can ask those who enforce the rules, at the
behest of political leaders, to act for them in the same capacity. Nor is it surprising
that the police would do so. 
Out of the dualism that characterises Vanuatu politics today, something new will
evolve. It is from crossovers of this sort that a new political system will gradually
emerge. The expatriate judge who decided Public Prosecutor v Kota believed that he
knew what the future should be. Chiefs, he believed, should stay in their sphere,
police in theirs. But he will leave, and Vanuatu will go on. Ni-Vanuatu chiefs, police,
villagers, town-dwellers, judges, magistrates, lawyers, members of parliament,
husbands and wives will all have a say, whether or not they intend to, in the political
system that is to come. We cannot know today precisely what it will be like, but we
can make some guesses. Will it treat women with more respect and less
discrimination? That is greatly to be hoped. Will it find creative and functional ways
to merge the post-colonial and the traditional, introduced law and custom? That, too,
is to be hoped — and, I think, expected.
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WOMEN AND THE VOTE
In Solomon Islands in 1986 twenty-two men came to a polling station intending to
vote in an election for the Malaita Provincial Assembly but left without voting.36 Since
the successful candidate won by only three votes it is evident that the votes of the
twenty-two might have changed the outcome of the election. The men did not vote
because:
Men who follow the old religion believe they will be ritually contaminated if they
enter a room that contains a menstruating woman or which has contained a
menstruating woman that same day. The presiding officer refused to make special
arrangements for these men such as allowing them to vote first; bringing the
ballot box outside the voting compartment; or voting on their behalf.37
The High Court was asked to overturn the election on the grounds that “the voting
was so conducted by the Returning and Presiding Officers as to be discriminatory
against” these twenty-two voters.38 The Court let the results of the election stand. In
doing so, it noted that if the election officials had made any special provisions for the
men so that they could vote — allowing them to vote first, for example, or building
them a separate polling booth — that might have constituted discrimination against
women.39 But, despite the fact that the Court said this, women’s right to equal
treatment under the law was not the legal basis on which the decision turned, nor was
gender equality the value that the Court seemed most interested in protecting.
The legal argument that swayed the Court was a narrowly literal reading of the
applicable regulations which provide that voting is to take place in a “screened
compartment in the polling station”.40 And, the Court held, “it was no part of the
duty of the presiding officer to make any alternative arrangement”.41 The regulations
did provide an exception to the requirement that voters cast their ballots in a closed
room, but the exception applied only to voters unable to cast their votes “by reason
of blindness or other physical disability.”42 “In the instant case”, the Court pointed
out, “the twenty-two pagan voters had no physical disability whatever and there was
nothing to prevent them from voting other than their fear and respect for their
custom”.43
If the Court had wanted to, it could have interpreted the regulations more broadly,
in a way that would have allowed the twenty-two disenfranchised men to vote. For
example, the Court could have looked to the purpose of the regulation44 which, so
the Court itself finds, is to protect the secrecy of the voter’s choice.45 The Court could
have pointed out that this purpose is intended to benefit voters and could then have
held that the persons that a regulation is intended to benefit can waive the benefit,
especially if they do not experience it as benefiting them.46
Counsel for the election officials gave the Court another argument that the Court
might have used to avoid the strict application of the regulation. Counsel pointed out
that government was currently considering new regulations that “would expressly
enable anyone prohibited by any customary rule from entering the polling station…
to be able to require the presiding officer to cast his vote for him”.47 The Court
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turned down the opportunity to fashion relief for the voters from this for two
reasons. First, the Court said that the revised regulation was not yet in force and “I
can only look at the law as it stands at the present time”.48 Secondly, the Court
questioned whether the men’s distaste for entering the voting booth after women had
been in it actually was “a point of customary law” — or was it, the Court asks,
“merely a religious tenet or belief”?49
If the men were motivated solely by religion and not by customary rule, the Court
seemed to be holding, then their actions would not be protected by the regulation,
even if the revised version were in force, because it refers to “customary rules” and
not to “religious tenets or beliefs”. No one seems to have brought to the Court’s
attention s 5(1)(f) of the Constitution (Solomon Islands), which guarantees freedom
of worship and belief. We cannot know, once the new regulation came into force,
whether a Court might hold that it could not stand because it violated this
Constitutional guarantee.50
We must wonder, because the Court’s distaste for the religion practised by the
twenty-two men seems to have been the core value driving the Court to the decision
it reached on the law. The Court mentioned the fact that the men’s actions
discriminated against women only once, and only in the course of quoting the
arguments made by counsel for the election officials.51 The Court dwelt, however, on
the fact that the men were, in its words, “non-christian”.52 They are, the Court noted
more than once, “pagan”.53 They practise “the old religion”54 which has rules that out
of “fear” they will not disobey.55 These are not words that a disinterested party would
use to describe a religion other than her own. These are the words and concepts
Christianity uses to impugn non-Christian religions. The Court’s choice of words is
evidence that the Court’s dislike for the traditional religious beliefs of Solomon
Islanders had little to do with their attitudes toward women and everything to do
with the fact that they dared to be non-Christian.
The case was resolved (at least until the new regulations were in force) in favour of
women, but the reasons for that resolution did not involve women’s equality. It
involved the inferiority, in the minds of a Christian judge, of all religions except
Christianity. This is not an unusual viewpoint to find in Melanesia. Although the
Pacific was colonised primarily for economic and political reasons, the colonisers
often justified their brutal mission on the grounds that they were bringing the
benefits of civilisation, law and religion in particular, to the savage pagans of the
Pacific.56 But if the colonisers were to convince themselves, let alone Pacific islanders,
of the truth of this justification, they had to remain convinced at any cost, that
Christianity was superior in all respects to the homegrown religions of the Pacific.57
It is sad, but not surprising, therefore, to find that contemporary carriers of the
colonial banner still believe it imperative to trumpet the merits of the Christian
religion at the expense of other belief systems.
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WOMEN AND COMPENSATION
In a 1991 case in Papua New Guinea a defendant pleaded guilty to the unlawful
killing of his sister-in-law.58 At the sentencing hearing the defendant argued that he
should receive a light sentence because he would have to comply with the “customary
obligation… to hand over one of his daughters for the deceased’s family” to
compensate them for the loss of their daughter.59 As an example of gender
discrimination the case is problematic. The defendant’s willingness to give away a
daughter seemed to the expatriate and urban communities, who read about the case
over their morning newspapers, to mean that he and the customary rules he was
following were treating a young woman with no more regard than they would treat
a pig or a shell or any other kind of property that is normally given as part of a
compensation agreement. However, the Court did not treat the matter as gender-
related. Instead, the Court seemed to presume that the custom might apply to
children of either sex. As such, the Court held that the custom was wrongful, not
because it discriminated against women but because, to the Court’s mind, it failed to
care properly for children. 
The Court was probably correct in finding that the custom of giving children in
compensation applies to boys as well as to girls.60 Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis
of the issues in the case would have benefited from a gendered approach. It is
particularly ironic that the Court did not do so in this case because the judge,
Doherty J., is a woman. Feminist jurisprudence teaches us to pay attention to the
particularities of litigants’ stories, to the context of their cases and to the narrative
that gave rise to the issues.61 Had the Court done this, it might have found a way to
resolve the matter that affirmed the dignity and selfhood of the individuals involved
without denying the integrity and value of their customs. 
The Court, however, approached the case as if every instance in which a child is given
in compensation to grieving parents is the same. There is nothing in the decision
about the particular facts of this case, about how the defendant felt at giving up his
child, about how the foster parents would treat the child. The Court held that the
custom violated both the Customs Recognition Act [Cap 19] (PNG) and the
Constitution (PNG). It would violate s 3 of the Customs Recognition Act because, to
the Court’s mind, it would be:
contrary to the welfare of [a] child under sixteen years… and… contrary to the
public interest to… reduce sentence where it was shown that a child or young
person or even an adult was handed over by one group of people to another
family or group in payment of obligations of some member of the child’s clan or
customary group.62
But, is it necessarily contrary to the welfare of a child to give her (or him) to grieving
parents who will welcome a child to replace their lost daughter or son? The judge’s
words suggest that she believes it is never in ‘the welfare of a child’ to use the child
in payment of an obligation. But, if the welfare of the child is at issue, ought not the
inquiry to be into whether the child has been placed in a good and proper home
rather than into the motivations that prompted the placement?
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The Court’s second reason for refusing to recognise and apply the custom was that
the custom violated s 253 of the Constitution (PNG), which prohibits “slavery and
the slave trade in all its forms, and all similar institutions and practices”.63 The Court
reasoned that the custom of giving a child to replace the child one has killed is a
practice similar to slavery:
I am unable to trace any case law in our jurisdiction on the interpretation of this
section [of the Constitution] and the word ‘slavery’ is not defined in our
legislation… [but]… The International Convention on the Abolition of Slavery
and the Slave Trade… refers to slavery as “the status or condition of a person over
whom all or any other powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”64
Using this definition, the Court found that the defendant’s obligation to part with
his daughter was, in the words of s 253 of the Constitution, an institution or practice
similar to slavery in two ways. First, the child had no say in the transaction.
Secondondly, the defendant was “handing over… a child, or an adult, to another
family or group in payment or recompense for the misdeeds of a third person”.65
Despite the Court’s care to find a definition of slavery, whether a practice is like
slavery may be in the eye of the beholder. If it is slavery to place a child with a family
without the child’s consent then almost all foster placements and adoptions, wherever
they happen, are practices similar to slavery, because the consent of the child is
seldom sought. And if it is wrong to give a child in compensation for one that has
been lost, then many common, and quite legal, practices are wrong. That reasoning
would make it wrong for a poor woman to give up her child so that wealthier parents
can raise the child. It would make it wrong for couples to pay surrogate mothers, to
invest in fertility clinics or otherwise to compensate anyone for helping them to adopt
or give birth to a child.66 All these practices involve, either directly or indirectly,
payment in connection with obtaining a child, the practice that seems to most anger
the Court in this case.
Whether the gift of the child was in the child’s welfare, whether it forced the child
into slavery, depends upon the particular facts of the story. If the adopting family
were intending actually to treat her as a daughter then it might not be against her
welfare. It might not be slavery. If the child and her new family were from the same
village the child’s circumstances might not even change appreciably, despite the
normative change in parents. In most Pacific villages children move freely around the
village, cared for by every adult.67 If, on the other hand, the adopting family were
forever to hold her father’s crime against the child, if she were made to work
ceaselessly to pay his debt, then it would not be in her welfare. It would be slavery.
We cannot decide this, however, without knowing more of the story behind the case.
In the end, the Court did not even decide the case on these grounds. Instead, the
Court decided the case on the basis of evidentiary rules, holding that the existence
and application of the custom had not been proved, and although “customary
compliance is a matter that can be considered in mitigation” of sentence, “customs
must be proved as a fact, that is by sworn evidence or affidavit evidence”.68 The
Court was even aware that the custom did indeed exist, but nonetheless refused to
recognise or apply it in the absence of sworn evidence put into the record by the
defendant’s counsel:
I am aware of this Custom in that part of the Sepik from other cases but I consider
in this situation before me where a submission by Counsel only is put forward is
insufficient evidence that a custom exists, what the custom exactly is and whether
the defendant has complied with it.69
In choosing to decide the case on this basis the Court may here have been reacting
to other cases in which counsel had failed to prove custom as the statute required.70
The Court may have been trying to send a message to counsel that courts would not
apply customary law unless counsel did the work of presenting that law to them. It
seems more likely, however, given the extensive dicta on the Court’s view that this
custom is unlawful and unconstitutional, that the Court wanted to be as certain as
possible that no appeal would enable the defendant to get a mitigated sentence on
account of this practice.
The people in every culture believe that they know what is in the welfare of their
children. And they do. At least, they know what is in the welfare of the children of
their culture. But cultures differ, and what may be in the welfare of the children of
one culture is not necessarily good for the children of another culture. A child taught
to honour the clan, to raise healthy pigs and to fight with bravery would do very well
in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea but not so well in London. However, a child
taught to find his station on the London Underground, to buy his lunch from the
fish and chip shop and to conjugate Latin verbs would not survive for long in a
Highlands village, no matter how well-prepared he was for English life. 
In deciding State v Kule, Doherty J. seems to have confused the values, needs, interests
and beliefs of Papua New Guinea culture with those of her own. In her culture, with
its nuclear families and its consequent emphasis on the parent-child relationship, it
might well be against the welfare of the child to be adopted for any reason other than
that its adoptive parents intend to cherish it. In Papua New Guinea’s villages, however,
it may be less necessary for the state to put its efforts into strengthening the parent-
child bond, because children are loved and cared for by every adult in their extended
family or clan. In Papua New Guinea, it may well be in the best interests of this child
to move from one village household to another, so long as she will be loved in both,
and especially as she will know that, in doing so, she is helping to preserve her father’s
honour and the good relations of everyone in the village.
CONCLUSIONS AND AFTERTHOUGHTS
We have looked at three cases that might have been about custom’s treatment of
women, but turned out to be about other things entirely. Public Prosecutor v Kota
was about the powers of chiefs in Vanuatu’s dual political system. Talusui v Tone-
ewane was about religion in Solomon Islands. And The State v Joseph Kule was about
the welfare of children. In at least two of the cases  the judges recognised that women
were being made the subjects of discrimination but in none of them did the courts
see it as their job to put an end to gender discrimination. This blindness on the part
1 3 6
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
of the state legal system, these examples of indirect discrimination, permitted the
direct discrimination of customary law to continue unchecked.
The cases demonstrate the varieties of indirect discrimination that Imrana Jalal has
identified.71 The proposed regulation described in Talusui v Tone-ewane was gender-
neutral on its face but would have had a discriminatory impact on women, a result
the Court failed to consider. In The State v Joseph Kule the judge’s social and cultural
attitudes blinded her to the possible realities of the situation. And, in Public
Prosecutor v Kota the judgment did not necessarily correct the discrimination created
by custom.
These cases raise a number of questions and issues about custom, state law and
gender. In particular they make us realise that women are the subjects of double
discrimination. They are directly discriminated against by custom — at least by
custom as it operates today — and they are indirectly discriminated against by a state
legal system that fails to redress the problems caused by custom. How might
women’s lives differ if judges recognised and redressed gender imbalances? How
differently might these cases have been decided if the judges focused on gender? The
decisions raise issues for the lawyers who represent women as well. The
discriminatory nature of certain customary norms and practices must be carefully
spelled out to the courts by counsel if we expect the courts to act in favour of
women’s rights to equality at all.
Finally, the cases raise questions about the treatment in the courts of custom and
customary law. In each of these cases, state courts refused to recognise and apply a
customary norm. And, in each case, the court did so for a different reason. In one
case, the customary practice conflicted with the Court’s notion of proper religious
expression. In another, the customary norm was at odds with the Court’s view of the
separation that ought to be maintained between the chiefly and parliamentary spheres
of government. In the third the Court believed that custom did not take due regard
of the welfare of children.
Whether custom or the state courts is correct in each of these instances is not the
most important question. The more important inquiry is why customary law and the
law of courts and constitutions continue, more than a quarter-century after most
Pacific nations came into being, to be so far apart. What can be done to bring them
into better conjunction with one another so that citizens do not feel themselves torn
between two legal systems placing conflicting duties and obligations upon them?
We who would like to do better are faced with a problem. We want to respect the
integrity of the indigenous cultures of the Pacific, but we also want those cultures to
act in ways that affirm the integrity and dignity of all persons. How do we accomplish
both these goals? The state courts have so far failed to find the proper balance. In the
cases we have discussed in this chapter, the courts have interfered with indigenous
cultures without creating laws that improve the lives of women. How do we, and the
courts, do better?
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7. RITES, WHITES AND MIGHT: A CRITIQUE OF
THE EFFECT OF THE REVIVAL OF CUSTOMARY LAW
UPON THE AUTONOMY OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN
By: Susan Bothmann
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Aboriginal
Generally of people, animals or plants existing in a place from the earliest time
or from before the arrival of colonists. The initial inhabitants of Australia were
once most commonly called Aborigines but this term has been replaced more
recently by the term Aboriginal(s).
Assimilation 
To absorb and integrate people, ideas or cultures into a wider or more
dominant society or culture. To remove the differences exhibited by one nation
or group by having it swallowed up into the mainstream. This concept was a
deliberate policy of white politicians in Australia for a time, in order to get the
Aboriginal population to disappear. 
Critique
A detailed analysis and assessment of something, especially a literary,
philosophical, artistic or political theory. The process of discussing critically.
Essentialism
A view that things have a certain set of characteristics, or an essence, that makes
them what they are. In the context of categories of people, the idea that there
exist defining characteristics that make, for example, all women, women; or all
Aboriginals, Aboriginals and that members of those groups always contain
those characteristics.
Exponential
Originally a mathematical term. Describes the expansion of a thing at a rate
where each item increases the capacity for further increases (like population
growth). Used generally to describe ever faster growth.
Governance
The actions taken by a governing body or the manner in which a government
governs.
Indigenous
Originating or occurring naturally in a particular place. Native. Describes
plants, animals and groups of people that are known to hail from a specific area
before any other similar stock could have been introduced there.
Lores
A body of traditions and knowledge held by some particular group. Typically
passed from person to person by word of mouth. Often used to describe the
rules governing the behaviour of indigenous peoples to contrast them from
western style laws.
Mores (Pronouced mor-ays). 
The essential or characteristic customs or conventions exhibited by a social
group. Acceptable habits and modes of behaviour particularly identifying a
specific group of people. Always expressed as a plural noun.
Patriarchal
A patriarch is the male head of a family or tribe. A patriarchal situation is any
situation where men dominate or have power by virtue of being male.
Postmodernism
A late 20th century style and concept originating in the visual arts and
extending into criticism and philosophical debate. It represents a departure
from the ideas of modernism. It consists of a general distrust of grand theories
and ideologies. Postmodernists try to break down concepts into smaller bits or
peel back the layers of notions inherent in any one notion to highlight the
invalidity of general overarching claims or ideas.
Poststructuralism
An extension and critique of structuralism. (Structuralism is the idea that a
thing’s structure is more important than what it is used for, its function.) Both
structuralism and its aftermath are largely French approaches to interpreting
language. Jacques Derrida is the most well known exponent. He started writing
in the 1960’s about deconstructing ideas. His ideas were developed further by
departing from structuralism’s idea of objectivity. Poststructuralism argues that
all things have pluralities and deferred meanings.
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INTRODUCTION
I always say that I’m Aboriginal first... Then I’m a mother, daughter, sister, aunt,
cousin, woman, historian, etc.1
I find it difficult to say I’m black first and a woman second or vice versa. I can’t
make that kind of distinction.2
Why should these two Australian Aboriginal women be confronted by an apparent
identity conflict? The first question, I suggest, is not how they choose between these
hierarchical notions of self, but why they should feel an inclination to do so at all. 
This notion of dissecting oneself and parcelling pieces of one’s identity up into special
categories is a practice that comes from western models of thought and theory3 and
has had no place in some other social constructs, including the traditional backgrounds
from which these two women come. Many traditional indigenous communities do not
share western conceptualisations of themselves or their societies. Rather, life is an
holistic and integrated experience. This different approach to living has been
recognised by western outsiders and sometimes idealised,4 sometimes derided.
Customary social structures, customary law, and pre-colonial behavioural norms
continue to exert influence upon the lives of most indigenous communities to some
extent, both practically and theoretically. Now some indigenous communities are
seeking to renew their customary ideas and practices as an overt political project. 
In examining the concept of Custom5 one must ask whether a return to a customary
legal system (which may resolve the quest for identity) will be helpful in achieving
political autonomy6 for indigenous women of colour. Or may Custom become a
vehicle for indigenous men to further disempower and oppress indigenous women? 
Adopting customary law as part of the legal system applicable to indigenous people
in post-colonial circumstances may increase the oppression experienced by
indigenous women unless those women are awake to the structures and
interpretations that are placed on Custom by men, indigenous and non-indigenous. 
In analysing whether indigenous women’s quest for cultural identity is theoretically
inconsistent with a desire for autonomy (where such identity is based upon a return
to traditional social and legal mores) it will be assumed that indigenous women want
both a special identity and autonomy for themselves.7
“One cannot claim to be either impartial or comprehensive, nor can one claim to
speak for everyone, to everyone, nor about everything.”8 Speaking from the position
of ‘outsider’ one can hope nevertheless to be seen as a sympathetic outsider with
some claims to insight into the dilemma faced by the women in the particular
communities referred to here.
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POSITIONING FEMINIST DISCOURSE IN THE
DEBATE ABOUT CUSTOM
Recent developments in jurisprudence have been rapid, exponential and diverse.
Critical Legal Studies (CLS), Feminist Legal Theor(ies) and Critical Race Theory
(CRT) have been launched, extended, inter-related and critiqued. Postmodernism
has infiltrated legal philosophy. Generally these discourses have tended to focus on
western style legal systems. 
The political implications of feminism have been widely explored, for example:
Feminism challenges the construction of knowledge about ourselves and the
Other, and is not confined to the critique of a particular discipline. It is also an
engaged political project — it seeks knowledge in order to change the ‘condition
of women’.9
Feminist legal scholarship has burgeoned in the past two decades. The most recent
developments in feminist legal theory have tended towards “fragmentation,
individuation and uncertainty”:
This postmodernist approach challenges the notion that women can be
encapsulated within some single theory of society and law; denies that the
interests of all women are the same, as if there is some ‘essential women’ (sic)
imbued with the characteristics and needs of every woman, irrespective of age,
race or class.10
Women of colour have played a vital role in highlighting the limitations of thinking
about ‘woman’ as ‘essential’.11 Non-white female scholars and commentators have
berated white feminists for contributing to the plight of women of colour.12 They
argue that throughout any colonial period of interaction between white western
colonisers and indigenous populations, white women have participated actively in the
oppression of the coloured minority, including and often, in particular, its women. 
White women, whilst undoubtedly victims of oppression themselves, are clearly not
innocent victims free from implication in the dominating and controlling of women
of colour.13 Women of colour argue that today’s white middle class feminists cannot
appreciate the needs of, cannot represent and cannot incorporate the struggle of non-
white women.14
Some women of colour recognise a ‘collective otherness’ based on being non-white
but they also insist that their particular circumstances set them apart from each other
as well.15 Some women of colour who feel marginalised or excluded from mainstream
feminism identify one version of difference.16 Their emphasis on difference is to deny
essentialism. Their scholarship highlights their personal experiences. Racism is as
great or greater a form of oppression against them, participated in by white women,
than sexism. Because this is the reality they experience, they know they must consider
the practical and theoretical implications of supporting the views of and seeking
solidarity with their own menfolk against whites of both sexes.17 Such theoretical
considerations also link difference with identity.
It has become very important for ‘post-colonial’ indigenous communities to regain
their traditions and customs. Indigenous people themselves perceive this return to
their own ways as a casting off of the western imposed yoke. It becomes a way of re-
establishing their particular identity in the world. A global movement towards
recognising and incorporating elements of customary legal systems into ‘mainstream’
systems in countries that have indigenous populations has emerged. This trend is
evident in Australia particularly in relation to Aboriginal land claims,18 and is manifest
in Vanuatu where it has been specifically provided for in the Constitution.19
‘Difference’ is also a theoretical construct behind the desire to return to or renew
customary systems. Western democratic, capitalistic legal systems are held to be
inappropriate to indigenous populations who crave a social system based on norms
which accord with their cultural aspirations. They seek self-determination or the right
to be different. This issue of the role, if any, for traditional lores in women’s lives is a
current concern for indigenous women. It has been raised in relation to Australian
Aboriginal women,20 Canadian first nation peoples, American native peoples21 and
peoples of the Pacific.22
An extensive body of knowledge has accumulated to establish what customary rules
really are.23 There continues to be controversy about the fact that general knowledge
of particular customs is often based on evidence gathered by white anthropologists
about certain indigenous rites and social regulations. Beyond the elements of any one
customary system the general or non-specific idea of Custom is a fluid concept. In
some places there remains a lively and vital tradition. In other places it has been
absorbed and must be actively reconstructed by indigenous people. The trend
towards a revival of Custom has raised two issues directly important to women. 
First, it is perceived by some that traditional mechanisms of social control may be
more oppressive towards the women in those societies and more limiting of women’s
scope for equal rights and humane treatment than a western human rights
perspective.24 This can be seen, for example, in those countries where there has been
a (re)turning to fundamentalism.25 ‘Oppression’ itself is a complex concept:
Actually a family of concepts, oppression has five aspects... exploitation,
marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.26
From the perspective of indigenous women of colour, while they may endorse the
reaffirmation of traditional and cultural mores as a way of asserting their own cultural
or racial identity within the larger social environment, they are mindful that this
approach can be a means of reducing or taking away some of their hard won ‘rights’.
It can also create an environment in which the struggle for further rights is made
more difficult.27 Consider, for example, a ni-Vanuatu woman trying to reconcile her
individual right to cast a secret ballot in general elections with her husband’s
expectation that she will vote as he directs.
Secondly, there has emerged a body of scholarship driven by indigenous women
themselves which posits the notion that Custom has been ‘bastardised’ by exposure
to white western legal theories and it is now impossible or dangerous to revert to
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those systems. This thinking starts from the premise that interaction between the
indigenous population and the colonial force has been conducted within a framework
of western patriarchal power. Even at its most friendly, interest shown in indigenous
ways has been by men about ‘men’s business’.28 Where in traditional cultures there
was or is a parallel, respected and ‘equal’ stream of ‘women’s business’ this has been
given no attention and has been overshadowed.29
Implementation of a political theory encompassing a revival of customary lores could
therefore have the negative effect of doubly oppressing indigenous women because
indigenous men may take advantage of the imbalance created by an exclusively male
perspective that already taints Custom. Indigenous women were indisputably
oppressed during colonialism, now they face the prospect of further oppression by
having any traditional autonomy reduced. Further, indigenous men may use Custom
as a vehicle to shame women into submission by suggesting that any opposition to
Custom would be a disloyalty to the collective identity.30
Postmodern/poststructural feminists and race/ethnicity feminists recognise that
there are diverse forms of power and identity. They share hostility to the ideas of a
singular conception of power, and of women as a group. The former deconstruct
universalising “procedures in modes of thought”31 by showing that these procedures
are not neutral but are connected with dominance. In other words, they break down
or unpack the elements that lie behind universal concepts and show that in fact they
are loaded with value laden assumptions. Those unstated assumptions can allow
notions of domination to be continued, implicitly. By contrast, race/ethnicity
feminists typically interpret diversity in relation to power and identity in a more
cautious way.32 They note that supposedly recognised differences between ethnic
groups are often perceived as different because of different power positions between
the observer and the observed.
It is possible to engage in a deconstruction of the notion of Custom (to show that it
is not a neutral concept) without threatening the utility of any customary system as a
political vehicle and without denying the fundamental importance of Custom as a
sign or indication of identity. 
The indigenous women at the Fourth World Conference of Women, held in Beijing,
argued for a global strategy that the women’s movement struggle be in terms of self-
determination, rather than gender equality. This is because self-determination is an
inclusive concept, incorporating women’s right to determine their political status,
and economic and social development.33 This quest by indigenous women for self-
determination in the context of gender may have arisen as an ideological offshoot
from the postcolonial movements by indigenous peoples to establish their rights to
reassert their cultural identities.34
Invariably, indigenous people have experienced and are experiencing cultural
schizophrenia as a result of colonialisation. That is not to say the experience of every
indigenous person is the same but there is no indigenous community that has not
been put upon to some extent by another culture. One solution adopted to overcome
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this psychological and political dislocation has been for indigenous communities of
colour to look to reaffirming their own cultural mores and re-establishing personal
and collective identities from within the refreshed elements of their unique cultures.
It is hard to walk the lines between the two cultures... We do not want to adopt
the whiteness of the dominant culture. We want to preserve our brownness... We
are happy to be who we are and we are fighting to protect that identity... to allow
our culture to continue to live.35
The political framework for this quest for indigenous identity arises in part as a
reaction to broad based policies of assimilation practised in many places until fairly
recently, including Australia and Canada. These policies and practices are perceived
by the victims of this approach as a nearly effective form of genocide. Women of
colour have also argued that, in theoretical terms, white feminist essentialising of
women is another aspect of an assimilationist approach.
Indigenous women of colour acknowledge that they experience being outsiders in
relation to their own communities as a product of their gender but they focus more
on describing the overwhelming experience and greater sense of ‘outsiderhood’ in
the context of their race and colonised status. Yet the ‘corrosive psychic effects’36 of
discrimination as a form of ‘spirit murder’37 is not something that every woman
experiences in the same way. For indigenous women seeking their own identities
through Custom that process itself can constitute further spirit murder if they find
their own spiritual needs being denied. Since the role of Custom is theoretically
relevant only as it applies within its own community, the element of otherness arises
in a purely gender context. In other words, women can feel excluded from the source
of their spiritual heritage by being rendered ‘outsiders’ in their own world solely
because of their gender.
WHAT IS CUSTOM? SOME MODELS CONSIDERED
True ‘tribal law’ is probably dead everywhere.38
[H]uman communities are living beings that continue to change; while there may
be a concept of the ‘traditional Indian’... no such being has ever existed. All along
there have been changes.39
The western model or paradigm of distinguishing our ‘legal system’ from other
spheres of human activity and defining ‘laws’ specifically as rules for correct behaviour
has little place in those social constructs described (from the perspective of the
western paradigm) as customary legal systems. Whilst indigenous peoples invariably
have (or in some cases, had) modes for organising social governance, these ‘systems’
might differ widely in content. It is nevertheless possible to identify some common
features. 
Traditional societies have no culture of individual rights. They maintain their
structure and coherence through a culture of duties.40
No thorough or systematic study of customs and traditions in Melanesia41 has been
carried out but it is clear that throughout the area “law is not quantifiable as an
autonomous institution, but is an aspect of the total way of life of the people”.42 In
the Vanuatu island communities, for example, there is no traditional body of laws that
is only understood and applied by specific operatives with special knowledge, such as
judges, lawmakers or specifically trained chiefs. There is social order, discipline and
control, and many of the languages43 include terms that recognise the concepts of
codes of conduct, ethics and values, but not the ‘rule of law’.44
In Melanesian communities there is no ‘law’ as a definable, isolated concept, but
there is a way of life combining the present with the future. The nearest term to
describe the concept is the expression pasin45 a pidgin rendering of ‘fashion’. The
notion of law must include “the ways of the people in their total environment, both
physical and metaphysical, tangible and intangible, concrete and abstract”.46
Similarly, when Australian Aboriginal Hobbles Danayarri says “[m]y law only one”47
he is referring to the concept of the Dreaming which is a set of principles governing
all human behaviour and indeed the laws of the universe.48
A recurring feature of indigenous cultures is a heavy emphasis on the relationship
between the community and the land and some form of collective responsibility
towards land.49 These concepts clearly pre-date any contact with the later colonising
powers.
The Australian Aboriginal people have suffered a 200-year period of oppression at the
hands of the colonisers and during that time have had their own traditions badly
damaged, and in many cases wholly destroyed. This has not been a uniform process.
Some communities of people, now described as ‘urban aborigines’, have been
completely dispossessed from their lands and the framework of their cultures by
forced separations from their families and by numerous other means.50 Other groups,
sometimes geographically distinguished as those still living in the desert areas and the
‘outback’, have retained substantial elements of their older lifestyles and belief
systems. These people have struggled to maintain their identities as members of their
Aboriginal communities.
The Melanesian experience in Vanuatu is unique. The colonisers there were French
and English planters and pastoralists, Catholic and Protestant missionaries,
government administrators from both colonising powers and stray ‘rascals’ who came
in numbers to exploit first the whales, then the sandalwood51 and other prized
timbers, and finally the human economic resource. Hundreds of men were stolen
away or ‘blackbirded’ to work virtually as slaves in Queensland cane fields.52
In both places the litany of introduced diseases, rape and pillage, Christianisation and
the removal of people to missions, development of farms, stations and plantations and
outright murder of the local populations has been the legacy of colonisation for the
indigenous communities. It is only fairly recently that the colonisers and others in the
west have come to understand the extent of the damage inflicted and the continued
struggle by the local people to retain their heritage. The process of cultural
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disintegration was not a simple, straightforward one. Some Aboriginal men ‘joined’
the outback stations as stockmen whilst others did not. Some Melanesian men and
women went to Queensland more than once and some never returned home. Cargo
cults53 were born as a way of explaining and making sense of why whites seemed to
be so much better off materially than the local people. Whatever the impetus the
result was inevitably disruption to an existing way of life. In neither Australia nor
Vanuatu did the indigenous populations have a tradition of writing as it is known in
the west. Customs are recorded through usage and oral accounts. 
‘Returning’ to Custom is more than a symbolic strategy for many groups. In Australia
the notion of incorporating aboriginal customary law into the municipal laws has
been extensively examined.54 Whilst in general there is little move to recognise
customary law, in the context of native title it is the basis upon which decisions
determining ownership will be made.55 Similarly in Vanuatu ‘Kastom’ has been
legislated into the legal system and in land matters it is the determining factor.56
In Vanuatu the adoption of Custom is a conscious ideology initiated by those who
pushed for independence. It is a clear example of a community wanting to give
credence and value to its own creeds and codes of social control as a means of re-
establishing a unique identity.57 In Australia, colonialism, which continues to exist,
has governed the context in which customary rules are allowed to be determinative
within the traditional environment because the colonial power (the Australian
government) has made the rules about that. The Aboriginal people themselves have
virtually no power to determine how effective their own ‘laws’ can be. If they follow
their own laws they are sometimes breaking ‘white-man’s law.’
The great difficulty in the implementation of Custom as a matter of practice is the
problem of deciding what Custom is. Where do genuine precepts come from after
there has been so much disruption? Custom changes, even without traumatic
interventions. Dynamic systems respond to new situations. Despite the common
western misconception that customs are somehow ‘written in stone’,58 they are
neither ageless nor immovable. Whilst communities understand that there has been a
profound impact during the colonising years on their means of social organisation
they nevertheless crave a returning to something genuine and wholly their own. This
is as true for indigenous women as it is for the men. 
WHERE ARE THE WOMEN’S VOICES?
In Melanesian communities the division of labour is generally drawn on gender
lines.59 This is not uncommon in traditional indigenous societies. Only recently have
we come to see that throughout the pre-colonial period there existed in traditions a
body of knowledge that was exclusively female.
‘Women’s business’ is also emerging as an ongoing vital tradition among Australian
Aboriginals. Pat O’Shane refers to three specific anthropological re-examinations
and notes:
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[A]ltogether, then it would appear that far from being ‘abject pawns in the games
of male political power’ Aboriginal women enjoyed a greater degree of economic,
social and political power than did women in Western society.60
Yet one needs to look very deeply into the literature generated by western academics
and anthropologists to find any mention of aspects of traditional lore that might
spring from and be fostered by women predominantly, or exclusively.
In 1955 Colin Simpson wrote a book of “vivid studies of Melanesia”61 called Islands
of Men.62 It commences with an “Author’s Note: Why Islands of Men” in which he
writes:
Melanesia seems to me to be characteristically male, and Polynesia female... in the
‘Black Islands’ to the west [of Polynesia] the women are less attractive than their
Polynesian sisters. The warrior male is, dramatically and even savagely, the figure
dominant in our Melanesian image. (The emphasis is mine).
One could write a whole essay unpacking that snippet, but there is more. Later in the
book Simpson relates a story told to him by one Tom Harrisson who had come to
the New Hebrides as a biologist with the Oxford Expedition. Harrisson describes
ridgetop Santo villages “where the menstruating women are kept in cages at one end
and fed through the bars with bananas”.63 Simpson further reports Harrisson as
saying “[L]ife was good in those [communal] houses. In the night, if you were
careful, you could get anywhere. In most parts one does not see enough of the
ordinary life of the women. Here one saw more than enough”.64
Simpson is described on the dust jacket as a “trained observer” but no other
qualifications are revealed. He wrote three other books entitled respectively, Adam
in Orche: Inside Aboriginal Australia, Adam with Arrows: Inside New Guinea and
Adam in Plumes. One is left to wonder about Eve.
In 1965 P. Lawrence and M. J. Meggitt edited a book containing articles about
Melanesian religions.65 In it R. B. Lane66 wrote a piece about the people of South
Pentecost67. He68 describes a situation illustrating a decision making process:
In the evening around the cooking fire in the communal men’s house where every
event of the day is brought forth, re-created, and dissected for the edification and
pleasure of the group, he presented his experiences... The discussion went on
through most of the night... The ultimate consensus of opinion was that W. had
actually had an encounter with a spirit-being.69
He talks about analysis taking place in group discussions and notes that “individual
conclusions are not necessarily disclosed in public”.70 The analysis he describes takes
place in the absence of the women who are presumably having similar conversations
in their own communal house from which the writer is excluded. ‘Public’ presumably
means the collective of men, women and children of the village. Perhaps women also
decline to disclose their discussions in public. The notion that every event of the day
is discussed by the men begs serious questions about what the women experience all
day long.
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Later in the article we find a subheading, “Graded Society”.71 This section runs for
four pages. Having given three full paragraphs of explanation about the men’s
grading system, the fourth small paragraph states:
Associated with the men’s graded society is a less elaborate women’s graded
society. There are three basic grades with subdivisions and each of the grades may
be repeated at different times in different ways. The taking of these women’s
grades is sometimes linked with the achievements in the men’s society by a
woman’s son or husband.72
So much for that, now let’s get back to eight more paragraphs about the important
stuff of men’s grades. Even the scant material about the women’s system is relevant
only in so far as it arises from achievements of the woman’s male kin. 
This selectivity mechanism is frequently repeated and has been increasingly identified
by feminist writers.73 Its effect is to rub out matters of interest and concern to
indigenous women and thereby render the women completely devoid of any political
voice for themselves. Deborah Bird Rose discusses this phenomenon of erasure74 in
the context of Aboriginal native title land claims. Indigenous knowledge systems
include boundaries of exclusion and silence across gender lines. She argues that
colonisation has had the effect of importing western European notions of gender into
the Australian consciousness and land claims are squeezed into that framework.
Aboriginals must substantiate their links to their land by giving oral evidence. The
process excludes women in two ways. The available bodies of learning have made
men the central players and men’s business the prime focus. Women’s concerns are
seen to be merely peripheral to those of men. This is the consequence of a white male
anthropological construct such as the one described above. Further, the need for
women to protect their traditions requires silence. If they speak their secrets to men
they break their lores, if they do not their silence is interpreted as “absence of
knowledge”.75
Serious consequences of erasure arise when the learning and understanding
accumulated in these texts is relied upon today by indigenous people themselves to
help reconstruct their customs. Another factor is the disproportionate growth and
development that might take place in the two gendered streams of custom and
tradition following contact with whites. Women’s business may not make dynamic
strides to keep up with modernising influences. Equally the division of labour and
power between the sexes is likely to widen.
Margaret Jolly has identified examples of both these phenomena.76 In her study about
the relationship between men and women in food production in South Pentecost she
notes the influences of colonialism. Among the traditional people (those less
influenced by having been Christianised)77 men’s leaving home to work temporarily
on other islands is a preferred strategy for raising cash. This pattern of migration has
had the effect of increasing the work load for women while the men are away and
reducing the power women have to influence what happens to the product of labour.
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The men exercise greater control over the cash and what it buys than they did over
the food grown collectively. 
Jolly identifies two other interesting spin-offs. Firstly, since the men tend to travel
in groups: 
They thus secure themselves against the depredations of European bosses, and the
more ethereal ravages of alien sorcerers. This time together... [is] like an extended
experience of the mal.78 Thus it tends to heighten male solidarity, vis-à-vis
women.79
Possibly the same male bonding took place amongst young men from different
traditional villages who were sent away to do their secondary schooling overseas in
the pre-independence years. Several of these men returned to Vanuatu and
established the various independence movements. This is a further illustration of how
western influence can tip the balance between the traditional sex roles so that
women’s traditional role loses value.
Second, “[m]ales also monopolize contact with European ideas and values. They
quite consciously inhibit the contact which women have with the outside world.”80
Through greater ‘sophistication’ in the ways of the west and with material goods (for
example firearms) the men further exclude women from exercising power in the
community.
The interweaving complexity of the influences that contact with western cultures has
had on indigenous groups like the Australian Aboriginals and the ni-Vanuatu is too
profound to describe in all its detail. What can be said is that it has had a major impact
on those parts of traditional systems that are devised and operated by women. How
does it impact on indigenous communities now? How does it affect the position of
indigenous women struggling to establish their right to self-determination within
their own communities?
DEFINING THE MASCULINIST RHETORIC
OF NOSTALGIA.
Nostalgia is a sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past. It is a desire for a
return to a period or place with happy personal associations. This is one of the
theoretical underpinnings of the political project for re-establishing Custom. Why
then ‘rhetoric’, with its negative connotation of insincerity?81 Is it not as Ati George
Sokomanu past President of Vanuatu has written:
The political demand is to reconstitute, reclaim, revive and reinvent, because of
what has been destroyed or lost under colonial rule. It is an urge simply to attain
political power and freedom not only from colonial domination and oppression,
but also from Christian ethics. It constitutes a process of santification (sic) of a
new creation for a common cultural identity.82
This is passionate language that speaks of a common struggle for rebirth. But
Sokomanu goes on to state that the “real past must be argued with proof, perhaps
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genealogically and ritually... for Pacific Islanders, their history is in the form of a story
that is passed from the great-grandfather to grandfather to father to son”.83 Here is
proof that the ‘proof’ used to reconstitute, reclaim, revive and reinvent will be men’s
stories about men.
Women must be vigilant in analysing seemingly laudable propositions so as not to be
swept up in the male rhetoric of Custom. When the Acting Chief Justice of Vanuatu
(as he then was) stated in a judgment,84 “it is clear from the lessons of history that the
price to be paid for failure to cherish and uphold the customs and traditions of
Vanuatu, is a heavy one: the loss forever of a national identity and way of life” he is
engaging in one form of rhetorical nostalgia. The price has been a heavy one; almost
certainly heavier for women,85 but the loss was not of a national identity as that never
existed in the first place.86
Indigenous men wittingly and unwittingly conspire in reducing the perceived
importance of women’s business for their own ends.87 Indigenous men may wish to
exploit the position of women in the light of their own exploitation by colonisers and
consequent feelings of alienation, and repress women as a means of overcoming their
own ‘castration’88 feelings at the hands of their colonial masters,89 but (whilst this
process might be expected, accepted and understood) its outcome is the oppression
of women. 
The overwhelming male rhetoric of Custom is often a lie that can be used to foster
greater gender power of men in the indigenous communities. At several levels men
may use the impact of colonialism to reinterpret Custom to suit themselves. At its
highest level, a whole stream of Custom has ceased to exist through a combination
of anthropological inputs largely of the Simpson variety and great disturbances in and
movement away from traditional life styles. This can lead to complete annihilation of
women’s business. Of course it has a substantial impact on the culture as a whole. In
Vanuatu there has been surprisingly little academic study of Custom90 with substantial
gaps in time between studies. Fairly isolated communities are selected for fieldwork
but, inevitably, general conclusions are drawn and encompassing findings are made
from these data. In the communities nearest to urban centres the de-Customising is
often greatest because of the impact of western churches and missionaries and
exposure to expatriate labour roles. There may be no collusion by indigenous men
with the colonisers in the prime process but neither are the men unaware of the
benefits they alone derive from these dislocations. It was the ‘big-men’, (selected by
the colonisers usually) who got the privileges available from the dominant culture.91
Having thus gained standing, that power base has been developed to gain rank
recognised in Custom.92
The second level operates because outsiders (anthropologists, settlers, historians,
tourists, whoever) have misinterpreted the place of men and women in indigenous
culture and have put everything into a western patriarchal framework. We shall never
know what the traditional mode of living was for many Australian Aboriginal
communities. Larissa Behrendt is an urban Aboriginal woman of the Eualeyai93 and
she explains that her remarks about her culture are based on generalisations and what
she has been told of her language group’s customs and values. She maintains that
there did not exist a concept of men being generally dominant to women, in her
traditional culture.94
Because the spirit of creation was a female energy, there is respect for women and
nurturing is valued in our traditional community. We, as women, had and still
have spiritual rituals, dances, songs and stories that are for women only. We are
respectful of elders. We know that with age and experience come wisdom and
powers. Women in our community are given as much respect as men. A female
elder can be as influential in a community as a male elder.95
But she acknowledges that “[s]exist oppression by [black] men started when the
white invaders arrived”.96 We have already noted how women’s grades in Vanuatu
have been glossed over and substantially ignored in the western literature. In
Vanuatu, pig-killing is a widespread ritual, significant for many purposes including
cementing friendships, inaugurating chiefs and taking grades. One can still attend
pig-killing ceremonies conducted by and for men. Ceremonies involving women
being engaged in pig-killing are never discussed. Yet Margaret Rodman has
documented women’s pig killing rituals on East Aoba.97
These days in order to establish and maintain a political presence Aboriginal people
are required to organise into committees and lobby groups. This mechanism has been
picked up and developed by indigenous men.98 Invariably, one sees the same
imbalance of gender representation in these bodies as one does with non-indigenous
activities. Deborah Bird Rose99 notes the importance of the written record in
Aboriginal claims and the fact that this record becomes a permanent structure for
describing the ‘truth’ about ownership. The Land Councils (Aboriginal bodies) have
a “tunnel vision approach... which asserts that as long as people get their land, it does
not matter who gives evidence... gender equity appears to be classed as an optional
extra... The idea is that people present their case, get their land, and get on with their
lives”.100 She notes the fallacy of this notion. In fact people do incorporate the
elements utilised in the claim procedure into their lives.101 Thereafter, “[e]ven junior
men… are treated as if they know more than the most senior women.”102
Thirdly, the situation arises where women are denied a vehicle for their traditions to
be recognised. In Helen Stacy’s analysis of the Hindmarsh Island case103 she outlines
how women of the Ngarrindjeri tribe, who were opposed to the construction of a
bridge to the island for reasons that were based on secret women’s business, were
subject to allegations that their lore was a fabrication:104 
Doug Milera, a senior Ngarrindjeri man and the husband of one of the women
claiming to be a custodian of the secret women’s business, claimed that the beliefs
had been fabricated in an effort to stop the bridge. He subsequently withdrew his
allegations of fabrication, saying that he had been drunk at the time of making the
claim.105
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Because he is a man his view was initially given greater credence in the public arena
than the word of the women, and this doubtful credibility about this issue lingered
despite his later discrediting of himself.106
On a fourth level, in the situation where an existing custom becomes substantially
modified because of a change in circumstances, men again reinvent and thereby gain
greater control over women. For example, in Vanuatu where custom owners of land
or family members obliged to pay value would once have settled the obligation with
mats (produced by women) or pigs (tended by women) the trend is now to operate
a cash economy. The payment with money changes the nature of the mutual
obligations significantly, because women generally have less access to cash and
therefore relatively less power. Alternatively, other women’s greater access to cash
wealth can operate to increase traditional penalties. Waiwo v Waiwo and Banga107
concerned a petition for divorce on the grounds of adultery also the plaintiff wife
sought damages from the co-respondent.108 Coincidentally, all three parties came
from the same area and were governed by the same Kastom. A decision had already
been made by their chiefs that the co-respondent (who was a financially independent
woman) should pay the plaintiff 10,000 vatu.109 They also ordered the respondent to
pay the co-respondent’s husband 20,000 vatu. The co-respondent argued that any
further claim would amount to punitive damages. The Senior Magistrate110 held that
damages should be awarded in accordance with customary law. He noted the
seriousness with which adultery is regarded in Kastom and ruled “that there is a
common basis throughout Vanuatu that adulterers must be customarily penalized...
[thus] damages [for adultery] should be considered as punitive damages on the basis
of custom”.111 He then ordered the payment of 100,000 vatu.112 Interestingly, he
made no reference to the discussion about adultery in the document prepared by the
Malvatumauri113 (the paramount council of chiefs) which would seem to have been
a good source for the customary position on the matter. In any event that document
offers no indication of the appropriate penalty.114 This case highlights brilliantly the
difficulty of reconciling imported concepts with traditional ones. If damages for
adultery were to be payable as a matter of custom (rather than as a surviving
anachronism from English property law) then surely the most suitable assessors of the
quantum of those damages would be the parties’ own area chiefs and the principles
for determining that quantum should also stem from custom. 
Fifthly, where the power paradigm has become entirely patriarchal men become the
sole arbiters of what custom was and so what it is to be. This level involves more
direct gender oppression. At its most overt it is a bald assertion of gender dominance
and the least subtle employment of the rhetoric of nostalgia. For example in Vanuatu
a white female citizen was appointed as the first Ombudsman.115 Certain indigenous
men in authority came under scrutiny and the Ombudsman published a number of
reports outlining quite serious allegations of misconduct against senior politicians.
One Member of Parliament116 stated publicly that he did not have to take any notice
of the allegations because a woman issued them and they were therefore contrary to
Kastom. Upon this rationale he did not feel obliged to address the question of the
validity or otherwise, of the allegations. 
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Finally there are circumstances where men simply tell lies about Custom. In land
claims in Vanuatu this situation is not infrequent117 where competing male disputants
will adduce evidence about apparent customary rules but all will neglect to explain
the matrilineal aspects of their customary succession.
CONCLUSION
Dissecting the psyche and categorising personal planes of self in some perceived
hierarchy is a western theoretical device. If western women have become
discomforted by being analysed and analysing themselves in such splintered terms,
how much more must that be true for indigenous women of colour whose cultural
outlook is integrative rather than segregationalist. 
Indigenous women of colour feel they are different from other people and want to
be different in pursuing their individual identities and their unique collective identity.
The collective identity involves a connection with the men of the group and the
women do not want to deny this part of their identity. To be comfortable in that place
given that as colonised people they experience ‘spirit murder’ in other places, they
want to embrace the vitality of their Custom/Kastom/Country. Internally, solidarity
requires consensus. That means that to be able to feel connected to each other within
a customary framework, men and women need to agree upon the general principles
that will govern them. Equally, externally the political agenda proscribes divisiveness.
To strengthen the collective claim for the validity of custom indigenous men and
women do not want to be seen as being at loggerheads. 
Neither do women want to criticise traditional mores and customs because that may
stimulate outsider scorn that Custom is primitive and uncivilised. The drive for a
reinvigoration of Custom thereby potentially casts women into another form of
schizophrenia because the loyalty to a customary ideology comes up against the
masculinist interpretations that erase their gender perspective. Indigenous men know
‘spirit murder’ too. While indigenous men struggle to overcome the past they must
not be allowed to redefine it so as to spirit murder their women anew.
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8.  THE INCORPORATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
& PRINCIPLE INTO SENTENCING DECISIONS
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION
By: Dr Tess Newton Cain
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Mitigation
Mitigation is the reduction of the severity or the effect of a wrongful act. A
‘plea in mitigation’ is the submission of certain facts by an offender in the hope
of receiving a more lenient sentence than the court would otherwise impose.
Restitution
Resitution involves making good a loss to a wronged person whether by actual
replacement of a lost good or providing recompense in monetary or other
terms. Restitution is similar to reparation which involves a wronged person
being compensated for loss that has been caused by an offender.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the South Pacific region1 there are fewer instances of having to reconcile
customary law and ‘introduced’ law within the realm of criminal law and procedure
than is the case in other areas of law such as family law or land law. By this I mean
that when we look to the available sources of law in relation to criminal matters, it is
evident that this is an area that has been extensively codified, either during the
colonial period or since then.2 A reading of these codes indicates that reference to
issues of customary law and principle occur rarely and are very limited in nature.
Once a matter is reported to the police and the issue is brought within the scope of
the ‘introduced’ (or ‘adopted’) criminal justice system, the relevant statutory
provisions relating to offences, defences and procedure make very few references to
customary concerns. This is despite the fact that within many Pacific island
communities there is a great deal of evidence (although it is largely undocumented)
that people who feel themselves to have been wronged by another person or group
of persons3 seek resolution of this type of dispute by reference to customary law and
practice as declared and/or interpreted by chiefs or other community elders. These
processes are commenced, conducted and concluded without any recourse to the
police, the Office of the Public Prosecutor or the ‘formal’ court system. There is also
evidence of some communities refusing to recognise the authority of the police or
other agents of the criminal justice system.4 In some areas the courts have not
attempted to close this gap between statute and social reality. Instead the courts have,
in several areas, taken an exclusionary approach to the introduction of issues of
custom prior to the sentencing stages of criminal matters. For example, we may refer
to the case of Public Prosecutor v Iata Tangitom.5 This concerned a charge of indecent
assault contrary to s 98(2) of the Penal Code [Cap 135] (Vanuatu). There was some
dispute as to the age of the victim but this was determined to be 13 by Marum J, who
then went on to make the following comment:
In mitigation, the counsel submitted that in custom, this is recognized and
accepted and further, age is irrelevant. In my view, if there is a conflict between
custom and public law, that is criminal law, then the law must prevail and that is
provided for under section 11 of the Penal Code Act (sic) where it expresses that
ignorance is no defense.
When we turn to the particular issue of sentencing, the situation is markedly
different. At this stage of the criminal justice process the impact of customary
principles, most notably reconciliation and compensation, is much more visible. It is
also at the sentencing stage that the potential ideological conflicts between the
underlying rationales of customary socio-legal structures and the introduced legal
system are highlighted:
The potential for paradox where such a notion of justice6 comes up against
customary penalty with very keen communal and collective investments is clear.
For instance, with traditional community shaming the whole village is co-opted
into the process and the offender’s family may take collective responsibility not
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only for the harm but also for his (sic) rehabilitation. Common law liability, on
the other hand, tends to isolate the offender from the community at all stages of
the penalty process. While requiring the individual to restore the social balance
through his guilt and shame.7
This chapter examines the question of how, if at all, the law as enacted and
subsequently applied by the courts attempts to reconcile such paradoxes. There are
three parts to this chapter. The first part is an examination of the written law to
identify what provision is made for the recognition of customary law in relation to
sentencing decisions of the courts.8 The second is a consideration of some of the
sentencing decisions of the courts of the region. The third is a brief overview of law
and procedure in other jurisdictions to provide some points of comparison with the
situation in the USP region.
THE WRITTEN LAW
Here, we shall examine the written law both in the form of constitutional provisions
and in the form of enacted legislation related specifically to sentencing and customary
law. In examining the relevant legislation the statutes constituting courts are
considered, as it is sometimes the case that courts are given broad powers to take
customary matters into account when making decisions.
Constitutional Recognition of Custom and Customary Law
There are many examples in Pacific constitutional documents of statements as to the
significance of customary law. These statements are often framed in very broad terms.
There are two main types of this sort of statement.
The first is the kind of statement that does not expressly refer to customary law in
relation to the particular jurisdiction but instead refers to the concept of ‘existing
law’, which could (and possibly should) be interpreted as including customary law.
An example of such a statement is Art 71 of the Constitution 1974 (Niue) which
should be read in conjunction with Art 82 where ‘existing law’:
...means any law in force in Niue immediately before Constitution Day; and
includes any enactment passed or made before Constitution Day and coming into
force on or after Constitution Day.
However, the Constitution of Niue makes no specific reference to the significance of
customary law other than in relation to land issues. Similar statements appear in the
Tokelau Act 1948 (NZ)9 and the Constitution (Cook Islands).10
The second form of constitutional statement that is found in the region in relation to
the significance of customary law is the type that makes express reference to the status
of custom, again in fairly broad terms. An example of this type of provision appears
in the Preamble to the Constitution [Cap 1] (Tuvalu):
And whereas the people of Tuvalu desire to constitute themselves an Independent
State based on Christian principles, the Rule of Law, and Tuvaluan custom
and tradition.
1 6 7
C U S T O M A R Y  L A W  &  S E N T E N C I N G
1 6 8
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
The status of custom is reiterated in s 85, which is concerned with the jurisdiction of
the courts:
...provided that in the exercise of their jurisdiction the courts shall, to the extent
that circumstances and the justice of any particular case may permit, modify or
adapt such rules as to take account of Tuvalu custom and tradition.11
In addition, it is possible to identify constitutional provisions that make reference to
issues of punishment. Again, these tend to be framed in very broad terms rather than
being detailed as to how the courts should sentence criminal offenders. An example
of such a provision is Cl 10 of the Constitution (Tonga):
No one shall be imprisoned because of any offence he (sic) may have committed
until he has been sentenced according to law before a Court having jurisdiction in
the case.12
It is evident that these provisions, and the constitutional documents of the region
more generally, do not make specific reference to the role that customary law should
play in relation to sentencing decisions made by the criminal courts. A possible partial
exception is s 186 of the Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji Islands) which does
make specific reference to the recognition of “traditional Fijian processes” within the
context of “dispute resolution”. It is therefore necessary to examine the legislation
that is relevant within the sphere of criminal law and procedure to ascertain if and
how the written law defines the role of customary law and principle at this stage of
the criminal justice process.
Legislative Provisions Concerned with Sentencing and Customary Law
In this section, we shall examine some of the legislative provisions that are concerned
with the relationship between sentencing decisions of the courts and customary law.
More particularly, we will be looking at how the relevant legislation seeks to
incorporate issues of reconciliation and compensation into sentencing decisions.
First, it is possible to identify provisions that give guidance as to the applicability of
custom and customary law within the whole of the criminal sphere, including the specific
issue of sentencing in the criminal courts. One of the most comprehensive examples of
such a provision is para 3 of Schedule 1 of the Laws of Kiribati Act 1989 (Kiribati):13
3. Subject to this Act and any other enactment, customary law may be taken into
account in a criminal case only for the purpose of: 
(a) ascertaining the existence or otherwise of a state of mind of a person; or
(b) deciding the reasonableness or otherwise of an act, default or omission by
a person; or
(c) deciding the reasonableness or otherwise of an excuse; or
(d) deciding, in accordance with any other enactment whether to proceed
to the conviction of a guilty party; or
(e) determining the penalty (if any) to be imposed on a guilty party,
or where the court thinks that by not taking the customary law into account
injustice will or may be done to a person.
A provision of this type has the potential to be very wide-ranging in scope and effect.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the application of customary law in any
or all of the identified circumstances is not mandatory in this provision. This is
indicated by the use of the word ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ in the first line of the
paragraph.
In addition to general provisions of this type the different levels of courts may be
subject to particular legislative provisions that define or shape the relationship
between customary law and principle and sentencing decisions.
Magistrates’ courts and ‘custom’ courts created by statute
In some jurisdictions, courts in these categories14 are empowered by statute to take
custom and customary law into account when dealing with criminal cases. For
example, s 10 of the Island Courts Act [Cap 167] (Vanuatu) reads as follows:
Subject to the provision of this Act an island court shall administer the customary
law prevailing within the territorial jurisdiction of the court so far as the same is
not in conflict with any written law and is not contrary to justice, morality and
good order.15
Section 16 of the Local Courts Act [Cap 19] (Solomon Islands) bears a close
resemblance to this provision. However, in this case the only limiting factor on the
application of custom by the local court is that “the same has not been modified by
any Act”. Similarly, in Samoa the operation and jurisdiction of the fono16 has been
placed on a statutory basis by the Village Fono Act 1990 (Samoa). The incorporation
and application of custom is central to the functions of the fono as envisaged by the
Act. This is clearly demonstrated in those sections that are concerned with the
handing down of sentences in criminal cases. For example, s 6 pertains to
“Punishments” and grants the fono the power to “impose punishment in accordance
with the custom and usage of its village” and deems that such power includes the
imposing of the following forms of punishment:
(a) The power to impose a fine in money, fine mats, animals or food; or partly in
one or partly in others of those things;
(b) The power to order the offender to undertake any work on village land.
It is also interesting to note that s 8 of this Act indicates how these customary
punishments or penalties are to be viewed by other courts (such as the district
courts17) when making subsequent sentencing decisions:
Where punishment has been imposed by a Village Fono in respect of village
misconduct by any person and that person is convicted by a Court of a crime or
offence in respect of the same matter the Court shall take into account in
mitigation of the sentence the punishment by that Village Fono.
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Superior courts
In the field of criminal procedure, including sentencing, the primary piece of
legislation that governs the courts is a criminal procedure Code or Act. Some
examples of this type of legislation are Criminal Procedure Act 1980–81 (Cook
Islands); Criminal Procedure Code [Cap 21] (Fiji Islands); Criminal Procedure Code
[Cap 17] (Kiribati); Criminal Procedure Act 1972 (Samoa); Criminal Procedure
Code [Cap 7] (Solomon Islands); Police Act [Cap 35] (Tonga); and the Criminal
Procedure Code [Cap 136] (Vanuatu). These are the laws that form the legislative
framework within which the courts of the region make sentencing decisions in
relation to criminal matters. Of particular interest here is what, if anything, these
pieces of legislation say about how the courts should approach customary issues when
making these decisions.
The relevant provisions of the legislation of Vanuatu18 provide a good starting point
for this consideration. This is because they make explicit reference to customary
forms of dispute resolution, namely reconciliation and compensation. Section 118 is
concerned with the promotion of reconciliation. It reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Code or of any other law, the Supreme
Court and the Magistrate’s Court may in criminal causes promote reconciliation
and encourage and facilitate the settlement in an amicable way, according to custom
or otherwise, of any proceedings for an offence of a personal and private nature
punishable by imprisonment for less than 7 years or by a fine only, on terms of
payment of compensation or other terms approved by such Court, and may
thereupon order the proceedings to be stayed or terminated. (Emphasis added).
This provision leaves several things unclear. Words and phrases such as
“reconciliation” and “amicable way” are not defined. Therefore, it is difficult to know
how they should be applied in practical terms. Similarly, no guidance is provided as
to the meaning of “offences of a personal or private nature”. In addition, the use of
a phrase such as this seems to be in conflict with the notion that criminal offences
have an inherently public nature or aspect as reflected elsewhere in the criminal law.
A further significant point regarding this provision is one that arises in relation to
similar provisions in other jurisdictions of the region:19
...where these provisions exist, they do not make any references to offences that
would qualify for settlement by way of reconciliation in terms of the nature of the
offences and/or the sentences they attract but which should be excluded from the
ambit of such provisions by virtue of their social significance. Incidents of
‘domestic violence’ are very clearly in this category.20
Whilst incidents of “domestic violence” may qualify under a provision such as s 118
referred to above as examples of the sort of offence that may be resolved through
reconciliation, it may be that to do so leads to an absence of a meaningful sanction
for this type of offence:
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...because of the unequal power positions of persons negotiating domestic
reconciliations, the private nature of their terms, and the application of
expectations that may go well beyond the immediate issue of the assault or future
threats of violence, reconciliation may become more of an avoidance of penalty.
For instance, where a complainant withdraws her allegation of assault as a result
of reconciliation, this may be the consequence of threats from the husband21 to
throw a wife out into the street if she does not ‘reconcile’, rather than any genuine
rapprochement. The court would not become aware of this by simply seeking an
assurance of reconciliation from the accused and the complainant may not be
examined by the court in this regard. The community, the traditional witness and
enforcer of reconciliation, also has no voice in the court hearing.22
Concerns of this nature indicate that in some situations the promotion of
reconciliation requires very careful consideration by the courts. It may also require
that the reconciliation process is supervised and monitored either by the courts or by
some other appropriate agency.
To return to the provisions that apply in Vanuatu, s 119 of the Criminal Procedure
Code [Cap 136] (Vanuatu) is concerned specifically with issues that relate to
sentencing decisions. This provision of the Code states:
Upon the conviction of any person for a criminal offence, the court shall, in
assessing the quantum of penalty to be imposed, take account of any
compensation or reparation made or due by the offender under custom and if
such has not yet been determined, may if he (sic) is satisfied that undue delay is
unlikely to be thereby occasioned, postpone for such purpose.
Again, a provision such as this one may be ambiguous or even problematic. The use
of the word “shall” in the first line indicates that it is mandatory that the court take
customary “compensation or reparation” into account. However, there is no
guidance as to what principles the courts should follow in so doing. There is nothing
in this provision that stipulates that the effect of having already complied with or
undertaken to comply in the future with some form of customary settlement should
be to mitigate the sentence. However, as is evident from the judgments of the
courts,23 such settlements are considered within the context of reducing a sentence
rather than increasing it. Of particular significance within a jurisdiction such as
Vanuatu is the absence of any guidance as to which (or whose) custom should apply
in determining practical issues such as the means by which reparation should be made
or the amount or type of compensation that is due.
In relation to issues of procedure, these provisions do not make reference to any
timescale for the envisaged reconciliation processes. Neither does the legislation
indicate what should happen in the event that the relevant parties agree to undertake
some form of reconciliation when they are before the court but subsequently fail to
go ahead with it. However, it is recognised that in many cases customary
reconciliation may have been initiated and, indeed, concluded before the case ever
comes before the court. Elsewhere in the region similar issues arise as it is generally
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the case that where such legislative provisions appear the processes for implementing
them are not clearly defined.
AN EXAMINATION OF SENTENCING DECISIONS OF THE
COURTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE INCORPORATION
OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND/OR PRINCIPLES.
It is reasonable to assume that the decisions of the subordinate and lower subordinate
courts are more likely to refer to issues of custom than would be the case in the
sentencing decisions of the superior courts. However, it is extremely difficult to get
access to the decisions of the magistrates’ courts and courts that operate at the lower
subordinate level (e.g. island courts or local courts). In many cases the judgments of
these courts are not fully transcribed unless they are requested by one of the parties.
Therefore, in this section I will focus on examples of how sentencing decisions of the
superior courts take account of custom and customary law. This will provide only a
partial picture of this area of criminal law and procedure. However, it will illustrate
some significant issues and questions that are important to this type of decision-
making throughout court structures at all levels, whether those structures are ‘formal’
or ‘informal’ in nature.
The questions of when and to what extent customary settlement and/or punishment
should be taken into account by the courts when passing sentences in criminal cases
has been considered in many of the jurisdictions of the region. There are first instance
decisions and appellate decisions that are relevant to this consideration. An
examination of judgments from a number of jurisdictions of the region reveals a
number of issues. They are identified and discussed here. The order in which the
issues are discussed does not necessarily reflect their order of importance.
The first issue is that in many cases the customary settlement, whether by means of
formal apology, payment of compensation or some other process, occurs prior to the
case coming before the court for sentencing purposes. This means that it is the most
likely scenario that the issue of the customary settlement is raised within the context
of a plea in mitigation. Further to this, it is evident from some of the judgments that
the perception of the victims and offenders is that it is the customary settlement that
is the final resolution of the situation with the court case being considered
superfluous and, sometimes, unwelcome. This type of perception is referred to in the
judgment of the Court of Appeal of Tonga in Hala v R.24 In this case, part of the
appeal was based on the fact that the trial judge had given insufficient weight to the
fact that the offender had helped the victim’s family financially, had made his peace
with them and that there was reason to believe that the family “did not wish the case
to go to a hearing”. 
However, a situation may arise in which the court hands down a sentence that has
been reduced on the basis that there will be some form of customary settlement
process at some point subsequent to the conclusion of the proceedings. This raises
the problem of what should happen in the event that an undertaking to pay
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compensation or undertake some other form of customary settlement is not fulfilled.
A very similar issue to this was considered in the appellate case of Rainer Gilmete v
Federated States of Micronesia.25 In this case the appellant was initially sentenced to
imprisonment (partly suspended) and to pay restitution. The restitution was not paid
within the time that the Court had prescribed and the appellant was sentenced to a
further year’s imprisonment. He appealed against the modified sentence. The
modified sentencing order had been made on the basis that where a convicted person
was unable to pay restitution, his or her family was obliged in custom to do so. The
Supreme Court of FSM held that:
If the defendant is incapable himself (sic) of paying restitution and he has made a
request for assistance to his family, the family’s bad faith in not paying cannot be
imputed to the defendant and result in increased imprisonment (per Benson AJ)
It is not clear from the judgment in this case whether the original sentence was one
that had been mitigated or reduced by virtue of the accompanying order to pay
restitution. It may be preferable that where the plea in mitigation is based on an
undertaking to go through a customary form of settlement rather than evidence that
such settlement has already been reached, that the court should defer final sentencing
until such time as is considered reasonable for the resolution to have been achieved.
However, a reading of a number of cases from the region concerning this issue
indicates that, in practice, it is usual that customary reconciliation and/or
compensation has already been undertaken before the sentencing stage of the
‘formal’ proceedings is reached. This can be seen from explicit and implicit comments
that appear in many of the cases that are considered in this chapter.
Second, a reading of the cases makes it clear that the courts’ approach is one of
limiting the scope of the effect of customary settlement to mitigation. In the
Solomon Islands case of R. v Nelson Funifaika and others26 Palmer J made the
following statement as to the effect of payment of customary compensation by the
offenders and their relatives to the victims and their communities:
The significance of compensation in custom however should not be over-
emphasized. It does have its part to play in the communities where the parties
reside, in particular it makes way or allows the accused to re-enter society without
fear of reprisals from the victims (sic) relatives. Also it should curb any ill-feelings
that any other members of their families might have against them or even between
the two communities to which the parties come from. The payment of
compensation or settlements in custom do not extinguish or obliterate the offence.
They only go to mitigation. The accused still must be punished and expiate their
crime. (Emphasis added).
This limiting approach has been demonstrated elsewhere in the reluctance of the
courts to accept customary obligations or beliefs as defences to serious criminal
offences. Reference has already been made to the Vanuatu case of Public Prosecutor v
Iata Tangaitom. Another striking example is the Solomon Islands Court of Appeal
case of R. v Loumia.27 This case highlighted the potential for conflicts between
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customary law and constitutional principles and between customary law and primary
legislation. The appellant sought to persuade the Court that the customary
requirement to ‘pay back’ a killing should afford him a defence to a charge of murder
(and a reduced charge of manslaughter) under s 204(c) of the Penal Code [Cap 26]
(Solomon Islands) which states that a defence exists if the accused:
...in causing the death… acted in the belief in good faith and on reasonable grounds
that he was under a legal duty to cause the death or do the act which he did.
The defence was not recognised by the Court on the basis that it was inconsistent
with constitutional protections of the life of the individual.28 In addition, the Court
made the following statement as to the relationship between the customary duty to
‘pay back’ a killing and s 204(c) of the Penal Code:
The matters of extenuation which will reduce the offence from murder to
manslaughter are set out in ss.196, 197 and 199 of the Code29 and it is sufficient
to say that the desire to avenge the death of another or exact retribution are not
matters of defence or extenuation either under the Code or at Common Law.
Clearly therefore, in my judgement, custom which calls for action which is a
criminal offence by the statute law of Solomon Islands is inconsistent with statute.30
The legislative provisions discussed in the previous section do not preclude the court
imposing a heavier sentence as a result of taking custom into account than might
otherwise be the case. However, the cases demonstrate that the usual result of
reference to customary settlement between victim and offender (and their respective
family or community groups) is that of a reduced sentence. A similar trend has been
identified in the neighbouring jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea.31
Third, it can be seen that the courts adopt different approaches to the significance of
customary reconciliation and/or compensation depending on the circumstances of
the case. The most significant factor appears to be the seriousness of the offence in
question. This is illustrated in the contrasting decisions of the Supreme Court of Fiji
in two cases dating from 1977.32 In Eernale Cagiliba v R.33 the Court, on receiving
evidence that the appellant was reconciled with the complainant, quashed the original
sentence of two years’ imprisonment and substituted one of 12 months’
imprisonment. The offence in question was that of robbery with violence contrary to
s 326(1)(b) of the Penal Code [Cap 17] (Fiji Islands). However, the sum stolen was
$7 and the victim and offender were cousins. In Suliasi Nalanilawa v R.34 the
appellant had once again been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. In this
instance, the offence was that of assault with intent to commit rape. The Court
refused to accept an argument that the sentence should be reduced because the
complainant’s family had forgiven the appellant “in accordance with Fijian custom”.
It would seem that both of these cases could come within the scope of the Fiji
Islands’ legislative provisions relating to the promotion of reconciliation that were
discussed previously. However, it is evident that the exercise of discretion by the
courts allows judges to differentiate between situations in accordance with broader
policy issues.
In other jurisdictions, such as Vanuatu, reference to the role of customary settlement
in sentencing is not restricted by reference to the nature or seriousness of the offence
involved. However, it remains the case that the courts do make differentiation
between when reconciliation and/or payment of compensation should and should
not operate to mitigate sentence. Again, the seriousness of the offence is a significant
factor in this regard. Recent comments made by the Supreme Court of Vanuatu
indicate a marked reluctance to accept customary settlement as a significant
mitigating factor in cases of serious violence, especially where death results. In the
case of Public Prosecutor v Peter Thomas,35 Marum J identified that the “normal”
penalty he would impose in such a case was one of nine years’ imprisonment. He then
made, inter alia, the following comment:
The Court under Section 119 of the CPC36 is also to take into consideration any
customary settlement into determining what is an appropriate penalty. I have
stated earlier in some of my sentencing on violence causing death that
compensation in compensating the life of a dead person is totally useless to the
dead person, because it cannot compensate him (sic) by putting him back to life,
and that is why I say that compensation is useless, when death occurs. However,
the Court does take into consideration compensation but of less significant (sic).
After consideration of everything in this matter I consider that the appropriate
penalty to impose by the Court on the Defendant is to sentence him of 7 years
and 6 months.37
LAW AND POLICY ELSEWHERE.
The issues and questions that have been identified here in relation to USP
jurisdictions have also arisen and been considered elsewhere in the world. Here, we
shall briefly examine some of the approaches that have been advocated and/or
adopted in Papua New Guinea, South Africa and Australia. It is intended that this
brief overview will identify questions and concerns that currently require or will
require consideration by legislators and judges of the countries of the USP region as
this area of criminal law and procedure develops.
Papua New Guinea
In Papua New Guinea, issues of customary compensation have been ‘elevated’ to a
statutory basis in the Criminal Law (Compensation) Act 1991 (PNG), as amended.
It is a significant piece of legislation in the Pacific as it provides a legislative framework
outlining the detail of judicial and magisterial powers and duties when making
compensation orders. This Act operates on the basis of the courts imposing orders to
pay compensation “in addition to any other punishments imposed”.38 Section 3 of the
Act identifies those factors that are to be taken into account when making
compensation orders. The section makes specific reference to “custom” as a factor
that may affect compensation orders in s 3(1)(d). These customs include:
any relevant custom regarding compensation, including but not limited to: 
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(i) any custom regarding the nature, the amount, the method of payment and
the appropriate person or persons to be paid the compensation; and
(ii) any custom which relates the amount of compensation to the age or life
expectancy of the person suffering injury or loss;
Thus, this legislation recognises that compensation may be in something other than
monetary form and that recognition of the dictates of custom in relation to
compensation may lead to compensation being paid to a person or persons other than
the victim of the crime in question. This makes this statutory framework quite distinct
from those that govern the imposing of compensation orders in jurisdictions such as
the United Kingdom.39 The PNG Act is silent on how the courts should deal with
cases where customary compensation is negotiated between the relevant individuals
and/or groups outside the formal court process prior to the making of any orders as
to sentence, including orders that may be made under this legislation. In subsequent
commentary, it has been argued that “any compensation payments outside of the
prevailing criminal compensation regime must be disregarded and discounted in
sentencing.”40 Just as was noted previously, the courts in this jurisdiction have
sometimes indicated that the imposition of a compensation order may not be
appropriate.41
South Africa
In a recent publication,42 the Law Commission of South Africa has raised several
issues of significance in this area. Of particular interest are the comments and
recommendations that were made highlighting the possible areas of conflict between
the rationale, structure and operation of ‘traditional courts’ and the supreme law of
constitutional provisions. One of the most complicated aspects of attempting to
incorporate customary law and principle into sentencing procedures (or indeed into
any other aspect of law) is how conflicts between customary law and other sources of
law should be resolved, if indeed they can be. The issues and resolutions that arose
in the case of Loumia discussed previously are relatively clear cut in this regard.
However, other considerations are more complex and ambiguous. A pertinent
example is that of the place of women in customary systems of dispute resolution
whether as victims, offenders or adjudicators. The South African Law Commission
has made the following recommendation; its careful wording is indicative of the
potential problems in this area:
5.6 The traditional element of popular participation whereby every adult was
allowed to question litigants and give his (sic) opinion on the case should be
maintained and encouraged as this boosts the legitimacy of the court.
However, to comply with s.9 of the Constitution, consideration should be
given to the full participation of women members of the community.43
Similarly, the Commission also considered the question of corporal punishment,
which is another issue with constitutional implications. The Commission’s report
notes that previously a chiefs’ court could administer corporal punishment on
“unmarried males under the apparent age of 30.”44 This, however, was determined to
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be in breach of s 12(1)(e) of the Constitution by the Constitutional Court in the case
of S. v Williams.45 Further to this decision, the Abolition of Corporal Punishment Act
1997 (South Africa) was passed. Thus the Commission has recommended that:
6.7.3 The traditional courts therefore need to be alerted that a sentence of
corporal punishment is contrary to the law.46
This type of consideration provides a very good illustration of the difficulty of
attempting to ‘blend’ introduced or adopted legal and democratic concepts such as
gender equality and constitutional individual rights with the longstanding beliefs and
values of traditional societies.
Australia
Many significant questions and concerns regarding the place of customary law in
relation to sentencing decisions of the criminal courts have been debated in Australia
with particular reference to how the criminal justice system does or should impact
upon members of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. 
The legislative framework for sentencing of Aboriginal offenders and the attendant
recognition of Aboriginal customary law differs between the Australian States and
Territories. In Victoria, the 1988 Sentencing Committee concluded that
“[A]borigines should not be given preferential treatment in sentencing; that
customary laws not be recognised; and that no special sentencing options be developed
for Aboriginal offenders.”47 In other parts of the country, where there are larger rural
Aboriginal populations and less assimilation of Aborigines with the non-Aboriginal
community,48 the courts have adopted a somewhat different approach.
One of the most problematic aspects of giving recognition to Aboriginal customary
law in sentencing decisions stems from the fact that in many instances, a system of
ritualised physical punishment (such as being speared in the leg) is used by the
community group.49 It would be very surprising to find the courts expressly
recommending or condoning a form of customary punishment that constitutes a
criminal offence (assault or wounding). Indeed, the courts have had to tread a very
careful path in this area. In the 1992 case of R. v Minor50 the Court of Criminal
Appeal of the Northern Territory held that where tribal payback punishment had
already been carried out or was to be carried out in the future, the Court should have
regard to this fact when passing sentence:
As I understand it, payback, in certain cases, which must be carefully delineated
and clearly understood, can be a healing process... It would be a serious and
impermissible abrogation of the court’s duty to reduce a sentence on any person
of whatever race or creed because of assurances that friends or relatives of the
victim were preparing their own vengeance for the assailant. If payback is no more
than this it is nothing to the sentencing process. If, however, it transcends
vengeance and can be shown to be of positive benefit to the peace and welfare of
a particular community it may be taken into account; though even then I do not
believe the court could countenance any really serious bodily harm.51
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Elsewhere in that judgment, the following points were made about the nature and
purpose of payback in the Aboriginal communities of the Northern Territory. It is
significant to note the highlighting of the relationship between this form of
customary resolution and the written law of the Territory:
...there was no evidence upon which his Honour could have concluded that the
form of punishment proposed was unlawful. An assault is not unlawful if
authorised by the ‘victim’ unless the person committing the assault intends to kill
or to cause grievous harm: Criminal Code (NT), s.26(3). ‘Grievous harm’ is
defined to mean ‘any physical or mental injury of such a nature as to endanger life
or to cause or be likely to cause permanent injury to health’: Code, s.1... In my
opinion... there was no evidence that the injury caused by the proposed spearing
must or even was likely to cause grievous bodily harm... However that may be, I
wish to make it clear that it is one thing for a court to take into account the
likelihood of future retribution to be visited upon the accused, whether lawful or
unlawful; it is yet another for a court to actually facilitate the imposition of an
unlawful punishment.52
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have examined constitutional, statutory and case law relating to
the recognition of customary law and principle within the context of sentencing
decisions handed down by the criminal courts. It has been demonstrated that the
rather scant provisions of the written law can raise ambiguities and complexities when
the courts seek to give practical effect to them. A brief examination of other
jurisdictions has demonstrated further issues that the jurisdictions of the South Pacific
region may have to consider if this area of law and procedure is to develop in a
coherent and principled fashion.
Increasingly in the region an interest is growing in the use of ‘restorative justice’
techniques in the field of criminal justice generally and, more particularly, to deal with
juvenile crime. In the context of this debate tensions may arise between traditional
dispute resolution principles and practice and ideas, such as constitutional rights, that are
associated with introduced or adopted laws. Some of these tensions have been identified
in this chapter, particularly in relation to crimes that occur within relationships that are
characterised by an imbalance of power, whether perceived or actual.
If communities continue to feel dissatisfied with the ‘formal’ mechanisms for dealing
with ‘rising crime’ (the police, prosecuting agencies and courts)53 then we are likely
to see increasing interest in a (re)turn to structures and processes that are more
‘traditional’ in nature. However, as the discussion in this chapter has indicated, a
complete (re)acceptance of customary norms and practices can lead to ambiguities
and concerns that are reflections of the impacts of colonial and post-colonial
modernisation in the South Pacific region. At present, it is not possible to accurately
gauge the thoughts and views of ‘the community’ on these issues. Do the people of
the region want the issue of punishment for criminal offences to be determined
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according to the principles of custom, the principles of introduced or adopted law or
some combination of the two? This question has not been subject to rigorous
research here or elsewhere. It is likely that in this socio-legal environment, as in most
others, that the answer would be a version of ‘it depends’.
The questions and concerns that have been raised here illustrate wider political issues
that are associated with the continuing place of custom in the legal systems of the
region, whether as part of the criminal law or any other part of the law. The tensions
associated with the reconciliation of modern living and the role of customary law and
practice in sub-national, national and regional identities are ones that will continue to
be played out in this area as in many others in the years ahead.
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1998
(http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_O–Q/PP_v_Tangaito
m.html Accessed 19/9/02).
6 Here ‘justice’ is used to refer to the ‘introduced’ common law notion.
7 Findlay, M. 1997. Crime, community penalty and integration with legal formalism in the
South Pacific. Journal of Pacific Studies 21: 145–160 at pp 148–9.
8 It is not my intention to explore at length the question of the relationship between
customary law and ‘introduced’ law other than within the specific context of sentencing
decisions. This issue has been explored elsewhere. See, for example, Corrin Care, J.,
Newton, T. & Paterson, D. 1999. Introduction to South Pacific Law. London: Cavendish,
at chap. 3.
9 See s 5 as amended by the Tokelau Amendment Act 1976 (NZ). It is recognised that this
Act is not a constitution. However, it contains many ‘constitution type’ provisions and
thus resembles other constitutional documents that exist in the region.
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10 See Art 77.
11 For further examples of this type of constitutional provision, see s 75 and para 2(1) of
Schedule 3 of the Constitution (Solomon Islands).
12 See, also, Art 5(2)(g) of the Constitution (Vanuatu) which states that persons cannot be
punished with a greater penalty than that which existed at the time the offence in question
was committed and s 5(1)(b) of the Constitution (Solomon Islands) which is framed in terms
of a custodial sentence being an exception to the right to personal liberty.
13 Para 3 of Schedule 1 of the Laws of Tuvalu Act 1987 (Tuvalu) is almost identical to this
provision.
14 For more detail on the structure and jurisdiction of the courts of the region, see above, n
8 at chapter 11.
15 For more detail on the structure and functions of the island courts of Vanuatu see Jowitt,
A. 2000. Island Courts in Vanuatu. Occasional Paper No. 2 School of Law, USP.
16 Village assembly or council.
17 District courts were created under the District Courts Act 1969 (Samoa). However,
in this piece of legislation, as elsewhere, the courts are sometimes referred to as
magistrates’ courts.
18 Criminal Procedure Code [Cap 136] (Vanuatu), ss 118 & 119.
19 E.g. Criminal Procedure Code [Cap 21] (Fiji Islands), s 163.
20 Newton, T. 2000. The differential impact of criminal law on males and females in Pacific
Island jurisdictions. Development Bulletin 51: 13–16 at p 15.
21 It could also be as a result of pressure applied by the husband’s family or the family of the
wife. Such pressure may well include expressed or implied disapproval of the wife’s
complaints about the husband’s behaviour.
22 Findlay, M. 1997. Above, n 7 at p 157.
23 See below for further discussion.
24 [1992] Tonga LR 7.
25 Unreported, Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia (Appellate Division),
FSM Appeal Case No. P4–1988, 1st November 1989. (http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/
paclawmat/Micronesia_cases/Volume_G–N/Gilmete_v_FSM.html Accessed 19/9/02).
26 Unreported, High Court of Solomon Islands, Crim. Case No. 33, of 1996, 6th June
1997(sentencing) (http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Solomon_Islands_cases/
Volume_R–Z/R_v_Funifaka.html Accessed 19/9/02).
27 [1985/86] SILR 158.
28 Per Connolly J.A. at p 163.
29 The section numbers are revised in the 1996 consolidation of the legislation of
Solomon Islands.
30 Above, n 27.
31 See Banks, C. 1998. Custom in the Courts: Criminal Law (Compensation) Act of Papua
New Guinea. British Journal of Criminology 38(2): 299–316.
32 In 1977, the ‘Supreme Court’ fulfilled the role of today’s High Court.
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33 Unreported, Supreme Court of Fiji Islands (Appellate Jurisdiction), Criminal Appeal
No 30 of 1977, 13th May 1977. 
34 Unreported, Supreme Court of Fiji Islands (Appellate Division), Criminal appeal
No. 30 of 1977, 13th May 1977. 
35 Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic of Vanuatu, CR No. 4 of 1998, 22nd March
1999 (http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_O–Q/
PP_v_Thomas.html Accessed 19/9/02).
36 Criminal Procedure Code [Cap 136] (Vanuatu).
37 See also Public Prosecutor v Lissy Kalip, Unreported, Supreme Court of the Republic
of Vanuatu, CR No. 54 of 1997, 6th October 1998
(http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Vanuatu_cases/Volume_O–Q/PP_v_Kalip%20
(Sentence).html Accessed 19/9/02).
38 Section 2(1).
39 See ss 35–38 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (UK) as amended.
40 Kalinoe, L. and Twivey, T. 1996. Compensation Payment Outside Court By Perpetrators
of Crime: The State v. William Muma. Melanesian Law Journal 24: 117–121 at p 121.
41 Banks, C. 1998. Above, n 31.
42 South African Law Commission. 1999. The Harmonisation of the Common Law and
Indigenous Law: Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders.
Discussion Paper 82.
43 South African Law Reform Commission. 1999. Above, n 42, at p 17. Emphasis added.
44 South African Law Reform Commission. 1999. Above, n 42, at p 31. Emphasis added.
45 (1995) 7 BCLR 861.
46 South African Law Reform Commission. 1999. Above, n 42, at p 31. Emphasis added.
47 Tomaino, T. 1999. Punishment practice. In Sarre, R. & Tomaino, J. (eds). Exploring
Criminal Justice: Contemporary Australian Themes. Adelaide: South Australian Institute of
Justice Studies Inc., at p 213. Emphasis added.
48 These states are Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australia.
49 However, it should be remembered that it is not possible to make sweeping generalisations
about Aboriginal customary law and practice. As in the South Pacific region, different
communities have different customs.
50 (1992) 79 NTR 1.
51 Per Asche CJ.
52 Per Mildren J.
53 For examples of expressed dissatisfaction with the (in)activities of police forces
in the region see Newton, T. 2000. Above, n 4.
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Review Questions
1. Of all the differences between state law and customary law, which do you think
are the most significant and why?
2. Do you think that customary law and introduced law can co-exist in a single
legal system? Why/why not?
3. What policies or principles should the courts follow when incorporating
customary issues (such as reconciliation and compensation) into sentencing
decisions? Can these policies and principles be applied to other areas of law?
4. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of establishing ‘custom
criminal courts’ in the countries of the region? Could such courts be usefully
used in other areas of law?
5. Do you think that custom discriminates against women? If so, how? Do you
think that introduced law can usefully be used to correct any discrimination?
Further readings 
Allen, M. (ed) 1981. Vanuatu: Politics, Economics and Ritual in Island Melanesia.
Sydney: Academic Press.
Findlay, M. 1997. Crime, community penalty and integration with legal formalism
in the South Pacific. Journal of Pacific Studies 21: 145 – 160.
Jalal, P.I. 1998. Law for Pacific Women: A Legal Rights Handbook. Suva: Fiji
Women’s Rights Movement.
Rose, D.B. 1996. Land Rights and Deep Colonising: The Erasure of Women.
Aboriginal Law Bulletin Vol 3 No. 85: 6 – 13.
Zorn, J.G. & Corrin Care, J. 2002. Proving Customary Law in the Common Law
Courts of the South Pacific. London: British Institute of International and
Comparative Law.
1 8 2
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
1 8 3
SECTION 4
HUMAN RIGHTS
9. THE NOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Anita Jowitt
10.  HUMAN RIGHTS VS.  CUSTOM IN THE PACIFIC:  
STRUGGLE, ADAPTATION, OR GAME?
Ian Fraser
11.  CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW AND GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Owen Jessep
1 8 4
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
People who live in the South Pacific would seem to know a lot about human rights.
That is, they hear a lot about human rights. Issues of human rights loom large on
a daily basis, whether in the context of constitutional reform, the place of women
in public life, the roles and functions of policing organisations or clashes between
landowners and migrant settlers. The concept of human rights appears to have
established and entrenched itself very securely in the consciousness of the region. In
this section our authors present some timely and provocative critiques of the
orthodoxy of human rights discussions as they are usually presented in the region. 
The first two chapters go some way to filling gaps that are often present when
human rights are discussed. First, Anita Jowitt grounds the concept of ‘universal’
human rights in an exposition of historical and jurisprudential development.
Second, Ian Fraser examines the political and pragmatic aspects of the
development of human rights and the extent to which they are accepted in Pacific
island societies. Finally Owen Jessep considers the particular tensions that arise
between customary family law and laws that seek to act to prevent or counter
gender discrimination. His more practical consideration serves to reiterate and
exemplify further the broader questions that were raised in the preceding chapters.
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9.  THE NOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
By Anita Jowitt
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Rhetoric
Whilst rhetoric has particular meaning in reference to classical Greek principles
and rules of composition, it more popularly is used to indicate the art of, or a
body of, persuasive (although not necessarily well reasoned) writing.
Jurisprudence/jurisprudential
Jurisprudence can be thought of as the philosophy of law, and jurisprudential
thought as philosophical thought about law.
Discourse
The word discourse is used to represent a body of thought and writing on a
particular topic or idea. As such it represents a collection of works. Whilst there
will be a plurality of views within this body of ideas, a dominant strand of
argument will usually come to represent the whole body of discourse. As such
the notion of discourse can be perceived as an implicitly ideological device for
referring to a body of ideas.
Hegemony/hegemonic
Hegemony is used to refer to a system in which control is maintained not by
force but by influence over others. This influence is gained through use of
social institutions to portray and reinforce a particular ideology.
Ideology
A system of beliefs that cannot be established as being true about the way that
things are or should be.
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INTRODUCTION
Human rights appear to be an incontrovertible part of the modern legal and political
world. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948,1 which purports to affirm
a number of universal inalienable rights, is probably the United Nations’ best known
document. In the Pacific the constitutions of almost all USP member countries
enshrine human rights.2 Powerful political organisations, including women’s rights
and minority rights movements form around human rights and are a prominent part
of political discourse in most modern Western or Western influenced democracies
including Pacific island countries. For example, the human right of self-determination
provided a focal point for Pacific decolonisation movements.3 Globally a number of
large international organisations, including the United Nations, have the protection
and promotion of human rights as central goals. It seems that all right thinking
people agree with human rights.
Although there seems to be international agreement with a core number of universal
inalienable human rights, in recent years the use of human rights throughout the
Pacific has proved to be one of the most contentious legal issues. Clashes between
customary norms and human rights, particularly in relation to the issue of equality
for women, have resulted in a number of judicial interventions.4 Such clashes mean
that the idea of universal inalienable rights is thrown into question. After all, if such
rights really were universal and inalienable then they would exist within all cultures
and surely customary norms would have developed in accordance with them.
Additionally, on a socio-political level the rhetoric of human rights has been used for
objectionable, or at least inequitable, ends. For instance, George Speight justified the
May 2000 coup in Fiji Islands on the grounds that it was necessary to protect the
indigenous peoples’ rights. Whilst this is an extreme example, and possibly not a good
one as it is widely acknowledged that indigenous peoples’ rights were a mere front
for the underlying political power plays, human rights are used in this way to favour
one group of people at the expense of others. How can this be right?
This chapter examines the following questions: What are human rights? Where do
they come from? Can anyone prove that they exist? Who decides what human rights
are right? Why do most people seem to accept the idea of human rights? In examining
these questions the chapter will consider the philosophical and political history of
human rights. As the history of human rights in Western political thought stretches
back to the early Greek philosophers this chapter is necessarily an introduction that
only touches on the broad themes that underpin the concept of human rights. It is
hoped that this introduction will also provide a background to some major strands of
jurisprudential thought that can be used to examine not only human rights, but other
aspects of law and policy as well.
WHERE DO HUMAN RIGHTS COME FROM:
NATURAL LAW THEORY
If asked what human rights are or where they come from many people will say that
human rights arise because they are a natural part of being a human being. They are
something that you are born with, an innate part of being human. Such a rationale is
present in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. Both
the preamble and the articles emphasise that the rights come from the inherent
dignity or innate nature of humankind as the excerpts below indicate (italics added):
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world...
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom...
Article I 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.
We can also see the concept that human rights are an innate part of being a person
reflected in constitutions within the Pacific. For example, the Preamble of the
Marshall Islands Constitution 1979 states: 
WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, trusting God, the Giver
of our life, liberty, identity and our inherent rights, do hereby exercise these rights
and establish for ourselves and generations to come this Constitution, setting
forth the legitimate legal framework for the governance of the Marshall Islands.
(Italics added)
The concept of human rights being a natural part of being a human being is part of
the jurisprudential tradition of natural law theory. Put simply, natural law theory is
the idea that the whole universe is governed by overarching natural laws. Because the
physical reality of the universe is unchanging and applies everywhere this natural law
is also unchanging and applies everywhere. To Aristotle’s illustration that “a law of
nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns both here and
in Persia...”5 we can add that fire burns both now and in ancient Greece. This natural
law is the source of innate rights. The Roman lawyer and statesman Cicero described
natural law, which he referred to as “true” law, in the following way:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application;
unchanging and everlasting... And there will not be different laws at Rome or at
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Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable
law will be valid for all nations and for all times...6
Natural law is conceived of as law derived from the higher order of nature that exists
independently of laws made by people. It provides natural moral or ethical criteria
from which the rules for correct living can be derived. It should be noted that
although human made law should accord with these natural moral and ethical criteria
it is not necessarily true that human made law will comply with the natural law. Bad
laws, or laws not in accordance with nature, can be made by human institutions and
will be recognised as valid in accordance with the rules of recognition created by
those institutions, regardless of their complilance with natural law. 
How can we identify what is natural?
The first belief as to how natural law can be identified is through the belief that
natural law can be revealed by a higher source that has knowledge of the natural order
of things. This higher source is often believed to be a god who has knowledge of the
natural order of things because he or she is also the creator of things or has divine
knowledge of the natural order. We can see evidence of the provision of natural law
through divine revelation in the very earliest laws. The Sumerian king Hammurabi,
who wrote the oldest known code of laws around 2000 B.C., claimed to receive these
laws from the Sun-god Shamash. Islamic law, which today provides the basic legal
system for a considerable number of countries, is based on the Koran, a recording of
divine revelations made to the Prophet Mohammed.7 Within Judaism and
Christianity probably the best-known example of law through divine revelation is the
ten Commandments that were handed to Moses. In the modern English common
law tradition we can continue to see the influence of the divine revelations recorded
in the Bible even though law is meant to be secular. Most law students will be familiar
with Lord Atkins’s statement in Donoghue v Stevenson that “[t]he rule that you are to
love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour”.8 This
principle is the basis for the modern law of negligence although the rule can be found
in both the Old and New Testaments.9 Laws found in divine revelations also affect
the legislature within modern common law systems. For example, the fourth of the
ten commandments, that the Sabbath should be kept as a day of rest,10 has influenced
some employment contracts legislation. For example, Vanuatu’s Employment Act
[Cap 160] states that “no employee shall be required to work on a Sunday”11 and that
“every employee shall be entitled to a weekly rest of 24 consecutive hours which shall
normally fall on a Sunday”.12
The second main belief as to how natural law can be identified is the belief that, as
nature is rational, the rational observation of human beings and society will enable
these criteria to be logically deduced. Such an approach to the identification
of natural law can be found in the works of the classical Greek philosophers. Of these,
Plato and Aristotle have had the most influence on modern legal and
political thought.
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Plato’s view of nature was that the world we live in is merely an imperfect reflection
of reality. Reality consists of ideal forms. These ideal forms are true to nature and the
appearances that we see are only imperfect copies of these real forms. Plato’s
conception of nature is explained in The Republic in the allegory of the cave. In a
dialogue Socrates explains to Glaucon that the appearances we perceive are a mere
shadow of reality.13 He creates an allegory of people chained in an underground den
and unable to turn around with a fire behind them and a wall in front of them. All
they can see is shadows of people and objects passing behind them in front of the fire.
As this is all they know, they presume the shadows that they see to be reality. This
story represents people in the ordinary world, who only see imperfect shadows of
reality and mistake these shadows for reality. In Plato’s conception of the state only
very few people have sufficient reasoning capacity to comprehend reality. Given a
high degree of training, these “philosopher kings” would be placed to rule the
everyday world according to nature as found in the reality of ideal forms. 
Aristotle sees nature, or the correct order of things, as being determined by a thing’s
end purpose. Aristotle’s belief is that all things have a particular potential, and this is
their nature. For example, the potential of a coconut is to grow into a coconut tree.
This is the coconut’s natural end. By observation and reason a thing’s end can be
determined. Natural laws are the laws that allow things to achieve their ends. As
nature, for Aristotle, is determined by the telos or end purpose of a thing, his analysis
is said to be teleological.14 In respect of people, government and laws should be
created to allow individuals to fulfil their telos, which is eudaimonia, a word usually
translated as meaning happiness. Eudaimonia includes a sense of success and of
material, mental and physical well being over time and is achieved by allowing people
to fulfil their social and political natures.
In modern times the idea that reason can be used to discover truths about nature has
become particularly important. The rise of science15 has greatly influenced philosophy
and in particular has led to the development of the social sciences. These social sciences
include disciplines such as sociology, psychology and economics. Just as sciences such
as chemistry, physics and biology rely upon observation, experimentation and
experience to discover the natural laws of the physical universe, so too do these
disciplines aim to apply scientific methods to discover truths about the behaviour of
society and human beings. Whilst we may now take such a methodological approach
for granted, such an approach has only been developed and systematised fairly recently.
The word sociology was only coined in the early nineteenth century by Auguste
Comte, who attempted to  apply scientific method to the study of society. 
It should be noted that a belief in the existence of a god and divine revelations can
coexist with a belief that natural laws can also be ascertained through the use of
reason. This was demonstrated most eloquently by the medieval Christian theologian
St Thomas Aquinas. In Thomist philosophy God’s eternal plan or reason for the
universe provides the eternal law. This eternal law provides the correct ordering of
things. Humanity can know of the eternal law in two ways. The first is through
revelation by God, primarily through the scriptures. Such revelations form the divine
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law. The second way that humanity can come to know of the eternal law is through
rational observation of the order of things. In identifying the eternal order St Thomas
Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s teleological analysis and looks to the ends or purposes of
things. As everything is ordered according to the eternal law rational inquiry will
reveal part of the eternal law. The parts of the eternal law that come to be known to
humanity through reasoned observation form the natural law. Finally, there is the law
made by humankind.16
The challenge to natural law theory 
The difficulty with natural law theory is the question of how the existence of some
kind of higher natural order can be proved or conclusively identified. St Thomas
Aquinas finds his source of natural order in God, a belief that cannot be proved but
requires faith. ‘Scientific’ approaches relying upon rational observation also require
that assumptions about the natural order or human nature be made. For instance,
Aristotle believed that you could identify the natural order through rational
observation of the telos of things, but deciding on what the telos of humanity is
requires the making of assumptions about human nature. What human nature is
cannot be proved but is also a matter of faith or belief, so such reasoning becomes
somewhat circular. It can also be noted that slavery is part of Aristotle’s natural order.
These days most people consider slavery to be abhorrent, but it was an accepted part
of Greek society in Aristotle’s time. Its inclusion in Aristotle’s concept of natural
order indicates that assumptions about what is natural are influenced by one’s society
and environment. There are also philosophical challenges to the question of how far
we are able to accurately observe nature.17 Whilst natural law theories contribute
significantly to the idea of human rights, the problem that remains with such an
approach is that the question ‘what is natural?’ cannot be objectively answered, but
is always reduced to a matter of faith or belief. Just as people have faith in different
religions so do people have differing views about what natural order is, whether these
ideas come from different religious faiths or some other source.
ARE HUMAN RIGHTS SIMPLY MAN MADE LAWS?
If, then, we are unable to identify the source of natural order from which human
rights seem to spring, does this mean that human rights are nothing more or less than
human made laws? The legal positivist answer to this would be yes. Legal positivism
takes the view that the law, including human rights, is simply a product of human
institutions. Whether something is a law is a matter of fact. There are rules of
recognition, including parliamentary rules about what must be done in order to
validly enact a statute and the doctrine of judicial precedent, that assist in determining
this fact.18 Law, then, is identified by its pedigree, or the way it was made, and not its
content. Ideas of what is natural still retain a place in society and may influence the
content of the law, but are not law. Law is what actually exists in conventions, on the
statute books and within cases. Belief about what is natural provides people with
morals from which come beliefs about what law ought to be. Human rights have
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force, then, not because they are natural, or somehow morally correct, but because
they are validly passed laws.
The positivist approach answers the question ‘what are human rights?’ satisfactorily
from the perspective of a practising lawyer who does not have to examine why laws
get made  but only has to identify what is law in order to be able to apply it. However,
on a philosophical level the positivist answer to what human rights are is quite
unsatisfactory. It does not help to explain why human rights seem to be special, or
why the rhetoric of human rights is so pervasive within modern Western legal and
popular thought. It also does not tell us much about how perceptions of morality
influence the law. 
THE PERVASIVENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Perhaps we can go beyond the positivist approach to human rights by saying that they
represent the most commonly shared beliefs about what is natural and right. Because
human rights represent the common ideal they assume higher status than other laws
that are concerned with the regulation of human lives rather than the upholding of
ideals. Such a conception of human rights subtly shifts away from natural law
theories. A natural law conception of human rights would hold that human rights are
rights that are in accordance with the innate nature of humankind. This conception
holds that human rights are rights that are in accordance with what the majority of
people believe to be the innate nature of humankind. As such, human rights are
human made laws, but they gain their authority from a widespread belief about what
is right. 
If one accepts that human rights are based on beliefs about what is natural then
human rights become disputable. Whilst one cannot argue with a concrete, provable,
natural order one can argue about beliefs about what this order is. Indeed, in the
Pacific, where human rights were received as part of the Western-style constitution
making, we are well placed to question the dominant belief about natural order. The
post-colonial discourse that challenges the cultural imperialism of the colonisers who
believed that their way of life was the right way and saw part of their role as ‘civilising’
islanders is challenging beliefs about the natural order. In terms of human rights, we
sometimes see challenges to human rights because of their focus on individual
equality and freedoms rather than communitarian values that are part of traditional
Pacific island lifestyles.19
However, human rights were generally adopted into Pacific constitutions and are
widely accepted both in the Pacific and internationally. Although if one stops to think
about human rights one may come to realise that they are only beliefs and therefore
open to challenge, challenges do not often occur with any success. Why is this? 
The place of ideology
The answer to this question may be that most people do accept, or at least not
question, the current concept of human rights as being natural or somehow
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fundamental. We can say that they are the dominant ideology, or belief system about
the way the world is ordered. As a belief system about natural order this ideology will
support the beliefs of some people whilst rejecting the beliefs of others. As such,
ideology is not neutral. It supports the interests, as reflected in the beliefs, of one
group, whilst rejecting the views of others. Remember that Aristotle believed that
slavery was part of the natural order. Whilst this belief obviously suited the slave
owners, who could justify their behaviour as upholding nature, one wonders what the
slaves thought of this. 
Karl Marx was one of the most significant philosophers to pick up on the idea that
the way in which society was organised is not neutral. His view was that all of society
is organised around its means of production and relations of production. In a
capitalist society things are therefore organised around class lines, with the people
who own the factories and other means of production, the capitalists, exploiting the
workers. These exploitative relationships are maintained by ideology, a widespread
belief amongst all members of society that this is the natural order, or the only order
that society can take. Marx’s analysis of ideology has contributed significantly to
much modern political discourse. Within the field of law, schools of jurisprudence
such as critical legal studies and feminist legal studies rely upon this ideological
analysis. Their aim is to look behind the law to see what power structures are being
upheld by the supposedly neutral laws before which every person is meant to be
treated equally.20 Some of the key beliefs of such analyses are that:
• Institutions, or the ways in which society is organised, are not neutral. Instead
they are designed to maintain particular relationships and power structures. 
• Ideology maintains these power structures. Ideology is a belief system,
something people believe to be true even though it cannot be proven to be
objectively ‘true’. This belief system is often unconscious, or taken for
granted without conscious thought.
• Hegemonic control is used to maintain ideologies/power relations without
the need to use force. In other words, the ‘oppressed’ themselves consent to
the system of oppression because they believe it to be ‘natural’. Education,
media, the political system, the legal system, religion, family structures and
other social structures all help to maintain control without force. This is why
ideology becomes so powerful. Although it is only an idea or belief, through
hegemonic control people come to accept that the ideology is actually real,
and therefore do not question it.21
Examining the ideology of the law therefore involves looking at the power structures
behind the law and who they benefit. One cannot presume that law is neutral. An
analytical approach that expressly acknowledges the place of ideology is powerful
because it makes seemingly unassailable ideas more open to challenge. If something
like human rights has ideological support it will be accepted as natural. It will seem
to be more than simply a man made law and therefore will be difficult to challenge.
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However, using an ideological analysis one can challenge the idea that things are
‘natural’ on the grounds that this is just a belief representing a particular ideology.
Ideology within human rights
Liberalism is the conservative politics linked to both to the rise of capitalism and,
frequently, to the rise of modern formulations of human rights. Capitalism operates
on the idea of free market (or laissez faire) economics. Freedom to do anything that
will not impinge upon other people‘s freedoms is one of the cornerstones of human
rights. Laissez faire economics relies upon individuals acting competitively in self-
interest in order for the free market to operate efficiently. Again we see this in the
individualistic nature of human rights formulations which stress the rights of the
individual and balance the rights of one individual again other individuals. Capitalism
also relies on the idea that an individual’s private property will be protected from
arbitrary interference, something that is protected within human rights documents.22
Indeed liberalism is behind many other things in the common law legal system, such
as the notion of freedom of contract, the shift from strict liability to fault based
liability in negligence and the arrangement of Western land tenure systems. Even the
things that the State says are crimes protect the liberal ideology or capitalist order
(one can at least argue).
This argument that human rights uphold liberal ideology is further strengthened
when one looks at the history of modern human rights documents. The modern
conception of human rights was first drafted into constitutional significance at the
time of the events of the American and French Revolutions. The first draft of the
American Constitution was presented in 1787 and came into effect in 1791. The
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was produced in 1789.
Both share similar philosophical roots.23 The principles enshrined in these documents
provided the basis for the UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which has in turn
fed into modern constitutions and bills of rights in the Pacific region and elsewhere.
The French revolution has been labelled a middle class revolution in that it aimed to
free a newly emerging class of capitalists from the oppressive rule and taxation regime
of the monarchy.24 Similarly progressive interpretations of the American Revolution
was largely fuelled by dissatisfaction with British taxation of the colony and its exports
and aimed to accomplish political, economic and social ends favourable to the
development of free enterprise.25
Human rights were also the product of Western societies and thinkers. As such they
may be criticised for being ethnocentric, or focussed on upholding the beliefs and
social structures of particular ethnicities at the expense of the beliefs and social
structures in other cultures.26
However, although human rights may be linked to an ethnocentric liberal ideology,
they can be used to support other peoples’ ideological agendas. Here, for example,
we can look to the events of May 2000 in Fiji Islands, during which George Speight
and his supporters used the notion of indigenous people’s rights to gain legitimacy
for their actions. Here human rights were used to justify underlying political power
1 9 3
T H E  N O T I O N  O F  H U M A N  R I G H T S
plays. I said in the introduction that Speight’s actions are possibly not a good example
of how human rights can be used for inequitable ends because they were a mere front
for the underlying political power plays driving the attempted coup. However, I tend
to think that this is an excellent example of how rights discourse can be manipulated
to meet particular agendas. We can also look at women’s rights movements both
throughout the Pacific and internationally, that have used the notion of human rights
to fight patriarchal (or male dominated) social structures within various cultures and
economic systems.27
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have looked behind that idea that human rights are ‘natural’ and
therefore that they hold special moral force. We have seen that, rather than actually
being part of the natural order, they only represent beliefs about this natural order.
We have also seen how through the ideological device of hegemonic control, this
belief is accepted as really representing the natural order. I have also briefly linked the
concept of human rights to ethnocentric liberalism. Whilst liberalism is probably the
dominant ideology (or world order) in Western societies today there are many other
ideologies or belief systems that either work in parallel or aim to refute liberalism.
Patriarchy, the belief that men are inherently superior to women, is an ideology.
Modernisation, or the belief in the organic evolution of society towards a higher goal,
is an ideology (often closely linked to liberalism through various development
programmes that see capitalist economic development as being the ultimate
development agenda). The idea of the ‘Melanesian Way’28 is an ideology. The belief
that white people (or black people or any other kind of people) are inherently
superior to others is an ideology. All of these things affect the power structures in
society. Some of them are very pervasive. People tend to accept them because they
are ‘natural’.
Analysis that challenges or critiques ideologies is useful for questioning human rights
and opening up debates about what the place of the current concept of human rights
should be in relation to other rights such as community, cultural and religious rights.
It is also useful for looking behind other aspects of law and social order to see what
power structures are supported by seemingly neutral social institutions.
The final question I want to pose is how important is it that human rights merely
represent beliefs about what is right? It seems to be part of the human condition that
we do not actually know what it is that nature has ordained for us. Maybe the best
that we can do is to create beliefs and ideals for the collective humanity to strive for.
Human rights, so long as they are recognised as being a statement of belief about
ideals, and not an unchanging statement of natural order, can provide governments
and peoples with aspiration and goals. Maybe this is sufficient justification for them
to retain their central place within current legal and political thinking.
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10.  HUMAN RIGHTS VS.  CUSTOM IN THE PACIFIC:
STRUGGLE, ADAPTATION, OR GAME?
By: Ian Fraser
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Analogy
The comparison of one item with another, suggesting that they are alike in
some relevant way. In the common law analagous reasoning is the extension of
a rule derived from a precedent to a different factual situation, by arguing that
the new situation is relevantly similar to that of the precedent.
Aspiration
An aspiration is a wish to achieve, or attain, some state or condition. 
A  constitution’s aspirational element may be a unified, prosperous, and orderly
society.
Discrimination
To discriminate is to differentiate among things, or people, in order to treat
different categories of those things or people differently. Every statute and
every legal decision does this, of course, but as normally used in the law the
meaning of the term is more specific. It describes discrimination which is
unjustified or unlawful. (A government does not discriminate when it issues
passports only to its citizens, but it is discriminating when it issues passports
only to male citizens.) 
Globalisation
The growing standardisation of any of a number of activities and values across
countries and cultures. Most commonly, the expansion of developed world,
especially American, economic practices to the rest of the world. 
Idealisation
The conception that for every phenomenon in the world there is a perfect model,
or archetype, of which the actual phenomena are merely imperfect examples. One
could say marriage is often idealised as a loving, complete, and permanent union,
even by people who have never known a real couple who lived so. This way of
conceiving of reality has great power in Western philosophy.
Ideology
A set of beliefs which is internally consistent, forming the basis of a person’s
outlook on life or some aspect of life. (The term is usually used to refer to
beliefs about politics and political issues.)
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INTRODUCTION
I propose here a scheme for considering what is going on when, in argument about
a government policy or decision, some people invoke ‘human rights’ (or
‘constitutional rights’) to justify their views and other people, opposing them, invoke
‘custom’ (or ‘tradition’). Such arguments may be political contests within a
government’s own bureaucracy, or in Parliament, or academic debates in pages like
these or in university cafeterias, or legal submissions to courts of law or law reform
bodies, or popular disputes in editorial pages, over kitchen tables or under village
trees. I propose a scheme, a set of models, for thinking about the patterns that these
arguments assume whatever their setting.
The models emphasise what is distinctive about the different views one can take. This
will accurately reflect what is going on in some instances of the arguments. For
others, it might seem to be exaggeration, a most un-Pacific focus on difference, on
the implications or assumptions of what a person says, or believes. But the aim here
is clarity in observation, not viable tactics for resolving disputes. (Those, one hopes,
are fostered by clear perception.) We, as students of the South Pacific, are observing
events, and observers need categories to make sense of what they see — it helps to
have lobsters and true crabs in mind when studying coconut crabs — and what
follows, I think, helps understand this field of study.
The scheme: struggle, adaptation, game
This is not a purely legal view. From a legal point of view, the issue is simple if
considered in the abstract — yet in any concrete case it is complex, too complex to
yield even a narrowly legal answer. 
The simplicity lies in the hierarchy of laws, the first thing any student of law learns,
in the Pacific or elsewhere. The constitution is above all other law in the sense that if
any conflict arises between it and what some other ‘law’, or source of law, seems to
say then the constitution prevails. At the same time it is below all law, in the sense
that all lawful acts and decisions must, however indirectly, be based on it. It is the
foundation of law, the only set of rules and principles whose validity does not depend
upon some other set of legal rules and principles. It just is: it is that it is, to invoke a
Biblical, and so quite apt, analogy (as I shall argue). So, ‘in principle’, legal principle,
the answer to any question involving the legal powers, disabilities, rights, privileges,
or prohibitions of anyone or any authority is simple. The law’s answer is whatever the
constitution says. If that accords with the ‘rights’ side, that side wins; if it accords
with the ‘tradition’ side, that side wins. This marvellously straightforward approach
to otherwise thorny issues is the very point of the movement for — originally an
idealistic dream of — written constitutions.1
The complexity, of course, lies in the second thing any student of law learns. The
same set of words may quite legitimately mean different things to different people.
That is, one can disagree with someone else about what a set of words, including a
provision of the constitution, should mean (should be ‘held’ by a court to mean),
while admitting that the other interpretation is a possible, or plausible, one. It is just
that more than one plausible interpretation exists, especially as the words are applied
to any particular set of circumstances. Further, in any given set of circumstances, one
finds that others do not necessarily share the interpretation one would prefer. At that
point everyone is agreed that the constitution should prevail: yet there is no
agreement on what should actually be done. Should the constitution mean what the
words it uses are held to mean in foreign jurisdictions? Should it mean what one
thinks ‘the people’ would read it to mean? If it reiterates rights in terms shared by
international and foreign bills of rights, as all the Pacific constitutions do, but also
expresses an adherence to the traditional values of its place — as all Pacific
constitutions also do2 — can its true meaning be that one prevails over the other?
An example is the recurring issue in Melanesian jurisdictions of migrants settling on
land to which they have no title, near capital cities, who become perceived by more
secure residents of those cities as labour pools for criminal gangs. Since before
independence in Papua New Guinea, since the early 1980s in Solomon Islands, and
by the end of last century in Vanuatu, proposals have been regularly thrown up by
the press and politicians to ‘send the squatters back home’. Just as regularly they are
met by the objection that this would violate the squatters’ rights. The legitimacy of
kicking the miscreants off rightful owners’ land lies in custom. Village leaders in the
squatters’ home areas should take responsibility for their people and make them
return. The legitimacy of letting the citizens stay where the opportunities are lies in
the rights granted by the constitution: they share everyone’s right of movement
within their country, they share everyone’s liberty from arbitrary seizure. The debate
assumes that form, and then it freezes. (If action does follow, it is a matter of sheer
force: bulldozers in PNG, militias in Solomon Islands.)
Should we regard this suspended argument as the legal aspect of a political struggle,
in which the concept of rights is a weapon, whose wielders face opponents armed
with the concept of custom? I shall consider this view first; it is the closest to what
would seem to be the orthodox or mainstream analysis. Legal argument is imagined
litigation, which is politics by other means. Like Clausewitz’ view of war, this is an
idealisation of law — in his terms, ‘true’ law — law as the pursuit of judicial orders
in accordance with correct norms.3 In this model, what is going on is a struggle (or
set of struggles) to accomplish some social or economic end(s), in which the
struggling parties attempt to use legal concepts against each other. As observers we
should examine the actual use and effectiveness of these concepts, imagine how they
might be used and applied, and consider how they could be improved.
But perhaps that model assumes too much rationality in the people, and groups of
people, we are observing. Perhaps they are not so calculating and goal-oriented. Law,
like war, is not always resorted to as a rationally chosen means to an end. It could be
that the concept of rights is attractive to people for reasons other than practical utility:
that they are drawn to it not because they have decided that it will help them achieve
some goal, but because of some less rational kind of attraction. Perhaps the attractive
quality is not so tangible. Perhaps it represents a moral good to them. Perhaps they
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do not really choose to invoke it at all. Perhaps the concept of rights, in a sense,
chooses them — the sense being that the concept, in a way more familiar when we
are observing fashions, religions, or consumer preferences, spreads and ‘catches on’
as though it were alive and people were its environment. 
In this model, my second, what is going on is competition between ideologies,
‘rights’ representing one and ‘custom’ another. The competition may be conscious,
played out in the hearts and minds of the people observed, the subject of deliberate
debate; this is the first version of the model. I shall call it the moral version. Or it may
be more like natural selection in an ecosystem, played out indeed in hearts and minds
but not by those hearts and minds. It could be that the competition is of the
attractiveness of concepts, without people being conscious of what attracts them.
This is the second version. I shall call this the evolution version. Both versions
emphasise the ways a concept can be adapted to its environment.
Finally, perhaps both the above models involve being misled by appearances. Perhaps,
in the reality the models are intended to describe, rights are not ‘taken seriously’ —
any more than communism and anti-communism were in, say, 1980s Africa. It could
be that ‘human rights’ is a mask, a rhetorical device to conceal manoeuvres and
motivations quite unconnected to the concept itself — the playing of a game. One
could see it as a misleading label, stuck onto legal policies which really amount to no
more than a continuation of the colonial heritage — the commercially-oriented
individualism and freely-alienable property rights that were once labelled ‘civilisation’
or ‘progress’. A corporation, for example, could resist regulation of advertising in the
name of ‘freedom of expression’. 
In this third model what is going on is forces for Western-style development making
the associated legal policies more palatable to local people. But one could also see the
intended audience as external. This generates another version of the third model. In
it, what is going on is local people, especially in government, putting on ‘human
rights’ as a team uniform, showing the international sources of aid, loans, and
legitimacy that they are on the same side. What the real manoeuvres and motivations
are is arbitrary in relation to the concepts of ‘rights’ and ‘custom’. Those concepts,
as in the version described in the paragraph above, are used as labels, but the labels
have no relation to the policies they label — like the colours of sports-team uniforms. 
What follows, then, is the consideration of several different ways of observing, and
thinking about, the significance and relative success of rhetoric about rights and
rhetoric about custom in the modern South Pacific. Note that although the rights
concept is generally associated with the former colonial powers, it includes notions of
collective rights, especially national self-determination and the importance of
indigenous status, which are not necessarily of the colonial heritage. Note too that
although the custom concept is associated with the quality of being indigenous, its
rhetorical deployment generally borrows a great deal from foreign example and non-
indigenous institutions (within the region and beyond it). Legal and academic writers
advocating the use of custom borrow freely from African literature and Colonial
authorities created major custom institutions like the Land and Titles Court in Samoa
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and the (Great) Council of Chiefs in Fiji Islands. There is no purity in culture.
Human affairs are rarely simple. Clarity can only be relative.
STRUGGLE? THE MANA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
It is beyond question that as interpreted in developed world bills of rights a right of
movement means that people may not be ‘sent back’ to their home areas, even if
ejecting them from others’ land is permissible. Likewise, even the bare right of liberty
is incompatible with a chief, or village authority however constituted, ordering a
person to live in one place rather than another. The point is simply not arguable —
such an order would not be valid even if authorised by a duly enacted statute. It is
equally beyond question that village authorities could, in custom, order people of
their village to live here or there.4 This too is not an arguable point — in its context.
But in the developed world context land is only property and any association between
kinship and locality means very little, and in the customary context people of the
village lived in the village. (Because people lived with their leaders, the leaders’ power
was less autocratic than it might seem when described abstractly.) But the context of
modern ‘settlements’, whether in Port Moresby, Honiara, or Port Vila, is neither of
these. This is what leads to the stalemate in argument. Each side is grasping at a
branch that has no tree.
Yet each side, if skillful enough advocacy is employed, has a perfectly good legal
argument. Each truly does rest on constitutional principle. The constitutions
themselves are sufficiently ‘flexible’ (that is, vague) to support either side in any such
issue. This is, notoriously, a feature of constitutions generally. It is crystallised in the
Pacific by the explicit recognition of custom as a source of law. Beyond the Pacific,
and in particular in the jurisdictions from which Pacific law is derived, a similar
complication is expressed, in courts and in popular debate, by appeals to ‘common
sense’, ‘community values’, or ‘the ordinary person’. Within the Pacific courts lump
those things together as a distinct source of law called ‘custom’. Here too, of course,
they really are law for all practical purposes, for the majority of the population.5
Here in the Pacific, that is, constitutional rights are not the ‘trump’ they are seen to
be in Western jurisdictions: the top-value card that beats any card drawn from
ordinary statute or common law. Nonetheless they are, in law, strong bases of
argument. Is that status, their force as the basis of argument in law, the reason that
people use them in argument generally? Are they attractive because they are seen to
carry mana, the quality of someone whom others choose to obey (or, time before, a
victorious warrior)?
If one thought so then one would have to say that people do intend to achieve ends
‘in the real world’, outside the courtroom, by invoking rights. In the squatter
example it would mean those who advocate letting the squatters stay think that that
is what the government will do if they can persuade it, or the courts, that that is what
the squatters’ rights entail. The power of rights may be restricted to actual litigation,
or it may be more general, a mana to which public or elite opinion responds, even
outside courts of law. If it is that kind of general mana then it would follow that if
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the public or the elite is persuaded that the law requires a course of action there will
be support for that course of action. In other words, this model of rights as weapons
entails the belief that the law itself is effective in causing events outside the legal
system — or at least that rights-advocates believe this. Is that justified?
We could consider it justified if there were examples of such impact, comparable to
the history of rights-advocacy in other jurisdictions. In America successful rights
arguments contributed crucially to ending official racial segregation and enabling
access to legal abortion. In Canada they changed the procedures by which refugees
are recognised and criminal suspects are investigated. In the UK they cut down the
government’s immunity to negligence suits. The legal sources of the rights arguments
varied, from constitutional bills of rights in North America to common law in
Australia and treaties in New Zealand and the UK. But in each jurisdiction it is the
legal force of claims of right that created these changes. One should not exaggerate.
One should note, especially, that all of these changes are most clearly changes within
the legal system, whose precise effects on action outside it are much less obvious. But
that there are actual effects, often as dramatic as legitimising ‘settlements’ would be,
is indisputable.
Are there such stories in the Pacific jurisdictions? The rights are there in a legal sense.
The issues are there in society, including, rather prominently, ones of discrimination,
women’s security and police powers. Rights arguments have been addressed to courts
about political and religious discrimination in Samoa and about police powers in PNG,
to take two examples. In deciding that matai were not accorded a constitutionally-
entrenched preferential franchise, however, the Samoan court relied on interpreting
the constitutional provisions relating to the franchise, avoiding decision on the
relevance of a right to vote among non-matai.6 Papua New Guinean courts did create
a line of decisions excluding evidence from criminal trials for police violation of
suspects’ rights, although they relied on the common law as much as the rights per se.
They created another line awarding damages to village people illegally raided by the
police, although these decisions emphasise the common law even more.7 In neither
area, however, is there much sign that police conduct has been affected.
As one can question the precise reality of the rule of law in the Pacific, especially in
the large Melanesian countries with their shrinking public services, so one can doubt
this first model. Certainly courts of law are not the preferred forum for debating,
much less settling, issues which seem to concern human rights — indeed, courts are
rarely so used at all. In Fiji Islands and Solomon Islands the effective installation of
unconstitutional governments in 2000–2001 has left the notion of a rule of law with
only a precarious role in public affairs.
Is this then a likely model? It may describe what some people mean, although
probably not many who are not lawyers. As a general view it does seem strained.8
ADAPTATION? THE FITNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The inspiration for this model is the inevitable analogy between human rights and
Christianity. Both are originally foreign notions. The potential local applicability and
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actual local incompatibility with existing practices of human rights, today, are both
obvious — but three to six generations ago the same could have been said of
Christianity. Christianity undeniably ‘succeeded’. Did it succeed because it could be
used effectively by people who wanted to accomplish something — because, when
people worshipped in the appropriate way, things happened ‘in the real world’ which
otherwise would not have happened? Christianity is strikingly dominant in Pacific
culture, popular and official. Is this due to God responding to Christian prayers, as
one might say the equally striking prevalence of rights-talk in the West is due to
courts responding to rights-arguments and other institutions responding to courts?
The question cannot be answered precisely as put, of course. And there are many who
would say it is not even the kind of question appropriate to a text examining legal and
political affairs, especially if the approach is critical or sceptical. But then there are
many, too, who would say the same of questions about human rights ideals. These
too have their believers, people who consider human rights ideals beyond criticism
(whatever arguments one may have about implementation). Both sets of people,
insofar as they exist in the Pacific, are among those we are observing here; as
observers we should ask not just whether we agree with them but also why they
believe what they do. 
In this model, the answer is ‘no’ (at least to the question precisely as put). Even if one
reason why Christianity was so widely and thoroughly adopted was that it worked, in
an instrumental sense, that does not seem to explain why the concept of human rights
is as attractive as it is. This is the conclusion reached about the first model. The
analogy is rather with another reason Christianity succeeded. In this model, human
rights and Christianity are indeed analogous, and understanding the appeal of one
helps understand the appeal of the other, but the analogy is in features of the ideas
— ‘human rights’, and ‘Christianity’ — rather than their instrumental effectiveness
in making things happen in politics. 
Why was Christianity so attractive when it arrived? It was not instantly successful, of
course. On many islands besides one near that from which I write, Erromango in
Vanuatu, it was not the ideas of the very first missionaries that were first swallowed.
In some places it only took real root once the local leadership decided, on personal
and, quite likely, instrumental grounds, that people would have to adopt it, while in
others missionaries struggled for a time with local authorities. But, fairly rapidly
everywhere, Melanesian and Polynesian people found in Christianity some quality or
feature which made it ‘applicable and appropriate’ to their lives (in the phrase used
by constitutional drafters as a test for adopting foreign law), despite the fairly radical
adjustment to behaviours that it meant.9
It was a great variety of particular doctrines of Christianity that were adopted,
although in the usual particular village there was a consensus as to what sort of
‘Christianity’ the people would adopt. There seems to have been no great
theological, as opposed to political, debate concerning the choices. One could
conclude that it was some general quality or feature of Christianity as such which was
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attractive, rather than anything specific enough to distinguish, say, Catholicism from
Lutheranism. 
These points suggest two things for the model being proposed here. One is that it is
something in the general idea of human rights, too, rather than any particular
application of it that is attractive.10 This is a strong point and, I argue, a valid analogy,
to which I shall return. It is at the base of the evolution version of this model. The
other is the relation of the imported idea to other changes. Christianity, of course,
did not arrive anywhere alone; it came in association with other things — especially
material improvements and opportunities which threatened tradition, disaster in the
form of new diseases and the sheer fact of dramatic change, largely out of the people’s
control, in itself. People were not entirely passive, of course, but many of the changes
must have felt like impositions. Becoming Christian would have meant many things,
but one of them, and surely one of the more significant, was joining ‘the modern
world’ in a way that was chosen. 
And why chosen with such enthusiasm? Perhaps because in Christianity people saw a
form of modernisation which promised something good in itself. The other forms of
modernisation — material change and dependence and overturned political order —
were to be reluctantly accepted either to avoid worse, like submission to new political
powers, or to try to obtain something desirable while minimising the cost, like selling
labour or land (or sending children to school).
In the moral version of this model, what is attractive about human rights now is the
same thing that was attractive about Christianity then. The concept offers a morally
good quality to modernisation. The worth of modernisation is ambiguous, and in any
event largely instrumental, whether it is called ‘civilisation’, ‘development’, or
‘globalisation’. Development, now that the distribution of wealth following political
independence is over, can seem as threatening as the disease and arbitrary rule that
modernisation first brought a century ago. Religion gave a moral face to that first
globalisation, which presaged colonialisation. Perhaps human rights represent the
moral face of the current globalisation, which replaces government largesse with
economic ‘discipline’. Championing human rights finds in this process something to
welcome precisely not because of what it can accomplish, but because it is good in
itself.
This requires accepting that people do see something morally good in human rights
and that they saw something morally good in Christianity. As it would have been
several generations ago, it still is today a valid argument in the Pacific to say squatters
should not be abused because that would be un-Christian: we are equally God’s
children, called to love all our fellows. Is there something similar going on when
people say squatters should be better treated because they have a human right (or a
constitutional one) to such better treatment? Do people affirm this because it affirms
the moral equality of human beings (or of citizens)?
Perhaps they do. Perhaps the concept of rights has come to symbolise a modern
morality, appropriate to this post-independence era of constitutions and globalisation,
just as Christianity did during its initial era here. But why this would be is not obvious.
Of course Christianity includes love for fellow human beings, an account of why we
exist and a promise to reward virtue: but so do other religions, including the
traditional ones it replaced.11 Likewise, the concept of human rights includes many
very strong notions of the morally good, but so do the traditional concepts making
up custom. The second, evolution, version of this model focusses one’s view on why
human rights would be seen to be ‘good’. 
Ideas are often said to ‘have a life of their own’, and in a useful sense this is more than
a figure of speech. The useful sense is that they can spread, and evolve, in a way
closely analogous to living species; and sometimes considering them in this way can
explain their adoption better than an assumption that people consciously and
rationally choose what to believe. It is not necessarily a radically different point of
view. It is an emphasis on ideas themselves, when considering their relation to the
people holding them. Religion has been the usual object of this view; few religious
people, after all, choose their religion — the overwhelming majority of human
beings, including those who believe very devoutly, profess the religion their parents
professed. Having secured a niche in one generation’s minds, the ideas of the
particular faith spread naturally through parental authority to the next generation.
Likewise, naturally, the great majority on the global scale of those who support the
idea of human rights are offspring of parents who supported that idea. It is the
changes that require explanation — why is there sometimes a pattern of people
adopting a set of ideas that come to them horizontally, so to speak, from beyond their
community?
In the case of religions, such patterns coincide with social upheaval. Faced with a
greatly disruptive force, people tend to shift their adherence to a faith compatible
with a way of dealing socially with that force.12 This is consistent with the account
above of Christianity’s reception in the Pacific: it seemed a good morality because it
was a morality compatible with accepting the disruptions of modernisation. Naturally
enough, given its long residence in Europe, Christianity was better adapted to the
‘modernising’ environment than were the old beliefs; and this was true of all the
particular denominations of Christianity that Pacific islanders embraced. 
Do we see something similar going on with the appeal to human rights today?
Consider our example. Do people find it easier to acknowledge the unpleasant side
of modernisation, in our example the slum-like settlements, by asserting a more
benevolent side of that same modernisation — the notion of rights based policies? Do
these go together as aspects of the same times? Given the way so many of the changes
in Pacific society are provoked by events and decisions occurring outside the region,
modernisation could seem a matter of space as well as of time. Could we say, even on
matters of morality and social policy: as foreign problems take root here, so we treat
them with foreign tools? This does seem plausible. Human rights, today, could seem
morally good because as a set of values it is compatible with the disruptive forces of
today. Human rights, that is, as a species of idea competing with custom for the same
2 0 7
H U M A N  R I G H T S  V S .  C U S T O M  I N  T H E  P A C I F I C
ecological niche, is naturally better adapted to the ways society is changing in the
Pacific. 
One can trace the compatibility — the adaptive features of this species of ideology —
more specifically. Especially as compared to custom, the human rights concept opens
up several useful ways of thinking to its adherents. It allows one to accept change, to
justify subjection to the market and government rather than to chief and family, to
welcome the ‘westernising’ element of modernisation and to accept identity as citizen
(or even just human) rather than as member of a personally known group. Most
importantly in the Pacific, it can allow one to experience individualism as liberty
rather than isolation, as independence rather than selfishness.13
GAME? HUMAN RIGHTS AS TEAM COLOURS
Finally, there is a model that notices a significance of human rights different from
both their legal utility and their content. This is their symbolic value. By attaching
human rights labels to them one can justify policies, and even judicial rulings, which
are no departure from colonial policies and judgments. They thus seem modern, even
progressive, without changing. Similarly, but more shallowly, one can invoke human
rights as a general flag of convenience, indicating to the outside world that the
government is on side — part of the human rights team of nations.
There was a project, in the independence era, to generate a new kind of law, a
combination of the colonial heritage and indigenous tradition — Melanesian, or
Pacific, rule of law.14 Much of it was included in independence constitutions, in the
aspirational invocations of tradition with Christianity (as discussed above at note 2).
It has not been seriously pursued since those times, despite the constitutional
mandates. When ‘the law’ notices custom, it does so as something other than true
law — either as fact, like ‘compensation’ treated as part-payment of damages or as a
factor in sentencing,15 or as foreign law, like customary marriages. Custom is
objectified and so kept out of the development of local common law. 
The human rights label could justify this rejection of custom as a source of legal
norms. Fault in negligence, say, or mens rea in criminal law, could be justified as
manifestations of liberty rights. The general individualism of common law doctrine
could be justified as reflecting the same philosophy in human rights. One would then
be rejecting custom because it did not adequately protect liberty, or because its sense
of ‘liberty’ was insufficiently individualistic. The new label could be better received
than the old one, which was the ‘civilisation’ of the metropolitan country. After all,
it amounts to no more than a simple claim to cultural superiority. There seems little
sign of this thinking, however, even where the colonial era ‘civilisation’ mission is
doubted. It does not seem to be what is going on, although an observer might look
for it in the future.
The other version of this model is the most obvious, and the most cynical. Declared
to an audience of foreign donors or development partners, a governmental or NGO
commitment to human rights signifies willingness to join the team — like anti-
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communism 20 years ago or ‘good governance’ in our day. There is obvious
advantage to this and it would not necessarily be illegitimate for any such body to
seek that advantage. It must then be considered whether at least some of the talk of
human rights we witness actually means very little, in itself — like a sports team’s
choice of colours. 
What does matter is how easily the audience is satisfied that the government, or
NGO, is indeed on the human rights team. Are such declarations of policy (including
the signing of treaties and enactment of legislation, on the part of governments)
perceived as sufficient? As a case to observe on this point, consider, as it develops, the
various governments’ commitment in the Biketawa Declaration to supporting human
rights in each other’s jurisdictions, declared at the October 2000 Pacific Islands
Forum meeting in Kiribati. Have governments issued any public comments on the
human rights situations in other island countries? Has there been resentment of such
comments? Are there any signs that diplomatic, trade, or other inter-governmental
relationships are affected by human rights concerns?
CONCLUSION
The models proposed here are meant to assist observation, as tools of description.
But does their consideration lead to any prescriptive conclusions about how we
should react to the ways human rights are invoked?
In the jurisdictions most familiar with rhetoric about rights (notably, the United
States of America) there has been much debate about the political and ideological
effects of ‘rights-talk’. After all, claiming a right to do something, or to resist
someone doing something to one, is not the only way to those ends in any political
or legal context.
The rights-claim appeals to law, but it  is not the only source of standards of
behaviour. Within law it appeals to a particular set of legal standards, usually
constitutional ones. The common law and the statutory law offer other legal
standards. The differences are not just in content but also in the form of the
argument: emphasising analogy and authority in common law claims, textual sense in
statutory ones, and broad statements of value in constitutional ones. Religion,
tradition, professional ethics and a community’s morality, in contrast, offer non-legal
standards.
When I claim a right to freedom of expression to justify my writing something critical
of a government  I have chosen a particular form of justification. Instead of appealing
to the heritage of open debate in village councils, the Bible, the idea of academic
freedom or a community’s tradition of tolerating such criticism, I have invoked the
law. And within law I have appealed to rights, constitutional or human rights, as
opposed to the common law civil liberties (or some particular authoritative decision)
and to applicable legislation.
Noticing that invoking ‘rights’ involves such a choice, and asking why it is made, has
led many thinkers to conclude that people often — and perhaps usually — do not
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realise just what choice they have made, or its implications. And the implications are
not necessarily — are perhaps not even usually — favourable to the people who
invoke rights. Rights become ‘reified’ in people’s thinking: they distract them from
what is occurring in the real world. They commit people to the legal system as
opposed to political struggle. In litigating claims in the legal system the advantage is
always with the already privileged who have the money for lawyers and the education
to use them. And democracy does not rule in a courtroom. Rights direct a political
movement’s resources to managing and paying for lawyers, rather than organising
and leading people. These points are known as ‘the rights critique’, associated with
leftist white academics in the 1980s.16
On the other hand, invoking rights can serve as a rallying point around which to
organise popular movements. Succeeding in a rights-claim, even just in the
courtroom, can be experienced as empowering. And for some people, small or nearly
powerless minorities, political struggle is simply not a viable option. Rights (that is,
legal struggle) offer them their only hope of improvement. People likely to become
criminal accused are the ones most likely to benefit from rights-arguments in court as
opposed to political pressure, since they do not constitute any politician’s
constituency; squatters are in a similar position. These points are known as ‘the
critique of the rights-critique’, associated with a later (1990s) generation of racial-
and sexual-minority academics.17 The debate has not noticeably moved beyond these
platforms, although, as a cause, human rights have certainly advanced: most notably,
for Pacific jurisdictions, in New Zealand and the UK.18
That debate is premised on the potency of rights as a weapon in litigation, the first of
my models here. It is premised too on a Western social context, where community
feeling is elusive, individualism is embedded in popular ideology, and government is
experienced as an all-powerful professional bureaucracy. Does this limit the debate’s
relevance in the South Pacific? The obvious relevance is limited to the point, in the
rights-critique, of reliance on rights draining resources to lawyers and, on the other
side, the point that a right can be an effective rallying cry (as it is used in Pacific
women’s movements).
Perhaps, however, the basic ideas of the critique could acquire relevance as — or if —
human rights gain momentum as a cause. Rights are a distraction from other means
to achieve political ends. To the extent that people trying to achieve political ends by
invoking rights assume that custom is something they must overcome, they allow the
impression that they oppose the values associated with community and tradition. This
is a drastic, even fatal, concession to make; few people want to see themselves as
throwing away tradition. In the West, this was an argument of the rights-critics: if in
using rights-claims to achieve progressive ends we give the impression that we oppose
tradition and community, then our conservative opponents will be able to portray
themselves as the defenders of these values. We may, for example, support more rights
for women, in order to achieve safer and healthier family life, but if this is seen as an
attack on all the traditional roles of women the conservatives will be able to say they
are the guardians of ‘family values’.19
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Reliance on rights to justify one’s claims involves reliance on law, immediately or by
logical entailment, displacing perhaps a more appropriate reliance on garnering
popular support. This can be an error even where, legally, rights really are ‘trumps’.
Observing a gathering responsiveness to human rights talk, if that is what we see in
the future, we should not necessarily be congratulatory of the rights proponents.
But all of the above, again, takes rights as weapons, a particular kind of tool, rationally
(if not necessarily wisely) chosen to suit the job. If my second model is valid, however,
these observations miss the point. Rights-talk will gain in power whether it is
rationally effective or not — rhetorical power, in public discussion (which may or may
not move courts of law). It will be swept along as the current form of modernisation
gathers force. 
If we see the third model gain plausibility, governments and NGOs associating
themselves with rights purely as team colours, will that affect the attractiveness, or
adaptiveness, of rights-talk among people? And if so, what sort of custom-talk will that
development favour? 
It may be a combination of the second and third models that proves most apt. If, on
the custom side, one focusses on the role of ‘chiefs’, the rights side can be seen as an
alternative. To some extent this is co-evolution of the very old dichotomy — or
dualism, in legal terms — of traditional/modern, indigenous/introduced. Those
terms are losing cogency as chiefhood develops, and indeed as originally-foreign legal
and political influences are internalised in Pacific societies (as religious ones were so
long ago). 
It seems clear now that the role of chiefs is in large part to mediate modernisation.20
The independent state appeared previously to almost all of its people, in most of the
Pacific, as a source of largesse. This significance is passing. In its wake, the
phenomenon of chiefly power represents a mobilisation of local solidarity. Rights-
talk, seen in this light, constitutes an alternative way to try to integrate the realities
of modernisation: mobilising international solidarity.
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11.  CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
By: Owen Jessep
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
(Gender) discrimination
Discrimination is the act of treating things differently. Popularly discrimination
is often used to refer to ‘unfair’ treatment, or treating people differently
because of prejudice or irrelevant reasons. Gender discrimination specifically
refers to treating men and women differently because of their gender and no
other reason.
Monogamy
A condition or practice during which a person only has or is permitted one
mate at any time.
Patriarchal
A patriarchal society popularly means a society in which men control a
disproportionately large share of the power. When used in an anthropological
sense patriarchy refers to a social organisation marked by the supremacy of the
father in the clan or family, the legal dependence of wives and children, and the
determination of descent and inheritance by the male line.
Polygamy
A situation in which a person may be married to more than one mate at the
same time. It is not a gender specific term — a polygamous realtionship can be
one in which a woman has more than one husband or a man has more than one
wife. However, polygamy is often popularly used only to refer to a situation of
polygyny, which is a situation in which a man can have more than one wife.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the continuing legal debates in Papua New Guinea in the years since
Independence in 1975 has been the proper weight to be accorded to custom in the
national legal system. At first glance, custom assumes a prominent position among
the sources of law set out in the Constitution, as one of the two principal sources
(together with common law) of what is called the ‘underlying law’.1 Despite this there
has been no shortage of complaints since 1975 as to the lack of progress in
establishing and developing an appropriate “indigenous jurisprudence”, that is, a
body of legal doctrine which reflects Melanesian ideas and principles.2 The reasons for
this situation are complex and the topic has been approached from different points of
view. One persistent strand in the discussion has been the continued reliance of courts
and lawyers on the imported common law. Relevant explanations for this
phenomenon include the apparent ignorance or laziness or antipathy of expatriate
lawyers and judges towards custom,3 the nature of education and training given to
Papua New Guinean lawyers,4 and limitations relating to the adversarial trial process
and judicial methodology.5
Another side to the debate, even in cases where the common law has not been
directly involved, has been the tension and possible conflict between elements of
custom and other legal principles, such as the human rights provisions set out in the
Constitution.6 That is to say, the recognition of custom in a particular case is never
automatic but is made subject to a number of constitutional or statutory restrictions
and qualifications. In the field of customary family law, for example, these ‘screening
mechanisms’ have assumed particular importance in the last decade, as Papua New
Guinean courts have taken the initiative in challenging and refusing to recognise
aspects of custom in individual cases relating to things such as marriage, divorce, and
custody of children.
It is not possible in this chapter to consider all of these recent developments. Instead,
I will focus on one matter in particular, which is also receiving attention in other parts
of the Pacific and in numerous African jurisdictions;7 the conflict and interaction
between customary family law, on the one hand, and constitutional or other legal
provisions dealing with gender equality, on the other.
OUTLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
By virtue of s 9 of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea, the laws of the country
include the Constitution itself, various categories of legislation, and the ‘underlying
law’. According to s 20, until such time as an Act of Parliament provides otherwise,
the underlying law is to be understood as set out in Schedule 2 of the Constitution.
According to that Schedule, the two principal sources of the underlying law are
custom8 and the common law.9 In relation to custom, Sch 2.1(1), so far as relevant,
states that ‘custom is adopted, and shall be applied and enforced, as part of the
underlying law’. This is however made subject to subsection 2, which requires that
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the custom not be inconsistent with any constitutional law inconsistent with a statute
or “repugnant to the general principles of humanity”. 
Another important statute dealing with custom is the Customs Recognition Act [Cap 19]
(PNG). According to s 3(1) of this Act, custom may not be recognised or enforced
in a particular case or context if to do so would result in injustice, would not be in
the public interest, or would not be in the best interests of a child under the age of
16 years. The same statute, in s 5, provides (so far as relevant) that in a civil case,
custom may be taken into account in relation to: 
(f) marriage, divorce or the right to the custody or guardianship of infants, in
a case arising out of or in connexion with a marriage entered into in
accordance with custom.
In relation to customary marriage, it may also be noted that by virtue of s 3(1) of the
Marriage Act [Cap 280] (PNG), a Papua New Guinean10 who is not already a party
to a statutory marriage may enter a customary marriage in accordance with the
custom of either of the parties. In this case, s 3(2) states that the customary marriage
“will be valid and effectual for all purposes”.
Section 55 of the Constitution
It follows from the constitutional and statutory provisions outlined above that there
are a range of requirements that represent potential obstacles to the recognition and
enforcement of family law and custom in a particular case. In practice these
requirements may often overlap and the same arguments be used in relation to several
of the grounds at the same time. For instance, the same considerations that are
claimed to make a custom inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution or
repugnant to the “general principles of humanity” may simultaneously found an
argument that to enforce the custom would cause “injustice” “not be in the public
interest” and so on.11 Examples of such alternative forms of argument will appear
below. In what follows, however, I will concentrate on the ground of inconsistency
with the Constitution, and in particular those provisions dealing with gender equality.
To begin with, there are relevant references in the ‘National Goals and Directive
Principles’ (NGDP) in the Preamble to the Constitution, such as NGDP 2(5) which
refers to “equal participation by women citizens in all political, economic, social and
religious activities”, and NGDP 2(12), to the effect that “a complete relationship in
marriage rests on equality of rights and duties of the partners”. Nevertheless, these
NGDPs are made “non-justiciable” (which in effect means not directly enforceable
by a court or tribunal)12 by s 25(1) of the Constitution. More directly applicable is s
55, dealing with the equality of citizens. This section reads as follows: 
(1) Subject to this Constitution, all citizens have the same rights, privileges,
obligations and duties irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political
opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the making of laws for the special benefit,
welfare, protection or advancement of females, children and young persons,
members of under-privileged or less advanced groups or residents of less
advanced areas.
(3) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of a pre-Independence law.
One or two cases in the 1980’s made passing references to s 55 in relation to custom,
but without any serious discussion of the scope of this provision. For instance, in
1981 the Supreme Court had to consider the legality of sending PNG troops to
Vanuatu for a peacekeeping operation. Michael Somare as leader of the Opposition
had sought to challenge the constitutional validity of a parliamentary decision and an
Act of Parliament approving the commitment of troops to Vanuatu. The Court’s
decision in Supreme Court Reference No 4 of 198013 dealt merely with the preliminary
issue of the petitioner’s standing to challenge the actions of the Parliament. A
majority of the Supreme Court held that the petitioner did have standing, based on
his status as a Member of Parliament and as a citizen of Papua New Guinea. It is not
necessary here to consider the reasoning of the judges, except to note that several of
them refused to acknowledge the petitioner’s claim to standing based on his position
as a ‘big man’ according to custom. Of interest here is Kidu CJ’s statement in
response to this argument:
[Counsel for the petitioner] submitted that in Papua New Guinea ‘big men’ can
speak in any forum. Mr. Somare should be allowed to speak in this forum because
he is such a man. If this is so, it goes against s 55(1) of the Constitution:
Subject to this Constitution, all citizens have the same rights, privileges,
obligations and duties irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political
opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex.14
This is an intriguing comment, but it is not clear which part of s 55 Kidu CJ had in
mind. Since part of the petitioner’s evidence was based upon custom in his home
province, the Chief Justice may have simply had in mind differences based on “tribe”
or “place of origin”, that is, that this custom may have been different to those found
in other parts of the country. On the other hand, Kidu CJ might have been objecting
to a custom pertaining to ‘big men’ in contrast to women, that is that if men rather
than women have a right of public audience this would be an example of
discrimination on the basis of “sex”. Since there was no real clarification of the point,
this brief reference to s 55 unfortunately remains ambiguous.
Another judge in 1989 referred more clearly to s 55 as prohibiting discrimination
between the sexes, but again in a context where detailed discussion was not necessary.
In Bore Konia v Daniel Dosinga and the State of PNG 15 Los J was hearing a claim for
damages by a father whose son had been unlawfully shot by a police officer. The claim
was based both on breach of the right to life guaranteed by the Constitution and on
breach of custom. During the trial evidence was given as to the relevant custom in
the deceased’s area relating to compensation for wrongful death. Referring to this
evidence, Los J noted that the claim for customary compensation had now to be
considered subject to the requirements of the constitutional framework. Thus:
2 1 8
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
Killing as pay-back, based on the notion of an eye for an eye, and tooth for a tooth
is unconstitutional.… Giving away women as compensation cannot apply now
because it is not only repugnant to the general principles of humanity but it is in
breach of specific sections of the Constitution. A woman is a person not a
property. As a person she has the same rights as a man… Section 55(1)
summarizes it all… 
I am aware that equality of women does not go down well with a traditional PNG
man, but he has to accept that, that is the position that he himself through the
Constituent Assembly accepted at Independence...
By our Constitution all lives are equal. They are not graded according to gender,
social or official status. See s 55(1) of the Constitution cited earlier. The amount
of compensation paid for loss of life must be equal whether a person is a man or
woman, big man or little man.16
The judge proceeded, without quantifying the damages in his judgment, to find the
first defendant liable, and the state of PNG vicariously liable for the wrongful actions
of the first defendant.
CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW CASES AND SECTION 55
In the early 1990’s, a number of cases arose in which the National Court felt obliged
to intervene to protect women from excessive punishment at the hands of village
courts.17 One such case was the 1991 decision of Re Wagi Non and the Constitution
Section 42(5).18 The husband had left his wife and their four children in the care of
his relatives in his village when he travelled to another province for employment.
After he had been away for five or six years without making contact with his family
or relatives the wife eventually formed a relationship with another man. The
husband’s relatives then complained in the Village Court that the wife had
committed adultery, in breach of customary expectations, and obtained an order for
compensation against her. When she failed to pay the amount required, the Village
Court ordered her imprisonment. In the National Court, Woods J ordered her
release, stating (among other reasons) that the custom relied on by the relatives of
the husband should not be recognised, as it infringed s 55 of the Constitution. In the
opinion of the Court:
I cannot help feeling that the going off and leaving the wife and children without
his support and protection yet expecting her to remain bound by custom is a
custom that must be denigrating to her status as a woman. It is denying her the
equality provided in the Constitution, s 55... I am not saying that a man cannot
have several wives and cannot travel but if he chooses to have wives and travel
elsewhere he must accord them equality in care and participation and she must
have the same freedoms that he has... The facts of this case suggest that this
woman is bonded, almost in slavery, to the husband even when the husband
neglects her. This must clearly be a denigration of the woman’s humanness.’19
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A similar result was reached by Woods J on almost identical facts in Re Kaka Ruk
and the Constitution Section 42(5),20 although, there, the Court preferred to ground
the decision on the doctrine of “repugnancy to the general principles of humanity”.21
Returning to s 55, in Re Kepo Raramu and the Yowe Village Court,22 a Village Court
had sentenced a woman to a term of six months’ imprisonment for commencing a
new relationship after her husband had died. On appeal, the National Court ordered
her immediate release. One of the several grounds relied on for this decision by
Doherty J appears in the following passage:
I am well aware of the custom in many areas that says women whose husbands
have died are not to go around with another man... I do not know of any
equivalent custom that says a man whose wife has died is not allowed to go
around with other women, and, as such, I consider this custom strikes against the
basis of equality provided in s 55 of the Constitution.
It appears to me, to quote the words of [Kidu CJ], ‘it is a custom that is
oppressive to women’, and the Village Court is in error in upholding this
custom.23
Other village court decisions, such as those concerning the law of customary divorce,
have also been the subject of National Court appeal cases. Some of these decisions
were made by the judge in the role of prison visitor and the judgments are rather
cursory and have not been reported. The former Chief Justice, Kidu CJ, heard several
cases in 1991 in which he asserted the freedom of wives to leave their husbands
regardless of any rule of custom to the contrary. One example is that of Re Raima
and the Constitution Section 42(5).24 There, a woman had been imprisoned by a
Village Court after being unable to pay the 300 kina25 compensation ordered in
favour of her former husband, whom she had left. Kidu CJ upheld several objections
to both the compensation order and the sentence of imprisonment. After examining
the Village Court records, the Chief Justice stated:
The order does not say why the compensation was ordered to be paid by her. Was
it to be paid because she broke the marriage or was it to be repayment of the bride
price paid for her by the husband of 3–4 months? On the face of it, it would
appear to be merely for her speaking strongly of breaking her marriage. This is,
of course, wrong in law. Whether under introduced law or customary law a
woman has the right to break her marriage. It is her right and she should not be
penalized for this. If a woman breaks her marriage the village court only has the
right to consider the repayment of bride price according to customary law. A
village court has no power to penalize her for breaking the marriage.26
Although the basis for this decision is not spelt out in the brief judgment, it is likely
that considerations of equality between the sexes were in the mind of Kidu CJ. The
clear implication of his statement is that any custom which denied the woman the
right of divorce would not be recognised and any court order enforcing such a
custom would similarly be invalid.
Unlike the cases considered so far, in which National Court judges were responding
to what they saw as the excesses and misuse of jurisdiction by village court
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magistrates, the 1997 case of Re Willingal27 reached the National Court after
publicity in one of Papua New Guinea’s national newspapers.28 In response to the
newspaper article, National Court proceedings were instituted by a non-
governmental human rights organisation, the Individual and Community Rights
Advocacy Forum. The proceedings featured a whole battery of legal challenges
against a custom requiring a woman’s forced marriage. The unfortunate woman was
Ms Miriam Willingal, an 18 year old high school student from the Western Highlands
area of Papua New Guinea, who was being made the unwilling participant in a
complicated compensation settlement between two kin groups. 
It is not necessary here to set out the full facts of the case, which began with the death
of Miriam’s father, who appeared to have been the innocent victim of a police raid on
a Highlands village. For various reasons this then led to extended negotiations
between the members of his kin group (to which Miriam also belonged) and the kin
group of his mother, two clans which had for generations enjoyed a close
relationship. At issue was the question of how to restore the balance between the two
groups in order to ensure their continued co-existence and alliance in the future. 
At the trial there was some disagreement over the details of the customary
compensation claim. The broad outlines of the claim referred to 25 pigs, 20,000 kina
and two women.29 Some witnesses said that no particular women were identified in
the negotiations, that no woman would be pressured to comply with the
arrangement, and that the marriages might not take place until some years in the
future. Other witnesses, including Miriam, gave a contrary impression, to the effect
that pressure could be or had been brought to bear on individual women by the clan
leaders, and that a delay in arranging the marriages would cause aggravation and ill
feeling between the two groups. On this crucial point Injia J found that Miriam had
already been subjected to pressure, that she did not like the idea of being used as a
form of payment and that she was afraid that the men of both clans might become
impatient and try to force her to accept the planned marriage.30
Turning to the relevant law Injia J had no doubt that Miriam’s constitutional rights
had been infringed and gave multiple reasons for this conclusion. His general
approach to the issue of recognition of custom appears in the following passage:
The traditional customs of the people of [this area] like the rest of PNG have
existed from time immemorial and they serve complex value systems which only
they themselves best know. It is not easy for any outsider to fully understand the
customs and the underlying values and purposes they serve. Any outsider
including the modern courts must not be quick to extract those customs and their
values and pass judgments on their soundness or otherwise... But it is clear to me
that the framers of our Constitution and modern day legislators were thinking
about a modern PNG based on ethnic societies whose welfare and advancement
was based on the maintenance and promotion of good traditional customs and
the discouragement and elimination of bad customs as seen from the eyes of an
ordinary modern Papua New Guinean. No matter how painful it may be to the
small ethnic society concerned, such bad custom must give way to the dictates of
our modern national laws.31
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The Court accordingly held that a number of provisions of the Constitution and of
other statutes would be infringed were the custom to be enforced. These included
constitutional guarantees of sexual equality, about which Injia J had this to say: 
It is further submitted that to oblige or pressure a woman to marry someone from
another tribe against her will restricts her right to freedom to choose a partner in
marriage on equal terms with men. It is submitted that this is contrary to
Constitution, National Goals and Directive Principles No 2(5) and (12)... I agree
with these submissions...
It is submitted that the same custom infringes Section 55 in that it violates the
equal choice that a woman in [this area], in this case Miriam, had of choosing a
partner from anywhere in Papua New Guinea just like men from [her] tribe and
the [other] tribe. I accept this submission. There is no evidence that the same
custom which targets young women from [Miriam’s] tribe also targets eligible
men from the [other] tribe.32
For these and numerous other reasons, the court then proceeded to issue permanent
injunctions and restraining orders against the various groups and their members.
DISCUSSION
I have outlined a number of cases arising in the last decade in Papua New Guinea in
which the courts have been prepared to strike at aspects of customary family law.
These cases have variously concerned differing expectations about spousal behaviour
in a customary marriage, parental custody rights, customary divorce, proper
behaviour as a widow and forced marriage. Section 55 of the Constitution, among
other provisions, has been invoked against customs which appeared to the courts to
be one-sided, oppressive or patriarchal in their application, and therefore to be
unlawful examples of gender discrimination. It is fair to say, however, that the
discussion in these cases of the notion of ‘discrimination’, and of the proper scope
and meaning of s 55, remains at a relatively simple and straightforward level.33
This is not to say that the judges in these cases should have been expected to engage
in a lengthy theoretical analysis. After all, judges obviously respond primarily to the
arguments presented to them. In few of the cases has there been much if any attempt
to justify or provide supporting arguments for the custom in question. Nor has the
court been requested to attempt an overall assessment of the relationship between
those parts of the Constitution emphasising the importance of custom and the
provisions dealing with rights of equality. Is it possible to reconcile these provisions,
or should one set of provisions always take precedence over the other? Could a court
in a particular case be asked to engage in a balancing exercise, weighing up the
benefits and values of the customary principles and concepts, on the one hand, and
the equality rights of men and women, on the other? 
As to the interpretation of s 55, there has also not been any attempt to date to uphold
elements of family law custom by reference to s 55(3), which states that the non-
discrimination principle in subsection (1) “does not affect the operation of a pre-
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Independence law”. The expression “pre-Independence law” is defined in Sch 1.2 of
the Constitution to have the same meaning as in Sch 2.6 (on the adoption of pre-
Independence laws), which defines the term to refer exclusively to statute law. At first
glance, therefore, a custom which existed prior to Independence would not gain any
special protection from subsection (3). On the other hand, what if the custom in
question was recognised and validated by a pre-Independence (that is, pre-1975)
statute? Two such provisions relating to customary marriage have been referred to
earlier, namely s 5(f) of the Customs Recognition Act (first passed in 1963, now Cap
19 of the Revised Laws), and s 3 of the Marriage Act (also first passed in 1963, now
Cap 280 of the Revised Laws). By virtue of the former, custom may be “taken into
account” in relation to a marriage, and the latter provision states more specifically
that a marriage entered into in accordance with the relevant custom “is valid and
effectual for all purposes”. Could it be argued, then, that an otherwise discriminatory
feature of customary marriage law would thereby be protected, via subsection (3),
from challenge under s 55(1)? 
Questions of this sort would no doubt arise if it were sought to challenge
fundamental elements of the system of customary marriage in Papua New Guinea. In
recent years, the most controversial family law topic has been that of polygamous
marriage. Even more than the constant controversy over elements of customary
brideprice,34 the practice of polygamy (which in practice means polygyny, that is the
right of a man to have more than one customary wife) has produced a constant flow
of public debate.35 While polygamy is virtually unknown in many parts of the country
today, it remains a relatively common practice among leaders from the Highlands
provinces. One memorable example of the public interest in polygamy is the
controversy which erupted when a newly-appointed Governor-General decided to
prefer the younger of his two wives to accompany him to England to receive his
knighthood, and then to occupy the viceregal residence with him.36
In legal terms, a polygamous customary marriage has generally been regarded as valid
by virtue of s 3 of the Marriage Act [Cap 280] (PNG), referred to earlier. Thus, in
the passage previously quoted from Re Wagi Non and the Constitution Section
42(5),37 Woods J stated plainly: “I am not saying that a man cannot have several
wives…”, but went on to insist that all the wives must be treated fairly and equally.
Against advocates of the practice, who rely on the Constitution’s support for
traditional customs, objections have come from community and church groups as
well as magistrates and judges dealing with the frequent financial and custody
disputes, criminal assaults and murders (whether between spouses, or between co-
wives) arising from polygamous arrangements.38 Since 1996, private members’ bills
designed to abolish or ban polygamy have been circulated on several occasions in
Parliament, so far without any collective governmental response. 
In the absence of any legislative initiative it is interesting to speculate on whether a
court in Papua New Guinea might be faced with an objection to some aspect of
customary polygamous marriage. While an out-and-out constitutional challenge to
the custom is theoretically possible, it is far more likely that the issue would arise in
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the circumstances of an everyday case. Such a claim might be raised in any context in
which a party’s rights or responsibilities will vary according to whether the marriage
is legally valid or not (such as spousal maintenance, property claims, inheritance,
compensation in relation to fatal accidents and so on). The contending party, then,
could be a husband, a wife, a relative, an insurance company or anyone else with an
interest in the result of the litigation. 
Some years ago, it should be noted, a Task Force of the PNG Law Reform
Commission expressed the view that the custom of polygamy was “unconstitutional”,
because the freedom to have more than one spouse was only extended to males.
Rather than argue for a similar liberty to be extended to females, however, the Task
Force concluded that Parliament should insist on monogamy for everyone.39
In its claim that polygamy was unconstitutional, the Task Force presumably had in
mind the prohibition on discrimination contained in s 55 of the Constitution. An
alternative form of the same argument might focus on the imbalance in the respective
rights and responsibilities expected from each spouse in relation to the other. While
it can be argued, as Kaganas and Murray have attempted in the African context,40 that:
The treatment of women as property, sexual stereotyping and domination are
not limited to polygamy, nor are they practices that can be shown to be inevitable
in polygamy...
the approach and judicial logic consistently demonstrated by the National Court
judges in the cases outlined earlier, culminating in the 1997 case of Re Willingal,
would suggest that the customary incidents of a polygamous marriage in Papua New
Guinea typically infringe the right to sexual equality in s 55(1). If so, then the court
would have to give consideration to s 55(3), as to whether the custom could be saved
as depending upon a “pre-Independence law”. 
Of course, leaving aside these complications surrounding the proper interpretation of
s 55, it is clear that some of the other grounds canvassed above could also come to
the fore here: for instance, that customary expectations and practices relating to
polygamy in a particular Papua New Guinean community might be inconsistent with
other rights guaranteed by the Constitution, might produce injustice, or might be
contrary to the public interest (see Customs Recognition Act [Cap 19] (PNG), s 3).
A court’s decision invalidating, on any of the grounds mentioned, a particular
polygamous marriage (that is, by denying recognition and enforcement to the
relevant custom) would not automatically spell invalidity for all polygamous
marriages, but would obviously have significant implications for other cases.
Alternatively, such a decision might prompt further calls for legislative intervention.41
CONCLUSION
It has been frequently argued that many aspects of customary family law in Papua
New Guinea reflect entrenched gender discrimination against women.42 Whether
referring generally to the law of customary marriage and divorce, or to the extremely
high incidence of domestic assaults and sexual violence reported for many parts of the
country,43 these commentators would certainly agree with the views of Los J,
expressed in a different context some years ago:
Although the equality of sexes is now a constitutional principle in Papua New
Guinea, at this stage it is more a matter of books, rather than practice. The
character of all aspects of life is a male dominance.44
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the tensions and possibilities for conflict
between constitutional norms that incorporate custom as part of the law of the
country, and other constitutional provisions that support the principles of gender
equality. In the last decade, National Court judges have begun to take the initiative
in challenging aspects of customary family law, by refusing to acknowledge and
enforce elements of custom which are found to denigrate or oppress women. This has
been especially evident in relation to custom as reflected and purportedly
implemented in decisions of village courts in some provinces. In overturning such
decisions, the National Court judges have employed a variety of judicial weapons,
among them s 55 of the Constitution. 
Of course, there is no reason to think that orders of the National Court immediately
bring about changes in ideas and behaviour among the people concerned,45 and it is
very likely that similar cases will continue to arise in the future. Were such cases to go
further and question more fundamental characteristics of the system of customary
marriage (such as polygamy or brideprice), the courts would then be faced with the
task of analysing the concepts of gender equality and discrimination, and the
interpretation of s 55, in a more detailed way than has so far proved to be necessary. 
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that “Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to disassociate these practices from polygyny or
to envisage a polygynous household in which the husband does not dominate”.
41 On the difficulties inherent in any legislative attempt to ban or discourage polygamy, see
Jessep, O. 1993. Above, n 35 at pp 40–41.
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42 See, for example, Johnson, D. 1979. Aspects of the Legal Status of Women in Papua New
Guinea in Melanesian Law Journal Vol 7: 5–81, at p 33; PNG Law Reform Commission
1992. Final Report on Domestic Violence: Report No 14 PNGLRC: Port Moresby, at 
p 22; Toliman, M., Davani, C. & Passingan, L. 1994. Papua New Guinea in Women and
Law in the Pacific – Report of a Regional Seminar International Commission of Jurists:
Suva; Doherty, T. 1999. International Standards, Domestic Litigation and the
Advancement of Women’s Rights: Perspectives and Experiences from the South Pacific.
Adams, K. Byrnes, K. & A. (eds.) Gender Equality and the Judiciary. London:
Commonwealth Secretariat, at pp 135–38. See also Zorn, J.C. 1994–95, Above, n 18 at
pp 202–204.
43 See, for example, PNG Law Reform Commission, above n 43; and Dinnen, S. & Ley, A.
(eds.) 2000 Reflections on Violence in Melanesia. Sydney: Hawkins and Asia Pacific Presses.
44 State v Kopilyo Kipungi and others (1983) N 437, at 5.
45 For example, in the year following the decision in Re Willingal (1997) N 1506 (the case
of Miriam, discussed above), the PNG Post Courier carried a front page story with the
headline “Clan Gives Girls Away In Compo Settlement” (7th August 1998). The item, by
W. Palme, told of a death compensation negotiation between two clans in the Western
Highlands. The original claim was for 30 pigs and 30,000 kina, subsequently changed to
30 pigs, 20,000 kina, and two 16-year-old women. A judicial inquiry was ordered into the
matter, but the outcome was never reported in the newspaper.
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Review questions 
1. Do the people of your jurisdiction tend to view ‘human rights’ as being
opposed to ‘custom’? Do you?    
2. Why do you think that human rights and custom seem to clash so much? 
3. What areas other than women’s rights do you think create the most clashes
between constitutionally enshrined human rights and custom?
4. Human rights are often viewed as being ‘natural’. Do you agree with this
viewpoint? Why/why not? What other aspects of your countries legal and social
systems do people treat as being ‘natural? Are they actually natural?
Further readings 
Aleck, J. & Rannells, J. (eds) 1995. Custom at the Crossroads. Port Moresby:
Faculty of Law UPNG.
Barber, B. 1995. Jihad vs McWorld: How globalism and tribalism are reshaping the
world. New York: Ballantine Books.
Dunne, T. & Wheeler, T. 1999. Human Rights in Global Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ishay, M. (ed) 1997. The Human Rights Reader: Major political essays, speeches and
documents from the Bible to the present. New York & London: Routledge.
Sheleff, L. 1999. The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law and Legal
Pluralism. London: Frank Cass.
Sperber, D. 1996. Explaining Culture: A naturalistic approach. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Weeramantry, C.G. 1982. An Invitation to the Law. Australia: Butterworths.
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SECTION 5
NATURAL RESOURCE ISSUES
12. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ISSUES IN THE SOUTH
PACIFIC AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Laurence Cordonnery
13.  LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONSERVATION
AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY AND
STRADDLING FISH STOCKS IN THE WESTERN
AND CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN
Laurence Cordonnery
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Consideration of natural resource issues in relation to law in the Pacific islands
has tended to focus on land tenure issues. This is unsurprising, given the unique
natures of many land tenure systems within the region. These systems, which draw
upon custom and, sometimes, blend with introduced systems of land management,
provide an area of interest and challenge for legal theorists and policy makers. The
central importance of land within Pacific island cultures also means that people
from other disciplines such as anthropology, sociology and political science take a
keen interest in Pacific land tenure systems and have contributed to the literature
on the subject.
This body of literature has resulted in a general awareness of the sensitivity and
importance of land issues in the Pacific island region. However the Pacific islands
also face a number of pressing issues to do with the use and management of other
natural resources that are, maybe, less widely discussed in academic literature. This
section aims to introduce readers to some of the natural resource issues other than
land tenure that Pacific island societies and legal systems currently have to address.
The first chapter provides an overview of the most common and pressing natural
resource issues that are being faced by the countries in the region. This overview
particularly focuses on areas in which domestic legal interventions can be used to
ensure that natural resources are not squandered. Current ‘best practice’
approaches to addressing these issues that incorporate the concept of good
governance are also described and examples of various legal interventions are
provided. An interesting point to note here is that the good governance agenda,
which is possibly most commonly linked to combatting corruption, can be seen to be
equally relevant in a different setting, that of environmental protection.
The second chapter analyses the particular issue of tuna fishing. As well as
providing detailed information on management of tuna resources in this region
this analysis provides us with a different angle from which to view resource issues.
It focuses our attention on the interplay between international law and domestic
responses and stresses the importance of cooperation at both international and
regional level in order for many natural resources issues to be addressed. 
Together these two chapters indicate the range of legal and social issues and
responses relating to natural resource management in the Pacific islands today.
Micro level interventions that maybe affect only single communities or areas,
national law and policy and international law and policy, particularly at the
level of regional cooperation are all shown, indicating the number of different
layers of law and policy that have an impact upon natural resource management. 
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12.  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ISSUES IN THE SOUTH
PACIFIC AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
By: Laurence Cordonnery
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Biodiversity
Also referred to as biological diversity, biodiversity describes the variety and
variability of nature. Plant and animal species are the most commonly
recognised units of biological diversity. 
Sustainable development
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (the
Brundtland Commission) defined sustainable development as “development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.” It requires an integration of economic,
social and environmental considerations in decision making at both
government and corporation levels in order to aim for development that does
not rely upon the short term exploitaition of any resources. 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA)
A critical appraisal of the likely effects of a policy, plan, program, project or
activity on the environment. These assessments are usually carried out by
independent assessors in order to assist the authority making the decision about
whether to proceed with a particular activity. 
Good governance
The term refers to a form of democratic governance that assumes legitimacy
through accountability, predictability and openness of government formed by
consent of the people and in accordance with the rule of law. In terms of
resource allocation and acquisition, good governance presupposes consultation
and participation of those affected by projects and transparency of decision
making and resource allocation.
2 3 3
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will introduce some of the environmental issues that need to be urgently
addressed in the South Pacific. It focuses upon the issues that Pacific island countries
(PICs) have some leverage in devising solutions for, whether within regional, national
and/or local legal and management frameworks. In presenting current approaches to
environmental protection and sustainable development the reasons why PICs should
depart from a strict transposition of western legal models, the relevance of
participatory democracy at the community level and the need for more transparency
and accountability of state actions will be emphasised. 
THE MOST CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC
Climate change
Vulnerability to climate change and the resulting impacts on coastal environments
due to sea level rise and coastal erosion, coral bleaching and changes in the
productivity of marine ecosystems is certainly the most pressing environmental issue
faced by PICs today, particularly for low-lying islands and atolls. Yet, despite general
awareness of the issue at regional and governmental levels, any solution to climate
change (as opposed to an adaptive reaction) will depend on the outcomes of the
global negotiations on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Convention on Climate Change. To that extent, climate change remains an
external issue for PICs despite them being its first victims. It can only be hoped that
further regional solidarity will be demonstrated against the inflexibility of the
JUSCAN group of countries (Japan, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) to
effectively tackle the issue by accepting to reduce greenhouse gases emissions at their
source. Typically, the example of climate change illustrates the lack of leverage of
PICs to address this global issue. Because of the inability of PICs to be proactive in
creating a solution to climate change this environmental threat will not be considered
further in this chapter.
The loss of biodiversity
The loss of biodiversity, which mostly occurs through land degradation, is another
pressing environmental issue of international relevance which has a better potential
to be addressed within appropriate regional and national frameworks. This is because
biodiversity loss is a direct result of population growth, urbanisation and
unsustainable development activities within the region. 
The tropical South Pacific is renowned worldwide for its high level of species diversity
and endemism2 (mostly on the high islands of PNG, Solomon Islands, New
Caledonia and Vanuatu). The region is also known to have the most extensive coral
reef system in the world. Pacific islanders rely heavily on these biological resources for
subsistence and for their economic, social and cultural well being. But island
environments are some of the areas in which biological diversity is most threatened
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in the world. For smaller islands of the region, such as atolls, up to 75% of indigenous
plant species are in danger of extinction. 
Island ecosystems are described as fragile because of their generally small size and
endemicity. Given the small land space, endemic species on islands can be lost within a
very short time span due to introduction of insect pests, diseases, predators or
destruction of critical habitat (often associated with construction activities). The loss of
any habitat is likely to mean the extinction of species of plants or animals. Because of
size, a large proportion of the land, its inhabitants and the adjacent sea are likely to be
affected by disturbances that might be only minor regional events on a larger landmass.
Unsustainable logging
Typically, unsustainable logging describes a situation where the rate of log harvests
exceeds sustainable yields, leading to the depletion of a resource. Unsustainable
logging practices commonly occur in the region but are of particular concern in
Solomon Islands where large scale logging operations are conducted by multinational
companies, mostly taking place on customary land. To address this issue both
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have adopted codes of logging practice. However,
both countries have experienced implementation difficulties either due to lack of
training, monitoring and enforcement capacity, as in the case of Vanuatu, or because
of generalised corruption at all levels of the decision making, a process facilitated by
a rapid monetarisation of certain sectors of society and the emergence of new elites
in villages.3 In addition, the issue of corruption in Solomon Islands is extremely
difficult to address given the economic dependency of the country on log exports. To
illustrate the current ineffectiveness of the logging regulation, in 1995 Solomon
Islands set a sustainable yield for logging activities at 325,000 cubic metres per year
but in that year the log exports reached 748,500 cubic metres.4
Unsustainable coastal fishing
Over-exploitation of inshore marine resources combined with the use of damaging
fishing practices (using dynamite for example) and coastal pollution has caused
declines in the amount of coastal fish stock. This is the case notably for rock cod
(Serranidae), mullet (Mugilidae), scad (Carangidae) and mackerel (Scombridae),
while some species, such as coconut crabs5 and giant clams, have been driven to
extinction in several areas. The question of sustainability in the exploitation of inshore
resources can be formulated in terms similar to logging. As stated by King et. al
“a fish stock may be regarded as over-exploited when the numbers of fish are reduced
to such an extent that the remaining adults are unable to produce enough young fish
to maintain the stock.”6
Secondary degradation because of unsustainable land use
Degradation of land and coastal environments is now widespread throughout PICs,
typically as a result of development activities that are either unsustainable by nature,
as in the case of clearfell logging, or for which no environmental impact assessments
(EIAs) were conducted and therefore no monitoring, mitigation or alternative
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development options were devised. The most common types of impacts from
development activities include soil erosion, impacts of sedimentation on coral reefs,
mangrove reclamation and degradation and pollution by sewage and industrial
effluents. 
Erosion
Soil erosion is a common consequence of construction projects, agriculture and
forestry activities, especially on steep slopes. Poor land use practice is the most
common reason for soil erosion. Soil erosion leads to poorer soil productivity and to
sedimentation downstream. 
Sedimentation
As mentioned before, sedimentation7 on coral reefs is usually a consequence of soil
erosion and more generally of all coastal developments since almost every project
generates suspended sediment (at least during the construction phase) and countries
in the region are surrounded by coral. The impacts of sedimentation on coral reefs is
to reduce photosynthesis of algae growing as part of their structure. In the best case
scenario sedimentation will therefore inhibit coral growth. However, long term
exposure to sediment will kill all or part of the coral colony. Even if the exposure does
not kill the coral directly, it will reduce coral growth as energy is diverted to clearing
sediment. Sediment exposure has led to ‘coral bleaching’, which occurs because of
the loss of the algae. 
Mangrove degradation
Mangrove degradation and reclamation is another issue linked to the widespread
perception of mangroves as wastelands that can be used as garbage tips or for land
reclamation. This view is now being challenged as the ecological role of mangroves is
gradually better understood. Mangroves, as a group of trees adapted to living on the
boundary of marine and terrestrial environments, play several crucial ecological
functions such as slowing down water movement and aiding in sediment deposition,
thus reducing sedimentation of reefs. Mangroves provide organic matter (through
their leaf litter and from nutrients of river water) that supports communities of micro-
organisms that in turn provide food for the young fish living in the mangroves.
Finally, they also provide habitats for juvenile fish species (about 60 to 80% of
commercial fish species are associated with mangroves at some point in their life
cycle) and for wildlife species including birds. 
Pollution
Coastal pollution, due to organic and industrial effluents, is localised to urban areas.
The impacts of organic effluents (sewage, fish wastes, slaughterhouse wastes and food
processing wastes) are to change the receiving ecosystem by stimulating algae growth
at the expense of other organisms, coral for example. This phenomenon can lead to
eutrophication and ecological death when algae growth reaches such a level that the
dissolved oxygen in the water is all used up by the decaying algae. Regarding
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industrial effluents, concerns can particularly be raised with toxic chemicals
concentrated in the food chain, as happens with the insecticide DDT. 
As can be seen, a wide range of environmental issues are of concern to the South
Pacific region. In addressing these concerns a number of approaches can be taken.
Introduced legal methods such as EIAs, the setting of polluting emissions standards
and land use planning schemes can be used to great effect in some situations.
Traditional environmental management methods in line with the realities of
customary land and marine tenure may also be used to address these issues. The
various approaches to addressing environmental concerns and their potential benefits
and shortcomings must, however, be analysed in the light of good governance
prerequisites in order to ensure that effective and appropriate responses to
environmental issues are formulated. 
THE NATURE AND ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental law first developed in western countries as a result of parliamentary
activity and the adoption of statutes that broadened the scope of administrative
control. In this sense, environmental law is almost entirely a product of legislation.
The reason for this is that the scope and content of environmental law falls largely
within the category of ‘public law’ rather than ‘private law’. Accordingly, the
emergence of environmental law in western countries coincides with the recognition
by the public and the government of past mistakes and of the necessity of using the
Earth’s resources in a more sustainable manner. The evolution and gradual
recognition of environmental law in a given country will therefore be a function of
the public acceptance and awareness of non-economic as well as economic factors
that are important in enhancing the quality of life to which we all aspire. In other
words, the evolution and expansion of environmental law is dependant upon the
extent to which the limits of conventional development models (that do not
systematically incorporate non-economic parameters such as the social and
environmental impacts of development schemes) are recognised. 
This is translated into the incorporation of the concept of sustainable development
and sustainability8 in the exploitation of resources in environmental legislation, which
outlines the need to integrate conservation and development so as to ensure that the
rights of future generations are not compromised. 
At the national level the implementation of the concept of sustainable development
raises a number of questions. How should governments change policies and priorities
to reflect the concept of sustainability? How will the concept find concrete expression
in law so that it is capable of being enforced? In terms of decision making there may
also be practical problems in reconciling the policy objective of sustainability with
development priorities and objectives. Should governments legislate to give priority
to concepts of sustainability and if so how will these be legally defined and what
mechanisms will be put in place to ensure coordination, continuity and compliance
in decision making? This also raises the question of the relevance of using foreign
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legislative models in introducing comprehensive environmental legal reform, as the
enforcement of foreign models may be of questionable practicality in the context of
PICs. As Farrier puts it:
Symbolic legislation may satisfy the demands of international conventions, but
legislation which is not enforced will do little to protect the environment of your
South Pacific Countries. Indeed it may lead to a complacency, based on a belief
that something is being done, that is positively damaging.9
Further, the implementation of environmental legislation presents a number of
difficulties due to commonly found reasons, such as:
• the isolation of communities, resulting in lack of awareness of laws created by
the central government and lack of enforcement due to travel restrictions;
• the smallness of communities, generating difficulties in getting independent
enforcement officers to apply sanctions;
• the inadequacy of penalties for environmental offences (usually relying upon
the imposition of fines) and the need to find more culturally appropriate
models of communal sanction against environmental offenders; 
• cultural traditions of customary landowners which may be opposed to central
government implementation of the law, unless a genuine participation of local
and landowner in the drafting is ensured; and
• the lack of recognition of traditional methods of resource management and
control in the legislation.
Further, one should bear in mind the appropriateness of foreign model legislation for
addressing the actual environmental issues of the country in which environmental law
reform is under consideration.10 A simple but striking example of the ineffectiveness
of foreign model command and control legislation is the Anti-Litter Decree 1992 of
Fiji. This decree has never been enforced and, in the absence of public information
campaigns, the population remains unaware of its existence. Despite the imposition
of severe penalties this piece of legislation has had little effect on curbing the litter
problem in Fiji. It shows that in order to be effective, there must be an ongoing
commitment to law enforcement and education of the population on the reasons for
the law. Without such a commitment any piece of legislation remains largely
irrelevant to the population and will therefore be largely ignored.
Another example that illustrates the difficulty of imposing foreign model legislation
and institutions is the proposed Environment and Resource Management Bill in
Vanuatu. This Bill is intended to facilitate the establishment of relevant institutions
and mechanisms for managing the environment (pollution control, mandatory EIAs,
protection of natural heritage and biodiversity conservation). A number of modified
versions of this Bill have circulated amongst the various stakeholders as a number of
legal experts and draftsmen succeeded each other, but after several years the Bill still
has not been tabled in Parliament for consideration. Unfortunately none of the legal
experts and draftsmen are aware of the issues facing Vanuatu in terms of feasible
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institutions and enforcement procedures. Therefore their work tends to rely on
foreign models of legislation that appear too elaborate to be able to grasp the
environmental issues and to address issues of capacity and responses to law
enforcement that are specific to Vanuatu. Given the existing financial and human
resource constraints to implementing introduced models of law enforcement,
traditional conservation and resource management practices have the potential to
bring more effective results than western models of law enforcement in the South
Pacific. 
In fact, one can argue that many of the environmental problems or existing gaps in
the law of PICs may be resolved without enacting command and control legislation,
but instead by strengthening existing institutions in government (such as the
Environment Unit in Vanuatu) as well as local government or village authorities and
providing community leaders with the necessary environmental awareness and
education. 
It is argued here that the implementation of the concept of sustainable development
in the South Pacific requires first and foremost the institutional development of a
society. That is, good governance and community participation in the development
process itself is needed. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING
If governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development, then the
linkage with sustainable development and environmental law is quite obvious, despite
having been overlooked to a large extent in the good governance discourse.11 Good
governance presupposes efficient administration and transparent institutions capable
of meeting the requirement of accountability. To achieve this, public administration
reforms are necessary. In particular priority needs to be given to the establishment of
a state governed by law, the development of a judicial system and of local government
autonomy and administration. 
Strengthening the public sector
Public administrative reforms are leading to institutional changes in the South Pacific
as in most developing countries, but whether or not these reflect the objectives of
sustainable development can be questioned. One shortcoming can be readily
identified in the fact that such reforms are often driven by aid donors without
necessarily taking into consideration the cultural factors responsible for most cases of
corruption, nor the applicability of the economic model proposed. For example,
under Vanuatu’s Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP), whose establishment
was part of the conditions set by the World Bank for granting further loans to the
Republic of Vanuatu, a reform of the civil service has been undertaken. This reform
led to a drastic reduction in the number of civil servants while increasing the salaries
of senior officials to provide incentives to productivity and efficiency in the public
service and to diminish the risk of corruption. Although these reforms appear
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necessary to improve the accountability of the executive, the CRP has also been
criticised for its focus on privatisation (such as introducing the user pays principle as
opposed to provision of essential services by the state) and corporatisation of the
public sector. It has been argued that this reform promotes economic development
without taking into account the interests of people in sustainable development.
Instead, as what constitutes development is largely subjective, development strategies
must be determined by the people themselves and adapted to their particular
conditions. Similarly, the corporatisation of the public service does not take into
consideration the fact that the majority of Ni-Vanuatu people are relying on
subsistence agriculture and are therefore unable to pay for the services that used to
be provided by the state. 
Accountability and the Office of the Ombudsman
Institutional strengthening of bodies whose specific role is to ensure the
accountability and transparency of administrative decisions is also an essential
component of the good governance agenda that clearly impacts upon environmental
policies. For example, the Office of the Ombudsman can play a significant role in
assisting environmental protection by way of the complaint procedure. The
complaint procedure to the Ombudsman is a way of ensuring that public officials
conduct themselves and their administration according to the law. For example, in
Solomon Islands, various Ombudsman’s reports to Parliament in recent years have
demonstrated the inadequacies of present law and practices in the forestry sector, also
questioning the legality of logging practices.12
Decentralisation
Decentralisation is often referred to as a form of government in line with the agenda
of good governance as its aim is to devolve executive and legislative power to local
and provincial government entities while relying on a number of good governance
assumptions to achieve this goal. The first of these assumptions is that, through
decentralisation, greater accountability will be achieved by ensuring public
participation in decision making. Secondly, decentralisation assumes that budgeting
and planning take place at the local and regional level, giving decisions makers the
opportunity to take into account the specificity and aspirations of community groups
and to accommodate them, thus promoting greater self-reliance. Thirdly, decision
making takes place amongst groups that are more closely integrated with local
communities, hence facilitating a more precise knowledge of issues amongst such
groups. Fourthly, in countries of great cultural and linguistic diversity such as
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, decentralisation is meant to foster the recognition of
the separate identity of groups and regions while at the same time uniting them. 
Whilst discrepancies exist between the rhetoric of constitutional and legal autonomy
and the actual practice of decentralisation in the South Pacific,13 the concept of
devolving power to communities and allowing self determination is of great relevance
in terms of environmental issues. Although devolution of power to community
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groups has only begun to be used recently in the environmental context, there are
now a number of examples of the successful use of community capacity building
programmes. 
At the regional level, SPREP has initiated a number of projects aiming at building up
the capacity of local resource owners and users to sustainably manage and develop
their own marine resources (coral reefs, mangroves, seagrasses) while encouraging
better coordination between government, NGOs and local communities. For
example, SPREP has initiated: 
• village level coral reef monitoring programmes and national training courses
in coral reef monitoring methods;
• a regional training workshop on developing a permit system for the coral
trade in PICs;
• community based marine protected areas workshops; and
• integrated coastal management initiatives to improve the capacity of PICs to
respond to changes and threats to coastal areas and resources from
urbanisation, land and marine based sources of pollution, inappropriate
coastal and port development and land use practices. 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND CO-MANAGEMENT
OF RESOURCES
Another approach to good governance through decentralisation is to improve
community participation in the allocation and use of resources through planning. An
illustration of such a bottom-up approach can be found with the Community Area
Resource Management Approach (CARMA) launched at the village level by the Land
Use Planning Office (LUPO) (within the Ministry of Lands) in Vanuatu. This project
is part of the Vanuatu Land Use Planning Project funded by AusAID to collect
information on land use so as to achieve sustainable development and conservation
of land resources. The aim is to first gather representatives of several villages in an area
to make an inventory of their resources. Development and exploitation options are
discussed and optimum areas for specific uses are identified. For example prime
agricultural land is zoned across community councils. LUPO’s role is to provide
advice on the need to ensure sustainability of resources. If preservation is identified
as the best option LUPO advises on how people can receive financial compensation.
Once agreed amongst the communities involved, the local land use plan is submitted
to the local government council and then to national government for approval. Maps
are produced using the Vanuatu Resources Information System (VANRIS), a
geographic information system containing attribute and statistical data, which
combined with maps generated at any desired scale provide an excellent decision
support tool for development options and are also relevant to EIAs. LUPO also runs
workshops where government and local people are taught how to use VANRIS
aiming at building the necessary training capacity for self-reliance in the use and
maintenance of VANRIS. Unfortunately, despite the continuing existence of LUPO,
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funding for the Vanuatu Land Use Planning Project stopped in 2000, without having
entirely achieved the level self-reliance that was expected in the time frame set for the
completion of the project. 
Environmental impact assessments
Community participation in decision making regarding development options,
allocation and use of natural resources can take many forms. Whichever forms of
community participation are favoured, in order to be truly effective they need to be
accommodated within the legal and management tools that are required to address
relatively new issues of large scale and potentially damaging and over-exploitative
activities brought by technological development. A perfect example of such a legal
and management tool devised in western countries for this purpose is the EIAs.14 This
tool has already been adopted for use in some countries in the region and is in the
process of becoming mandatory in a number of other Pacific countries. In Solomon
Islands, EIA procedures are included in Part III of the 1998 Environment Act. In
Kiribati, EIA procedures are included in Part III of 1999 Act to Provide for the
Protection, Improvement and Conservation of the Environment of the Republic of
Kiribati and for Connected Purposes. In both Fiji and Vanuatu EIAs appear as
guidelines only, but their legal status is likely to change with the enactment of the
Sustainable Development Bill in Fiji and the Environment and Resource Management
Bill in Vanuatu, which both detail EIA procedures. 
The object of an EIA process is to identify the possible risks to the environment that
may result from a proposed action. This information is then used to decide whether
to proceed with the action and on what conditions. The ultimate purpose of an EIA
is not just to assess impacts; it is to improve the quality of decisions. EIAs not only
force environmental knowledge into the policy process but also reveal the inadequacy
of the decision making process caused by incomplete information. As a formal process
EIAs can only be conceived and developed in societies with an effective system of
government administration and where there is enough wealth to support them. This
is because they require technical expertise coupled with scientific research in order to
determine the nature and extent of potentially adverse environmental impacts. 
Applied to the South Pacific, the EIA process necessarily requires a minimum
institutional capacity that needs to be located at the appropriate level of government
(whether central, provincial or local) where development and sectoral policies,
programmes and projects are evaluated. To establish a formal EIA process, SPREP15
recommends three administrative levels so as to secure a minimum level of
impartiality in the decision making process: 
• Firstly, an environment unit to carry out the government functions of
screening, scoping, reviewing and enforcing EIAs;
• Secondly, a senior body with authority over other departments to require
them to adhere to environmental policies is required to make decisions about
controversial projects. The suggested structure of this senior body is a
commission made up of permanent secretaries or ministers from the major
departments that influence the environment. Such a commission would be
mandated to review both public and private sector projects;
• Thirdly, SPREP recommends that each government department concerned 
with natural resources should appoint a middle management person to ensure
that the projects initiated by that department follow EIA procedures. 
From a good governance perspective the EIA review process must ensure that there
is sufficient evidence showing that people affected by the project have been consulted
and that members of the local community understand the information contained in
the environmental impact statement. In other words, community participation in
development decisions must be established as a legally enforceable right. 
With respect to the environmental issues described in the first part of this chapter,
EIAs could address issues of soil erosion by developing mitigation measures such as
erosion control practices like terracing or recommending the use of ponds to control
sediment runoff around construction projects involving earth movement/
disturbance. Through the EIA process the erodability of soils in areas to be logged
could also be determined and sensitive areas could be mapped out. Similarly, it is
notable that the impacts of sedimentation on coral reefs can be easily monitored by
establishing monitoring sites where the percentage of live cover of coral is measured,
and that such a monitoring measure can be incorporated into the EIA process. 
Addressing coastal pollution resulting from land based activities is also within the
scope of EIAs by determining whether the receiving waters (stream, river and/or
bay) can accommodate the additional nutrient load that will result from the proposed
activity. The answer will depend on the amount of dilution that can be expected. For
example, in the case of a river, the dilution is controlled by the volume of flow. In the
case of a marine discharge, dilution will be determined by the amount of flushing, a
function of the tidal range and the water currents. If there is insufficient dilution to
reduce the nutrient loading to near background levels within 100m of the outfall,
then the EIA should recommend a sewage treatment to reduce the nutrients loading.
One way of addressing this issue could be to ensure that the EIA for a proposed
development that has industrial effluent describes the average chemical content of the
waste, and the average and peak volumes. 
Finally, the recognition of the ecological importance of mangroves can be
incorporated in the scoping of sites subject to EIAs by proposing alternative sites.
The use of customary approaches
Community participation in the management of resources can also be promoted
through a legal recognition of customary rules and practices adopted by communities
themselves. Most countries in the South Pacific have in fact two legal systems in
operation: that of customary law and that established through government
legislation. 
Although the relative positions of customary law and introduced law vary from
country to country, it is fair to say that both systems of law are intended to be
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complementary, which is why both are generally recognised within countries
constitutions. In practice though, the two systems are not always mutually supportive
and tend to operate independently of each other. Yet improvements in environmental
protection and resource management may be achieved through stronger links
between customary practices on one hand and, on the other, processes developed
under state law. There are also merits in strengthening customary law with new
information and management practices designed to cope with resource options now
available due to increased pressures on resources rising from things such as
population growth, the introduction of a cash economy and the advent of new
technologies. 
In most countries in the South Pacific customary land and marine tenure systems
have been maintained or restored after independence, with customary landholding
being the dominant form of land ownership.16 Dispute resolution methods that take
customary methods into account, including separate customary court structures,
have also been established to resolve land disputes at least in the first instance.17 But
despite the importance of customary land tenure, customary land law and customary
dispute resolution methods are not fully treated as equal to introduced law as
customary courts often remain subordinated to higher courts, which rely on
introduced common law. For example, island courts in Vanuatu, which have been
established to provide for customary resolution of disputes, are not effective in
resolving land issues as most cases are directly appealed to the supreme court due to
the lack of training of support staff and low level of competence of Justices over
customary law.18 Indeed, under the Island Court Act [Cap 160] of Vanuatu the
customary exercise of justice by chiefs is not recognised, despite the fact that the
chief’s role in maintaining social order remains important in most areas of Vanuatu,
particularly where there is little police presence or control. In ensuring regulation of
the environment (or, indeed, other areas of social regulation) to fail to utilise a
functioning, and largely effective, system of authority seems to be a gross oversight,
particularly when governments do not have the resources to commit to creating new
systems of authority and regulation. Since chiefly authority is a working system
acknowledged by all why treat it as an alternative system of justice and not fully
incorporate the chiefly system of justice into the judicial system, at least in so far as
land and natural resource issues are concerned? 
The option of utilising traditional systems of justice for regulation of the environment
has been fully explored in Samoa through the adoption of village by-laws for
managing inshore marine resources. It has been such a success that the feasibility of
transposing this model to other PICs is currently debated within regional forums and
conferences. By-laws for the conservation of inshore fisheries were introduced in
Samoa as a result of a drastic decline in catches due to over-exploitation and the use
of destructive fishing methods. This situation raised alarm not only within the
Fisheries Division but in a number of villages. Village fono or councils of chiefs first
started to use local media to advertise village rules in order to prevent further decline
of fishery resources. Advertisements focused on banning the use of explosives,
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chemicals and other destructive fishing methods and the prohibition of fishing in
designated areas. These advertisements also indicated penalties to be paid to village
fono for any breach of their village rules by their own residents. Any breach
committed by people who were not residents of the village was subject to threats of
litigation. However, as some village rules contradicted existing laws, several fono
could not pursue court action against breaches by neighbouring villages.19
While the value of such a campaign to improve the conservation and management of
inshore fisheries was acknowledged by the Fisheries Division, the necessity of giving
legal recognition to the rules set by the village fono in the introduced courts and to
ensure that such rules to do not contradict provisions of national fisheries legislation
was also realised.20 A consultation process was then initiated between representatives
of village fonos and the Fisheries Division on the appropriateness of their proposed
rules. This consultation process has now been formalised as the second step in the
formulation of any village by-law, followed by a final check and clearance by the
Office of the Attorney General. Every by-law is signed by the Director of the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries and Meteorology, and then passed to the
Legislative Assembly to be gazetted while also being published by the Fisheries
Division in the local newspaper and copies distributed in neighboring villages. As a
result, the Fishery Act 1988 gives legal recognition to village by-laws and details
procedures upon which a village can declare its own rules as by-laws. By-laws apply
to all citizens equally, and cover any measure assisting the management and
conservation of inshore fishery resources, including:
• restriction on sizes of fish and shellfish that can be taken; 
• bans on certain types of fishing gear and methods;
• allocation of fish quotas; 
• restriction of mesh sizes for nets and fish traps; and 
• closure of fishing seasons or areas to allow fish to reproduce. 
The main advantage of village by-laws over the regular laws is that the rules are
created by the people with a real interest in the management and the conservation of
fishery resources. This means that the village fono is more inclined to monitor and
enforce such rules. Communities either build watch houses, maintain patrol canoes
or employ watchmen to monitor illegal activities in their coastal zones and marine
protected areas. Customary fines (the provision of pigs and taro for example) are
imposed on residents of villages that own the by-laws while legal action can be taken
against any breach by outsiders. 
The success of the village by-law model in Samoa is therefore linked to community
participation in the management of resources based on customary ownership. This
model integrates one of the most important yet easily forgotten aspects of
development: culture, as reflected in customary land and marine tenure systems. 
The transposability of the Samoan village by-law model will be determined by the
extent to which customary law is given legal recognition in the country considered
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and the extent to which the cultural and social of customary practices have been
maintained in society generally. In much the same manner such by-laws should be a
success in other PICs, provided that the system of custom is utilised in the same way
as in the Samoan context. 
Transposing the Samoan village by-law model to Melanesian countries may present
additional difficulties due to the greater cultural and linguistic diversity and the
erosion, in some parts of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, of the chiefly system and
the questioning of chiefly decisions and authority. This difference may be explained
by the homogenous character of Polynesian societies, both ethnically and
geographically, in contrast with Melanesian countries. 
A parallel to Samoa’s by-laws regime can be made with the Decentralisation and
Local Government Regions Act adopted by the Vanuatu Parliament in 1994, which
allows the introduction of by-laws whose function is to “outline create and draw up
regulations governing the environmental protection zones (natural parks, natural
reserves or tourist attraction areas in the national interest)” under section 20(9) of
the Act. Such by-laws designate protected areas on the basis of custom, amenity and
livelihood. Customary tenure is strengthened by making it an offence to contravene
the rules governing a protected area while the term of the by-laws is specified by the
landowners. In addition amendments may be made by landowners at any time.
Finally, under this by-law model, for every declared protected area a committee of
management is set up representing both landowner interests and community interests
through chiefly representation.21 However, compared with the Samoan village by-law
model now applied in at least 54 villages on Upolu Island, the Vanuatu model has
hardly been applied by local governments. One reason may be the focus on protected
areas designation as opposed to management of resources. Another reason may be
the ineffectiveness of local government structures. In addition, whereas the Samoan
legislation was created because communities were already making by-laws and these
needed legal recognition, the Vanuatu legislation has been drafted by law makers with
little awareness by and little commitment from communities. 
With an improved approach to community participation the situation may be
different, as demonstrated by the co-management approach recently adopted by the
Vanuatu Fisheries Department for the Trochus Niloticus combining traditional
management methods with fisheries management regulation and wild stock
enhancement using hatchery reared trochus juveniles. Co-management means a
cooperative approach between communities, acting in their local interests, and
governments, acting in the national or public interest, in the management of a
particular resource. In a co-management context, the central government (in this case
the Fisheries Department) acts as the coordinator and provider of technical advice,
but the process should be owned by the community and be based on traditional and
customary practices. 
As Amos notes “customary law in Vanuatu dictates that most near-shore areas
especially coral reef flats owned by clans or larger communal groups are not open to
access fisheries”.22 Such areas are therefore currently managed through traditional
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restrictions imposed by the resource owners including limited entry, closed seasons
and restricted harvests. Again, as Amos points out, the major feature of customary
tenure is that controls are expected at a local level, not from fisheries officers
considered as outsiders. This gives rise to the main difficulty of combining traditional
management practices and fisheries management regulations — establishing a
working relationship between the Fisheries Department (as outsiders) and the
resource users and owners. This relationship must necessarily take into account the
need to devise income generating alternatives for communities who are depending
heavily on the depleted resources concerned. As Amos23 concludes, if the people are
not provided with alternatives that will ensure that their subsistence and financial
needs are met, they will continue to over-exploit the resources concerned, regardless
of management controls. 
The advantage of co-management is that it combines scientific methods of fisheries
management when sufficient data exists for it to be workable and when relevant, with
traditional practices of resource exploitation. Fishing communities in turn acquire a
better understanding of fisheries management principles. The costs of enforcement
and management are minimised as well as the social and political conflicts between
the government and the community. 
CONCLUSION
This chapter explored current environmental issues in the South Pacific and possible
ways of addressing them by giving meaning to two concepts commonly found in aid
policies: sustainable development and good governance. Strengthening the rule of
law and government institutions and introducing environmental law reforms are
certainly relevant and necessary to address these issues from a top-down perspective
of management. From a bottom-up perspective however, improved community
participation in development decisions and the legal recognition of customary
resource management practices are the most culturally appropriate and the most cost-
efficient ways of addressing the limitations and shortcomings of the state and of
promoting greater self-reliance. This approach is extremely relevant today given the
increasingly limited powers granted to the state in the context of the globalised
economy. Yet, reliance on these elements of a bottom-up approach to sustainable
development and good governance necessitate access to education, both formal and
vocational, a prerequisite that has received too little attention in the South Pacific
beyond the training of future elites who tend to lose connection with the needs of
their communities as they become the main beneficiaries of globalisation. Hence,
before sustainable development and good governance can become truly meaningful
concepts in the Pacific region, environmental education and subsequent wider
consciousness of environmental issues needs to be established. 
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13.  LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGHLY
MIGRATORY AND STRADDLING FISH STOCKS IN
THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN
By: Laurence Cordonnery
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Archipelagic waters
Under article 49 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47 and
described as archipelagic waters. Archipelagic baselines may be drawn by joining
the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands
and an area in which the ratio of the area of water to the area of land including
atolls is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
Artisanal
This term refers to the scale and techniques of fishing operations in the context
of subsistence economy as opposed to industrial fishing operations.
Biomass
The term biomass refers to the total mass of living organisms of one or more
species per unit of space.
Straddling stocks
Highly migratory species that move across vast expanses of ocean space and
that cross international maritime boundaries, straddling the exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) of one or more states and the high seas.
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PACIFIC TUNA STOCKS:  ECONOMIC SECURITY AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF PACIFIC ISLAND
COUNTRIES
The Pacific Ocean represents 12% of the world’s oceans, and, its importance for
Pacific islanders is such that in many ways, “it is the sea that holds the key to the
future of Pacific Islands peoples”.1
The importance of marine resources to Pacific island countries (PICs) has been
recognised in Chapter 17 (Programme G) of Agenda 21, the action plan for
implementing sustainable development in the 21st century adopted as a soft law
instrument2 of the 1992 Rio United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED). Chapter 17 focuses upon the protection of the oceans and
provides that:
Small Island States are ecologically fragile and vulnerable. Their small size, limited
resources, geographic dispersion and isolation from markets, places them at a
disadvantage economically and prevent economies of scale. For island developing
states ocean and coastal environment is of strategic importance and constitutes a
valuable development resource.3
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) provides the habitat for the world’s
largest and most valuable tuna resources, contributing over 50% of the world 3.4
million tonne catch.4 According to the 1988–1997 data compiled by the Secretariat
of the Pacific Community, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of PICs yield 78 %
of the WCPO tuna catch5 with a 1998 estimated value of US$ 1.3 billion.6 Given the
limited economic development options available to PICs, as outlined in the previous
quote, the importance of tuna resources and their exploitation to the economic
security and sustainable development of the South Pacific are considerable and cannot
be overstated. Indeed, as Aqorau and Bergin note, “for many of the PICs, tuna is not
just a resource; it is the only resource that sustains their economies”.7
PICs have traditionally exploited tuna resources for local consumption. However,
artisanal fisheries in comparison with industrial fishing activities undertaken by
Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) represent less than 10 % of the total tuna
catch. The negotiation of bilateral and multilateral access agreements with DWFNs
has therefore been the main strategy used by PICs to obtain benefits from the foreign
exploitation of tuna stocks present in their EEZs. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
has been particularly instrumental in facilitating the negotiation of such agreements.
Its mandate is to promote regional cooperation and co-ordination amongst PICs in
management, conservation and development of legislation and fisheries policies in
connection with the tuna resources of its member countries as further discussed in
this chapter. 
The sustainability of the Pacific tuna stocks, although not immediately threatened
except for the most valuable bigeye tuna species (mostly exploited for the sashimi
market), must be considered in the global context of the collapse of northern
hemisphere world fisheries (such as the north Atlantic cod) and the relocating to
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southern oceans of intensive industrial fishing activities (south Atlantic, Indian and
‘southern’ oceans). 
The current exploitation rates of the three main tuna species (skipjack, yellowfin,
albacore) are considered low to moderate with stocks capable of supporting further
increases in catch. In contrast, the status of the bigeye tuna stock is uncertain with
increases in catches of juvenile fish raising concerns of over-fishing and declines in
adult biomass.8 Despite the relative abundance of the Pacific tuna stocks, the fact that
tuna species are considered highly migratory as well as straddling stocks raises a
number of issues for the management and conservation of the tuna fisheries. Indeed,
the mobility of tunas across their oceanic habitat characterises these species as an
international resource to be harvested both within EEZs and in the high seas. Given
this, the sustainability of tuna resources can only be ensured if management and
conservation measures adopted within the EEZs are compatible with measures
implemented on the high seas where the freedom of fishing prevails, subject to
conditions that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. In other words,
the reliability of tuna fishing as an option for sustainable development for PICs is
dependent upon the establishment of a legal framework for managing the resource
that needs to be devised in collaboration with DWFNs. This negotiation process was
initiated in 1994 with a series of Multilateral High Level Conferences (MHLC)
which culminated in the adoption of the Regional Convention on the Conservation
and Management of Tuna in the WCPO in August 2000. 
RATIONALE FOR COOPERATION IN TUNA FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Tuna in the WCPO is a
regional outcome of a regulatory process in international fisheries that was first
initiated at the global level by the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. It was followed by the Agreement for the
Implementation of the UNCLOS relating to the conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish species (commonly known as the
Implementing Agreement) in 1995. 
The UNCLOS entered into force on 16th November 1994.9 It is a framework
convention, which establishes rules governing all uses of the oceans and their
resources. It embodies in one instrument traditional rules for the uses of the oceans
(freedom of the high seas) and at the same time introduces new legal concepts
(coastal states’ sovereignty over EEZs, sea-bed as common heritage of mankind) and
addresses new concerns such as the sustainable use of marine resources. 
The EEZ concept brings under national jurisdiction large tracts of ocean space that
previously belonged to the regime of the high seas. A coastal state has sovereign
rights to explore and exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources in the EEZ
(article 56.1(a)). In the exercise of such rights, UNCLOS permits coastal states to
undertake enforcement measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial
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proceedings (article 73.1). UNCLOS also imposes an obligation upon coastal states
to “ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the EEZ is not endangered by over-
exploitation” (article 61.2). From this general obligation, two more specific
obligations are derived. First, the coastal state is required to determine the total
allowable catch (TAC) of the living resources in its EEZ, taking into account the best
scientific evidence available. Secondly, the coastal state has the obligation to ensure
an optimum utilisation of the living resources in the EEZ (article 62.1). If the coastal
state cannot harvest the entire TAC, the coastal state is obliged to give access to the
surplus to other states by agreement (article 62.2). 
While the principle of sovereignty is useful to regulate an exclusive use of the 200
nautical miles zone seaward from the coastal state territorial sea baseline, it is of little
relevance in regulating the exploitation of highly migratory fish species beyond the
EEZ. This is because the principle of freedom of fishing in the high seas remains a
central part of the “freedoms of the high seas” codified in Article 87 of UNCLOS.10
This freedom of fishing is only subject to the duty for fishing states “to seek to agree”
with coastal states upon the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area to the
coastal states’ EEZs, in accordance with article 63.2 of UNCLOS. The limitation of
the EEZ concept in managing highly migratory fish species is further demonstrated
in article 64 of UNCLOS. This provides that coastal states and states whose nationals
fish in the high seas shall cooperate to ensure conservation and promote the objective
of optimum utilisation of such species within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone. As pointed out by Hewison, the principle of freedom of fishing in the high seas
was based on the assumption that the ocean’s resources were inexhaustible.11 This
assumption has now been replaced by a realisation that conservation and allocation
measures were required to prevent over-exploitation. In the South Pacific, the issue
of driftnet fishing and the subsequent ban imposed by PICs on this particularly
devastating fishing method for marine resources certainly triggered this awareness.12
Moreover, the new competence of coastal states to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as
provided in article 61.3 of UNCLOS, puts limitations on the access of DWFNs to
fisheries resources. Subsequently DWFNs had to adjust strategically and search for
alternative fishing grounds, the tendency being for DWFNs to fish immediately
outside the 200 NM zones. This strategy of margin fishing (or unregulated fishing)
cannot be considered illegal yet it is damaging to the interests of coastal states. For
stocks whose biomass occurring outside the EEZ is sufficiently large, unregulated
fishing in the high seas can seriously deplete the stock and render ineffective
management measures taken inside the EEZ. In the case of Pacific tuna stocks,
depletion of the stocks due to unregulated high seas fishing is unlikely to occur given
the spatial distribution of the catch with a high proportion taken in the EEZs and
archipelagic waters of coastal states. However, the lack of enforcement capacity of
PICs in the regulation of fishing within their large EEZs calls for an increased
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cooperation amongst PICs themselves as well as with DWFNs to make conservation
and management measures applicable and effective. 
While the principle of cooperation between coastal states and DWFNs was first laid
down by UNCLOS, it has been further elaborated under the 1995 Implementing
Agreement.13 Indeed with the Implementing Agreement,14 cooperation becomes a
prerequisite to ensure the compatibility of the conservation and management
measures for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks between areas under coastal
states’ jurisdiction (EEZs) and on the high seas (article 7.2). In other words, the
Implementing Agreement acknowledges the necessity to consider highly migratory
fish stocks as one biological unit over its entire range of distribution. This is clearly
stated in Article 7.2 (d), which provides that:
In determining compatible conservation and management measures, states shall
take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the
stocks and the relationship between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries
and the geographical particularities of the region concerned, including the extent
to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction. 
One issue raised by the requirement to ensure the compatibility of conservation and
management measures on the high seas and in the EEZs is the setting of the total
allowable catch (TAC). The Implementing Agreement does not specify whether or
not the TAC should be set jointly by coastal states and DWFNs. As discussed further
below, the setting of the TAC for Pacific tuna stocks has similarly been a contentious
issue during the MHLC negotiations. 
Another limitation of the Implementing Agreement is in the lack of enforcement
rights to enable coastal states to impose compliance by states fishing for straddling
stocks in the area beyond and adjacent to their fisheries zone. Under the
Implementing Agreement, enforcement remains the prerogative of the flag state,15 as
provided in article 19. Yet it is common knowledge that flag state enforcement has
typically been characterised by its lack of effectiveness in international fisheries. Since
enforcement of provisions is left to the state in which the vessel is registered (or
whose flag it is entitled to fly), fishing operators tend to exert political pressures on
flag state governments for them to be complacent when it comes to enforcement. In
addition, most flag states do not have the technological ability to ensure that their
nationals comply with international and foreign regulations of fishing activities often
undertaken at a considerable distance. 
The Implementing Agreement however provides the jurisdiction for port state
enforcement. Under article 23 (2), a port state may inspect documents, fishing gear
and catch on board. A port state may also adopt regulations to prohibit fishing vessels
from landing catches or transshipping catches where it has been established that the
catch has been taken in a manner that undermines the effectiveness of conservation
and management measures on the high seas (article 23.3). Despite greater power
granted to coastal states under these provisions, port state enforcement is only
applicable to vessels fishing in the high seas that choose to use a coastal state port for
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landing catches. It is common knowledge that today industrial fishing fleets are
capable of undertaking transshipment of catches at sea, an activity that can easily
escape port state16 and flag state control. 
Perhaps the most proactive features of the Implementing Agreement in terms of
enforcement are to be found in the provisions for international cooperation and
regional agreements. Regarding international cooperation, states are to assist each
other in the conduct of an investigation of an alleged violation of conservation and
management measures and in the identification of vessels reported to have engaged
in activities undermining the effectiveness of such measures (article 20.2 and 20.4).
States are to establish arrangements to make available to prosecuting countries of any
other state evidence relating to alleged violations of conservation and management
measures (article 20.5). In addition, state members of a regional fisheries
management organisation ought to take action to deter vessels that have violated
conservation and management measures through recourse to regional proceedings
established for that purpose (article 20.7). Finally, a flag state may authorise a coastal
state to board and inspect a vessel on the high seas, providing there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the vessel has been engaged in unauthorised fishing within
an area under the jurisdiction of a coastal state (article 20.6). 
Clearly the provisions of the Implementing Agreement regarding enforcement
through regional cooperation provide some extended powers to coastal states, despite
the fact that the exercise of such powers is dependent on the extent to which the flag
state does or does not fulfill its enforcement obligations. 
As discussed before, the central aim of the Implementing Agreement is to encourage
international and, foremost, regional cooperation in the management of highly
migratory fish species. In doing so, the Implementing Agreement primarily grants
extended enforcement powers to coastal states that are parties to a regional
arrangement or organisation for managing straddling and highly migratory fish
species. This provides both an opportunity and an incentive for PICs to negotiate
with DWFNs a regulatory regime for managing the Pacific tuna fishery. Indeed, such
a strategy may be analysed as a logical outcome of the collaborative achievements of
PICs themselves that were orchestrated by the FFA. 
INTRA-REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN PICS:
THE ROLE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FFA IN
RELATION TO THE PACIFIC TUNA FISHERIES
Since its establishment in 1979 under the Forum Fisheries Agency Convention,17 the
FFA has played a pivotal role in promoting intra-regional cooperation and
coordination, particularly with respect to the harmonisation of fisheries management
policies, surveillance and enforcement, and relations with DWFNs. Major outcomes
in the work of FFA include the adoption of harmonised Minimum Terms and
Conditions (MTCs) of access for foreign fishing vessels that impose a list of rules on
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all foreign fishing vessels, aimed at controlling the operations of such vessels in the
EEZs of FFA member states.18
The MTCs were initially adopted in 1982 and revised in 1990 to strengthen the
control of FFA member states over fishing operations by prohibiting transshipment
at sea and requiring the maintenance and submission of catch logs on high seas
fishing. In 1983, MTCs were complemented with a Regional Register used as a
database and compliance mechanism holding details of all foreign fishing vessels
operating in the region. The requirement of good standing being a prerequisite to
obtain a licence to fish in the region, once the good standing status is withdrawn, the
licencing bans remains with vessels even if sold or renamed.19 The prospect of change
in status of the vessel on the Register and subsequently having access denied to the
entire region has been sufficient to make vessel operators comply with the fisheries
laws of FFA member states. This also facilitates compliance with court orders or the
settlement of negotiations regarding the payment of compensation for
infringements.20
In 1995, the FFA launched a major initiative to implement a satellite-based vessel
monitoring system (VMS) that will strengthen the effectiveness of existing
monitoring and enforcement programmes such as military air and sea surveillance on
fishing activities undertaken by New Zealand, Australia and France. The VMS will
monitor the positions of fishing vessels using a global positioning system in near real
time. Once implemented, the FFA VMS will require that any foreign fishing vessel
wishing to apply for a licence (to fish in the waters of an FFA member country) be
fitted with a VMS in addition to the licencing procedures normally required to
become part of the Regional Register. 
The FFA also provides assistance to members in drawing up bilateral and multilateral
access agreements with DWFNs. Until recently, FFA member states have been leasing
fishing rights to DWFNs through bilateral agreements. They are now interested in
multilateral access agreements to promote more stability in fisheries relations. This
trend was initiated in 1987 with the adoption of the Treaty on Fisheries Between the
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United
States. This treaty has been considered as a major achievement since it put an end to
the dispute between PICs and the United States over the jurisdiction of tuna. For the
first time the USA recognised the right of coastal states over highly migratory species
contained within their EEZ and also agreed to pay for the right to fish them (via
fishing licences). The treaty gave access to 50 US vessels to be licenced and to fish in
the EEZs of 16 FFA member countries. Access is subject to regulatory conditions.
Vessels are only permitted to catch tuna using purse-seiners. They must comply with
the good standing requirements of the Regional register, they cannot fish within
closed areas (internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters) and they must
carry FFA observers on board. 
Despite such impressive achievements, it is important to emphasise the limitations of
the FFA in so far as conservation and management of tuna stocks is concerned. The
limitations of the FFA stem from its lack of a decision-making role. The FFA’s
functions are administrative, facilitative and advisory. These functions prevent it from
becoming a management agency. The need for an international management
arrangement distinct from the FFA is even recognised in article III(2) of the Forum
Fisheries Agency Convention which provides that: 
…effective cooperation for the conservation and optimum utilisation of highly
migratory species of the region will require the establishment of additional
machinery to provide for co-operation between all coastal states in the region and
all states involved in the harvesting of such resources.21
Indeed, one missing element if such a machinery was to be devised within the FFA
would be the accession of DWFNs to the FFA Convention as a prerequisite to their
participation. Although nothing in the Forum Fisheries Agency Convention prevents
other states from acceding to it, one has to recall the initial controversy as to whether
DWFNs could become members of FFA. The argument raised at that time was that
the inclusion of DWFNs would dilute the agency’s regional unity and weaken its
bargaining position for asserting ownership of migratory tuna. That argument
prevailed and the DWFNs were excluded from FFA membership. It was therefore
necessary to envisage new avenues for cooperation beyond the FFA. 
COOPERATION BETWEEN PICS AND DWFNS:
THE MHLC NEGOTIATION PROCESS
In September 1996, South Pacific Forum leaders called the second Multilateral High
Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks of the Central and Western Pacific (MHLC2), which was held in Majuro,
Marshall Islands, during 10th–13th June 1997. The conference brought together
member countries of the South Pacific Forum, other coastal states and territories, and
those DWFNs with legitimate interest in the region’s tuna fisheries, with a view to
developing cooperative conservation and management measures consistent with
international law.
The outcome of the conference resulted in the adoption of a Declaration of Principles
(the ‘Majuro Declaration’) setting a framework on which future negotiations were to
be based, with the aim to have them concluded by June 2000. From 1997 onwards,
negotiations took place following the initial framework set by the Majuro Declaration
which covered the following matters: 
(a) species and stocks to be covered by the arrangement; 
(b) geographical area to be covered; 
(c) membership and participation by observers; 
(d) mechanisms for decision-making and procedures for the settlement of disputes; 
(e) mechanisms for the collection and exchange of fisheries data, scientific
research and stock assessment; 
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(f) determination of conservation and management measures, including
the application of the precautionary approach; 
(g) relationship with other regional and global fisheries organisations
and arrangements; 
(h) procedures for monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement; and 
(i) financial and administrative arrangements. 
States participating in the negotiation process included all 16 member states of the
FFA,22 the three French Pacific territories (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis
and Futuna) and France, DWFNs (Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, United
States of America) and other coastal states in the region (Philippines and Indonesia).
The United Kingdom did not attend despite being an eligible participant due to the
presence of its one remaining territory in the region, Pitcairn Island. 
From 30th August to 5th September 2000, a final round of negotiations was
convened in Hawaii (MHLC 7) which resulted in the adoption of the Convention on
the Conservation and Management of Tuna in the Central and Western Pacific
Ocean. Despite every effort made by the Chairman, Ambassador Satya Nandan, to
have the Convention adopted by consensus in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the Implementing Agreement, the persistent opposition of a number of states to
the final draft prevented this approach. The Convention was therefore adopted by a
two third majority vote, with 19 states in favor, 2 states voting against (Japan and
Korea) and 3 abstentions (China, France and Tonga). 
The final negotiation process necessarily involved protracted debates on a number of
outstanding issues, which included decision-making, the status of fishing entities and
participation by territories. The absence of consensus on the above issues resulted in
the abstention or rejection of the final text by the states listed above. These issues will
now be analysed in the light of the objectives set in the Convention. 
The main objective of the Convention is listed in article 2, which provides: 
the objective of this Convention is to ensure, through effective management, the
long term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the
western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 Convention and
the Agreement. 
Amongst the principles for conservation and management listed under article 5, it is
provided that members of the Commission shall apply the precautionary approach in
accordance with this Convention and all relevant internationally agreed standards and
recommended practices and procedures.23 The Convention is more than a framework
agreement in that it provides for institutional arrangements to facilitate the
implementation of the Convention provisions. A Commission is to be established
with a secretariat and two committees dealing with compliance and scientific issues.24
The Commission will be the decision-making body and will:
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• determine the TAC in the Convention area and adopt such conservation
and management measures as may be necessary to ensure the long-term
sustainability of stocks (article 10.1(a));
• ensure that conservation and management measures on the high seas are
compatible with areas under national jurisdiction (article 10.1(b));
• establish cooperative mechanisms for effective monitoring, control
and surveillance and enforcement, including a vessel monitoring system
(article 10.1(i));
• promote peaceful settlement of disputes (article 10.1(n));
• be responsible for compiling and disseminating statistical data while
maintaining confidentiality (article 10.1(e)). 
Further to article 10.1, paragraph 2 specifically lists the type of measures that the
Commission may adopt in giving effect to article 10.1. These measures include:
determining the quantity of any species or stocks which may be caught, the level of
fishing effort, limitations of fishing capacity, including number of fishing vessels,
types and sizes, areas and periods in which fishing may occur, the size of fish of any
species that may be taken, the fishing gear which may be used. 
DECISION-MAKING
At the outset, decision-making within the Commission has been identified as a
delicate issue requiring adequate representation for all members as well as ensuring
that decisions can be made in an efficient manner. Article 20 of the Convention
provides that decision-making shall be by consensus as a general rule and refers to a
three-fourths majority vote for decisions on questions of substance once efforts to
reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted. In addition, mandatory
consensus is required for all decisions pertaining to the rules of procedure for the
conduct of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies’ meetings (article 9.8), the
budget of the Commission (article 18.1) and the allocation of the TAC (article 10.4).
Given the scope of the decisions on conservation and management that may be taken
by the Commission it is not surprising that some DWFNs, particularly Japan, felt
threatened by the future power of the Commission and sought to obtain a decision-
making process that would best secure their interests. This is illustrated by the
Japanese proposal presented at the final round of negotiations which demanded the
inclusion of an objection clause allowing for an objecting party to opt out of a
decision. This proposal was supported by Korea but vigorously opposed by the
Forum Fishery Committee (FFC) (which included all FFA member states) on the
basis that a substantial compromise had already been reached during the previous
session, which resulted in an increase of issues for which mandatory consensus was
required, including budgetary arrangements and allocation of fishing opportunities.
In addition, the FFC argued that most fora use a two-thirds majority rule for
adopting substantive matters. Yet, in the case of substantive matters to be decided by
the Commission the threshold had already been raised to a four-fifths majority in
addition to decisions that are subject to consensus. 
Not surprisingly, the FFC refused the Japanese proposal of inserting an objection
clause in article 20 on decision-making on the grounds that it would make the regime
ineffective in the light of previous international fisheries regimes. In addition, the
FFC exerted some pressure to revert to a two-thirds majority vote as provided in the
earlier drafts. 
Yet, an ultimate compromise was made in order to secure the approval of Japan and
Korea. A proposal was raised by the head of the American delegation for a voting
system by chambers, which would be arithmetically detrimental to the FFC member
states. The modified text proposed a three-fourths majority vote by chambers on
questions of substance, instead of a four-fifths majority vote of members present and
voting, as stipulated in the earlier draft convention adopted during MHLC 6. More
specifically, the final text of the Convention identifies two chambers: one composed
of FFA member states and the other chamber composed of non-members of the
FFA.25 Article 20.1 further states that “in no circumstances shall a proposal be
defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber”. 
Despite the inclusion of these provisions Japan and Korea voted against the adoption
of the Convention. In addition, Tonga made a statement referring to the vote in
chambers as the tyranny of the majority and the surrender of the negotiation on
decision-making process, and decided to abstain from voting on the final text of the
Convention. 
STATUS OF CHINESE TAIPEI AS A FISHING ENTITY
Given the substantial fishing activities of Taiwan in the region26, it is therefore
imperative for the effectiveness of the regime to ensure her participation in and
compliance with the decisions taken by the future Commission. This proved difficult
to achieve because of the diplomatic position of China. In the MHLC jargon, Taiwan
is referred to as Chinese Taipei as a result of the non-recognition by China of Taiwan.
One has to note here that while five FFC member states (Palau, Solomon Islands,
Tuvalu, Nauru and the Marshall Islands) have diplomatic ties with Chinese Taipei and
supported its inclusion as a contracting party, other FFC member states support the
‘one China policy’. At the outset, Chinese Taipei, which has participated as a full
member in the MHLC process, sought to obtain contracting party status as a fishing
entity. China has maintained throughout the negotiations that Chinese Taipei may
only be allowed observer status, emphasising that the inter-governmental nature of
the Convention amongst sovereign states ought to be preserved. During the FFC
meetings of MHLC 7 a common position emerged that for Chinese Taipei’s
participation to be secured, the text of the Convention would have to be modified in
order to clarify the rights, duties and obligations of fishing entities. Such
accommodation of Taiwanese interests is reflected in Annex I of the final text of the
Convention, which provides that after the entry into force of this Convention, any
fishing entity may agree to be bound by the regime established by this Convention.
In addition, paragraph two of Annex I stipulates that any such fishing entity shall
participate in the work of the Commission, including decision-making. To avoid any
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further confusion, the text adds “[r]eferences thereto by the Commission or
members of the Commission include, for the purposes of this Convention, such
fishing entity as well as Contracting Parties”.27 Despite such clarifications aimed at
ensuring the full participation of Taiwan in the decision-making process of the
Commission, the Taiwanese delegation made a declaration noting its disappointment
regarding the status granted to Taiwan in the final text. The declaration stated that
had Taiwan such capacity it would vote against the adoption of the Convention if
such a procedure were used. On the other hand, Taiwan declared, she would have to
approve the Convention if adopted by consensus. China remained opposed to the
participation of fishing entities in the decision making process and on that basis
decided to abstain from voting. 
Having analysed the position of the states that either abstained or voted against the
Convention, one needs to examine their likely implications on the future of the
regime. It may be useful at this point to quote article 8(4) of the Implementing
Agreement, which sets the requirement of participation in regional arrangements as
a prerequisite to having access to regional fisheries as follows: 
Only those States which are members of such organization or participants in such
arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management
measures established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to
the fishery resources to which those measures apply.28
Despite the Implementing Agreement not having entered into force, this provision
can be seen as a strong incentive for the future accession of the two DWFNs that
voted against the Convention, Japan and Korea, as well as China. Incidentally, the
option of demanding DWFNs’ participation in the Convention as a prerequisite to
access to the EEZs of coastal states was raised by the Papua New Guinea delegate
during one of the MHLC 7 FFC meetings. This was, however, in order to encourage
the FFC Chairman to table the text as it was then, and to refuse any further dilution
of the decision-making process. Before this option can be applied though, it would
certainly have to be weighed against the benefits of Japanese aid in Pacific Island
countries and the strings attached to it. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF THE WCPO TUNA CONVENTION
Precautionary Approach to fisheries management
A major strength of the WCPO Tuna Convention rests in the application of a
precautionary approach for the conservation and management of fish stocks as
referred to in article 5(c) and detailed in article 6 of the Convention. This is in line
with article 6 and Annex II of the Implementing Agreement, which sets a precedent
by incorporating this approach in the management and conservation of straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks. The precautionary approach illustrates a paradigm
shift from the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) approach, previously used as a
method for determining the potential reproductive productivity of a stock and setting
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a catch limit based on this determination. As Macdonald notes,29 using MSY as a
management tool led to many variables being ignored in allocation decisions,
particularly biological variables such as minimum reproductive biomass, safe
biological limits, optimum recruitment30 levels and maximum statistical probability of
ecological and economic collapse. The MSY approach led to the adoption of
politically motivated catch quotas and in a vast number of species being
overexploited.31 Because of past failures of fisheries management to act in the face of
scientific uncertainty in stock assessments, a new paradigm began to emerge relying
upon a precautionary approach to fisheries management. In other words, caution is
required when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. This approach is
reflected in article 6(2) of the Convention, which provides that “the absence of
adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing
to take conservation and management measures”. When contrasting this approach
with the previously prevailing attitude that fishing activities were left unregulated
until there was an absolute proof of over-fishing, the paradigm shift is quite obvious.
Yet it does not seem to be fully achieved since a strict interpretation of the
precautionary principle would shift the burden of the proof to the proponent to
prove that the proposed action (in this case fishing) does not degrade or have a
negative impact on the resource. Macdonald32 rightly argued that such a strict
interpretation of the precautionary principle is not applicable to fisheries
management, except in extreme cases as in the case of the high seas driftnet fishing
ban imposed by the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets
in the South Pacific.33 Instead, a more pragmatic interpretation has been applied in
both the Implementing Agreement (article 6.3(b)) and the WCPO Tuna Convention
(article 6.1(a), (b)) which require the setting of precautionary reference points to
prevent over-fishing. The precautionary reference points are target levels of fishing
effort designed to ensure that the abundance of fish stocks is maintained to a level
above that which can produce the MSY. In setting precautionary reference points the
resilience and reproductive capacity of stocks as well as major sources of uncertainty
related to the knowledge of the stocks and the fisheries exploiting them are taken into
account. In addition, article 6.3 of the Convention provides that: 
members of the Commission shall take measures to ensure that, when reference
points are approached, they will not be exceeded. In the event they are exceeded,
members of the Commission shall, without delay, take the action determined
under paragraph 1(a) to restore the stocks. 
Finally, the development of data collection and research programmes to assess the
impact of fishing on non-target and associated (or dependent) species and the
adoption of plans to protect habitats of special concern are other applications of the
precautionary approach provided for in article 6.1(c) of the Convention. 
If effectively implemented, the provisions listed above will certainly have major
implications for fishing activities in the WCPO, which explains the concerns raised by
Japan over the application of the precautionary approach and its attempts to delete
paragraph 1 of article 6 from the text of the Convention.34 However, the likelihood
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of implementation of the precautionary approach will depend on the decisions
adopted by the Commission, subject to a vote by chambers where consensus fails.
Furthermore, the Commission in adopting decisions will take into account the
reports and any recommendations made by the Scientific Committee. The Scientific
Committee in turn will review assessments and analyses prepared by scientific experts
before making any recommendation to the Commission.35
This raises at least two questions. Will the Commission be capable of adopting
conservation measures in the face of scientific uncertainty? Past experience in fisheries
management has shown that lack of data and the consequent scientific uncertainty
provide powerful arguments to reluctant states not to adopt proposed conservation
measures. The example of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, and the delay of eleven years after the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in adopting
precautionary catch limits on krill, reveals the difficulty of implementing a
precautionary approach to fisheries management.36
Secondly, will the members of the Commission provide accurate data concerning
catch of target and non-target species and fishing effort in order to facilitate the work
of the Scientific Committee? It is noteworthy that the Convention provides an
incentive to that effect in article 10.3(e). This article lists the contributions of
participants to conservation and management of the stocks, including the provision
by them of accurate data and their contribution to the conduct of scientific research
among the criteria to be taken into account by the Commission for the allocation of
the TAC.38
The setting of the TAC
As demonstrated by Tony Lewis, the spatial distribution of the tuna catches shows a
high proportion of the catch taken in the EEZs of coastal states. The legal
implications of this are considerable in terms of ensuring the compatibility of the
conservation measures throughout the range of stock, that is within EEZs and in the
high seas.39 This concern is addressed in article 8.3 of the Convention, which provides
that coastal states should ensure that the measures applied to highly migratory fish
stocks within areas under national jurisdiction do not undermine the effectiveness of
measures adopted by the Commission in respect of the same stocks. 
One issue raised by the requirement to ensure the compatibility of conservation and
management measures on the high seas and in the EEZs is the setting of the TAC
which has been a contentious issue during the MHLC negotiations. FFA member
states maintained that the Commission should only be allowed to set fishing quotas
for the high seas, leaving coastal states the sovereign right to set national quotas and
determine the conditions of access to their EEZs. Yet, one difficulty in this argument
is the fact that only a few PICs have actually set their own TAC within their EEZ,
even if most are currently reviewing and amending their fisheries legislation and
adopting national tuna management plans to address this issue. Fishing nations on
the other hand argued that the Commission should allocate quotas throughout the
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region, both in zone and on the high seas, thus questioning the sovereign right of
coastal states to set national fishing quotas. The Convention implicitly recognises the
right of coastal states to set national quotas by reference to compliance with national
laws as part of the terms and conditions for fishing prescribed in Annex III. However,
it does not clearly spell out a precise formula to be used by the Commission for
determining the TAC within the Convention area. Despite this, article 10.3 refers to
criteria to be developed by the Commission for the setting of the TAC. Such criteria
are to be developed mainly taking into account:
• the status of the stocks and the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery;
• the historic catch in an area;
• the needs of small island developing states whose economies are highly
dependent on the exploitation of marine resources;
• the fishing interests and aspirations of coastal states in whose areas of
national jurisdiction the stocks also occur. 
In addition, any decisions relating to the allocation of the TAC are to be taken by
consensus, as mentioned before. Past experience in fisheries regimes operating under
consensus shows that the threat of veto by one or more fishing nations is likely to
succeed in preventing the imposition of quotas. From a conservation perspective, the
fact that the Commission will only be empowered to limit catch or effort in the area
of application of the Convention in general also presents some difficulties given the
somewhat unclear delimitation of the Convention area itself as discussed in the next
section.
Area of application of the convention
In order to be effective, conservation and management measures ideally need to
cover the full range of tuna stocks, that is an area covering the 50°N to 50°S and from
the coasts of Asia to the longitude of 150°W. For the skipjack tuna, its main
distribution is between 45 degrees of latitude north and 40 degrees latitude south,
the stock being concentrated west of 150 degrees longitude west. The Convention
area therefore covers most of the skipjack stock since the easternmost boundary of
the Convention is at 130 degrees longitude west. Similarly, for the yellowfin tuna
whose distribution is between 40 degrees latitude north and 40 degrees latitude
south, with higher abundance in the western Pacific, most of the stock distribution is
covered within the Convention area.
However, the main problem area for the skipjack and the yellowfin tuna is with
respect to the western boundary. Twenty-three per cent of the total skipjack catches
and 32% of yellowfin catches occur outside the Convention area, in the Philippines
and Indonesia archipelagic waters. As pointed out by Hampton:
Unless compatible management of these fisheries can be guaranteed, having such
large portions of the total catch outside of the management regime has the
potential to severely limit the effectiveness of management measures.40 
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A boundary problem also occurs for the bigeye since its distribution is continuous
from the east coast of the Pacific ocean to the west coast, to capture the entire stock
distribution ideally the Convention area would have to be extended to the coast of
the Americas. The eastern boundary stops at 130 degrees longitude West and only
150 degrees longitude West at the latitude of Kiribati. Cooperation will therefore be
required with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) in the
management of the bigeye stock, already considered endangered and the most
valuable species. In addition, 16% of the total bigeye catch occurs to the west of the
Convention area in the archipelagic waters of Philippines and Indonesia.41 For the
albacore, 10 to 20 % of the total north Pacific catch occurs east of the Convention
area and cooperative management with the North American trawl fleet would be
required.42
Despite attempts being made to set a northern boundary at 50 degrees north, this
was rejected by some delegations and the final text of the Convention only defines
the western and northern boundaries of the Convention area by reference to the
migratory range of the stocks. Such open-ended boundaries raise concerns about
possible enforcement of the measures adopted by the Commission in the future. In
an attempt to address this issue, a proposition was made at MHLC 5 to establish sub-
committees to deal with the both northern and western areas. This proposition was
initially opposed by the FFC as it was felt it would weaken the decision-making power
of the Commission and was only partly retained with the establishment of the
Northern Committee. The Northern Committee is to be composed of member states
situated in such area and those fishing in the area.43 Its role is:
...to make recommendations on the implementation of conservation and
management measures that may be adopted by the Commission for the area
north of 20 degrees parallel north latitude and on the formulation of such
measures in respect of stocks which occur mostly in this area.44
Concerns were raised during FFC meetings of MHLC 7 over recommendations that
may be formulated by the Northern Committee in relation to stocks also occurring
within the jurisdiction of FFA member states. According to Lewis,45 the stocks
concerned would represent 20% of skipjack, 14% of bigeye and 12% of yellowfin since
these species occur throughout the range. The risk of establishing a Northern
Committee mostly composed of fishing nations with potential to overturn the
decisions made by the Commission was therefore identified. To a large extent, these
concerns are set aside by the fact that the Northern Committee has no decision-
making power but only acts as an advisory body to the Commission. Besides,
recommendations formulated by the Committee must be adopted by consensus and
the Commission is entitled to take decisions regarding stocks occurring north of 20
degrees latitude north in the absence of any recommendation formulated by the
Committee. Yet, in case the Commission does not accept the recommendation of the
Committee on any matter, it shall return the matter to the Committee for further
consideration. The Convention does not explicitly state how such matters should be
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dealt with and article 11.7 simply provides that “the Committee shall reconsider the
matter in the light of the views expressed by the Commission”. 
As illustrated above, the limitations in the boundaries of the Convention area show
the need to develop cooperative and compatible management measures with the
IATTC which are not secured at present. These geographical and biological
limitations in the area of application of the Convention also reflect the unsuccessful
attempt to fully cover the species range by bringing into the negotiations additional
coastal states that may have different interests to those of PICs. This is so in the case
of Indonesia and the Philippines who refused to have their archipelagic waters
included within the Convention area despite their vote in favour of the adoption of
the Convention. Reference to the particular status of Indonesia and the Philippines is
made, albeit rather implicitly, in article 3.2 of the Convention, which provides that: 
nothing in this Convention shall constitute recognition of the claims or positions
of any members of the Commission concerning the legal status and extent of
waters and zones claimed by any such members. 
Despite the fact that the Convention does not clearly spell out the non-applicability
of conservation and management measures to the archipelagic waters, this has been
clearly expressed by Indonesia in the following statement made at MHLC 6:
We therefore like to interpret, as far as we are concerned, and in conformity with
article 64 [of the Law of the Sea Convention] that the notion of ‘throughout the
range of stocks’ cannot be interpreted to include these stocks within archipelagic
waters.46
Another western boundary limitation to note concerns the exclusion of South-East
Asia waters from the Convention area which are not part of the Pacific Ocean. There
was a general agreement among MHLC participants that the benefits that may have
been gained in terms of fisheries management and conservation did not outweigh the
difficulties in bringing into the negotiation states claiming sovereignty in the South
China Sea, an area currently subject to territorial disputes.47
Compliance and Enforcement
Compliance and enforcement mechanisms devised by the WCPO Tuna Convention
range from the establishment of an observer programme, the requirement of VMS
and the regulation of transshipment, to high seas boarding and inspections
provisions. The establishment of a regional observer programme was initially opposed
by some DWFNs, mainly Japan, Korea, China and Chinese Taipei because it was
perceived as a challenge to flag state authority. Despite this, the idea of establishing
an observer programme was retained although concessions were made for the
Commission to develop further procedures and guidelines in order to ensure the
confidentiality of the data collected by observers.48 The role of observers is to collect
catch and other scientific data and to monitor the implementation of the conservation
and management measures adopted by the Commission. In other words, it is an
important tool to facilitate compliance with the fisheries regime. However, no
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agreement was reached on the issue of funding for the observer programme, an issue
that is left to the Commission to resolve. 
The VMS is incorporated as one of the instruments for facilitating compliance
through the requirement for fishing vessels operating on the high seas to use near
real-time satellite position fixing transmitters. This requirement is listed in article
24.8 as part of the duties of flag states. The VMS will be operated by the
Commission, under rules of procedures for protecting the confidentiality of
information received. Compatibility between national and high seas VMS is ensured
though cooperation between the members of the Commission. Each member of the
Commission whose flagged fishing vessels operate in areas under the national
jurisdiction of another member shall require those vessels to use near real-time
satellite position fixing transmitters in accordance with the standards and procedures
determined by the coastal state. Finally, any member of the Commission may request
that waters under its national jurisdiction be included within the area covered by a
VMS. Simultaneous and direct transmission of information on vessels’ positions to
the Commission and the flag state raised concerns during the negotiations from
Japan and other fishing nations who maintained that that this would undermine flag
state jurisdiction. Article 24.8 strikes a compromise by providing that the
Commission should directly receive from the VMS, and simultaneously with the flag
state where that state so requires. 
The regulation of transshipment on the high seas (also referred to as transhipment at
sea) is provided for under article 29 and article 4 of Annex III of the Convention.
Prohibition of transshipment at sea is already part of the MTCs of fisheries access to
EEZs set by FFA member states. Consequently the FFC’s position was to support the
prohibition of transshipment on the high seas so as to ensure accurate reporting of
catch. However, that proposal was generally rejected, except for the transshipment at
sea by purse-seiner vessels operating in the Convention area, which is prohibited
under article 29.5. For other fishing activities, article 29.1 of the Convention does
not impose a similar prohibition but only refers to members of the Convention which
“shall encourage their fishing vessels, to the extent applicable, to conduct
transhipment in port”. Transshipment at sea is thus generally permitted (except for
purse-seiners) provided it takes place in accordance with the terms and conditions set
out in article 4 of Annex III of the Convention. Such terms and conditions create an
obligation for the vessel operator to comply with any procedures established by the
Commission to verify the quantity and species transshipped, hence allowing access
and use of facilities and equipment necessary for any person authorised by the
Commission to undertake such duties.49
Compliance and enforcement provisions are detailed in article 25 of the Convention,
based on flag state responsibility to investigate any alleged violation by fishing vessels
flying its flag of the Convention’s provisions or conservation and management
measures adopted by the Commission. Serious violations of the provisions of the
Convention are defined in the Convention by reference to article 21.11(a) to (h) of
the Implementing Agreement.50 For fishing vessels on the high seas that have been
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engaged in unauthorised fishing within an area under the national jurisdiction of a
member of the Commission, cooperation is required between the flag state and the
member of the Commission concerned regarding boarding and inspection on the
high seas. It will be one of the Commission’s tasks to establish procedures for
boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the high seas in the Convention area
within two years of the Convention coming into force. If after two years the
Commission cannot agree on any procedures or alternative mechanism to boarding
and inspection, the provisions of article 21 and 22 of the Implementing Agreement
will be applied as if they were part of the Convention. 
CONCLUSION
The analysis of overlapping legal, spatial and biological boundary issues shows the
complexity of devising a legal regime for tuna in the WCPO that is both effective and
accommodating to the interests of all parties. However, despite major concessions
made to fishing states and entities in the decision-making process of the Commission,
the latter has the potential to develop an effective conservation regime by applying a
precautionary approach to fisheries management. 
The fact that two DWFNs, Japan and Korea, voted against the adoption of the
Convention should not be seen as a major obstacle to the future of the regime, given
the legal basis existing for linking access to fisheries in the region to their participation
in the regional fisheries’ organisation that the Convention creates. In addition, had
the Convention not been signed and negotiations reopened in a few years, it would
have been extremely difficult for PICs to defend their long term interest in the
sustainability of the fisheries given the increasing level of fishing activities that would
have certainly taken place by then. 
The coming into force of the Convention, upon ratification by three states north of
the 20 degrees parallel North latitude and seven states South of that latitude, along
with funding arrangements, will ultimately determine the political willingness of
states participating in the MHLC process to make the new regime effective.
Meanwhile, the interim regime established by way of a Preparatory Conference will
be responsible for preparing practical and administrative arrangements for the future
of the Commission51 so that when the Convention comes into force, the Commission
will be able to start its work. 
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Review questions 
1. What is the relevance of traditional and customary practices for managing
natural resources in the South Pacific region?
2. What are the advantages of establishing mandatory EIAs for development
projects? What problems are associated with undertaking EIAs in the Pacific
region?
3. What is the relationship between sustainable development and good
governance? To what extent do co-management initiatives fall within the aims
of decentralisation?
4. Explain the importance for sustainable fisheries management of ensuring that
conservation and management measures applicable in the EEZs are compatible
with those that apply on the high seas. Compare the relevant provisions of the
Implementing Agreement and the Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean. Focus on the criteria and factors to be taken into consideration
in fulfilling this compatibility requirement.
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The final section of this book expands on some of the ideas introduced in Graham
Hassall’s chapter on the links between governance, legitimacy of the state and
corruption. His argument is that a lack of consitutional legitimacy has created a
situation in which the order embodied within the constitution is not respected. This
disorder can be expressed in multiple ways or on multiple levels. Often countries
will experience disorder on multiple levels at the same time, with, maybe, disorder
on one level encouraging a lack of respect for order on other levels. To address this
seemingly endemic problem of disorder it appears that we need to fundamentally
reconceive our notions of the state and of the key institutions operating within it.
The three chapters within this section examine different aspects of the problem of
disorder in the Pacific. 
This section begins with a chapter by Sinclair Dinnen that discusses the problem of
lawlessnesss and crime in Papua New Guinea, which of all the Pacific island
countries, probably has the longest history of problems of social order. Dinnen places
this issue into the wider context of governance and legitimacy, pointing out that
even if individual institutions are reformed the law and order problem will not be
solved unless the underlying issues relating to governance and legitimacy that have
arisen from the uneasy relationship between ‘modern’ conceptions of the state and
indigenous cultures are addressed.
The next chapter, by Anthony Regan, examines constitutionalism and the actions
of government in Melanesia. As well as comparing different Melanesian countries
this chapter makes comparisons with consitutionalism in Africa, a region that is
generally noted for its post colonial difficulties in the area of governance. The
farily recent development of constitutionalism in western history is also noted. This
comparative approach provides us with a perspective on why difficulties with
consitutionalism in Melanesia exist that sites the region within a global context.
Finally the chapter by Professor Hughes offers us a somewhat radical position on
the theory of the state. He argues that modern constitutionalism requires a unitary
conception of the state and identity that is false. In order for modern states to gain
legitimacy within this pluralistic environment, the state must be reconceptualised
so as to allow for recognition of this plurality. Possibly this theoretical perspective
offers us a way to approach the (re)building of Pacific island states in such a way
that constitutional legitimacy, and thereby order, will be established. 
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14.  BUILDING BRIDGES – LAW AND JUSTICE
REFORM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
By: Sinclair Dinnen
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Governance 
The manner in which power is exercised (in a country, community or any other
organisation) for the management of social and economic resources.
Kiap
The Melanesian pidgin term used to describe patrol and district officers in
colonial Papua and New Guinea.
Polity
According to the Oxford dictionary this is the term for a form or process of civil
government, a condition of civil order. Here it is used to refer to a particular
political order, whether of a village, tribe, island or nation.
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INTRODUCTION
Problems of lawlessness loom large in current accounts of Papua New Guinea.
Concerns about these problems have induced high levels of personal insecurity, as
well as providing a major disincentive to foreign investment. While such problems
cannot be resolved by law and justice solutions alone, the continuing deterioration of
PNG’s ‘law and order’1 situation raises questions about the adequacy of the formal
regulatory system. Successive governments have been loud with ‘tough’ rhetoric, like
many of their counterparts elsewhere. Practical responses have been essentially
reactive and short term.2 Australia, PNG’s largest aid donor, has claimed to
concentrate on institutional strengthening projects with individual law and justice
agencies. While there have been achievements it is clear that improving the
performance of law and justice processes is a complex and long term task and one that
needs to be integrated with other areas of governance reform. 
Building a more effective law and justice sector requires strategies that go beyond the
strengthening of particular institutions. Given the operational interdependence of law
and justice agencies, a broader sectoral focus is needed. In addition, while the state is
the central player, there is a need to recognise the contributions of other stakeholders
to the management of conflict and maintenance of peace at local levels. PNG’s non-
government sector, comprising ‘traditional’ structures of governance, community
groups, churches, NGOs and the private sector, already plays a significant, if often
unacknowledged, role. A sustainable law and justice framework needs to delineate
responsibilities between different organisations and develop appropriate and mutually
reinforcing linkages between government and non-government sectors. 
This chapter examines the challenges facing PNG’s law and justice sector and
identifies key directions for reform. Section one describes the broader context of
PNG’s problems of order, including the acute fragility of the nation-state and the
high levels of social and legal pluralism. Attention is drawn to the restorative character
of many ‘traditional’ justice practices and the manner of their interactions with
colonial institutions of social control. Section two examines the workings of the
modern criminal justice system. Its shortcomings are attributed as much to a lack of
legitimacy and strong social foundations as to its patent lack of institutional capacity.
The final section looks at the recently endorsed National Law and Justice Policy  and
Plan of Action and the prospects for building a more socially attuned and effective
law and justice system.
THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The broader context is one of rapid change induced by a combination of local and
global forces that have left few individuals or communities untouched. PNG was
granted independence in 1975 after a relatively short and uneven period of colonial
administration. Over 800 languages are spoken among a population of just over five
million people scattered across the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. The
institutions and traditions of small, self-regulating societies have demonstrated
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remarkable resilience and adaptability in the face of colonial and post-colonial change.
Twenty-seven years after independence, the primary allegiances and identities of most
Papua New Guineans remain firmly implanted in local kin-based associations.
Building the institutional framework of modern statehood, including a uniform
system of law and justice, commenced in earnest during an intensive period of
institutional modernisation in the twenty years preceding Independence. As in other
parts of Melanesia, the birth of the new ‘nation’ occurred in the absence of any shared
sense of identity among its ‘citizens’. Binding so many disparate communities into an
effective political and ideological unit remains a formidable challenge.3
Despite the many gloomy forecasts, Papua New Guinea has stayed intact and retains
an impressive record of uninterrupted democratic government. Serious challenges
nevertheless remain, many of these stemming from the fragility of the post-colonial
nation-state. The tragic and costly 12-year Bougainville war provides the most
dramatic example. A weak national economy is hostage to the vagaries of regional and
international markets. Levels of debt have risen as successive governments have been
forced to seek loans from the multilateral development banks and bilateral donors.
Economic mismanagement has contributed to growing popular discontent. Social
indicators suggest a serious reversal of early advances, particularly in the areas of
health and education. On a global scale, PNG’s human development profile ranks in
the lower one-third of all nations and is the lowest of all the Pacific island countries.4
Government services are in a perilous state in many rural areas, where over 85% of
the population live. Whilst the reformist government of Sir Mekere Morauta
struggles to reverse this pattern of decline, political instability, corruption and
lawlessness continue to pose a major threat.
CRIME AND LAWLESSNESS
The most visible manifestation of PNG’s ‘law and order’ problems is the growth of
so-called raskol crime in the main urban centres.5 Serious outbreaks of inter-group
conflict have also occurred in parts of the Highlands. The spread of lawlessness has
tended to follow larger patterns of development. Hence the concentration of
organised crime in the expanding urban centres, armed hold-ups along the arterial
highways, and inter-group conflict in the vicinity of large-scale resource development
projects. The incidence of corruption, fraud and ‘white-collar’ crime has also
increased significantly in recent years.
Quantifying the extent of these problems is difficult given the paucity and partial
coverage of available statistics. Criminal justice data is largely confined to the urban
areas, where less than 15% of the total population live. They nevertheless suggest a
marked growth in crime, with a 65% increase in the number of serious offences
reported to the police over the last decade.6 Port Moresby, the national capital,
accounts for 40% of all reported serious crimes. Mount Hagen (Western Highlands)
and Lae (Morobe) rank second and third respectively. With a conservatively estimated
population of over 313,000,7 Port Moresby has been described as one of the most
dangerous cities in the world.8 Between 1996 and 1998, the capital alone accounted
for a recorded total of 232 murders; 3,361 robberies; 2,131 break and enters; 556
cases of causing grievous bodily harm; 816 serious sexual assaults; 585 drug offences;
and 307 cases of illegal use of firearms.9
Media and anecdotal accounts draw attention to the violent and predatory activities
of raskol gangs. Although they tend to be concentrated in urban centres, criminal
gangs are found in many rural areas as well. Sexual assaults against women and girls
appear to be widespread, and are by no means confined to gangs.10 Gangs operate
with relative impunity in the absence of effective deterrence from either the police or
informal community controls. The typical probability of being arrested for crimes of
larceny has been estimated recently at just over 3%.11 Contrary to their depiction in
popular stereotypes, gangs are often well integrated into their local communities. As
well as ties of kinship and personal association, raskols engage in selective acts of
redistribution, providing material and other benefits to their neighbours in, often, the
poorest and most socially deprived urban communities.12
At a macro level, urban raskolism has developed in an environment where access to
legitimate economic opportunities is severely restricted. A recent survey estimated
that 18% of the Port Moresby population rely on crime as their principal source of
income.13 Raskolism has become, in effect, the largest occupational category in the
informal urban economy. Rampant corruption among the political elite has also
fuelled the rise of raskolism, providing a powerful rationalisation for street criminals.14
Falling commodity prices, deteriorating government services and infrastructure have
contributed to rural poverty and the spread of raskolism from urban centres to rural
areas. These developments, in turn, have placed enormous pressure on an already
weak criminal justice system.
As well as the devastating impact on individual victims, concerns about lawlessness
have undermined commercial and investor confidence. They have become major
constraints to the achievement of national and local development objectives.
Employers in PNG recently ranked theft and crime, followed by corruption and then
poor infrastructure, as the most significant obstacles to doing business.15 A
reinforcing downward spiral has developed whereby rising crime reduces legitimate
economic activities which, in turn, leads to further crime and so on.
Many of the issues underlying PNG’s current problems are shared with other
developing and newly democratising countries. They include a potent cocktail of local
and global factors contributing to uneven development and growing levels of division,
exclusion and poverty. While domestic policymakers and international donors scramble
for practical and timely solutions, it is clear that there are no quick fixes. 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SECTORS
The encounter between different traditions of justice brought about by colonialism
in Melanesia, as elsewhere, generated many new tensions. It also gave rise to new
synergies and the possibility for creative interaction between different regulatory
traditions. Ideas and practices of law and justice relate to particular social and political
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orders. In western societies, the legal system provides the official framework for the
regulation of relations between citizens, corporate entities and the state. In practice,
many subordinate regulatory systems operate alongside, and interact with, this formal
system.16 The state is nevertheless central to understandings, structures and processes
of law and justice in such a polity. In the case of crime, for example, it is the state that
defines the categories of prohibited behaviour, prosecutes those who allegedly engage
in them, and administers punishment to those who are found guilty. 
In ‘traditional’ Melanesia, perceptions and practices of justice reflected the social and
political organisation of small, essentially ‘stateless’, societies. Rather than being
centralised in a single entity, authority was typically dispersed throughout the social
body. ‘Law’ was an indivisible part of social and political life in these societies. Kinship
and social relations were fundamental to the determination of an individual’s rights
and obligations in respect of others. There was no concept of ‘crime’ per se. Disputes
were defined and resolved within an elaborate framework of kinship, status and
relationships.17 Notions of reciprocity and equivalence were also central to the redress
of perceived wrongs, as they were to other social activities. Given that parties to a
dispute were likely to continue to live in close proximity and interdependence, an
important objective of dispute settlement was the restoration of relations between
them. Compensation or the exchange of gifts was a common form of redress and was
generally the result of protracted negotiation and mediation between the parties and
their respective kin networks. Principles of restorative justice were thus central to the
settlement of disputes between members of a recognised group or community.
Where, on the other hand, there was no morally binding relationship between the
parties, as with strangers or members of rival groups, retribution or ‘payback’ was a
more likely response.
Interactions between western law and justice institutions and Melanesian processes of
self-regulation provide insight into the challenges currently facing the formal legal
system in PNG. They also reveal important areas of continuity in indigenous
responses to conflict and wrongdoing and these, in turn, provide lessons for law and
justice reform today. The formal system is largely a legacy of the period of
institutional modernisation that preceded Independence. Throughout most of the
colonial era there was in fact no discrete system of judicial administration applying to
indigenous subjects. Instead, the policing, judicial and penal powers of government
were part of an undifferentiated and decentralised system of ‘native administration’.
This system was personified in the Australian district officer — the kiap — who acted
simultaneously as administrator, policeman, magistrate and gaoler at local levels. A
special set of regulations (the Native Regulations), applying exclusively to
Melanesians, was administered in separate courts presided over by the kiaps. 
‘Custom’ was never officially accorded the status of law and no attempt was made to
incorporate customary institutions into the formal government system. At the same
time, ‘traditional’ structures were only interfered with when perceived as a threat to
colonial authority or European prestige18 and continued to shape the daily existence
of most Melanesians. The evolutionary premise of the colonial ‘civilising mission’ was
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that the indigenous population would remain subject to their ‘traditional’ practices
until such time as they had ‘advanced’ sufficiently to be fully integrated into the
‘modern’ legal system.19 Integral to colonial thinking was the assumption that there
was nothing in indigenous methods of governance that could provide the basis for a
uniform system of justice. Linked to this was the belief that ‘custom’ would
eventually die out under the impact of ‘civilisation’ or, in a later phase,
‘modernisation’.
While some district officials argued for the recognition of indigenous regulatory
processes,20 opposition was expressed by the long serving Australian Minister for
Territories, Paul Hasluck (1951–1963). Hasluck, the principal architect of
modernisation, was intent on building a system of justice consistent with what he saw
as the future political needs of the Territory.21 This entailed the gradual replacement
of the discriminatory system of ‘native administration’ by a modern system of
centralised government, which, in turn, would provide the institutional foundations
for eventual statehood.22 While kiap justice was a pragmatic strategy for the gradual
expansion and consolidation of administrative influence, it was not seen as an
appropriate option for the long-term governance of the Territory. Establishing a
centralised judicial system administering a uniform body of law was, in Hasluck’s
view, a necessary condition for the self-government that would one day follow. The
adoption of an essentially Anglo-Australian model of law and justice was proposed in
a review of the system of judicial administration commissioned by Hasluck, the so-
called Derham Report of 1960.23
Ironically, while official thinking maintained that indigenous institutions were
inadequate to the task, the colonial administration was dependent on them in practice
for the maintenance of peace in most rural areas.24 A high level of cooperation and
interdependence developed between many kiaps, Melanesian policemen and
‘traditional’ leaders, including unofficial village ‘magistrates’, at local levels.25 Had
official thinking been more receptive it would certainly have been possible to develop
a framework combining elements of both introduced and indigenous systems.
Such a possibility was out of the question, however, because it “was in fundamental
conflict with the official political goals and therefore restricted to an underground
existence.”26 The growing emphasis on nation-building that emerged during this
period served simultaneously to draw attention away from the role of indigenous
structures of governance, including mechanisms for dealing with conflict. The
subordination of local institutions within the larger nation-building project has
prevailed throughout the post-Independence period and conforms to a broader
pattern of neglect evident in other Melanesian countries.27
For many observers, the decision to establish a modern centralised system
contributed to the erosion of local social controls and the subsequent growth of
PNG’s ‘law and order’ problems.28 While there have been many other factors at work,
there is little doubt about the weakening of local regulatory systems. Related to this
is the marked failure of the modern system to facilitate the mutually supportive
interactions that developed in practice between kiap and indigenous ways of doing
2 8 3
B U I L D I N G  B R I D G E S
justice. While the Australian kiap may not always have been aware of the extent and
character of these engagements, they were generally conducive to the maintenance of
peace at local levels. 
Contributing to the relative success of the kiap system in dealing with disputes was
the large repertoire of agency functions and powers that these officials could draw
upon.29 These extended well beyond their official magisterial powers. The kiap also
had considerable discretion in the exercise of his powers. He could, for example, link
dispute resolution to the provision or withdrawal of various government services and
facilities. He could persuade and reward, as well as punish. He could address remedies
to either individuals or groups. Kiap justice accorded more closely with indigenous
practices because it approached dispute resolution in a more holistic way than was
possible under formal western juridical practice. In doing so, it produced outcomes
that were generally acceptable in local terms. There are important continuities
between kiap justice, particularly its holistic and problem solving approach, and many
of the informal restorative justice practices that have emerged in Papua New Guinea
since Independence. 
Kiap justice’s capacity to negotiate the seemingly unbridgeable space between the
requirements of colonial order and indigenous perceptions of justice provides an
illustration of what Sally Falk Moore has described as a “semi-autonomous social
field”:
The semi-autonomous social field has rule-making capacities, and the means to
induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix
that can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons
inside it, sometimes at its own instance.30
In practice, if not necessarily by design, kiap justice allowed for a high degree of
articulation between formal and informal fields of justice that was, in turn, an
important contributor to the administration’s much-lauded Pax Australiana.31
By contrast, the incremental processes of centralisation and specialisation that
followed the endorsement of Derham’s proposals served to close down or weaken
many of the points of articulation between formal and informal systems that had
contributed to peace. In the process, the differences between these regulatory
systems became more apparent, as did the deficiencies of the formal system in the eyes
of many local litigants. Thus the professional magistrate, who replaced the kiap, was
constrained by all manner of substantive, evidential and procedural rules.
Professional, as opposed to kiap justice, took much longer and entailed a
cumbersome and formalistic process, all conducted in a foreign language.
Professional officials, in the form of lawyers, magistrates, police officers and so on,
now dominated proceedings, leaving little scope for meaningful participation by
parties to the dispute and their wider support groups. Local litigants viewed this new
system as exclusionary, confusing, and often profoundly unjust.32 Speaking of the
Western Highlands, Marilyn Strathern noted that:
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The Kiap’s handling of trouble cases in the past combined both a concern for
public order and a capacity to deal with minor offences. In fact, these derived
from different aspects of his roles (administrator and magistrate), but it meant
that he “settled disputes” roughly along lines familiar to Hageners. The paradox
is that although the modern official courts are ostensibly concerned with law and
order, they fail in Hagener’s eyes to take cognisance of matters directly related to
both of these elements.33
Not surprisingly, dissatisfaction with the process and outcome of professional justice
led to a return to older traditions of self-help in some areas. Many of these involved
the use of violence as enhanced mobility created new opportunities for conflict. So-
called tribal fighting — a practice which had been effectively suppressed under the
kiap system — reemerged in parts of the Highlands in the early 1970s. The
availability of modern firearms provided an additional lethal ingredient.
Twenty-seven years after Independence, minor disputes in rural areas are still dealt
with largely by informal means as they have adapted to changing circumstances. The
formal law and justice sector remains geographically, as well as socially, distant for
many villagers. It also suffers from chronic under-resourcing that has seriously
affected its operations. Informal means vary in different places but are likely to
include a combination of methods: negotiation or mediation by kin, ‘traditional’
leaders or church officials; village moots; or the decisions of local komitis. Village
Courts are also used widely and constitute the most important hybrid institution
established in the post-independence period (see below). The effectiveness of
informal processes is largely a consequence of the degree of social cohesion of rural
communities. Social and economic change has had a seriously corrosive effect in
many places. A common complaint relates to the lack of respect shown to village
leaders and customary authority, particularly by youngsters exposed to the urban-
oriented education system and the hedonistic values of global culture. Likewise,
alcohol abuse has weakened social cohesion in both rural and urban communities,
becoming a major cause of violence against women and children.34
The formal system proclaims a monopoly over the processing of the most serious
incidents of conflict and dispute. Its record in this regard, however, leaves much to
be desired. It has proved particularly ineffectual in dealing with the large inter-group
conflicts that have broken out periodically in parts of the Highlands. There is
evidence in some rural areas of an increasingly destructive entanglement between the
social control processes of state and local kin-based associations. Rather than leading
to a strengthening of overlapping social fields, as in the case of kiap justice, this
process ultimately weakens both and generates further conflict. This is most evident
in cases where officials endowed with state powers use these powers for essentially
‘private’ or other ‘unofficial’ ends. This would include, for example, the case of a
police officer using a police raid to punish an adversary in a marital dispute,35 or a
Village Court magistrate responsible for maintaining peace and good order who is
simultaneously a local fight leader.36
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It is clear that many ordinary Papua New Guineans have little faith in either the
efficiency or fairness of the formal justice system. There is a popular perception of a
widening gap between ‘law’ and ‘justice’. In addition to the brutality and violence of
many police actions, there is a view that those with power and influence can
manipulate the formal system to their own advantage.37 In this respect, the
deficiencies of the present system relate as much to lack of legitimacy as to lack of
institutional capacity. 
At the policy level, the incessant debate about ‘law and order’ in Papua New Guinea
has focused on the issue of declining state capacity. Restoring law and order has been
portrayed as a challenge primarily for the state. Practical proposals have thus
concentrated on strengthening the formal sector. Continuing a long tradition of
neglect, the role of informal institutions has been seen as peripheral at best. 
Donor assistance to the law and justice agencies has reinforced the centrality of the
state in this respect. Most assistance continues to be in the form of capacity building
within state institutions. The outstanding challenge today is to develop appropriate
strategies for enhancing the capacity of both the formal and informal sectors and
linkages between them. 
THE LAW AND JUSTICE AGENCIES
The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary faces enormous challenges. The scale of
existing problems of order and PNG’s demanding topography would stretch any
modern police force. In some areas the police have been literally outgunned by
groups armed with automatic weapons. Many of the factors contributing to
lawlessness are issues of development that go well beyond the realm of law
enforcement. Expectations of the police are often unrealistically high. Lasting
improvement in the performance of the constabulary requires changes in the wider
environment and the mobilisation of a range of other stakeholders. There is a
pressing need to overcome popular distrust of the police and to develop more
cooperative and productive linkages with community and non-government
organisations.
At Independence, police coverage extended to only 10% of the total land area and
40% of the population.38 Police resources are still concentrated in the towns and many
rural areas are accessible only with considerable difficulty and expense. The size of the
force has failed to match the demands of a growing population and escalating
lawlessness. In 1975, when crime rates were relatively low, there were 4,100 police
officers covering a national population of slightly more than 2 million people. At the
end of 1998, with a total population of over 4.6 million and serious problems of
order, there were still only 5,000 police officers, of which 20% were either reserves or
auxiliary officers.39 Singapore, with a similar population, has more than double the
number of police operating on a small island with excellent transport and
communication infrastructure.40
2 8 6
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
Lack of adequate government support has been a major constraint. The bulk of
spending in the annual budget goes on salaries and wages, which, according to some
accounts, consume 80% of the total police budget.41 Funds for petrol, airfares, office
equipment and other basic necessities are scarce and officers-in-charge are forced to
seek external assistance, often from local business houses. The physical condition of
many police stations and houses is appalling. Health authorities condemn police
facilities regularly as unfit for human habitation. Barrack-type accommodation
reinforces the separation between police and the surrounding community. While
many dedicated officers struggle to maintain standards, poor working conditions
have had a corrosive impact on morale and operational efficiency. 
Disappointing performance in basic crime prevention, record keeping, investigation,
and prosecution are, in part, a consequence of the shortage of experienced and
specialist officers.42 It also reflects the constabulary’s colonial origins as an institution
whose primary role was the extension of government control and only secondarily the
control of crime. Lack of adequate on-the-job supervision has also contributed to ill
discipline. Allegations of serious human rights abuses against individuals and groups
are commonplace.43 
An internal affairs division is responsible for managing public complaints against the
police. In practice, less than 15% of complaints are resolved and lengthy procedural
delays are usual.44 Another disturbing trend in recent years has been the theft or
disappearance of weapons from police armouries. Suspicions abound that
unscrupulous officers have been selling or hiring weapons to criminal groups and
those involved in inter-group conflicts. 
Lack of capacity and poor community relations have contributed to the tendency to
be confrontational in dealings with individual suspects and groups. The superficial
‘strength’ of reactive policing disguises the actual weakness of the institution.
Reactive approaches have contributed to popular distrust and fear of the police.
Police violence fuels criminal violence in a reinforcing spiral that becomes increasingly
difficult to break.45 Violent encounters with the police have become part of the
process of induction into raskolism. While there are now serious efforts to develop
community policing, the concept itself remains unclear in the eyes of most people,
including many officers. The 1984 Clifford Report remarked that many police saw it
as “the police being close enough to control the community — or at least to instruct
it how to behave”.46 The same is true of many officers today, over sixteen years later,
particularly in the Highlands. The dominance of this retributive approach in
contemporary policing practice, with its continuous undermining of
police/community relations, remains the most significant source of the
constabulary’s current weakness. 
Correctional Services
The Correctional Service (CS) has been the most neglected of PNG’s law and justice
agencies. Low annual appropriations have been barely sufficient to cover wages and
basic institutional costs. The condition of prison facilities and staff housing has
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deteriorated alarmingly over the years with predictable effects on the morale of staff
and detainees.47
As a method of punishment, imprisonment elicits ambivalent views in the wider
community, being seen as too harsh in some cases and too ‘soft’ in others.48 This
ambivalence also signifies differences in approaches to wrongdoing between formal
and informal systems of justice. Removing offenders from society and locking them
up in isolated institutions fails to deal with many of the issues that are central to
informal dispute settlement processes. There is, for example, no role for the
community or the parties most directly affected by the wrongdoing. Many Papua
New Guineans view imprisonment as a form of punishment for and by the state, one
that does little to ‘resolve’ the infraction or dispute in question. As such, it does not
preclude the application of additional informal sanctions, such as compensation. 
In practice, imprisonment has also served to reinforce, rather than reduce, criminal
commitment and organisation. Raskol affiliations thrive in the major prisons.49 As
elsewhere, prisons provide a fertile environment for the building of criminal identity,
the expansion of criminal networks and the transmission of new criminal skills. Just
as policing is implicated in the generation of lawlessness, prisons have also
contributed to the reproduction of criminality and violence in contemporary PNG. 
Despite the ‘correctional’ tag, the primary role of prison is still viewed as being the
provision of secure and punitive custody. Lack of resources, including trained
personnel, has contributed to the neglect of rehabilitation programs. Activities that
do take place — vocational training, spiritual counselling, and gardening — tend to
be dependent on the voluntary participation of individuals and groups from the wider
community. There are few follow-up activities or organised support programmes for
released prisoners.
The CS operates as an integral component of the overall law and justice system. As
the end-of-the-line agency,50 many of the problems it faces are a consequence of
inefficiencies in other parts of the system. Currently, over one-third of the prison
population comprises remandees awaiting trial. Delays in court proceedings have
added greatly to the pressures on the prison system, as well as contributing indirectly
to prison breakouts. Overcrowded institutions experience difficulties in feeding and
providing uniforms for the growing number of detainees. Many remandees would be
more appropriately dealt with in separate remand centres or on bail in the
community. Likewise, many minor offenders could be diverted from prison through
the provision of adequately supervised community-based sentences or by
decriminalising many minor summary offences, such as defaulting on debts and
minor thefts.
The Law and the Courts
The development of a ‘home-grown’ legal system was an important theme in PNG’s
rhetoric of decolonisation. It was envisaged that ‘custom’ or customary law would
play a major role in the post-colonial legal order. Indeed, the new Constitution
explicitly adopted ‘custom’ as part of the underlying law that was to be developed
when no existing law was applicable. The National Goals and Directive Principles in
the preamble to the Constitution expressly called for “development to take place
primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social and political
organisation”.51 They also recognised the importance of community structures,
calling for “traditional villages and communities to remain as viable units of Papua
New Guinea society, and for active steps to be taken to improve their cultural, social,
economic and ethical quality”.52 The constitutional scheme was thus receptive to the
development of a more holistic and restorative approach to crime control and conflict
resolution, including a greater degree of community participation. 
Under the direction of Bernard Narokobi the Law Reform Commission was an early
advocate of greater integration between western and Melanesian legal traditions. A
1977 report argued that the formal justice system should take greater account of the
role of community mechanisms for dealing with conflict.53 The same report called for
wholesale law reform to narrow the perceived gap between the values governing
indigenous communities and those embodied in the introduced criminal law.
Despite the idealism of the 1970s, there has been little practical progress towards
fulfilling these aspirations. Few of the recommendations of the Law Reform
Commission were implemented and, in recent years, the Commission has lacked
adequate funds, effective leadership and political commitment. The slow pace of the
development of the underlying law has been blamed on Parliament’s failure to enact
enabling legislation. This situation has been remedied recently with the enactment of
the Underlying Law Act 2000.54 Others have criticised the constitutional scheme,
pointing to the non-justiciable character of the National Goals and Directive
Principles, the wholesale adoption of pre-independence laws, and the subordinate
role of the underlying law in the constitutional scheme.55 
The superior courts — the supreme and national courts — are occasionally lauded as
one of the success stories of the post-independence period. There are growing signs,
however, that the generic problems affecting other state institutions are having an
impact at even the highest judicial levels. An expanding caseload has placed great
pressure on the court system and led to lengthy delays in proceedings. The present
Chief Justice, Sir Arnold Amet, complained recently that “the judicial system is
swamped” and recommended the development of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.56 Finding suitably qualified citizens to sit as judges has long been a
problem and there is a growing reluctance to recruit overseas candidates. A recent
survey by the Institute for National Affairs (INA) found great concern among
business executives about the declining predictability of judicial decision-making.57 
These difficulties have been even more marked for the magistrates and staff of the
subordinate courts who process the bulk of formal court cases. There are currently
130 District Court58 magistrates. This works out at only 1 magistrate per 36,5000
people and less than 1.5 per administrative district.59 The deteriorating condition of
court buildings and staff accommodation has also had an adverse impact in many
areas. 
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The courts in the national judicial system have a range of non-custodial penalties
available to them including, for example, probation, community work orders, and
good behaviour bonds. A shortage of trained supervisory staff and other resources
has inhibited their use in practice. The idea of probation was proposed initially after
independence on the grounds that it was consistent with the spirit of the Constitution
and older traditions of managing disputes in the community. The Probation Act was
passed in 1979. The first operational probation service was established in 1981 by a
local NGO, the Eastern Highlands Province Rehabilitation Committee. This
initiative developed a strong community network and became the model for the
development of a national service.60
Probation offices have now been established in every province, with the exception of
Western Province.61 While the use of probation is gradually increasing, lack of capacity
remains a major constraint. In practice, there is often only one operational officer
available in each province to carry out a large number of tasks.62
The weak capacity of the probation service has also had an impact on the workings
of the Criminal Law (Compensation) Act of 1991. For many years the courts have
taken account of any customary compensation paid by an offender to his/her victim
as a mitigating factor when determining the appropriate judicial penalty.63 The 1991
Act goes a step further and empowers the national and district courts to make
compensation orders in addition to other penalties imposed for an offence.64 In order
to assist the courts to determine the appropriateness and amount of compensation,
the Act requires the Chief Probation Officer to submit a means assessment report.
The ability of the probation service to fulfil this requirement has been seriously
affected by its resource problems.65
Arguably the most significant institutional innovation in the law and justice sector
since independence has been the establishment of the village courts. The primary
function of these courts is to “ensure peace and harmony”, and endeavour to obtain
“amicable settlement of disputes” and apply custom “as determined in accordance
with the Native Customs (Recognition) Act of 1963”.66 Village courts are intended to
provide an accessible forum for dealing with minor disputes and infractions and one
that is responsive to the needs and expectations of local communities. They are
presided over by village leaders appointed as village court magistrates after
consultation with the people. While designed primarily for rural areas, these courts
also operate in the urban centres. There are currently 1,082 village courts covering
approximately 84% of the country.67
Responsibility for the payment of allowances to village court officials was transferred
from the national government to provincial and local governments under the
Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government 1995. Provincial and local
level governments claim that when these functions were transferred, no actual
funding was transferred with them. As a result, many village court officials have not
been receiving their allowances. While some continue to work, others refuse to hear
cases until they receive payment.68
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District court magistrates are responsible for supervising the village courts but in
practice rarely have the capacity to do so. It is not realistic to expect 130 district court
magistrates to supervise the work of 1,082 village courts. At the same time,
supervision is clearly required. There have been many instances of village courts
exceeding their powers under the Village Courts Act by, for example, hearing cases
that should be tried before the formal courts, or by unlawfully sentencing offenders
to imprisonment. 
Many early observers complained about the formalism creeping into village court
procedures.69 Illustrations included the construction of separate bush material
courthouses and the holding of regular court sittings. Others, however, point to the
successful synthesis between different traditions represented by these courts and their
overall flexibility.70 The formalism that worries some observers may be more a
reflection of local expectations and the practice of ‘forum shopping’ than a deliberate
attempt by village magistrates to slavishly imitate the formal courts. Many villagers
simply expect these courts to be more formal than the informal local forums that they
operate alongside. 
A common criticism of the village courts, particularly in the Highlands, is that they
reinforce the subordination of women and children.71 There have been reports of
women accused of adultery being imprisoned while their male partners go
unpunished. Likewise, children have been locked up for minor offences. The problem
here is that the courts have become too responsive to local power structures
dominated by older men. In the process, they have compounded the grievances of
the weakest groups in the community, notably women and children. The solution lies
in a combination of better training that will discourage such inequitable outcomes
and an effective system of supervision that will provide remedies to aggrieved parties.
It is the weakness of the linkage between these courts and the formal system that is
the source of many of their problems. Their strength lies in the provision of an
accessible legal forum that is highly responsive to local expectations. Their location
between the national court system and local dispute resolution mechanisms makes
them an important point for creative interaction between formal and informal justice
sectors. With appropriate support and supervision, these courts can provide ‘semi-
autonomous social fields’ that are capable of integrating different regulatory regimes
at local levels, like kiap justice in an earlier era.
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
There have been numerous reports and reviews about law and justice issues in PNG
over the years. As mentioned previously, the practical response of governments has
been the adoption of short-term measures aimed at suppressing lawlessness in
particular areas. These have entailed a familiar repertoire of curfews, liquor bans, and
special policing operations.
The well-known weakness of the PNG policy-making environment72 has been
accentuated by the sheer number of institutions and agencies comprising the law and
justice sector. Separate departments and ministers exist for justice, the police and the
2 9 0
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
correctional service. Each minister exercises a high degree of autonomy and no
formal mechanism exists for ensuring coordination or even regular consultation
between the various institutional components of the sector. In the absence of an
overall sectoral vision and strategy, each agency has been able to develop their
corporate plans and programmes independently of each other. Frequent changes in
ministers, agency heads, and senior departmental officials have undermined further
policy coherence in the sector.
The National Law and Justice Policy and Plan of Action 2000
Although policy instability continues to pose a major challenge, a window of
opportunity presented itself with the election of the reformist Morauta government
in 1999. The new government committed itself to an ambitious reform programme
as part of its strategy to restore the integrity of state institutions and improve overall
government sector performance. Establishing a secure and peaceful environment was
recognised as a fundamental condition for the pursuit of other social and economic
goals. A small working group of senior law and justice officials was tasked with
preparing a draft national policy for the sector. Earlier proposals were reviewed,
including the 1993 policy, and extensive consultations took place with a range of
stakeholders. The Morauta cabinet endorsed the new policy and plan of action on
21st August 2000. The policy provides the vision statement for the sector as a whole,
while the plan of action consists of a detailed set of proposals for achieving this
vision.73 These proposals are organised around three main pillars. 
(a) Improving the Efficiency of the Deterrence System
The first pillar emphasises the need to improve the efficiency of the formal criminal
justice system and is consistent with ongoing and proposed institutional capacity
building activities. Australia has been funding development projects in the law and
justice sector since the late 1980s. While initial assistance focused on the police,
capacity building projects are now being provided to the Ombudsman Commission,
the National Judicial Staff Service, the Legal Training Institute and the Attorney
General’s Department.
The new policy recognises that the state has a vital role to play in the maintenance of
peace and good order and that its agencies must be appropriately equipped in terms
of human and material resources. The strengthening measures proposed in the policy,
however, are directed to the sector as a whole, rather than to individual agencies.
These include strategies to revitalise the juvenile justice system and the Law Reform
Commission, as well as the development of a national rehabilitation policy and multi-
agency approaches to tackling corruption. 
Increasing community participation in law and justice processes lies at the heart of
the new policy and is seen as an integral part of institutional strengthening. Emphasis
is placed on the building of mutually reinforcing linkages between state and non-state
entities around activities aimed at preventing or resolving conflict in a variety of social
and institutional contexts. 
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(b) Coordination 
The second pillar relates to the critical issue of sectoral coordination. This is premised
partly on the high level of inter dependence between criminal justice agencies in
practice. Coordination between agencies is essential for ensuring that they operate
effectively as an integrated system. As well as horizontal coordination, there is a need
for vertical coordination between agencies and non-government actors operating at
different social and geographical levels. The Organic Law on Provincial and Local
Level Government, which is currently only partially implemented, mandates a major
redistribution of functions and responsibilities from national to provincial, district
and local level authorities. This larger exercise in decentralisation provides the broad
framework for implementing the policy’s vision of devolved law and justice and
increased community participation.
At the national level, the policy recommends the establishment of a National
Coordination Authority comprising the chief executives of the law and justice
agencies, related government departments and co-opted members. This body will be
responsible for the monitoring and review of sectoral policy, planning and budgeting,
and the coordination of law and justice data and research. It will also provide
oversight of sectoral training, liaison with other stakeholders at the national level, and
cross-sectoral issues. Provincial level coordination will be based on the existing
Provincial Peace and Good Order Committees. In addition to representatives from
the law and justice agencies and provincial authorities, these committees will include
a representative group of non-government stakeholders. Their functions will be
broadly similar to those of the national authority. They will also serve as a conduit for
the flow of information between national and local levels.
District level authorities are proposed to assist in the coordination of law and justice
services in conjunction with local level governments. They will be involved in
identifying and responding to local law and justice priorities, allocating resources, and
the coordination of programs such as community policing, community based
corrections and local preventive and restorative justice initiatives. At the time of
writing, a number of ‘community justice centre’ pilot projects are being designed and
these will be used to test and refine suitable local-level mechanisms. It is recognised
that these mechanisms need to be sufficiently adaptable to accommodate different
local circumstances. 
(c) Prevention and Restorative Justice
The third pillar of the new policy relates to crime prevention and restorative justice.
It seeks to strengthen the capacity of informal community based and other non-
government structures to prevent and resolve conflict at local levels. ‘Restorative
justice’ is the term used to describe the broad criminal justice reform movement that
has emerged in many countries in recent years. It is often contrasted, somewhat
simplistically, with retributive justice whose principal rationale is the deterrence of
wrongdoing through punishment. While most modern criminal justice systems
combine retributive and restorative principles in practice, it is their organisation
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around processes of identifying and punishing individual offenders that is used to
distinguish them from restorative alternatives. Hence the traditional focus of the
criminal process on apprehending suspects (the role of the police), ascertaining their
responsibility under the law (the role of the courts) and, if found guilty, the
administration of punishment (the role of the correctional service). There is usually
little scope for the participation of either the immediate victim(s) of the wrongdoing
or the wider community in this process. 
By contrast, restorative justice provides a major role for the community and those
who have been most directly affected by an offence or dispute. Ironically, the
restorative justice movement in countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada and
the United States draws inspiration from the dispute resolution methods of
indigenous, small-scale societies. An important objective of dispute resolution is seen
as the restoration of balance and harmony in the community affected and, wherever
possible, the healing of relationships damaged by wrongdoing or conflict. This
involves allowing an offender to make amends for his/her infraction and, thereafter,
to be reintegrated back into the community. Violence and other forms of
wrongdoing are understood as doing damage to the fabric of a community and
restorative practices are necessary to accomplish the necessary repairs. This is where
law and justice activities have the potential for intersecting with other community
building objectives. Empowering communities to manage conflict in this way can
thus become an important force for community development. 
Clearly not all conflicts or infractions are suitable for, or amenable to, restorative
techniques. Retributive justice will always remain an option for dealing with the most
dangerous and intractable offenders. In addition, where there are significant
imbalances in power between particular groups, as in the case of women appearing
before village courts, ‘restoring’ relations may simply serve to reinforce these
underlying inequities. In such a case, a form of justice is needed that contributes
actively to the transformation of the imbalances (e.g. ‘transformative’ justice). For the
vast majority of minor offences and disputes, however, there remains enormous
potential for developing restorative solutions that avoid the amplifying outcomes of
retributive practice. Restorative justice in this broad sense is not a new idea in Papua
New Guinea. As we have seen, practices like compensation, shaming and
reconciliation have strong social foundations in Melanesian communities. 
There are many examples of restorative justice institutions and practices in PNG
today. Some of these operate independently of the state and are, in part, responses to
the perceived failings or absence of state solutions. Others involve linkages or
partnerships between state and non-state entities. As most of these practices are
informal and occur in rural areas, they are often invisible to the planners and officials
based in the central government offices in Port Moresby or in provincial
headquarters. At the same time, they provide a rich reservoir of experience and
innovation with much to offer the current reform process.
Mass surrenders and gang retreats are a fascinating illustration of an incipient
restorative practice that has been developed in recent years.74 In the case of the
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former, groups of self-professed criminals surrender themselves and their weapons at
public ceremonies. Surrendering groups ask forgiveness for their criminal deeds and
assistance for their rehabilitation strategies. Surrenders are often brokered by church
groups or individual pastors. Brokers are instrumental in persuading the group to
renounce crime and, in return, offer help in securing access to legitimate economic
or educational opportunities. The violence involved in a life of crime is often given as
a reason for surrendering. Where court proceedings eventuate, magistrates are likely
to take the fact of surrender into account. Business houses and others in positions to
help are often sympathetic to the plight of such ‘reformed criminals’. 
Gang retreats bring criminals together with state officials, business and political
leaders. As in the case of surrenders, church representatives often broker retreats.
Criminals engage in frank discussions with those in positions of authority and
influence, outlining their grievances and identifying what is required to get them to
abandon crime. Like the surrender, the outcome of a retreat can be a commitment to
leave crime in return for access to legitimate opportunities. Unlike criminal justice
practice, these informal institutions are potentially restorative with the capacity for
breaking the reinforcing pattern of retributive violence between raskols and police.
They also offer the prospect of sustainable solutions by linking exit from crime
explicitly to employment, education, micro-credit and social development options. 
In some areas voluntary associations have been formed to assist in the rehabilitation
of ex-prisoners and ex-criminals. For example, in 1984 a group of former prisoners
set up the Western Highlands Ex-Criminal Self Help Task Force. This group
continues to operate today, producing a weekly programme on the local radio and
engaging in a variety of spiritual, vocational and agricultural training programs for
‘youth at risk’ and released prisoners. The group also visits those in police custody
and prison and provides informal representation for members of surrendering groups
appearing in court.
Contrary to their depiction in current stereotypes as disorganised and lawless
communities, many urban settlements have well-developed capacities for self-
policing. John Ivoro, a leader in Port Moresby’s Saraga settlement, documents the
successful mediation of disputes by a local dispute settlement committee in a large
multi-cultural urban community.75 He also tells the story of a mutually beneficial
partnership forged between the committee and a neighbouring private company. The
company approached the committee over their concerns about thefts and break-ins
at the company premises. After listening to community representatives, the company
agreed to engage local youth in casual employment as security guards and provide
sponsorship to church and sporting activities. As a result, criminal activities
diminished and a relationship previously based on distrust and hostility was
transformed.
Members of the Saraga dispute settlement committee received their mediation
training from the Peace Foundation Melanesia, an NGO that has been helping local
communities deal with conflict since the mid-1990s.76 The Foundation offers training
modules in people skills, conflict resolution, community development planning,
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training of trainers, and mediation and restorative justice. These modules have been
developed with the full participation of villagers from many different parts of the
country and are all linked to the general goal of building community cohesion and
promoting community development. In practice, they work through existing
community structures and local churches. The Peace Foundation has also worked
with mining companies, the police, staff and detainees in prisons and university
students. Training members of particular communities or institutions as trainers has
given these initiatives a high degree of sustainability in practice.
While the Peace Foundation is probably the best-known NGO in this area, there are
many others operating at local levels. East New Britain’s Sosel Eksen Komiti is a good
example. Initially established in 1986 as the Social Concern Committee of the East
New Britain Provincial Assembly, they were incorporated as an NGO in 1991. Over
the years, Sosel Eksen has built an extensive network of grassroots volunteers
throughout rural East New Britain. Among its many programmes, it runs workshops
and training courses directed at reducing drug and alcohol abuse, child abuse, and
‘domestic’ violence. There are approximately 120 trained extension volunteers living
and working in villages throughout the province.
The peace process that has emerged out of the tragic conflict on Bougainville
provides a rich source of restorative ideas and practices. While the conflict centred on
the struggle between armed secessionists and the PNG security forces, it also served
as a catalyst for many sub-conflicts between and within Bougainvillean communities.
The collapse of state authority left the way open for the creation, and revival, of a host
of local structures and processes of governance in different parts of the island. As
such, it provides a unique opportunity for viewing the dynamics of order without
state. The ongoing peace process has given rise to many innovative and culturally
based strategies for reconciling the many different kinds of conflict provoked by the
war. While subject to enormous variation, ‘traditional’ authority, in the form of chiefs,
has played an important role in many areas:
It reduced the tensions that were often the driving force in violent localised
conflict, including that between BRA and Resistance Forces. In some cases the
roles of chiefs in promoting peace went much further. Some exerted control over
local BRA or Resistance Forces, limiting them to defensive roles. Some played
major parts in initiating reconciliation between groups in conflict, a role now
increasing as the peace process gathers momentum.77
Women’s groups, churches and NGO’s have been active in reconciliation and
rehabilitation activities with individuals, families, ex-combatants, and villages. The
role of women in the current peace process recalls the long history (and longer pre-
history) of women as peace-makers in Melanesia.78
The Peace Foundation has also been involved in the Bougainville peace process,
working with chiefs, women’s groups and others in the area of mediation, conflict
resolution and restorative justice.79 John Tombot, a traditional chief and former
village court magistrate in the Siwai district of southwest Bougainville, underwent
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training with the Foundation. Since 1997 he has been involved in over 300
mediations including many cases of homicide occurring during the conflict.80 He tells
how many local people in his area believed the imposition of fines by the formal
courts was primarily an income generating activity for magistrates. When the war
broke out, many magistrates were openly attacked and disputes that had been dealt
with by the courts were resumed, often with violent consequences. According to
Tombot, restorative practices that accord closely with ‘traditional’ methods are much
more successful than formal adjudication in achieving sustainable resolutions. 
In other parts of Papua New Guinea, the lack of tangible support from distant
headquarters in Port Moresby has also served to stimulate local officials into
developing creative solutions. In one large provincial prison, the commander and his
senior officers have gone to great lengths to build supportive relations with the
surrounding community. A local NGO has been providing training courses for prison
staff and their families, as well as detainees. Selected inmates have helped build and
repair local community schools and perform various public works. The prison has
been contracted by a local company to provide detainees for sign writing on vehicles.
A nearby agricultural research centre has been allowed to use prison land and detainee
labour to grow hybrid guavas. From being a depressingly insular institution
concerned solely with security, this prison has become a hive of activity. Regular
interactions have diminished fears and insecurities among the local community about
the proximity of a large prison. Likewise, the morale of detainees, prison staff and
their families has risen dramatically.
These are a selection of some of the restorative initiatives occurring in different parts
of PNG. Many other examples could be cited. These practices have been developed
under very different local circumstances and involve a range of both state and non-
state actors. The challenge now facing policy makers, law and justice practitioners and
community and non-government sector leaders, is how to integrate these various
practices within an overall regulatory system. It is the challenge of developing ‘semi-
autonomous social fields’ that allows the existence of complimentary layers of social
regulation under the rule of law. These levels inevitably draw on different traditions
and experiences but should ultimately be directed at achieving the same overall
objective — the promotion of peace and good order. The new national policy
contains specific recommendations aimed at ‘community-building’. These involve the
identification of particular community needs and priorities and the provision of
appropriate training and other support designed to increase local capacities for self-
regulation. The policy also introduces the notion of ‘partnerships for peace’ whereby
support will be targeted at preventative and restorative initiatives between state and
non-state entities. Wherever practical, support will be directed at these partnerships
thereby building the capacities of formal and informal sectors simultaneously and, in
the process, nurturing a process of mutual learning.
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CONCLUSIONS
It would be naïve to expect that law and justice reform alone could overcome PNG’s
problems of order. These problems are diverse and complex and need to be addressed
in different ways. At the same time, fundamental reform is clearly needed. The formal
justice system, particularly in its criminal justice role, has not only failed to stem
lawlessness and conflict but has, in many ways, become a contributor to them.
At the heart of PNG’s challenges of governance — including that of ‘law and order’
— lies the uneasy fit between the institutions and ideology of the modern ‘nation-
state’ and the multiplicity of indigenous polities that constitute modern Papua New
Guinea. The formal law and justice system is a relative newcomer and has been
superimposed onto a patchwork of self-regulating local systems that have by no
means ‘disappeared’ under the onslaught of modernity and externally induced
change. On the contrary, the latter have been remarkably resilient and have engaged
actively with institutions of more recent origin. Although many of these interactions
are consistent with building a larger and sustainable social order, others are not. 
While the role of the state internationally has undergone dramatic changes over the
past two decades, its central role in national development is widely accepted. For
many observers, PNG is a classic example of a ‘weak state’.81 This weakness is
manifested in the difficulties it experiences in carrying out the most basic tasks of
statehood, including the maintenance of public order, preserving political stability,
providing basic services, and managing the national economy. Building the capacity
of state institutions, including the law and justice agencies, is a necessary response to
this weakness. Problems arise, however, when the state is treated in isolation from its
social environment. Lack of state capacity is often viewed as a ‘technical’ problem to
be remedied by strategic inputs targeted exclusively at state institutions. The question
of a state’s relations to its wider society and the extent to which these might
themselves be a source of its limited capacity is rarely raised. The fragile legitimacy of
the state in Papua New Guinea has all too often been ignored in the haste to build
its institutional structures.
An implicit argument in this paper is that the weak performance of PNG’s formal law
and justice system, particularly its criminal justice system, is as much an outcome of
its lack of legitimacy, as it is a consequence of shortage of resources, ‘technical’ or
otherwise. There are growing levels of distrust and disaffection with the workings of
the formal system. This can be seen in the turning away from state remedies, the
revival of older ways of dealing with conflict, as well as in the creation of new ones.
Restoring faith in the law and justice system requires that priority be given to
improving relations with the wider society it exists to serve. Building trust and
confidence in the principal agencies is an integral part of any sustainable institutional
strengthening activities. Community participation in law and justice processes is a
necessary part of building the social foundations whose absence is a significant
contributor to the sector’s current weakness. 
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While the weakness of the state is widely acknowledged, the weakness of PNG
communities has received less attention. Building the conditions for sustainable peace
and good order requires both a strong state and strong communities. Rapid social
and economic change has taken its toll on even the most distant village. Combined
with the deficiencies of formal processes, the erosion of community cohesion has
meant a growing absence of effective conflict resolution capacities in many areas.
Empowering communities to deal with local problems of order within an overall
framework of national law is an important priority in the National Law and Justice
Policy. As we have seen, there are already many community based organisations
involved in conflict resolution and restorative justice initiatives in different parts of
the country. Some of them already work with state officials and agencies, while others
work with the private sector. Developing partnerships of this kind, as envisaged in the
policy, is an important way of building the capacities of state and civil society
simultaneously and in a mutually supportive way.
PNG’s colonial and post-colonial history provides important lessons in the
importance of developing law and justice strategies that can accommodate a degree
of semi-autonomy at local levels within an overall national system of regulation. The
relative success of kiap justice had less to do with the personal attributes of these
agents of pacification, as with their ability to link the needs of colonial order with
those of local power structures in a mutually reinforcing way. Their ability to
approach disputes in a holistic manner allowed them to contribute to resolutions that
were broadly acceptable and conducive to the maintenance of peace and good order.
Local leaders were active participants in these processes, rather than merely passive
bystanders.82 Kiap justice was thus able to integrate the requirements of an
encompassing ‘administrative’ order with those of particular ‘local’ orders in a way
that the post-independence justice system has singularly failed to do. 
There are strong echoes of this holistic approach to conflict resolution in many of the
restorative justice initiatives that have developed informally in PNG in recent years,
often in response to the failings of the formal system. While restorative justice
approaches elsewhere have attracted criticism for individualising responsibility for
conflict, the novelty of these responses in PNG has been their deliberate attempt to
address underlying causes, including the structural conditions that contribute to
crime (e.g. by providing pathways back to legitimate economic activities). An
important source of the weakness of the formal system has been its failure to address
the broader issues of social justice that are widely seen as contributing to crime and
conflict. Indeed, many Papua New Guineans view the formal system as reinforcing
these grievances by, for example, punishing the minor criminals while leaving alone
those who engage in serious abuse of public office. The ability of restorative responses
to engage directly with social justice issues provides an important way of building the
legitimacy of the law and justice system. Contrary to a negative perception of law and
justice as being solely about control and suppression, restorative justice also provides
a way of integrating law and justice processes with more positive and productive
development activities. 
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15.  CONSTITUTIONS AS LIMITS ON THE STATE
IN MELANESIA:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, PARTICIPATION
AND CIVIL SOCIETY* 
By: Anthony J. Regan 
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Authoritarian
A government system based on an established system of authority rather than
on the express or implied consent of the governed. The term is also applied to
situations where established power is regarded as having an absolute right to
assert itself.
Bourgeois/bourgeoisie
A French word meaning ‘town dwellers’ and the upper class of such persons.
As used by Karl Marx (see ‘Marxist’ below) it refers to the class of property
owners who rose with and developed the capitalist system of production, taking
power from the feudal aristocracy. (Also see ‘middle class’).
Clientilism
A term describing informal and unequal power relations based on exchange of
benefits. It is found in many forms, including some small-scale traditional
societies where a high status person uses his or her authority and resources to
offer protection to others who in return provide support and services. 
Dictatorial
Dictatorship is a form of government in which a single person, office, faction
or party has complete political power. The term is often used in a less precise
way to describe someone who has enormous political power or influence even
though they are acting within the legal restrictions of a democracy.
Marxist
A Marxist is a person who adheres to any of the versions of social theory that
derive from the works of Karl Marx (1818–83). The central part of his complex
theories is the view that history must be explained in materialistic terms. Each
person exists as a member of an economic class with all classes always in
competition with others.
* I am grateful to Sinclair Dinnen, Yash Ghai, Peter Larmour, Ron May and Robert
McCorquodale for their insightful comments on an early draft of this chapter.
3 0 6
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
INTRODUCTION
Human societies have to balance two apparently contradictory needs. While ‘rulers’
are needed to manage the society, at the same time there is a need to limit the
tendency of those with power to abuse it. The potential for abuse is particularly acute
in complex modern societies where coercive power is great. Hence the discussion of
the control of rulers in the present day tends to be about limiting state action.
Constitutionalism — the acceptance by government of limits on its actions set by
constitutional rules — was anticipated as an outcome of adoption of ‘Western’ style
independence constitutions for most post-colonial states. In much of Asia and Africa,
these hopes were not fulfilled, with most independence constitutions being short-
lived and limits on the state increasingly being ignored by those in power. But
following the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, expectations were raised that the efficacy
of constitutions as restraints on the state might be bolstered by democratic change,
and especially by popular participation in government associated with
democratisation and by the development of civil society, and not just in Eastern
Europe, but also in Africa and Asia.
In the post-colonial states of the Pacific constitution-makers embraced the need for
limits on government. Popular participation in government was expected to assist
acceptance of constitutional limits by governments. By contrast with Africa and Asia,
hopes for independence constitutions in the Pacific initially seemed to be fulfilled.
Adherence to constitutional provisions on succession of government in the
immediate post-independence era was seen as evidence of support for
constitutionalism.1 But since at least the late 1980s, the position has become less
clear, especially in the four turbulent states of Melanesia (Fiji Islands, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu). Not only was the Fiji independence
constitution overthrown in the first of two coups in 1987, but there has been a
further coup in Fiji Islands (May 2000) and a coup in Solomon Islands (June 2000).
More generally, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, there seems to be growing
evidence of reduced acceptance of constitutional limits on government, so that
constitutionalism increasingly seems problematic in Melanesia. As with other parts of
the post-colonial world, some see possibilities that civil society will assist in a
resurgence of constitutionalism.
This chapter examines the record of and prospects for constitutionalism in Melanesia
with particular reference to acceptance of limits on the state in the form of
constitutional rules on succession of government, accountability and human rights.
It also examines the possibility that popular participation and civil society might offer
hopes of increased acceptance of limits on the state in Melanesia in the future. The
chapter does not purport to examine the full range of factors relevant to
understanding the persistence or otherwise of constitutionalism, factors which now
include various forms of pressure from the international community, as for example,
with the conditionalities in both bilateral and multilateral aid associated with
governance-related goals.
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CONSTITUTIONALISM, PARTICIPATION
AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is the imposition of effective limits on state action through the rule
of law under constitutional government. It is “a constitutional system in which the
powers of the government and the legislature are defined and limited by the
constitution, which enjoys the status of fundamental law, and by which the courts are
authorised to enforce these limitations”.2
De Smith emphasised the distinction between the “formal sense” of constitutionalism
— rules intended to limit government action — and its operation as a “living
reality”.3 Constitutionalism really lives only when “these rules curb the arbitrariness
of discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of power, and to the extent that
within the forbidden zones upon which authority may not trespass there is significant
room for the enjoyment of individual liberty”.4
Critics of post-colonial states often forget that constitutionalism became a ‘living
reality’ in Europe comparatively recently, at the time of the bourgeois revolutions,
when its ‘constituent elements’ of secularisation, nationalisation, separation and
limitation of public powers developed.5 Secularisation was part of efforts by national
monarchies to escape papal authority. Nationalisation of public powers was sought by
the bourgeoisie as it pursued mercantilism from the 16th to the 18th centuries.
Capitalism’s needs were served by constitutionalism, as the bourgeoisie sought limits
on arbitrary or discretionary powers of either the monarchy or the centralised state in
relation to property or contractual matters, general legal rules enforced by
increasingly independent judges being well suited to such aims.6 Hence
constitutionalism did not emerge as part of a grand design, but rather as a slowly
developing product of complex political and economic forces.
Constitutionalism is basically a description of a desirable outcome. The description
alone does not help us understand how the outcome is achieved. The more important
question for the purposes of this chapter is what is it that makes constitutionalism a
‘living reality’, especially in the post-colonial states of Melanesia, where the political
and economic forces at work are very different from those of 16th to 18th century
Europe? 
Participation
Participation of the populace in political matters — through the ballot box, political
parties, interest groups seeking to influence government, et cetera7 — is almost
universally accepted as essential to the accountability of government. Regular
elections are seen to contribute to the legitimacy of constitutional government and
to keeping it accountable (as policies of rulers subject to the real threat of
replacement in elections need to exhibit some sensitivity to the needs of the society).
Popular participation in sub-national governments — both directly and through
elections — is said by many commentators on decentralisation and on autonomy
arrangements to create centres of power able to check dictatorial tendencies of the
central state and to make the local state responsive and accountable. Finally, popular
participation in local level government is seen as vital to the strengthening of civil
society, as discussed below.8
Popular participation was a goal of Melanesian constitution-makers, especially (but
not only) Papua New Guinea’s Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), whose
1974 Final Report9 provided the basis for much of Papua New Guinea’s 1975
independence constitution. With a jaundiced view of the state based on experience of
colonial rule, the CPC was concerned that constitutional law alone might not be a
sufficient restraint on the state, and envisaged popular participation making the state
more accountable. Its recommendations on constitutionally entrenched sub-national
(provincial) government were intended to encourage political forces that could act as
checks on authoritarian tendencies at the centre.10
Civil Society
Civil society in the ‘developed’ industrial states can be seen as the range of interests
in society distinct from government, which in various ways combine and place limits
on government. There is little consensus, however, about either exactly what the term
‘civil society’ means or how it acts to limit the state, even in relation to the
industrialised democracies of Europe. An analysis by Woods11 comparing civil society
in Europe and Africa is helpful. 
The concept springs from a differentiation between public and private interests that
began to be made at the time of the emergence of the middle class two to three
hundred years ago, and the idealisation of this separation as the monarchy and semi-
feudal institutions were gradually restricted from treating the political and
governmental arenas as private domains. As patrimonial rule12 diminished, the notion
developed that political authorities should be accountable to the public.13 As to the
manner in which civil society acts to limit state action, Woods emphasises the
significance of the involvement of individuals in the public sphere through
“articulated associational groups which could rely on an informed leadership to shape
public opinion”.14 Civil society articulates “a set of norms which affect the way the
state functions and how other groups will interact”.15 In other words, the
contributions of groups and networks of private individuals to public debate helps
shape values and standards of behaviour that become so widely accepted that they
cannot be ignored, even by the state. So, for example, the higher degree of adherence
to such things as democratic norms and limits on corruption in industrialised
countries than in post colonial states is often explained in terms of a more ‘developed’
civil society.
Links are made between civil society and popular participation, it being claimed that
civil society is strengthened by participation in local level government:
Civil society provides an especially strong foundation for democracy when it
generates opportunities for participation and influence at all levels of governance,
not least the local level. For it is at the local level that the historically marginalized
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are most likely to be able to affect public policy and to develop a sense of efficacy
as well as actual political skills. The democratization of local government thus
goes hand in hand with the development of civil society as an important condition
for the deepening of democracy and the “transition from clientelism to
citizenship” in Latin America, as well as elsewhere in the developing and post-
communist worlds.16
Interest in civil society in the context of debate on limits on the post-colonial state
originates with the role of popular protest in the fall of the Eastern European
‘Marxist’ regimes. This was widely seen as evidence of the emergence of a potentially
powerful civil society, and the move to a free market economy in those states since
1989 as likely to strengthen civil society as an effective limit on the state. As discussed
later in this chapter, many observers debate whether or not there is evidence for
similar trends in Africa17 and other areas of the post-colonial world, including
Melanesia. 
Perhaps the most striking instance of speculation about the potential for civil society
to limit state action in Melanesia arose from events in Papua New Guinea in early
1997 in relation to the Sandline affair. In the wake of action by army elements to oust
mercenaries engaged under a government contract with United Kingdom company
Sandline International, popular unrest in the main cities, much of it led by the same
army elements and also involving some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), led
to the standing aside of Prime Minister Chan.18
Before considering whether the expectations of popular participation and civil society
as limits on government in Melanesia are realistic, it is helpful first to discuss the
effectiveness of more than 25 years of post-independence experience of constitutional
limits on state action in Melanesia. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS –  SUCCESSION OF
GOVERNMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Among the central sets of rules in constitutions intended to set limits on state action
are those on: succession of governments; accountability of politicians and public
servants for use of state resources; and protection of human rights. One way to
evaluate constitutionalism is by reference to the extent to which these rules have been
effective restraints on the state. 
The Rules in the Melanesian Constitutions
In relation to succession, three of the four Melanesian constitutions provide for
variants of the Westminster system, with prime ministers taking office as a result of
election by the legislature.19 The exception is the 1997 Fiji Islands Constitution,
where the situation is closer to the original Westminster system, with a (largely
ceremonial) President appointing as Prime Minister a member of the lower house of
the legislature who in the opinion of the President can form a government with the
confidence of the legislature.20 In general, prime ministers and governments can only
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be removed following a general election or through votes of no confidence21 (again
the President of Fiji Islands has limited discretionary powers in this area).
Concerning accountability, the four constitutions place unusual emphasis on the issue
in that they:
• carefully codify variants of the principles of parliamentary control of the
executive in various ways, including provision for collective responsibility of
the political executive (often called the ‘Cabinet’),22 removal through votes of
no confidence,23 scrutiny of public finance,24 and committee systems;25
• all provide for both ombudsman institutions and codes of conduct for leaders.26
• all provide for offices of the auditor general27 and of the public prosecutor,28
each independent from direction and control;
• all provide for independent judicial arms,29 with extensive powers of judicial
review and to interpret and apply the constitutions;30
• all provide for constitutional offices with roles concerning accountability of the
main arms of government (especially of the executive) and that are independent
from direction and control, the constitutions of Fiji Islands and Papua New
Guinea containing especially elaborate arrangements in this regard.31
As for human rights, the four constitutions contain elaborate bills of rights that
guarantee protection of the standard political rights32 and enforcement in case of
breach of rights.33 In addition, the constitutions of Papua New Guinea and Fiji
Islands are unusual in that they make provision directed to securing some aspects of
economic, social and cultural rights, although those provisions are limited in extent
in Fiji Islands and largely unenforceable in Papua New Guinea.34
Rules Versus ‘Living Reality’
It is clear then, that de Smith’s ‘formal sense’ of constitutionalism is well established
in Melanesia. But what of the ‘living reality’? Do rules limiting government action
really curb the actions of the rulers? Are the zones of activity forbidden to those in
power leaving increasing room for the exercise of liberty in Melanesian states? 
The post-independence record of adherence to constitutional limits by the
Melanesian states contrasts favourably with Ghai’s 1993 assessment of the Third
World generally. Not only did just a handful of post-colonial states retain their
independence constitutions,35 but in addition:
Overwhelming evidence of the gross violations of law on the part of government
officials; arbitrary and capricious exercises of power are frequent; there are many
detentions without trial (and occasionally torture of detainees); massive direct or
indirect censorship is obtained and it is difficult to exercise the right of association
if the government does not like the officials or the purposes of the association;
succession to office is seldom the result of elections; judiciaries are weak and some
are compliant. One person or one party rule dominates the political system of
most of these countries.36
A starting point for contrasting the situation in the Melanesian states is that all save
Fiji Islands retain their independence constitutions. The picture with regard to
democratic rule is also different, there being no instance of sustained one person or
one party rule. Further, where coups have occurred (Fiji Islands in 1987 and 2000,
and Solomon Islands in 2000) there have been popular pressures for restoration of
constitutional rule and the holding of elections. 
In relation to rules on succession of government, until the 1987 coups in Fiji Islands
the record was remarkable compared to most other post-colonial states (and hence
the early 1980s suggestion of new hope for constitutionalism on the basis of
experience in the then ten post-colonial states of the Pacific).37 Provisions for
accountability generally operated reasonably well, especially in Papua New Guinea,
where the Ombudsman Commission and the Leadership Code were generally
regarded as having achieved much.38 The position concerning human rights was well
regarded in all states until the late 1980s.39
It would appear, however, that if there ever was a ready acceptance of constitutional
limits in Melanesia it has been reducing since at least the late 1980s. The evidence
includes the overthrow of the independence constitution in Fiji Islands in 1987, the
attempted overthrow of the 1997 Fiji Islands Constitution in 2000, and the severe
undermining of the Solomon Islands Constitution by and following the 2000 coup.40
Each of these cases has involved attempts to take control of the state in large part
related to ethnic conflict.
Rules on succession of government have been challenged in various ways, most
notably in the Fiji Islands and Solomon Islands coups. In Papua New Guinea there
has been: an inept coup attempt by the Police Commissioner in 1990; the attempted
manipulation of constitutional provisions by the Prime Minister in 1993 in order to
gain 18 months in office free from motions of no confidence;41 the adjournment of
Parliament for periods of seven to eight months in order to escape motions of no
confidence (the Skate Government from December 1998 to July 1999 and the
Morauta Government from November 2000 to July 2001); and the standing aside of
the Prime Minister in April 1997 forced by urban unrest following the Sandline
affair.42 In Vanuatu in 1995 and in 2001 the constitutional rules on succession have
been bent or ignored by members of Parliament until court decisions have resolved
the problems.43
Even adherence to rules on succession of government prior to 1987 may not tell us
much about the effectiveness of constitutional limits generally. Indeed, as discussed
later, the more likely explanation is that managed competition for power within the
constitutional framework suits the political and economic interests of the segments of
the elite competing for political power.
Concerning the rules on accountability of government, their impact seems to be
reducing as corruption in government and bureaucracy increases. The reports of the
Vanuatu Ombudsman and the Papua New Guinea Ombudsman Commission and the
decisions of leadership tribunals in Papua New Guinea dealing with prosecutions for
misconduct in office by leaders provide powerful support for the proposition that
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state powers and resources are increasingly being used almost routinely for the
personal enrichment of those with access to state power.44 There seems little doubt
that only a fraction of those involved in such activities are ever dealt with under the
criminal law and the Leadership Codes. Those cases that do get dealt with suggest
generalised patterns of abuse of office, from misappropriation of government funds
to the soliciting of bribes and favours from interests seeking to extract natural
resources wealth. There is increasing pressure on ombudsmen (for example, constant
public criticism of the Papua New Guinea Ombudsman Commission suggesting it is
too harsh in dealing with political leaders under the Papua New Guinea Leadership
Code) and other accountability institutions, some of which have achieved little,45 and
a growing sense that the standards they seek to enforce are not consistent with those
of a large proportion of public office-holders.
As for the record concerning human rights, there had been a generally poor human
rights record in the colonial period in Melanesia, and much interest in changing this
situation at the time of the de-colonising constitution-making exercises. For much of
the post-independence period Melanesian countries have had a good record of
respect for most civil and political rights. Since the late 1980s, however, there has
been increasing evidence of a reduction in standards. The post-coup situation in Fiji
Islands both in 1987 and 2000 has given rise to many abuses of rights.46 In the
Bougainville conflict in Papua New Guinea terrible abuses have occurred on all sides,
including hundreds of extra-judicial killings, torture, rape and destruction of
property.47 The ethnic conflict occurring in Solomon Islands since late 1998 has
resulted in appalling breaches of rights.
The situation in Papua New Guinea is of special concern, going well beyond the
problems of the Bougainville conflict. A few examples drawn from a July 1995 report
on Papua New Guinea by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights (UNCHR)
illustrate the nature and scope of the problems. Police beatings and rapes of persons
held in connection with investigation of criminal offences and their violent raids on
villages in search of suspects, evidence and retribution were noted. Common
violations of rights of prisoners by personnel of the Correctional Institutions Service
included severe overcrowding, and routine rough treatment and confiscation of
belongings.48 The institutions that could have been expected to redress human rights
abuses (the legal profession, the Public Solicitor, the Public Prosecutor, the
Ombudsman Commission and the courts) had had a limited impact on human rights
problems, not a single case relating to breaches of human rights arising from the
Bougainville conflict having been conducted to completion.49
Additional, seldom highlighted but yet important facets of the human rights picture
in the region were identified by the UNCHR report. First, it suggested that the
severe law and order problems in Papua New Guinea involve violations of “the most
fundamental rights of people — to life, to liberty and to security of the person”.50
Secondly, the right of citizens to equality was seen as “far from being a living reality,
and there is no real evidence of, or apparent support for affirmative action”, despite
“severe and growing disparities among various social groups, and between various
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areas of the country”. The “social, economic and political disadvantages” of women
and the “widespread evidence of violence” against them suggested they suffered
particular problems in this regard.51 Thirdly, there was a “general failure to secure
economic, social and cultural rights”, suggesting “a failure of policies or of
management or both”.52 Although they are intended to be to some degree
enforceable through the National Goals and Directive Principles in the Preamble to
the Papua New Guinea Constitution, there was little evidence of post-independence
progress towards making those rights effective.53
While there is evidence of reducing acceptance of constitutional limits since the late
1980s, the record in Melanesia since then has been mixed. For example, even in the
post-coup situations in Fiji Islands and Solomon Islands there have been serious
attempts to restore constitutional rule. This is most notable in Fiji Islands, where
court rulings early in 2001 on the continued applicability of the 1997 Constitution
were accepted by the interim government installed after the coup of May 2000 in that
instead of continuing to develop a new constitution, fresh elections were conducted
under the 1997 Constitution as a result of the rulings.54 Courts have resolved crises
or conflicts on the succession rules in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.55 The
fact that ombudsman institutions, public prosecutors and courts continue to take
action in support of accountability offers hope to many concerned about the trends.
Despite growing human rights problems, abuses by the state probably continue to be
less serious and fewer in number than in many other post-colonial states, and are still
capable of being dealt with under the law by independent courts, at least in Papua
New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji Islands (although access problems remain severe).
For the purposes of this chapter, two major questions arise from this assessment of
the record of constitutional limits in Melanesia. First, why has the record of
constitutionalism in the Pacific apparently been relatively better than that of so many
other post-colonial states, and especially, until recently, in relation to succession of
government? Secondly, why has the effectiveness of restraints on state action
apparently reduced since the late 1980s?
Insights into these questions may be gained by considering the factors that influence
the roles of constitutions in both the industrialised ‘democracies’ and post-colonial
states. In the space available, only a selective analysis is possible, highlighting just a
few salient factors.
SOME FACTORS INFLUENCING EFFECTIVENESS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
At the time of independence in most post-colonial states, there was a tendency to
assume that the passing of constitutions on the model of those of the colonial powers
would produce outcomes similar to those generally assumed to flow from the
constitutions of the metropolitan powers.56 In other words, it tends to be assumed
that the ‘living reality’ of constitutionalism automatically flows from the formal rules
set out in a constitution. 
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In fact, however, there is little consensus about what it is that makes the rule of law
apparently a strong force in Western industrialised countries,57 or what makes its
effectiveness lesser in so many post-colonial countries. Most theories of both politics
and law would now accept that the totality of the impacts of law in any society is likely
to be a factor of the relationship between law and numerous forces at work in the
society where it operates. The differing consequences of constitutions in post-colonial
societies compared to the colonising countries suggest that there are distinct forces
at work in the two sets of countries. Those that support the rule of law in the former
colonisers may not be present, or may work differently, in post-colonial states.
Similarly, the record of better adherence to constitutional norms in the Melanesian
states than in many other post-colonial states suggests that again there are different
forces at work in the two sets of states.
Ghai argues that it is the coinciding of economic and political power in the ‘West’
that makes the rule of law possible there. The constitution supports the forces that
dominate in civil society, especially those with economic power. Because they can
achieve their economic and other interests through a wide range of means, they do
not have to rely openly on political or state power; the coercive power of the state
seldom needs to be deployed on their behalf. Hence the outward forms of state
neutrality and impartiality in accordance with constitutional and legal norms (for
example, in the shape of an apparently neutral and impartial judicial system) can be
preserved.58
By contrast, where economic and political power do not coincide in the same way as
in the West, and especially in countries where the private sector is relatively
‘undeveloped’, as has been the situation in most former colonies both at and after
independence, politicians have little independent economic base. They instead tend
to use their access to the state to accumulate both wealth and the further power
associated with it. Corruption flows from both personal interests of politicians and
“the imperatives of political survival, since the primary basis of a politician’s support
is generally not the party or another political platform, but clientelism, sustained by
regular favours to one’s followers”.59 Popular control and accountability tend to be
contrary to the fundamental interests of those in control of the state, and opposition
can only be dealt with by coercion, the state tending to become authoritarian.
This analysis tells us much about the factors underlying the different roles of law in
industrial and post-colonial states. It also provides us with insights into the reasons
for the declining adherence to rules about accountability and human rights in
Melanesia, suggesting that there are some important similarities between the forces
at work in the Pacific and other post-colonial states. The analysis does not address,
however, the reasons for the apparently better record of constitutionalism in
Melanesia than, for example, in much of Africa. Comparing the operation of
constitutions in Africa and Melanesia should provide some insights in this regard.
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The State and the Constitution in Africa
Much of the vast literature on the state in Africa argues that while the state is
immensely powerful compared to any other single force in society, it is also relatively
weak. So although it dominates aspects of the economy and controls considerable
coercive force, it has a limited impact on the lives of the majority who are rural
dwellers. Such people organise their lives through rapidly adapting but nevertheless
resilient pre-state social structures with considerable autonomy from the state.
On the other hand, among the few ‘uniting’ factors beyond clan and tribe in many
African countries are major ethnic/regional and religious identities. Sections of the
elite have tended to mobilise people around such identities in struggles for state
power. They have exploited fears as to what will happen if ‘representatives’ of another
group gain, or are not removed from, power. In the process, existing divisions have
often been exacerbated and new ones created. There have been few pressures on the
elite to stay within constitutional frameworks in their competition for state power. In
deeply divided countries, there has been strong pressure for the section of the elite in
control of the state to use any means at hand to retain power. Such measures have
included seeking control of an expanding repressive apparatus of the state
(intelligence services and security forces). 
In the 1960s and 1970s such tendencies were often bolstered by state ideologies of
development, which emphasised the need for stability. Super-power competition
provided financial resources and legitimacy to weak regimes, and often contributed
to development and increased capacity of repressive apparatus. Patronage and
subsidies (for example, of urban food prices) were used to shore up support from
client groups and to reduce the likelihood of potentially destabilising urban dissent.
Constitutions became little more than legitimating devices in many countries. They
were ignored, overthrown or replaced where they were obstacles to the accumulation
of power and wealth by those in control. Abuses of rights on an appalling scale
occurred in the struggles for power between sections of the elite.
The State and the Constitution in Melanesia
There are parallels between the situations in Melanesia and Africa, especially
concerning the prevalence of the weak state and strong localised society based on
resilient pre-state social structures. In Melanesia, however, the state is perhaps even
weaker than in Africa, due to factors such as the limited sustainable capacity
developed during the colonial era, as well as others, discussed below, which inhibit
co-ordination of both policy and agencies of the state.
Linguistic, cultural and ethnic groups in Melanesia tend to be both small and
multiple. These factors help to explain the absence of attempts on behalf of any ethnic
group to control the state in the post-independence period prior to the 1987 coups
in Fiji Islands. Of course, the large Indo-Fijian population in Fiji Islands enabled
observers to treat that situation as an exceptional case in the Pacific. However, the
increasing complexity and intensity of divisions among indigenous Fijians, the ethnic
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element in the conflict in Bougainville since 1988,60 and the development of
significant ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands since 1998 all point to the potential for
ethnic tensions to become central to struggles for control of the state in Melanesia in
a manner similar to Africa.
It is the absence of significant ethnic divides in national politics anywhere other than
Fiji Islands that is the basic explanation for the good record of Melanesia (before the
Solomon Islands coup of June 2000) in relation to adherence to rules on succession
of government. Where such divides do not exist there is room for political
competition between a wide range of sections of the elite. None is either subject to
strong pressure to take exclusive control of the state or capable of doing so if it wishes
to. (They are all unable to capture control of the repressive apparatus by ethnic
stacking of positions, as in Africa.) Without a cohesive force controlling the state,
needing always to fend off or destabilise competing claims on power, the stakes of
political competition are not nearly as high as in many cases in Africa.
In the absence of class and other interests which cut across the multiple and fractured
clan interests, no political party or ideology promotes cohesive interests at the
national level. The first-past-the-post electoral system also works against development
of such interests. As a result, the state is controlled by ever-changing bands of sections
of the elite. Unable to control the whole, each element of the band in government
for the time being tends to attempt to extract what it can from whatever part of the
state apparatus and resources it can get access to. The societies from which the
politicians (and even senior) officials originate also tend to apply pressure to them to
extract state resources on their behalf. In the process, the weakness of the state is
reinforced, but a kind of equilibrium is maintained.
There is little capacity to develop a coherent policy or to integrate the operations of
state agencies. Indeed, coherent policy or integrated operations could limit the ability
to extract resources from the state. Accordingly each agency tends to operate with a
great deal of independence. Prime ministers might like to assert control over all parts
of the state apparatus but, having no means of enforcing discipline over their coalition
partners, they have little capacity to control the state agencies under particular
ministers.
As a result of such factors, all factions tend to accept the constitutional framework for
managing political succession. More correctly, the constitution is accepted as the
arena for management of elite competition. But acceptance of the arena does not
reflect acceptance of all constitutional limits. As already discussed, there is evidence
that the constitutional norms concerning accountability and human rights have
limited acceptance. They tend to stand in the way of accumulation of wealth by those
in power. Further, the limited cohesion and co-ordination of state agencies
encourages, or at least puts few obstacles in the way of, breach of such norms.
Without co-ordination and constructive policy, the pressures of rapid social and
economic change tend to produce crises that the state has little capacity to analyse or
manage. Semi-autonomous state agencies have little capacity to analyse and deal with
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such crises, and their responses tend to be poorly judged, often exacerbating the
original problems. Abuses of human rights tend to occur in such circumstances, not
because the state desires them, but precisely because there is ineffective co-ordination
and control of weak and under-resourced state agencies. The way in which the
Bougainville conflict in Papua New Guinea escalated from late 1988 is the most
obvious example of this pattern of response by the state. Poorly judged and
undisciplined responses by police riot squads helped transform a localised landowner
conflict to a province-wide rebellion. Harsh responses by the initially better
disciplined Defence Force to Bougainville Revolutionary Army action added to the
problem.61
It is also true, however, that the absence of pressure to take exclusive control on
behalf of any ethnic or other interest means there is little focussed effort to use the
coercive power of the state against particular opponents. Hence, human rights abuses
by security forces have in most cases been less systematic and less severe than has
often been the case in Africa. They are most often products of the random and
uncoordinated actions by disjointed and poorly trained elements of the state
apparatus, rather than of organised state action.
Consequently we can say that some constitutional limits are accepted by those in
power whereas protection from the constitution is largely an irrelevance for the vast
majority of the population — the rural dwellers and the urban poor.
This is not to say that constitutions have not played, and do not continue to play, a
significant role in Melanesia generally. Independence mythology (the debate and
stories about independence that have given special meaning and status to events of
the time) combined with longevity have given them legitimacy and status that have
enabled them to have a degree of autonomy and therefore to have some significant
impacts.62 Thus, for example, independent institutions created by constitutions with
accountability functions benefit from the protection of the constitution (even if, in
some cases, their positions have tended to be weakened as more elements of the elite
find it in their interests to evade the restrictions of constitutional limits).
PARTICIPATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY:  SUPPORT
FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM?
In the light of the preceding analysis of factors which may help to determine the
differing roles of law in various post-colonial societies, the extent to which support
for the rule of law may be offered by popular participation and civil society can be
examined more realistically.
Popular Participation
As already discussed, participation in government is widely regarded as contributing to
constitutionalism. Its importance tends to be assumed in the industrialised
‘democracies’. However, there is limited consensus on the factors which result in the
rule of law being accepted in such countries. Further, there is little reason to believe that
governmental arrangements for popular participation that might have particular results
in such countries will necessarily have the same outcomes in post-colonial societies.
Debate in Africa from the early 1990s about the possible consequences of popular
participation in government arises from moves away from the highly centralised one-
party states that emerged in many countries in the 1960s. Popular participation even
in the form of national elections either did not occur at all or was tightly controlled.
There was almost no experience of elected sub-national government of any kind. The
question is whether the experience of multi-party elections and political
decentralisation helps to restrict executive action.
In fact what can only be described as tentative moves towards democratisation in
Africa since the late 1980s were sparked not so much by popular pressures as by the
impact of several closely related factors. These were the end of the Cold War, the
general fiscal crisis facing most states and the ascendancy of a global economy. With
the Cold War over, the global economy reduced the significance of national borders
for the flow of capital. Grossly unfair patterns of world trade and poor domestic
management contributed to the fiscal crisis of the state, itself exacerbated by cessation
of the Cold War super-power competition that had subsidised authoritarian but
otherwise poorly managed and unsustainable regimes. Forced to turn to international
financial institutions, African governments had little choice but to meet the
conditions attached to aid informed by a new orthodoxy about good governance and
a reduced role for the state being pre-conditions for economic development. The
possibilities for state patronage and subsidies reduced as the size of the public sector
shrank rapidly. Loyalty of security force members was often undermined by lack of
pay. Urban dissent emerged.
Governments no longer capable of crushing or buying off dissent called national
constitutional conventions (or were forced to accept them), or amended
constitutions or were overthrown. A few — such as Zaire and Kenya — initially
resisted change, but at the cost of interminable chaos. The result was a wave of
‘democratisation’. It is far from certain, however, that the long-term outcomes will
include effective constitutional limits on those in power.
A survey of popular protest and political reform in African countries after the Berlin
Wall fell found little evidence of emergence of effective forces “aggregated across the
full breadth of civil society”. Based in the urban bourgeoisie, protest sought to
“protect corporate privilege”, being “a conservative reaction against economic
austerity. The opportunism of opposition political leaders, their patronage followings,
and their links with current elites all suggest that a change of leadership would
probably perpetuate a clientilistic pattern of ‘politics as usual’”.63
When the dust of popular protest had settled new elite groups had taken control
under multi-party political systems introduced by constitutional amendment (as in
Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania) or under new constitutions, as in several francophone
countries (Senegal, Mali etc.). Astute managers of reform, such as President Moi of
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Kenya, managed the transition. Exploiting differences in the opposition he was
returned to power in the first — and flawed — multi-party election in almost 30 years
and thereafter continued to rule in much the same dictatorial manner as before under
the new and supposedly democratic system.
Concerning popular participation in government in Melanesia there is limited
evidence that the operation of the parliamentary democracy at the national level
counters the pressures towards abuse of rules on accountability and human rights, as
discussed already. Regular national elections in Westminster system variants have
produced national legislative and executive institutions that tend to be unaccountable
to the electors. Contributing to the outcome have been the lack of effective political
parties, the first-past-the-post electoral system, small traditional societies (clans and
sub-clans), the continuing strength of clan loyalties and the lack of class and other
interests which cut across them.64 There was some evidence that the provincial
government system operating in Papua New Guinea until 1995 did have an impact
in terms of acting as a check on power at the centre.65 However, the reforms of the
system in 1995 provided for in amendments to the Constitution and the Organic Law
on Provincial and Local-level Governments 1995 has given members of the national
legislature control of provincial governments. There is little evidence of sub-national
governments elsewhere in Melanesia being effective checks on the national
government.66
Civil Society
In like manner to the debate on democratisation, the lack of clarity in debate on civil
society in industrialised countries has not prevented many assuming that emergence
in post-colonial countries of a ‘developed’ civil society on the model of the former
countries will necessarily result in support for constitutional limits on the state. Yet
the evidence for the emergence of such a civil society in post-colonial countries is far
from clear, and the role of civil society in such countries remains problematic.
The evidence for civil society in Africa is supposedly seen in the largely urban-based
social unrest that has contributed to the fall or destabilisation of some one-party
regimes since the late 1980s. The dominant notion of civil society in this discourse
has been described as:
...civic organisations of professionals, workers, women and others which not only
lobby the State but also seek to humanise society. A particular species of them, the
NGOs, have achieved prominence in recent years, seen as champions of rights and
democracy, and giving voice to the underprivileged.67
This notion is in the tradition of civil society in the model of the industrialised
‘democracies’, of associations which shape public opinion and establish norms
affecting the way the state operates. As discussed already, there are supposed to be
links between civil society and popular participation, especially through sub-national
government.68
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Many observers (including foreign donors — both foreign governments and aid
organisations) of post-colonial states in Africa and elsewhere tend to believe that
encouragement of local level NGOs and local level governments will not only assist
in controlling the executive, but may also contribute to maintaining and restoring
basic order in developing states where economic and other pressures are tending to
undermine “the basic structures of nation states”.69
Key strands of thought about the evidence for the emergence of civil society in post-
colonial states can be criticised. First, as to social unrest since the late 1980s, rather
than evidence of civil society, it may be better understood as a conservative reaction
to economic austerity.70 Secondly as to the role of NGOs, there is a need for caution
in assessing their potential role, “as they proliferate under encouragement of or
incentives from foreign donors, operate increasingly as consulting firms, and lose
touch with, or accountability to, in local constituencies”.71 Thirdly, as to the role of
local government in strengthening civil society, there is little experience of long-term
political decentralisation in Africa. Deconcentration of administrative capacity —
‘administrative decentralisation’ — rather than political decentralisation has been the
pattern since the end of the colonial era. In the Pacific and elsewhere in post-colonial
countries, the uneven experience of political decentralisation72 suggests the need for
care in making assumptions about sustainability and outcomes of political
decentralisation. 
Little is understood about the way in which civil society might develop to the point
where it supports constitutionalism in a significant way in either Africa or the Pacific.
If, as Woods argues, the principal indicator of a ‘developed’ civil society is the manner
in which individuals and groups “articulate a set of norms which effect the way the
state functions and how other groups will interact”,73 then civil society in Africa “is
still threatened by the particularism of ethnicity and atomistic actions”.74 The
“relatively unarticulated character of economic differentiation on the continent” is a
significant factor, for while the economic base “does not determine whether a civil
society exists… it does influence the rate and manner in which class interests will
intersect with normative claims in the Western European tradition”.75 In other words,
in the absence of the economic conditions of Europe, civil society will probably not
limit state action in the same way it may do in Europe.
Even Woods’ interesting analysis tends to assume that the goal for African civil society
is something on the model of Western Europe. The views of Woods and
commentators with similar analyses have been criticised by Kasfir. He points out that
most notions of civil society in Africa are based too much on idealised Western
experience, do not incorporate much of the rich web of political activity which goes
on in Africa, and are unrealistic about the extent of the problems likely to be involved
in developing civil society organisations to the point where they are powerful enough
to act as limits on the state. In Kasfir’s view, it is not possible to exclude ethnic or
religious associations from civil society. Such associations, if strong and democratically
based, could in fact weaken the state, undermining its ability to reconcile conflicting
interests in society.76
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If civil society is to become more important in Africa or the Pacific, factors such as
ethnic divisions, the limited economic base, the limited linkages between traditional
society and the modern economy77 and the still relatively pervasive role of the state,
will tend to shape distinctive African and Pacific island forms of civil society. These
may also work in different ways and have quite distinct consequences from civil
society in Western Europe.
In particular, civil society in Africa and the Pacific may not necessarily limit state
power on the model of civil society in the ‘developed’ world. Experience in Asia
should warn against what Ghai terms “over-romanticisation of civil society”, for it is
not only the state that abuses human rights:
...massive violations also take place in and through civil society, sometimes with
the connivance of the state, and frequently reflecting feudalistic and patriarchal
dimensions of culture. Social conflicts, particularly those stemming from ethnic or
caste differences, have politicised and militarised civil society in many states.78
There is, of course, civil society in Melanesia. But with the exception of Fiji Islands,
the vast majority of the population in Melanesia live in rural areas and in pre-state
social structures with limited engagement with the modern state. As a result, there is
little in society to make it meet the criteria of ‘civil’ society. Society has limited
cohesion, little which aggregates multifarious local interests in a way that can
influence the state. Even in the few large urban centres, there is limited aggregation
of interests. There are media organisations, trade unions, NGOs and — especially —
churches, all of which seek to influence the state, but each on their own has a limited
impact, and their concerns seldom coincide. These characteristics of civil society help
to explain the lack of fulfilment of the hopes of some Papua New Guinea observers
that the March 1997 popular protests against the Chan Government’s role in
Sandline signalled the emergence of civil society as a powerful force in Melanesia.
The emergence of a ‘developed’ civil society in Melanesia may occur at the expense
of traditional society, for it would be likely to involve development of such things as
class and other interests which cut across clan loyalties. On the other hand, growing
social pressures arising from overlapping factors such as economic change associated
with globalisation, increasing social stratification, land shortages, law and order
problems are resulting in increased popular dissatisfaction being expressed in
government. The popular protests associated with Sandline provide an example from
PNG. As dissatisfaction spreads more widely it will probably tend to be mobilised by
populist leaders. Depending on the leadership, the basis might be laid for emergence
of new political forces. In the process, aggregations of interests powerful enough to
influence the state may occur. There are, however, many possible alternative futures.
For example, the struggles for power and control of resources likely to be involved
could contribute to emergence of new ethnic identities. As in Fiji Islands and
Solomon Islands, these may be manipulated in the course of such struggles and
ultimately contribute to undermining of constitutional rule as in both of those
countries or at least undermine the ability of the state to reconcile conflicting interests
in society.79
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CONCLUSIONS
The constitutions of Melanesia are impressive examples of the ‘formal sense’ of
constitutionalism. While the record of the ‘living reality’ of constitutionalism may be
less remarkable, it nevertheless compares more than favourably with that of much of
the rest of the post-colonial world. While there may be some evidence of
commitment to constitutionalism in Melanesia in the immediate post-colonial era,
the analysis in this chapter would suggest that such commitment was always limited.
In particular, the apparent commitment to constitutional rules of succession suited
the interests of sections of the elite. Moreover, such rules are readily jettisoned,
particularly as significant ethnic conflict becomes a factor in national politics. The
effectiveness of rules on accountability and human rights also appears to be waning.
Just as it was assumed at the time of de-colonisation — in the Pacific as much as in
other parts of the world — that the rule of law would be a consequence of acceptance
of ‘Western’ constitutional models, there is a similar tendency to assume the efficacy
of the model of the ‘West’ in the debates about the ability of popular participation
and civil society to support constitutionalism in post-colonial states. There is little
evidence, however, to suggest that the popular participation provided for under the
post-independence Melanesian constitutions has had a significant impact on
constitutionalism there, and little evidence so far for significant impact in that regard
from a Melanesian civil society.
It seems likely that the particular political and economic forces at work in Europe in
the last few hundred years were critical to the emergence of constitutionalism. If civil
society is in fact a major factor in maintaining constitutionalism in the West, it is
important to remember that it was probably a product of much the same economic
and political forces as contributed to constitutionalism. Those forces do not exist in
Melanesia. In particular, there is no developed private sector. Nor is there the same
set of nationalising pressures as existed in Europe, and which contributed to the
notion of nationalisation of power (one of the “constituent elements” of
constitutionalism identified by Ghai).80 Rather, in Melanesia, small pre-state
structures with their own norms are the primary sources of identity and the main
centre of loyalties of most individuals, often undercutting national identity and
support for the state.81 With such different political and economic forces at work, it
is most unlikely that either constitutionalism or civil society will develop in the same
way in the Melanesian countries as they have in the West.
The reasonably positive record of acceptance of constitutional limits in Melanesia up
until the late 1980s can be related to particular factors in the post-independence
situations, and especially the limited competition for control of the state by large
ethnic and other interests. On the other hand, the same factors have contributed to
the longevity of independence constitutions, thereby increasing their legitimacy and
autonomy. These qualities have probably been factors in the popular pressure for
return to constitutional order in post-coup situations, especially in Fiji Islands. It is
also, in part, a response to expressions of concern from the international community,
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something that is likely to become an increasingly important factor in support for
constitutionalism in post-colonial states. All of these factors can be expected to
continue to operate, although developments since the 1980s suggest that their
impact will not necessarily be enough to change existing trends towards a weakening
of constitutionalism.
This is not to say that constitutionalism is a dead issue in Melanesia. Nor should it be
concluded that there is no role at all for increased participation in government or for
civil society in enhancing constitutionalism. Rather, the point is that they — and
indeed constitutions generally — can be expected to operate differently from their
equivalents in the West. Despite the absence of the same conditions that contributed
to the development of both civil society and constitutionalism in the West, people in
Melanesia can nevertheless be expected to find their own paths to constitutionalism.
After all, they, like people everywhere, have a deep interest in ensuring that there are
limits on those with access to state power.
Finally, not only can it be expected that the paths to constitutionalism will take
account of the particular situation of each Melanesian state, but the process could also
be slow and gradual. If constitutionalism in Europe was a slowly developing product
of complex political and economic forces, much the same will probably be true if it
is to become more of a ‘living reality’ in the Melanesian states.
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16.  LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF IDENTITY 
By: Professor Robert Hughes
KEY TERMS AND PHRASES
Pluralism – legal
The term covers various theories of law which hold that there can be many
independent spheres of law, such as local or customary law, which do not
require or depend upon the existence of a central state as the primary law
making body in a society. 
Pluralism – political 
A body of theory which holds that the existence of groups and associations
within society perform an essential function in any democratic society by
mediating between the public arena of government and the individual citizen.
Monistic state 
The idea, generally opposed by legal pluralists, that the state is the sole and final
repository of legal and political authority within any society.
Orthodoxy 
A body of theory, set of ideas or ideology which is either unchallenged and/or
ordinarily accepted as an explanation for some phenomenon.
Formalism 
In the legal context formalist theory conveys the idea that law consists
essentially of abstract and general principles which are not dependent on any
substantive principles such as those based on social norms and practices,
customs and moral or ethical ideas including principles of justice. 
Ontology 
In philosophy, ontology is that area which concerns itself with questions of
being; that is to say, with questions as to what things must assumed to exist and
not exist. Most theories about social phenomena usually convey assumptions
about what things the theorist takes to be the fundamental elements of society. 
Legal Postulates 
Basic propositions advanced by a particular theory of law.
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I will take up one aspect of the legal pluralist challenge to conventional
views of law and legal institutions. My concern is primarily with the challenge to the
unified conception of the state which many legal pluralists hold is pivotal to the
orthodox theory of legal systems. The orthodox position (i.e. positivist
jurisprudence) holds that the existence of a unified central or monistic state is
necessary for the existence of law in the sense that law is logically antecedent to the
state. One of the central concepts or principles underlying this orthodox conception
of a state is that of a unified identity. In this chapter I am suggesting that this concept
is fundamentally misconceived for a variety of reasons. I will suggest an alternative
understanding of identity and outline the consequences of adopting such an
alternative in our understanding of the state.
The challenge of legal pluralism is made difficult to assess because of the absence of a
coherent body of legal pluralist theory. So far as the state is concerned legal pluralism
often appears as a critique of the state rather than as a theory pretending to offer any
alternative view. Its business seems to be incomplete in some ways. There are also
many versions of pluralism which lead in possibly different directions. The view I wish
to put forward, nevertheless, is that legal pluralism’s challenge is to be taken seriously
and that we ought to attempt to accommodate it. I will argue that the monistic
conception of the state is, regardless of its orthodoxy, a misconception. What the state
presupposes is not some all-embracing unity as such. What it should be taken to
presuppose is, rather, an identity; but an identity understood in a particular way that
is consistent with the idea of the state as a substantive association rather than as an
abstract or formal corporate institution. The South Pacific experience of ‘small’ states
simply reinforces our need to recast our fundamental conceptions of the state in this
way. In larger and more complex ‘Western’ societies we often lose sight of the fact that
a state is basically composed of human individuals who are associated in various ways.
The tendency has thus long been to conceive of the state in wholly abstract formal
terms, such as appears in corporate theories of the state. In South Pacific states, given
their size and the relative familiarity involved in social relations between their citizens,
this abstract conception seems immediately inappropriate. 
LEGAL PLURALISM – CLAIMS AND CHALLENGES
We should initially look at some of the claims of legal pluralism in more detail in order
to set the context of the following discussion. What is legal pluralism? Hooker defined
legal pluralism as that which “refers to the situation where two or more laws interact.”1
Griffiths defined it as the presence in a social field of more than one legal order.2 For
Chiba legal pluralism is that body of theory which recognises that the total context in
which law operates within a legal system consists of a plurality of different culturally
determined ‘layers’ of practice which might consist of official laws, unofficial laws and
legal postulates. These cannot be wholly controlled by the central state nor unified
under its authority. In fact, these layers continue to develop independently of the state
and its institutions. However, these different systems of laws can and do interact with
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one another. This seems not to be a necessary interaction but a possible one only. The
interaction is sometimes harmonious and sometimes not.3
Legal pluralism, in its advocacy of what is sometimes called the ‘local law’, ‘customary
law’ or ‘the people’s law’, presents us with conceptions of law. Law, so it is claimed,
is a culturally relative concept and in many cultures there are customs, practices,
conventions and quasi-legal rules which perform a function similar to those of law
elsewhere. This can be so notwithstanding the absence within those environments of
a state with a concomitant monopoly on power and law-making authority.4
Thus legal pluralism clearly challenges one of the precious themes of standard legal
theory; namely, that there must be a state understood as a centralised legal
institution.5 This centralised institution is the modern unified nation state that has as
its primary function that of law-making or legislating.6 This rule- or law- making
function is allegedly paramount and supercedes the authority of any other form of
law, including judge made law. As this supreme legislative function is usually one of
parliament there is parliamentary sovereignty. As parliament is a supposedly
representative body comprised of members elected by the people the state, and hence
law, might be thought to be democratic. From a legal pluralist perspective however,
nation states are increasingly challenged by the existence of cultural and social
diversity which they find within themselves.7 The orthodox theoretical articulation of
the nature of a state in fact implies that there is a large gap between the state, as such,
and culture. This gap is especially evident in so far as this understanding of the state
cannot theoretically accommodate multicultural and multi-religious content. 
According to legal pluralists, one consequence of this sovereignty principle is that it
devalues custom, tradition and culture. It both elevates itself at the expense of culture
and values and eschews any serious attempt to understand law or legal institutions in
light of these ‘non-rational’ and contingent historical principles.8 Custom, on the
centralist view, is perceived as that which is typical of societies that are relatively
undeveloped or under-developed. Custom based societies are those that have
insufficiently progressed towards modernity. Thus the orthodoxy of state-centralism
is revealed as substantially biased in favour of modern constitutional principles, which
are in turn supported by a range of assumptions about modern culture as opposed to
traditional or ‘primitive’ culture and custom.9
There are other associated orthodoxies occasionally challenged by legal pluralists,
expressly or impliedly. One of them concerns the central importance of law itself. For
example, it is sometimes contended by pluralists that it is only in European culture
that the primary principle of social and political order is taken to be law in the sense
of apparently value-neutral, rationally justifiable and publicly created rules or
principles. Other cultures might have ‘law’, or something like the Western sense of it
but it is not all that important either in the production of social order or in conflict
resolution.10 In another way, legal pluralism has presented an alternative theoretical
perspective to challenge the legal positivist conception of the relationship between
law and culture and law and society Whilst positivism eschews any meaningful or
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logical relationship between them, legal pluralists purport  to establish quite the
reverse.
Different concepts of legal pluralism
‘Classical’ and ‘new’ legal pluralism
Legal pluralism developed distinctly as a “law from the outside” perspective11 mainly
through legal sociologists and anthropologists who were studying traditional or state-
less societies. They were often confronted with what appeared to be quasi-legal rules,
practices and orders that seemed to warrant some consideration as law within these
societies.12 These so called ‘classical legal pluralism’ proponents asked us to suspend
belief in our Eurocentric concepts of law and to entertain the claim that, in some
cultures, custom, or at least some part of it, could be regarded as law. One theme,
perhaps, was that we should restrain our Western philosophical tendency to
universalise our own concepts — legal and otherwise — and accept some form of
cultural relativism. 
The focus of this classical legal pluralism was on the relationship between introduced
legal systems and custom.13 These different spheres aligned, and perhaps still do align,
themselves readily with the politics of modernisation and development on the one
hand, and the defence of traditional society and culture on the other. Sometimes the
respective poles indicate alignments on issues of colonising values versus those of self-
determination. Yet, ironically, the distinction, largely unacknowledged in classical
legal positivism itself, between introduced and customary law was largely the creation
of colonisers themselves, and custom mostly assumed the characteristic of reinvention
tainted by the intervening colonial experience. The institutions raised to defend
custom and tradition were often those created by the colonial government to achieve
nothing more than administrative convenience.14 The body of custom itself was
affected by its interaction with colonial law, such that it could not be taken as a pre-
existing body of customs or practices.
The body of Pacific jurisprudence that is concerned with the relationship between
introduced and customary law largely fits within the tradition of classical legal
positivism. We can also see the opposing tensions of modernisation and tradition
within politics in the Pacific. The ironic nature of the custom/introduced law
dichotomy is, perhaps, not as thoroughly examined, particularly as it weakens the
foundations of the policies of tradition as compared to modernsation.
Some legal pluralists have since turned their attention to European legal systems,
arguing that even those systems are pluralistic in important respects. Whilst legal
pluralism was once an approach that was distinctively focused on questions as to the
operation of law in post-colonial societies that is no longer the case. The theoretical
approach has inspired some renewed thinking about the nature of legal systems in
Western countries such as those of Europe and the United States. Writers such as
Merry and Van den Bergh have seen pluralistic patterns operating in various
industrialised societies.15 This is sometimes called ‘new legal pluralism.’ Turned back
on itself legal pluralism has seemed a suitable platform from which to investigate the
plurality that consists in various non-state forms of social order existing within the
larger and enveloping unity of the state. It has purported to reveal a plurality of legal
orders which operate within late capitalist societies. Merry sees the new legal
pluralism as having shifted from the classical problematic which was with the mutual
relationship and interaction between separate spheres of order such as
introduced/official law and custom or non-official law. It has become concerned with
the relationship between the official legal system and “other forms of ordering that
connect with but are in some ways separate and dependent on it”.16 It is concerned
with a complex network of relationships which exist within and between overlapping
groups and subordinate orders which also interact within the same overarching
structure. Thus “this perspective sees plural forms of ordering as participating in the
same social field.”17 
The new legal pluralism seeks to direct us away from the frequently assumed
theoretical dualities of state and society, law and non-law, official and unofficial law,
public and private towards more multifaceted terrain. One of the questions it compels
us to ask is whether there can be a pluralistic logic applied to conceptions of
European law and state which would displace that conventional logic which demands
a mere unity both of the sovereign state and of the legal system.18 But the
consequence of new legal pluralism, ironic in some ways, is to eliminate some of the
fundamental differences in cross-cultural perception. If all societies have pluralistic
structures have we not, via the all-embracing techniques of social science, produced
a new universal or modernist understanding of society and state?
Legal pluralism, political pluralism and political theory
In exaining different concepts of legal pluralism it should be noted that it cannot be
viewed, historically at least, to be a product of what is known as political pluralism,
which developed particularly in the United States and is characterised by minority and
interest group politics. Political pluralism is a theory which promoted the role of such
groups as a vital one in a democratic society. This is particularly because these groups
or associations provided, firstly, an opportunity for some degree of participation by
citizens in larger social purposes and, secondly, because they perform a mediating
function between the public and private spheres in society. Legal pluralism, it is
sometimes said, has had, and needs little or no input from, this particular movement.
Baxsi, for example, suggested:
I believe that although liberal doctrine and dogma of interest group pluralism has
run aground, there is no need to import this crisis into the domain of legal
pluralism. While thinking on legal pluralism has been influenced here and there
by liberal doctrine, literature on legal pluralism has, by and large, arisen from the
sociology of law (including legal anthropologists) and comparative lawyers. No
leading liberal theorist has bothered much about legal pluralism let alone with the
relative autonomy of law in an analysis of the state… Legal pluralism does make
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certain assumptions about the nature of the state and civil society, but these
assumptions are rarely tied to a specific version of interest group pluralism.19
However I think it is also a fallacy to assume that legal pluralism can or need pretend
to be anything other than a form of political theory. Discourse and argument as to
the nature and role of the state has long been taken as characteristic of political
theory. Legal pluralist argument, whatever use it might have had for comparative law,
seems fundamentally to challenge our thinking about the state, if also its relationship
to law, so is a branch of political theory.20
Juridical and social science and strong and weak versions of legal pluralism
Aligned to the classical and the new versions of legal pluralism, as mentioned above,
there is the juridical version and the social science version. The juridical version is that
which is concerned, as Griffiths suggested, with the drawing of links between parallel
systems in the context of the overall system. Law and the state provide a kind of
coordinating role in respect of diverse sub-systems of law. The social science version
is more concerned with revealing the content of the complex web of relationships
which exist between orders whilst admitting that there might be some more general
linkage between them, for example, in terms of law. 
Along the same lines there is sometimes said to be a weak version and a strong version
of legal pluralism. Weak legal pluralism would hold that there can be ‘parallel systems’
of law; primarily state law and non-state law, introduced law and customary law. It
endorses the recognition of alternative systems within a state, although they are
systems which are not dependent on the state as such for their authority. The strong
version, on the other hand, would hold that even the distinction between law and
non-law postulated by state centralism itself is, in fact, socially constituted or
constructed. Clearly the category of the social assumes a primary force here, which
indicates also the sociological bias in the analysis. It insists on a ‘mutually constitutive’
nature of law and society.21 Such a view usually places considerable emphasis on the
plurality or diversity of distinct legal orders existing independently of the state. The
disunity of the ‘system’ in general leads readily to the conclusion that law can and
does exist without the need for a state at all. Hence, so it is claimed, the state cannot
achieve the basic unifying function which orthodox theories attribute to it. 
Legal pluralism and polycentricity 
It is usual to differentiate legal pluralism from legal polycentricity, although the basis
for the differentiation is often confused. Legal pluralism describes and accepts
multiple legal orders within some more general community or association and
proceeds to consider the ways in which these might intersect. At the national level,
this community is obviously a state, but in some cases this is extended to the
international or global context or community as well. Polycentricity focuses rather on
the law itself. It seeks to indicate that law manifests something other than the unity
and coherence which it is often assumed to have. Rather than achieving stability
through this alleged unifying function law can be shown to contain an inherent
elements of inconsistency, disunity and, therefore, instability. Others in this vein refer,
more specifically, to the factor of fragmentation and to the lack of any cohesive moral
foundation for law.22 If legal pluralism is a view of the legal order from without then
polycentricity is a view from within, which seems to suggest that perhaps it is law or
the legal Weltanschauung (world view) which accounts for the plurality of the world.23
Yet the two are sometimes difficult to disentangle. 
Legal Pluralism – Comprehensive Theory or Marginal Critique?
There are now several different dimensions or contexts of legal pluralist argument
along with a shift in the focus of attention. There is that which is dualistic and has
largely focused on the coexistence of local decentralised systems of law and central
state based law within a given system. But there is also that which shifts attention to
another context, which is the global and seemingly stateless context. This is what
Chiba has termed “legal pluralism in triple structure”.24 This structure assumes the
dualistic structure of operation of legal pluralism but extends beyond it. In this
context Teubner, for example, argues:
Global law can only be adequately explained by a theory of legal pluralism which
has recently successfully turned from the law of colonial societies to the laws of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious communities in modern nation-states. It
needs to make another turn — from groups to discourses. It should focus its
attention on a new body of law that emerges from various globalization processes
to multiple sectors of civil society independently of the laws of nation states.25
It could be thought that legal pluralism is not in any particular need of any theoretical
perspective to do its work. Perhaps many legal pluralists merely accept that different
peoples have different senses of law, setting out from there to understand what that
sense of law is. This lack of theoretical perspective is a possible deficiency of legal
pluralism as acknowledged, for example, by Griffiths. There is a lack of clear
definition of just what pluralism entails and in particular what it propounds as an
alternative to the legal centrism that it sets out to correct.26 But perhaps this is not a
problem. Bergh suggests instead some kind of Hegelean solution to the lack of a
single theoretical perspective. The legal pluralist position would thus be seen not as
one of adopting a pluralistic logic of categories of laws which would potentially and,
perhaps inevitably, lead to conflict. Pluralism is rather to be seen as a process that
develops in and over time.27 It is not a static situation or set of interrelated categories
but a complex pattern of interaction taking place constantly.28
In summary, legal pluralism claims to reveal the operation of a number of legal orders
within a society. Those legal orders are administered in several sets of institutions.29
This implies a system of complex interactions within a legal system, the notion of a
‘system’ here being taken in a rather loose or open sense. Sometimes the parts of the
system interact closely with one another and sometimes they do not. As one writer
puts it “law in modern society is plural rather than monolithic,… it is private as well
as public in character and… the national (public, official) legal system is often a
secondary rather than a focus of regulation.”30 In principle, such a conception of a
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legal system has a ring of familiarity to it to most who have engaged in the practice
of law. From such a perspective, the idea that there is any coherent unifying principle
operating in the legal system would be the product of idle fancy. At times there appear
connections between areas of law but there are also substantial gaps between areas of
law and between law and practice. At times, usually during periods of judicial
radicalism, the courts appear to assume a reductionist stance proposing that there are
deep connections between principles in tort, contract and equity, for example. But it
has generally defied jurisprudence to show that there is uniformity (rather than
equivalence) across the different sub-domains of a legal system. From the practical
standpoint the legal system would be better conceived in terms of diverse practices
which sometimes overlap and interact and sometimes they do not. Discrete groups or
sub-groups do operate even within all legal systems. Sometimes they stand in direct
connection the state, and sometimes independent of it. The division between groups
and also between state law and local law cannot be cast in rigid terms or as harsh
conceptual divisions.31 It is the complicated interaction of the legal system as such
which renders the term ‘pluralism’ appropriate.
Despite this, within so-called Western societies, legal pluralism has not developed
much beyond a marginal critique. The recognition of plurality of legal orders as an
empirical phenomenon can perhaps be dismissed as an unfortunate complexity —
another case of facts not being allowed to get in the way of a good theory. Legal
pluralism runs foul of the dominant view that different legal systems cannot co-exist
within the structure of a sovereign state without challenging the continuing authority
and legitimacy of the state. Moreover, from an international perspective, legal
pluralism might seem to erode the claimed need for absolute independence of a nation
state by weakening the inner unitary core of the state. The claim to a plurality of legal
orders, in other words, appears contrary to the idea that the law should derive its
authority ultimately from a single source.32 Furthermore, in the originally fertile
ground of legal pluralist research, the so-called traditional societies themselves, there
seems a strengthening of state centralism as new governing elites seek out rapid
development, international financing, structural reform and rapid assimilation to the
liberal capitalist model of the state. All of this seems to imply a strengthening of legal
positivism within these societies,33 although not without resistance form other sectors
within the society.34 Thus the actual tendency of many such societies, especially after
independence, has been towards a positivist rather than a legal pluralist paradigm.
Legal positivism and the Pacific
In the Pacific context positivism is that which reinforces the supremacy of introduced
law and systems of government that are part of the colonial heritage. They are no
longer colonial societies but they are not traditional either. Colonialism has left
behind legal/political systems in which elements of custom and modernity are
intermingled in an ambivalent and uncertain relationship with a central state system.
Nowhere is custom exactly pre-colonial custom and, as is common in ‘new’ states
post-independence, traditions need to be invented and reinvented to forge some kind
3 3 6
P A S S A G E  O F  C H A N G E
of community out of the colonial residue. Legal pluralists have not been able to agree
themselves on the future of this relationship between introduced law and custom.
Some in fact have argued that custom will inevitably be eliminated by introduced
law.35 The co-existence of these two produces in these societies a thorough-going
systemic confusion of authority. Legal pluralism plays to some extent, and perhaps
originally, on connections between custom or tradition and self-determination or
independence.36 Thus the tension between custom and the introduced legal system is
represented as that between independence and some form of lingering cultural
imperialism. 
Inevitably, however, there is ambivalence in the Pacific region about playing this song
of independence to the end. On the international political scene it is still important
for the small Pacific countries to engage in the statehood game so as to maintain
recognition as states. This has strategic significance not only in terms of
internationally sourced funding for aid and development. It also impacts directly on
the content and structure of internal politics. Introduced government systems or
central state structures lend themselves to a certain sort of politics. They provide a
playing field suited to certain sorts of players — particularly educated and non-
traditional elites — who play according to a different set of rules. Those who are
empowered in this way are those who frequently preach the gospel of custom and
tradition whilst in practice ignoring it. Thus it becomes less likely that the introduced
legal system will be subjected to modification or change or that the tension between
custom and the introduced legal system will be resolved. One thing that the Pacific
countries do make obvious — perhaps as a result of their size — is the fact that
pluralism within these states has a certain explanatory power. They are small societies
but they are highly complex and diverse in their composition. Thus the so-called
official view of traditional jurisprudence that has tended to apprehend political
societies or states in terms of their apprehended unity and uniformity seems
remarkably deficient in this environment.
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF THE STATE
We have seen that legal pluralism rejects the concept of a monolithic state. This can
be contrasted with the traditional jurisprudential view of the modern state, which sets
out to justify the idea of the modern state which, in turn, finds as its key principle,
historically and theoretically, the principle of sovereignty.37 In modernist terms
sovereignty embodies certain key ideas, not the least of which is its essential unity or
indivisibility. It must do, so the argument goes, because now sovereignty has the
sense of absolute and final political and legal authority.
This concept of the modern state is based on the works of those such as Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau. It is a formal or imaginative conception which makes certain
assumptions about the necessary uniformity of human nature as a defining condition
of membership or citizenship. This is only possible if we treat a state as a formal
association, and define the individuals who comprise it in terms that are themselves
essentially formal. 
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The essential unity of the sovereign state is clearly enough expressed, for example, in
Hobbes’ corporate view of civil or political association; a theory which clearly involves
borrowings from Cicero and the later medieval jurists.38 Faced with the fact of
impenetrable human diversity, the answer of theorists such as Hobbes was to appeal
to artifice rather than nature, and more particularly to personation theory provided
by the classical jurists. 
The natural unity of humanity was a thesis of Platonically inspired natural law theory.
It was rejected by Hobbes on the basis variously of its absurd, unscientific and
irrational metaphysical doctrines.39 To Hobbes, the many can become one if they are
united in an artificial sovereign persona which is the product of their own covenant
and to which they assign power over themselves. As an artificial person the sovereign
body is a kind of Hobbesean individual writ large, its mortal imperfections perfected
in the abstract in light of reason and imagination. It has a kind of completeness of
power which is also the final and ultimate source of all political legitimacy. Unity is
possible for such a being because it is both separate from and above the diversity of
natural (or ‘private’) human existence in the so-called State of Nature. The primary
function of this ‘thing’ is, moreover, to legislate.40
Modern constitutionalism
The fundamentals of Hobbes’ political theory provide the platform for modern
constitutionalism. In his book Strange Multiplicities41 James Tully draws out what he
takes to be the seven conventions of modern constitutionalist doctrine. This doctrine,
he claims, constitutes an orthodoxy which is adhered to in varying ways by
contemporary liberals, nationalists and communitarians. Each of these three groups
in fact have slightly different but consistent enough versions of popular sovereignty.
It is these seven features which together enabled adherents of modern constitutional
theory to suppress arguments based on ancient constitutionalist principles including
tradition and custom. They continue to exclude the voice of diverse minority interests
and intercultural groups from constitutionalist argument. But further they supported
the claim that the principles thus developed are of universal validity, thus diverting
attention away from intercultural as well as regional diversity on the global scale.
These seven conventions are as follows42:
1. There is adherence to the basic notion of sovereignty as a modern principle
of statehood.
2. The modern constitution is defined in contrast to ancient or historically
earlier constitutional types which are sometimes treated as ‘earlier’ and as
belonging in a lower phase of historical development. It also sets up a
distinction between that which is distinctly European, and that which is not.
Ancient constitutions are also most often treated as implying irregularity or
disorder. The traditional and the customary become something pre-modern
but more significantly also primitive, underdeveloped, incompletely formed.
Hence there is what Tully calls an imperial element in the argument.
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3. There is a contrast between the modern constitution with its features of unity,
uniformity and order, and the ancient constitution(s) which has features of
disunity, differentiation, plurality, multiplicity, disorder.
4. There is the recognition of custom within a general theory of progress. It
appears as a lower phase of historical development and, more especially as
something which is overtaken or rendered irrelevant by progress.
5. Modern constitutionalism becomes identified with respect to a particular set
of European political principles as essential features of what was sometimes
called a ‘republican constitution’. This includes the likes of rule of law,
separation of powers, representative government, equal citizenship with
fundamental rights and a distinctive public realm.
6. The sixth convention is one that he takes to have come especially to the fore
since the French and American revolutions. This is that:
a constitutional state possesses an individual identity as a ‘nation’, an
imaginary community to which all nationals belong and in which they
enjoy equal dignity as citizens. Although the nation is interpreted
differently in each society... it engenders a sense of belonging and
allegiance by means of the nation’s individual name, national historical
narrative and public symbols. By naming the constitutional association
and giving it a historical narrative, the nation and its citizens, who take
on its name when they become members, possess a corporate identity
or personality. From Pufendorf onward, this corporate identity of
nation and nationals in a state is seen as necessary to the unity of a
modern constitutional association.43
7. The final convention is that which aligns or assimilates modern constitutions
and democracy. As he puts it, “the modern constitution comes into being at
some founding moment — and stands behind and provides the rules — for
democratic politics.”44 The modern constitution appears as a precondition
rather than a part of democratic politics. It lays the ground and prescribes the
domain of debate on democratic politics at the same time excluding the
classical dimensions of democratic debate.
Tully acknowledges in fact that legal pluralists are those who have challenged this
uniformity supposed to exist in modern states conceived under the dominant rhetoric
of modern constitutionalism. It is the rhetoric of modern constitutionalism that
devalues alternative conceptions of a state based on principles which acknowledge and
respect diversity just as the principles of modernity purport rationally to exclude the
likes of custom, traditional and the diversity which this entails both internally and
globally. It is modernity and the logic of both universalism and uniformity that drives
this rhetoric, which purports in a wider global context to devalue and debase cultural
and social diversity. 
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Modern consitutionalism and the state in the Pacific
We can see the impact of the need for unity in the concept of the modern state in
independence movements in the Pacific. This concept shaped the political
imagination and the resultant form of the emerging nations. For example, in Vanuatu
the politics of nationalism were expressed in 1971 by the newly formed New
Hebrides National Party. One of its first public statements began:
Our aims in forming a National Party are to preserve the New Hebridean people;
their culture and their ways of life are in danger of large scale settlement by
Europeans.45
Nationhood was seen as being the end goal of decolonisation, with the national
purpose being to protect and project the national cultural past of the New Hebridean
people. The cultural underpinnings of nationhood, with its ideological insistence
upon cultural homogeneity, inevitably affected the political imagination. Despite the
fact that the group of islands that now make up Vanuatu did not form a single entity
until they were defined as the New Hebrides by colonisers, a single New Hebridean
people46 and New Hebridean culture became the justification for the creation of
Vanuatu.47
Also if we look at the current constitutions of the Pacific states themselves we will see
the familiar proclamations of the unity, common destiny, common citizenship and
heritage of the people; in all an assumed identity of the people under the adopted
constitutional frameworks. They are complete with conventional proclamations of the
rule of law, the common possession of fundamental rights and freedoms and equality
of all before the law. Almost without exception these documents are masterpieces of
liberal design reinforcing the various tenets of modern constitutionalism as Tully has
described it. The central legal authority of the state is clearly established. The role of
custom is recognised but generally, with the possible exception of Vanuatu in relation
to land ownership, is subordinated to the central authority of the state.48
Yet the assumed identity constructed or at least assumed by these constitutions has
been shown by recent events to be an unstable one. The relationship between
modern constitutional theory and actual practice in the Pacific is tenuous. The civil
war in Solomon Islands from 2000 onwards, and the events following the attempted
coup in Fiji Islands in May 2000 have, for one thing, shown that assumptions about
the underlying unity of a people at the national level are frequently misplaced. The
forces of fragmentation and internal division were, if anything, shown to be much
potent than any reading of the the constitutions themselves would have suggested.
THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY
It is the sixth convention in Tully’s analysis above which is of interest. He talks of a
convention within the doctrine modern constitutionalism which is that of identity or
at least a particular sense of it. The notion of identity that Tully is referring to here is
what he calls corporate identity, but it might equally be called formal, nominalistic,
artificial or abstract identity. It is a product largely of elevation of the writings of
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Hobbes, Locke and Hume on identity into something of an orthodoxy amongst
liberal philosophers.49 This is a notion of identity as a simple unity in the sense I have
already mentioned. 
Tully seeks to solve the problem of a unitary concept of identity by developing a
notion of identity using the theoretical perspectives of Wittgenstein, post-
modernism, post-structuralism, interculturalism and feminism. He purports to
reconstruct the idea of identity such that it is a product of, and contains difference.
That is to say, it is a sense of identity that does not involve self-reflexive or essentialist
notions of identity. Such a concept of identity allows for a state which can
acccomodate intercultural ideas, ideas of cultural diversity and so on. I do not
disagree with that conclusion but I think there are other ways of proceeding. The
major points I wish to make are as follows:
First, modernist authors from Hobbes and Locke onwards have simply
misrepresented the concept of identity as if it were, and could only logically be, a
principle implying simple numerical unity. These writers were, for their own political
ends, keen to reject the metaphysics of both Neoplatonism, Catholicism and natural
law along with the challenges to secular political authority which these seemed to
entailed. Thus they rejected, or at least redefined, what was one of the key defining
principles of it; namely, the principle of identity taken in a properly collectivist sense.50
Second, this misconception of identity renders any conception of an association or a
collectivity, human or otherwise, not so much impossible, but highly abstract. It is a
creation of the philosophical imagination or of grand artifice because it is only in the
imagination or in abstract thought that a corporate identity achieving such a unity
could be conjured up out of the diversity of practical existence. Treated in this way
identity could only be employed in our understanding of a state as if those which it
unites are treated as fundamentally the same in some respect or other. To Hobbes,
and perhaps correctly, this would be impossible with respect to natural individuals.
But these individuals also assume a certain conformity if we attribute to each
individual by virtue of the covenant a formal persona as citizens which appropriately
affects their membership but also their subjection of the artificial corporate persona.
But the corporate unity is, as I have indicated, a reflection of the simple atomic or
numerical unity of the individual. It does not carry with it the multiplicity of the ‘state
of nature’. Nor does it carry any taint of the multiplicity of individual membership.
It transcends even that because it is an essential unity. Thus as we say in modern
corporate theory, according to the separate identity doctrine: it has an identity (i.e. a
juristic status) distinct from its individual members or any aggregation of them.
Thirdly, there is another way of understanding identity that is not exclusive of
diversity or difference at all. Such an employment of the concept is quite legitimate
from an historical point of view as also from a logical point of view. It is that sense of
identity which I suggest is more appropriate to our understanding of a state.
Concepts of Identity
I have elsewhere explored the relationship between identity and politics and
implicitly, perhaps, the relationship between identity and the state.51 There are many
who would think that the connection between identity and political discourse is a
recent one. It is common enough now to talk of ‘identity politics’ as a certain sort of
political debate occurring particularly in the U.S.A. in the 1960s and 1970s as, for
example, a politics of gay identity, race identity, ethnic identity and so on. 
It is apparent that this recent theme of ‘identity politics’ has itself come to an end. One
of the reasons for that is that the concept of identity that it employed is that of a simple
or numerical unity or oneness. Given this, the suggestion appeared to be that identities
such as racial, feminine or ethnic could be reduced to some seamless or pure conceptual
base. This search for a numerical, finally specific, essentialist notion of identity was
inevitably a failure, because it was found that within such identity categories there were
considerable and significant differences to be accounted for. Thus it is an odd story.
That which was alleged in itself to capture a definitive essence of something and thereby
differentiate itself from the rest, merely collapsed. What it sought was impossible either
to achieve or to sustain because an identity concept such as this, being one that admits
no difference, diversity or change, is an impoverished one.52
But the connection between identity and politics is much longer and the potential for
this concept far more considerable than these undertakings might indicate. Are there
richer alternatives to the concept of identity? Here, maybe, we can look to Hegel.
Identity has a seemingly peculiar and difficult sense in Hegel’s conception of the
dialectic. The dialectical method is integral to Hegel’s understanding of philosophy,
or the so-called philosophy of the ‘Absolute Idea’. Thus it is integral also to Hegel’s
philosophy of the state as expressed in the Philosophy of Right.53 The dialectic is a
process or movement from unity to diversity to a higher phase of unity. All might be
change in some sense but it is an orderly, logical process of change. Thus it is more
appropriately a sense of development. It is that higher phase, which is a unity of the
diversity which can gone before it,54 which is specifically called “identity” by Hegel. 
Many have set out to ridicule Hegel’s concept of identity as if concepts such as unity-
in-diversity, unity-in-difference or sameness-through-change entail a basic
contradiction in terms. Identity, Hegel’s critics hold, means a numerical unity (hence
exactly the same, oneness). Thus it can hardly be something found in, or compatible
with, difference. But this is clearly not what Hegel was arguing at all, as far as I can
tell. He was arguing that identity, at its simplest, is that process whereby thought
moves from a point of unity to a point of differentiation from that unity, and thence
to a higher, fuller unity. Identity is precisely the outcome of this process and
necessarily implicit in all of the stages of this process. As a process it incorporates the
moments of unity and difference. Furthermore, these critics simply fail to understand
that the tradition of understanding that Hegel was drawing on here is a tradition in
which identity is not understood as a principle of simple unity, individuation or
oneness. It is a tradition which builds on Aristotle and Neoplatonism (Christian and
otherwise, classical and medieval) as much as Leibniz, Fichte, Kant and Schelling.
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True, it is a tradition which can be understood in terms of its tendency towards
unitary metaphysics. But another fruitful way of looking at it is that it is a tradition
which attempts to balance or mediate the two sides of unity and diversity; sameness
and difference.
Two Senses of Identity?
If we take an overview, we can say that there have been two differences of meaning
assigned to the concept of identity. There is one which derives from Hobbes and
Locke which treat identity as importing a type of simply mathematical idea unity i.e.
oneness. There is the other, older, philosophical tradition in which identity is treated
as that sense of unity that persists amidst difference. It is a unity-in-diversity in the
sense in which we might speak of any form of human association as a form of unity-
in-diversity, a unity of different individuals.
IDENTITY AND THE STATE
If we are to take identity in this alternative sense and apply it to the understanding of
states where does it lead us? Taking identity as a unity-in-diversity means that we can,
in some more reasonable way, retain the sense that the state is an association of
individual human beings. In the case of small states such as those of the Pacific this
original sense of a state as a ‘polis’ might be more obvious than in larger ‘developed’
countries where formalism and abstraction have reached special heights, possibly as a
reaction to complexity. But formalism is neither an inevitability nor a necessity. Our
rethinking of identity in relation to states will lead us towards a possible resolution of
the real problem posed by legal pluralism. This is not that of recognition of plurality
in the face of the omnipresent unity of the state. It is that of finding some degree of
balance between plurality and unity. The problems in Fiji Islands and Solomon
Islands adverted to above are, I think, indicative of the need to address these issues,
rather than seeking solutions within the framework of existing constitutional
structures.
Let me sketch out some ways in which a balance between plurality and unity might
be achieved. I will have to consider first the notion of association and, second, what
identity in this revised sense might bring to it. Third, I will consider the idea of
culture which I think is tied up with identity issues. Finally I will comment on the
role of law within a state thus reconsidered.
All associations are primarily unities of diverse things or, to be more specific, unities,
combinations, collectivities (however we prefer to put it) of diverse human
individuals. The very idea of individuality implies, as I have said, an extreme of
diversity and multiplicity. Individuals are allegedly unique and this clearly implies
diversity. Hence where I am asserting that identity can be attributed to a state, and
that it is a far more basic or workable way of conceiving of a state, I am suggesting
that it properly captures the sense of the state as an association — a unity of diverse
things. I am also asserting that this diversity is such that it might consist of individuals
certainly, but also sub-associations of individuals in a wide and perhaps indeterminate
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array or relationships. In other words, we might prefer to think of states as
associations of associations and of individuals, given the manifold ways in which
human beings conduct themselves.
However that might be, we are still engaged here at a level of formal abstraction. An
association is a unity-in-diversity which traditionally lawyers have been prepared to
conceive of themselves, making clear distinctions between incorporated bodies and
other forms of association. These associations are identities which are not distinct from
the aggregates which compose them. But implied in this notion of unity-in-diversity is
also the fact that what we are talking about is a systematisation of human conduct and
experience55 which, in some sense, brings together form and content. We need to
consider how this might be so. The way forward here is in terms of the fact that
identity is a relational principle. It asserts a relationship between (different) things. 
Once this is understood we can proceed to the second point. This is that identity does
not merely assert an association. It asserts association in some respect or other. Thus
it asserts association by virtue of something that is held in common — some
characteristic of sameness that is held by those who are associated. This is how unity
is achieved and how the identity as a relational concept is to be grasped as identity
with respect to a particular something or other. This is basic to the sense of identity
I am seeking to articulate. In common parlance the identity of something is
answerable by reference to the acknowledgement that it is something of a certain sort
or type which it shares with other things. This is in large part why idealist
philosophers constantly refer to identity as asserting a qualitative, rather than a
numerical, unity. Identity is identity in respect of some common or shared
characteristic or feature. 
One can perhaps assume that things can be associated by chance or associated simply
by being somewhere — a chance conjunction. One can also assume that there can be
simple associations as a matter of principle. But on closer analysis even these things tend
to be associated by virtue of some common or shared characteristic such as being in the
same place, or being together at the same time or being human. Associations of human
beings are meaningful, though not always purposeful, associations. They persist perhaps
because they are attributed meaning by those who are associated even if the original
circumstance of the association might have been one of chance or choice.
Third, it is this characteristic of being associated in a certain respect that brings out a
connection between culture and identity. Culture consists of shared ideas or beliefs
which are, in other words, held in common. Commonness is closely related to
community. Culture is a community of ideas, beliefs and so on. These go to establish
the content of identity. Whilst there is some conjecture about the possibility of
natural identities in political associations I think that it is much more sensible to
admit that all political identities are composed by human thought out of historical
practices. Whether they actually represent human practices is quite another question.
But what sort of identity is this? The content of such identity is cultural constructs
which are created, challenged, adjusted and recreated. The whole idea of attempting
to build political associations as if they were logical extensions of families and other
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allegedly natural forms of association is one which is dead and buried if indeed it ever
were viable. Liberal theory has had its moment in putting this idea to rest. 
The sense of identity here does not transcend culture because identity in the sense in
which I am employing it has the characteristic of immanence. Immanence implies
being contained within and confined by some more general context. Thus we can say
that this cultural identity is indeed a diverse unity. Identity is embedded in culture.
The form is determined within and by the content. It is identity which changes with
the culture itself. It has the feature of relative continuity. It is persistent but it is not
permanent. In the first place we must acknowledge the fact that identities vary
considerably from one place and from one association to another. The variance is
cultural. Additionally ideas both persist and are transmissible over time regardless of
the comings and going of the generations or those who from time to time comprise
the substance of an association. 
It is primarily ideational culture understood as a community of shared ideas, beliefs
and opinions that both provides and preserves the identity of the state.56 It is culture
that transcends the individual experience of those who are the variety of associations
within a state and indeed constitutive of the state itself, without destroying or
denying them. We can say here that identity manifests a certain sameness but not
sameness in any rigid or static sense. And it is certainly not sameness per se whatever
that might be. Without a sustainable identity in that sense, the structure of a state and
the prospects of its continuance are poor. Without any such identity the putative state
and its institutions lack legitimacy.
It appears to me that cultural identity must exist to some reasonable degree before
one can even begin to acknowledge the constitutional viability of a country. Without
that underlying system or pattern of commonness or community then unity in any
sense is impossible. Individual, ethnic and other forms of diversity are basic within the
overarching identity of a state and play a vital role in the construction of the
sustaining cultural identity. But at some point or other they could, if unrestrained,
cause it to fragment. 
How are we to treat law in such a scenario? Law is a set or a system of relatively
abstract system of ideas. It is, I think, merely a subdivision or an aspect of a culture.
This fact accompanied with the role of language in law lends itself directly to analysis
in terms of culture. As a system of ideas law is very ‘loosely’ systematised. Its unity as
a system is weak. This is because it the product of a history of abstractions from
practice without any unifying or guiding logic and without clearly established axioms
or assumptions from which to generate rules or formulae. Law is not like a logical
system because it is affected by practice. It can never be the whole of culture even
though in some respects it often pretends to function as if the abstractions it contains
are somehow were representative or symbolic of the culture which surrounds and
contains it. Legal culture captures the mutual and sometimes confused relationship
according to which law is affected by and in turn affects culture. It is because of this
mutuality in fact that law very often has influenced concepts of personal identity. 
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Law, in other words, is a component of culture, which in terms of relative priority must
precede, not flow from, the existence of the state. This seems clear enough as an
historical fact. Even legislation which is the product of a state occupies a place as part
of culture and has no meaning or force apart from it. In certain cultures, such as
modern Western cultures, law assumes a position of pre-eminence. It need not occupy
such pre-eminence in all cultures, and indeed it does not as I have noted above. 
Tully acknowledges in fact that legal pluralists are those who have challenged this
uniformity supposed to exist in modern states conceived under the dominant rhetoric
of modern constitutionalism. It is the rhetoric of modern constitutionalism that
devalues alternative conceptions of a state based on principles which acknowledge and
respect diversity just as the principles of modernity purport rationally to exclude the
likes of custom, tradition and the diversity which this entails both internally and
globally. It is modernity and the logic of both universalism and uniformity that drives
this rhetoric, which purports in a wider global context to devalue and debase cultural
and social diversity.
Furthermore in the Pacific context, it is obvious that the modern constitutional
structures which they have adopted assume that law and centralised legal structures
can somehow settle the question of identity in some satisfactory way. This, it seems
to me, is a dangerous fallacy. It is a question which assumes that more fundamental
cultural issues of identity, especially those at the national level, have been settled when
in fact they have not. Pacific constitutions, as they presently stand, clearly assume that
they have been. However, there is often mere fragmentation and high levels of
diversity. The theoretical assumptions are clearly at odds with the reality. Moerover,
the expectation that centrally imposed law, in terms of an homogenous central set of
legal principles, can formally resolve such issues of identity, especially in societies
where there remain deep divisions, and there is little pre-disposition towards law as a
means of social ordering, is clearly a pipe dream. 
CONCLUSION
The identity problem is, I think, a crucial one for small South Pacific countries. The
orthodox conception of identity to which Tully referred is clearly a colonial legacy.
Modern constitutionalism is clearly a major aspect of that legacy; a subsisting residue
which has survived independence. It is part and parcel of the attempt to conceive of
a state in abstract institutional terms and to position law as a central agency within
this perspective. Theoretically it makes a range of assumptions as to uniformity under
a coherent body of law, which are clearly at odds with the social and cultural reality
of these countries. 
The position I have attempted to argue is that the concept of identity which is
employed within modern constitutionalism is one which ought to be rethought. In
fact it needs to be rethought and reworked in order that these relatively new post-
independence countries within the Pacific region can begin seriously to set about a
task of nation building which incorporates and makes sense of their unique and
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diverse cultural traditions. Modern constitutional doctrine and the identity principle
which goes with it serves, and has served, to exclude cultural diversity. It is only when
we understand the identity principle as one of incorporating and preserving diversity,
rather than excluding it, that the proper social and cultural dimensions of these
constitutional systems can be preserved. The way to do that is, I believe, to
understand identity as a contingent principle in the sense in which collective identities
emerge as the products of history, rather than as the posulates of abstract
philosophical reason. This is essentially what a principle of identity as a ‘unity-in-
diversity’ must be taken to imply. Only understood in this way can it capture the
historical reality of newly emergent states.
Does that mean that law therefore plays no place in such a scheme of things? I think
not. It is fallacy to suggest that law or a legal system necessarily either requires or
could achieve the kind of uniformity which many writers seem to assume. Law, surely,
is only very loosely a coherent and/or unified system. It is what Stone referred to
once as a “complex unity” or a unity which is “multi-fashioned”.57 It is itself in basic
ways a product and sometimes a reflection of historical practices which have preserved
within it vital elements of diversity and differentiation, if also at times tension and
inconsistency. Thus the identity which law might provide within a state ought to be
understood in just this way.
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43 Tully, J. 1995. Above, n 41 at p 68 Rousseau’s conception of the general will appears as a
slight variation on Hobbes’ notion of personation. About the social contract, he said, 
“(at) once in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of
association creates a corporate and collective body, composed of as many members as the
assembly creates voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and
its will.” Rousseau, J.J. 1975. The Social Contract and Discourses. London: Dent p 175. 
44 Tully, J. 1995. Above, n 41, at p 69.
45 Van Trease, H. (ed) 1995. Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanautu. New Zealand:
Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury at p 21
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46 The “New Hebridean people” were constructed as singular because of common
descent/shared ethnicity.
47 Jowitt, A. 1999. Reconstructing Custom: The Politics of Homophobia in Vanuatu.
Unpublished conference paper. 2nd ISSACS Conference, Manchester, July 1999.
48 See, for example, the application of laws provisions in the Constitution of Solomon Islands,
section 75 and Schedule 3 which assign customary law to such a subordinate position. See
also the decision in To’ofilu v Oimae Unreported, High Court of Solomon Islands, Civil
Appeal Case No. 5 of 1996 19th June, 1997.
49 Locke seems to have been the first to employ identity as a concept in relation to a person.
It was more usually applied with respect to collective entities some of which were
exceedingly general, such as the human species. This redeployment converts it from a
universal concept into something particularistic. 
50 Hughes, R.A. 1995. Above, n 38. Chapter 4 deals with the political context of the
rejection of classical and religious metaphysics in the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke and
Hume and the relevance of identity in this context.
51 Hughes, R.A. 1995. Above n 38. 
52 See Danielsen D. and Engle K. 1995. After Identity. New York: Routledge, p xiv. This of course
hardly prevents the search for new identity concepts or the search for new identities as such.
53 On Hegel’s use of identity see Hughes, R. A. 1995. Above, n 38, chapter 5. 
54 The dialectical process in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right begins specifically with the greatest
degree of diversity in human affairs, the individual. 
55 All systems are in some basic sense unities in, or of, diversity. 
56 Some might prefer the term ‘ideology’ but culture is more acceptable because ideology has
a negative sense in some areas of political theory where the understanding of ideology is
itself ideological. 
57 Stone, J. 1964. Legal System and Legal Reasoning. London: Stevens and Sons. p 21 and 25
respectively. Such a state of complexity has led Stamford to suggest that the term legal
system was itself highly misleading and misrepresentative. In fact he suggests, law is better
imagined as “a vast web of relations (or perhaps a multi-dimensional maze)” Stamford, C.
1989. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p 223.
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Review questions 
1. Identify and discuss restorative justice practices in different parts of the Pacific
islands. To what extent do you think that such approaches can be used to
reconstitute or stabilise states that are experiencing coups, civil wars or other
major social unrest?
2. Are the institutions of the modern state and ‘Western’ constitutions appropriate
or sustainable in the Melanesian states?
3. What are the most important factors and forces at work in your own country
which influence the extent to which constitutional limits on the state are
accepted by those in power?
4. Consider the extent to which Pacific constitutions assume, or perhaps impose,
some underlying principle of identity. Do the assumptions made by the
constitutions in this regard, if any, reflect the actual conditions of the society in
question?
5. Identity is a principle which seeks to balance out the interests of unity and
diversity in a society. Both elements are necessary in any society and neither can
be ignored. To what extent does or could law contribute to a solution to this
balancing problem?
Further readings
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Moore, S.F. 1978. Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach London, Henley
and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Petersen, H. and Zahle, H. (eds.) 1995. Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of
Pluralism in Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Sack, P. and Minschin, E. 1986. Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra
Workshop. Canberra: Australian National University.
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